Romero v. Synergy Restoration LLC

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: January 6, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-01602
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Milton Iturrios Romero, No. CV-24-01602-PHX-MTL

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Synergy Restoration LLC, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Plaintiff Milton Iturrios Romero moves for default judgment against Defendants 16 Synergy Restoration, LLC (“Synergy”), Bradley Schultz, and Sarah Schultz (collectively, 17 the “Defendants”), pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 18 (Doc. 14.) For the following reasons, the Court will grant the motion for default judgment. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 As the Clerk of Court has entered default (Doc. 13), the Court takes the complaint’s 21 factual allegations as true. See Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 22 1977) (“The general rule of law is that upon default the factual allegations of the complaint, 23 except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.”). 24 The complaint alleges claims of failure to pay overtime and minimum wages in 25 violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), failure to pay minimum wages in 26 violation of the Arizona Minimum Wage Act (“AZMWA”), and failure to pay wages due 27 and owing in violation of the Arizona Wage Act (“AZWA”). (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 63-85.) 28 In October 2023, Romero began working for Synergy, “a restoration company” 1 owned and operated by Mr. and Mrs. Schultz. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 30.) Until December 2023, 2 Romero worked as a non-exempt manual laborer engaged in laying floor.1 (Id. ¶ 31; 3 Doc. 14-1 at 5.) During this time, Romero worked “between 50 and 60 hours or more per 4 week” for compensation “on a piece rate basis, regardless of the number of hours he worked 5 in a given week.” (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 42, 33.) But Defendants did not pay Romero for his final two 6 work weeks or his overtime hours.2 (Id. ¶¶ 43, 52.) 7 As a result, Romero filed a lawsuit asserting two violations of the FLSA, one 8 violation of the AZMWA, and one violation of the AZWA. (Id. ¶¶ 63-85.) Romero alleges 9 he was an employee who Defendants misclassified as an independent contractor. (Id. ¶ 36.) 10 He seeks monetary damages for his final two work weeks, federal and state liquidated 11 damages, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. (Doc. 14 at 6-7, 9-11.) In total, excluding 12 attorneys’ fees and costs and post-judgment interest, Romero requests $12,603.90 against 13 Synergy, with $7,274.40 of that amount to be held jointly and severally against all 14 Defendants. (Id. at 12.) Romero also requests that damages be augmented by post-judgment 15 interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961. (Id.) Finally, Romero asks that the Court allow him 16 to file a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs following the award of default judgment. (Id.) 17 Roughly two months after Romero filed the complaint, Mr. Schultz called Romero’s 18 attorney and left a voicemail stating, “[o]bviously we need to do something here.” 19 (Doc. 14-2 at 2.) In response, Romero’s attorney called and texted Mr. Schultz on multiple 20 occasions “but never received return correspondence.” (Doc. 14 at 8.) Despite being served 21 with the summons and complaint (Docs. 9, 10, 11), Defendants failed to file an answer, 22 respond to the complaint, or file a notice of appearance. Romero’s application for default 23 was entered by the Clerk on August 12, 2024, and he now moves for default judgment

24 1 In the complaint, Romero alleges he worked “approximately nine months,” from October 2023 until December 2023. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 31, 40(h), 41.) However, in Romero’s motion for 25 default judgment, he alleges he worked from October 2023 until December 2024, or “about 13 work weeks.” (Doc. 14 at 5.) The Court will use the December 2023 date from the 26 complaint. See Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560 (taking the factual allegations in the complaint as true) (emphasis added). 27 2 Section 7 of the FLSA provides for overtime compensation of employees, including those paid on a piece rate basis. See Navarro v. Bean Drywall Inc., No. CV-06-2096-PHX-GMS, 28 2009 WL 10707832, at *3 (D. Ariz. Oct. 16, 2009) (citing Hodgson v. Cactus Craft of Ariz., 481 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir. 1973)). 1 against Defendants. (Docs. 13, 14.) 2 II. DISCUSSION 3 A. Jurisdiction, Venue, and Service 4 “When entry of judgment is sought against a party who has failed to plead or 5 otherwise defend, a district court has an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over 6 both the subject matter and the parties.” Tuli v. Republic of Iraq, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th 7 Cir. 1999). Romero asserts claims arising under the FLSA, the AZMWA, and the AZWA. 8 (Doc. 1 ¶ 1.