Rosalio Munoz and Michael E. Tigar v. United States District Court for the Central District of California

Ninth Circuit

Rosalio Munoz and Michael E. Tigar v. United States District Court for the Central District of California

446 F.2d 434

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedAugust 9, 1971

Docket26587_1

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 446 F.2d 434 (Rosalio Munoz and Michael E. Tigar v. United States District Court for the Central District of California) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Rosalio Munoz and Michael E. Tigar v. United States District Court for the Central District of California, 446 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1971).

Pincite

Opinions

ORDER

In its opinion accompanying this Court’s order upon the original writ of mandamus, this Court held that Rule 1 (d), Rules of the District Court for the Central District of California, was ambiguous. We remanded the case to the District Court with directions to resolve the ambiguity, and we indicated that the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the applicant.

Upon remand the District Court received evidence directed to the question whether or not the applicant “does not maintain an office in this district for the practice of law.” The District Court did not resolve that issue. Instead, the Court decided that the rule was not ambiguous, but even if it were, the ambiguity should be resolved against the applicant. It then denied the application because the applicant was a resident of the district.

This Court did not remand the cause for the purpose of permitting the District Court to reach a construction of the rule at variance with that stated by this Court. The precatory language of the opinion about resolving the ambiguity in the applicants’ favor apparently led the District Court into overlooking our directions. Nothing in the record suggests that the District Court’s denial of the application was based on anything other than a reading of the rule contrary to our interpretation of it.

The record on the question of the applicants’ maintenance of a law office in the district is before us. Evidence directed to the question of the applicants’ maintenance of a law office in California was not conflicting. The Government did not oppose the motion, and it offered no evidence on the issue. The only question presented in respect of that issue is whether or not one who has undertaken the activities revealed by the evidence maintains an office for the practice of law. We resolve that question of law in the applicants’ favor.

The processing of the writ, the proceedings on remand and the pendency of the present motion have all seriously delayed the trial of Munoz.

The petitioners’ motion for enforcement of this Court’s order is granted. No useful purpose would be served by further prolonging the proceedings. We direct that the applicant be admitted pro hac vice for the single occasion of representing Munoz in the pending prosecution.

Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 2, Fed.R.App.Proc., the mandate shall issue forthwith.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

ORDER

In its opinion accompanying this Court’s order upon the original writ of mandamus, this Court held that Rule 1 (d), Rules of the District Court for the Central District of California, was ambiguous. We remanded the case to the District Court with directions to resolve the ambiguity, and we indicated that the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the applicant.

Upon remand the District Court received evidence directed to the question whether or not the applicant “does not maintain an office in this district for the practice of law.” The District Court did not resolve that issue. Instead, the Court decided that the rule was not ambiguous, but even if it were, the ambiguity should be resolved against the applicant. It then denied the application because the applicant was a resident of the district.

This Court did not remand the cause for the purpose of permitting the District Court to reach a construction of the rule at variance with that stated by this Court. The precatory language of the opinion about resolving the ambiguity in the applicants’ favor apparently led the District Court into overlooking our directions. Nothing in the record suggests that the District Court’s denial of the application was based on anything other than a reading of the rule contrary to our interpretation of it.

The record on the question of the applicants’ maintenance of a law office in the district is before us. Evidence directed to the question of the applicants’ maintenance of a law office in California was not conflicting. The Government did not oppose the motion, and it offered no evidence on the issue. The only question presented in respect of that issue is whether or not one who has undertaken the activities revealed by the evidence maintains an office for the practice of law. We resolve that question of law in the applicants’ favor.

The processing of the writ, the proceedings on remand and the pendency of the present motion have all seriously delayed the trial of Munoz.

The petitioners’ motion for enforcement of this Court’s order is granted. No useful purpose would be served by further prolonging the proceedings. We direct that the applicant be admitted pro hac vice for the single occasion of representing Munoz in the pending prosecution.

Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 2, Fed.R.App.Proc., the mandate shall issue forthwith.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

446 F.2d 434, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rosalio-munoz-and-michael-e-tigar-v-united-states-district-court-for-the-ca9-1971.

Opinions

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack