Ronald Tai Young Moon, Jr. v. United States

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedJune 25, 2025
Docket24-12069
StatusUnpublished

This text of Ronald Tai Young Moon, Jr. v. United States (Ronald Tai Young Moon, Jr. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ronald Tai Young Moon, Jr. v. United States, (11th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-12069 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2025 Page: 1 of 5

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-12069 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

RONALD TAI YOUNG MOON, JR., Petitioner-Appellant, versus UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama D.C. Docket Nos. 2:23-cv-08035-ACA, 2:19-cr-000324-ACA-HNJ-1 USCA11 Case: 24-12069 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2025 Page: 2 of 5

2 Opinion of the Court 24-12069

Before ROSENBAUM, ABUDU, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Ronald Moon, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se on appeal, appeals the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate. We granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to determine whether the district court violated Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc), when it failed to address Moon’s claim that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not ar- guing that his sentence was unreasonable. 1 Moon also raises on appeal various arguments outside the scope of his COA and asks us to expand the COA to include all of the claims he brought in his original motion to vacate. In response, the government argues that there is no basis to expand the COA, but concedes that the district court committed Clisby error by misconstruing Moon’s ineffective- assistance claim as an effort to overcome procedural default. In- stead, says the government, the district court should have con- strued it as a freestanding claim that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to argue that his sentence was un- reasonable. After careful review, we vacate and remand so that the district court can consider Moon’s ineffective-assistance-of-appel- late-counsel claim.

1 In Clisby, our Court held en banc that district courts must resolve all claims

for relief raised in a habeas motion, regardless of whether habeas relief is granted or denied. See 960 F.2d at 935–36. USCA11 Case: 24-12069 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2025 Page: 3 of 5

24-12069 Opinion of the Court 3

In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to vacate under § 2255, we review legal conclusions de novo and findings of fact for clear error. Stoufflet v. United States, 757 F.3d 1236, 1239 (11th Cir. 2014). We review de novo the legal question of whether the district court violated Clisby by failing to address a claim. See Dupree v. Warden, 715 F.3d 1295, 1298–99 (11th Cir. 2013). The scope of our review is limited to the issues enumerated in the COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1195 (11th Cir. 2011). As we’ve noted, under Clisby, a district court must resolve all claims for relief raised in a § 2255 motion, regardless of whether relief is granted or denied. See 960 F.2d at 935–36; Rhode v. United States, 583 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009). A claim for relief is “any allegation of a constitutional violation.” Clisby, 960 F.2d at 936. When a district court does not address all constitutional claims in a habeas petition or motion to vacate, we “will vacate the district court’s judgment without prejudice and remand the case for con- sideration of all remaining claims.” Id. at 938. Here, the law is clear that the scope of our review is limited to the question enumerated in the COA -- that is, whether the dis- trict court committed Clisby error by denying Moon’s § 2255 mo- tion without directly addressing his claim that he was denied effec- tive assistance of appellate counsel because his counsel failed to challenge the reasonableness of his sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); McKay, 657 F.3d at 1195. Thus, to the extent Moon seeks to argue the merits of his ineffective-assistance claim or raise additional USCA11 Case: 24-12069 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2025 Page: 4 of 5

4 Opinion of the Court 24-12069

issues beyond this claim, we lack jurisdiction to consider these ar- guments as outside the scope of our review. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); McKay, 657 F.3d at 1195. Moreover, to the extent Moon asks us to expand the scope of his COA to include all of the issues he raised in his § 2255 motion, he essentially is requesting that we reconsider our earlier order denying his motion for reconsideration, which is not permitted under our rules. See 11th Cir. Rule 27-3 (“[A] party may not request reconsideration of an order disposing of a motion for reconsideration previously filed by that party.”). As for the issue enumerated in the COA, however, we agree with the parties that the district court committed Clisby error when it construed Moon’s ineffective-assistance claim as an attempt to anticipate the government’s procedural default defense rather than as a standalone claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Clisby, 960 F.2d at 935–36; Rhode, 583 F.3d at 1291. In his § 2255 motion, Moon expressly argued that his appellate counsel rendered ineffec- tive assistance by failing to argue that his 360-month sentence was unreasonable on direct appeal. Although Moon raised this argu- ment as a subclaim of his claim that his sentence was unreasonable, there is no indication that he intended to raise the claim as a preemptive attempt to overcome procedural default rather than as a freestanding constitutional claim. Nevertheless, the district court treated Moon’s claim as an attempt to anticipate and overcome the government’s procedural default defense. In so doing, the district court failed to address Moon’s ineffective-assistance-of-appellate- counsel claim as a standalone constitutional claim, in violation of Clisby. Clisby, 960 F.2d at 935–36. USCA11 Case: 24-12069 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 06/25/2025 Page: 5 of 5

24-12069 Opinion of the Court 5

Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment with- out prejudice so that it can consider Moon’s claim of ineffective as- sistance of appellate counsel. Id. at 938. VACATED AND REMANDED.

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Related

Rhode v. United States
583 F.3d 1289 (Eleventh Circuit, 2009)
McKay v. United States
657 F.3d 1190 (Eleventh Circuit, 2011)
Christopher Stoufflet v. United States
757 F.3d 1236 (Eleventh Circuit, 2014)

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Ronald Tai Young Moon, Jr. v. United States, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ronald-tai-young-moon-jr-v-united-states-ca11-2025.