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over 9 claims arising out of federal law, including claims under the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 201, et 10 seq. Romero’s state law claims under the AZMWA and the AZWA, form “part of the same 11 case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 9.) 12 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Thus, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Romero’s state law 13 claims. 14 Further, Romero alleges that venue and personal jurisdiction requirements are 15 satisfied because all Defendants “regularly conduct business in and have engaged in the 16 wrongful conduct alleged herein . . . in [] this judicial district.” (Id. ¶ 10.) Since “a 17 substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim” occurred in this district, 18 venue is proper. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Additionally, the Court has personal jurisdiction 19 over the parties because Synergy is licensed to conduct business in Arizona and “has 20 officers, and/or maintains agents for the transaction of its customary business in Maricopa 21 County.” (Id. ¶ 12.) Similarly, Romero is a resident of the state of Arizona. (Id. ¶ 11.) 22 Service is properly executed by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint 23 to the individual personally. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(A); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(d)(1). Here, 24 Mrs. Schultz was personally served on July 18, 2024. (Doc. 11.) On the same occasion, she 25 accepted service on behalf of her husband at their place of residence. (Doc. 10.) 26 Service on a corporation can be executed by serving a copy of the summons and the 27 complaint on a statutory agent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(i). 28 Mr. Schultz is Synergy’s registered statutory agent, and he provided authorization for 1 service upon it to be left with his wife. (Doc. 9.) Because he is the statutory agent and one 2 of Synergy’s owners, the corporation received sufficient notice of the complaint. See Chan 3 v. Soc’y Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Rule 4 is a flexible rule 4 that should be liberally construed to uphold service so long as a party receives sufficient 5 notice of the complaint.”). Therefore, all Defendants were properly served. 6 B. Default Judgment 7 Once a default is entered, the district court has discretion to grant default judgment. 8 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980); 9 Symantec Corp. v. Glob. Impact, Inc., 559 F.2d 922, 923 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting the two- 10 step process of default judgment: “Entering a Default” and “Entering a Default Judgment”). 11 The following factors are to be considered when deciding whether default judgment 12 is appropriate: 13 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of the claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of 14 money at stake, (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts, (6) whether default was due to excusable 15 neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring a decision on the merits. 16 17 Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986); NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 18 840 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2016). As the party seeking default judgment, Romero “bears 19 the burden of demonstrating to the Court that the complaint is sufficient on its face and that 20 the Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting default judgment.” Ronald Norris v. Shenzhen 21 IVPS Tech. Co., No. CV-20-01212-PHX-DWL, 2021 WL 4844116, at *2 (D. Ariz. 22 Oct. 18, 2021). Romero also bears the burden of proving all damages. Szabo v. Sw. 23 Endocrinology Assocs. PLLC, No. CV-20-01896-PHX-DWL, 2021 WL 3411084, 24 at *2 (D. Ariz. July 27, 2021); see also Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prod., Inc., 25 219 F.R.D. 494, 498 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 26 1. The first, fifth, sixth, and seventh Eitel factors 27 Defendants have yet to respond or participate in this litigation. Traditionally, this 28 means the “first, fifth, sixth, and seventh [Eitel] factors are easily addressed.” Zekelman 1 Indus. Inc. v. Marker, No. CV-19-02109-PHX-DWL, 2020 WL 1495210, at *3 (D. Ariz. 2 Mar. 27, 2020) (noting that the first, fifth, and sixth Eitel factors supported granting default 3 judgment because a denial would prejudice the plaintiff, there was no dispute over material 4 facts, and the default was not due to excusable neglect). 5 The first factor weighs in favor of default judgment because denying Romero’s 6 motion for default judgment will leave him “without other recourse for recovery” due to 7 Defendants’ failure to appear in the suit. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 8 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). The fifth factor also weighs in favor of default judgment 9 because “all well-pleaded facts in the complaint are taken as true . . . no genuine dispute of 10 material facts would preclude granting” the motion for default judgment. Id. Additionally, 11 the sixth factor tips in favor of entering default judgment because Defendants were properly 12 served. (Docs. 9, 10, 11.) See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Streeter, 438 F. Supp. 13 2d 1065, 1072 (D. Ariz. 2006) (finding that a defendant’s failure to answer is likely not a 14 result of excusable neglect if the defendant is served properly). 15 Finally, although the seventh factor—which considers the policy favoring a decision 16 on the merits—generally weighs against default judgment, the existence of Rule 55(b) 17 “indicates that this preference, standing alone, is not dispositive.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 18 2d at 1177 (quotation omitted). Therefore, this factor is not sufficient to preclude the entry 19 of default judgment in this case. 20 2. The second and third Eitel factors 21 The second and third Eitel factors, the merits of the claim and the sufficiency of the 22 complaint, are often “analyzed together and require courts to consider whether a plaintiff 23 has stated a claim on which [he] may recover.” Vietnam Reform Party v. Viet Tan-Vietnam 24 Reform Party, 416 F. Supp. 3d 948, 962 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (quotation omitted). However, 25 before turning to whether Romero stated a claim on which he may recover, the Court must 26 analyze the status of Romero as an employee within the meaning of the FLSA, the 27 AZMWA, and the AZWA. 28 1 i. FLSA claims 2 The FLSA defines an “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer.” 3 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). It defines an “employer” as “any person acting directly or indirectly 4 in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” Id. § 203(d). The Ninth Circuit 5 has traditionally employed a six factor “economic reality” test to distinguish between 6 employees and independent contractors. Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., Inc., 7 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979). No one factor in the test is dispositive. Id. Instead, the 8 determination depends “upon the circumstances of the whole activity.” Rutherford Food 9 Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947). 10 The economic reality test is comprised of these factors: 11 (1) the degree of the alleged employer’s right to control the manner in which the work is to be performed; (2) the alleged 12 employee’s opportunity for profit or loss depending upon his managerial skill; (3) the alleged employee’s investment in 13 equipment or materials required for his task, or his employment of helpers; (4) whether the service rendered 14 requires a special skill; (5) the degree of permanence of the working relationship; and (6) whether the service rendered is 15 an integral part of the alleged employer’s business. 16 Real, 603 F.2d at 754. 17 The first factor examines the employer’s degree of control. Romero alleges that 18 Defendants exercised control over the manner in which Romero performed work as a 19 manual laborer. (Doc. 1 at 4-5.) In support, Romero states, “Defendant[s] . . . had the 20 authority to hire and fire employees, supervised and controlled work schedules or the 21 conditions of employment, determined the rate and method of payment, and maintained 22 employment records in connection with [Romero’s] employment.” (Id. ¶¶ 14, 15, 37.) 23 Romero further alleges that “Defendants individually and/or through an enterprise or agent, 24 directed and exercised control over [his] work and wages at all relevant times.” 25 (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 25, 59.) It appears Romero merely copied and pasted this language from 26 Bonnette v. Cal. Health and Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983). 27 Nevertheless, these cursory allegations, taken as true, are sufficient to determine that 28 Defendants exercised control over Romero’s work. See id. (finding that given the 1 “circumstances of the whole activity” the alleged employee exercised control over the rate 2 and method of payment, and the structure and conditions of employment). 3 The second factor contemplates the alleged employee’s opportunity for profit and 4 loss. Likewise, this factor weighs in Romero’s favor because he did not bear any of the 5 business’s financial risk and he “was economically dependent on Defendants.” 6 (Doc. 1 ¶ 39.) Further, he “had no opportunity for profit or loss in the business” (id. ¶ 40(f)) 7 because there was “a lack of opportunity for loss of capital investment.” See Donovan v. 8 Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 1981). 9 The third factor weighs the relative investments of the alleged employer and 10 employee in the business. Courts consider the worker’s level of investment in “equipment 11 or materials required for his task,” Donovan, 656 F.2d at 1370, and “the worker’s 12 individual investment [in comparison] to the employer’s investment in the overall 13 operation.” Dryhaug v. Tax Breaks, Inc., No. CV-13-01309-PHX-BSB, 2015 WL 14 13567067, at *9 (D. Ariz. Sept. 15, 2015). This factor also weighs in Romero’s favor 15 because he did not make capital investments in Synergy or in the materials required for his 16 task, and he “used equipment owned by Defendants.” (Id. ¶ 38.) As a result, he did not 17 “suppl[y] the necessary risk capital to run the [business].” Donovan, 656 F.2d at 1372. 18 The fourth factor considers the degree of skill necessary to perform the alleged 19 employee’s work. “A minimal level of skill weighs in favor of finding that an individual 20 was an employee, rather than an independent contractor.” Dryhaug, 2015 WL 13567067, 21 at *9. This factor weighs in favor of Romero, whose duties consisted entirely of manual 22 labor. (Doc. 1 ¶ 31.) See Real, 603 F.2d at 755 (finding no special skill was required when 23 services “consist[ed] primarily of physical labor”). 24 The fifth factor contemplates the permanence of the working relationship between 25 the alleged employer and employee. Romero alleges that he spent less than a year working 26 for Defendants. (See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 31, 41.) Outside this bare assertion, the complaint lacks 27 sufficient allegations for the Court to determine the permanence of the working 28 relationship. As a result, this factor weighs neutrally. 1 The sixth and final factor considers whether the alleged employee rendered services 2 that were an integral part of the alleged employer’s business. Romero asserts “[t]he service 3 rendered by [him] in his work for Defendants were integral to Defendants’ business.” 4 (Id. ¶ 40(g).) Apart from this allegation, Romero provides no more information. However, 5 the Court assumes that Defendants were dependent upon manual laborers to lay flooring, 6 as Synergy is a restoration company. Therefore, these six factors weigh in favor of finding 7 Romero is an employee of Defendants under the FLSA. 8 ii. AZMWA claims 9 The AZMWA, like the FLSA, defines an “employee” as “any person who is or was 10 employed by an employer.” A.R.S. § 23-362(A). To determine whether a worker is an 11 employee as opposed to an independent contractor, AZMWA places the “burden of 12 proof . . . upon the party for whom the work is performed to show independent contractor 13 status by clear and convincing evidence.” A.R.S. § 23-362(D). Defendants do not meet this 14 burden because they have not appeared. Additionally, because the AZMWA shares the 15 same definition of employee as the FLSA, the Court’s reasoning as to Romero’s 16 employment status under the FLSA applies with equal force here. 17 The AZMWA defines an “employer” as “any corporation proprietorship, 18 partnership, joint venture, limited liability company, trust, association, political subdivision 19 of the state, [and] individual or other entity acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an 20 employer in relation to an employee.” A.R.S. § 23-362(B). Defendants are employers 21 because they operate in Arizona and controlled Romero’s work and wages at all relevant 22 times. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 12, 14, 16.) 23 iii. AZWA claims 24 Like the FLSA and the AZMWA, the AZWA defines an “employee” as “any person 25 who performs services for an employer under a contract of employment either made in this 26 state or to be performed wholly or partly within this state.” A.R.S. § 23-350(2). Because 27 Romero alleges that he was an employee, he sufficiently states an AZWA claim. 28 (Doc. 1 ¶ 11.) See Tejeda v. Boston Mkt. Corp., No. CV-23-01497-PHX-JJT, 2023 WL 1 8810927, at *2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 20, 2023) (“Plaintiff alleges that since May 2023, Defendants 2 failed to pay him while he worked . . . [a]ccepting this allegation as true, Plaintiff has shown 3 that Defendants violated the . . . A[Z]WA.”) Romero also alleges that while working for 4 Defendants, he resided in Maricopa County, Arizona. (Id. ¶ 11.) 5 The AZWA defines “employer” as “any individual, partnership, association, joint 6 stock company, trust or corporation, the administrator or executor of the estate of a 7 deceased individual or the receiver, trustee or successor of any of such persons employing 8 any person.” A.R.S. § 23-350(3). Romero alleges that Mr. and Mrs. Schultz own Synergy, 9 a business with offices that “maintains agents for the transaction of its customary business 10 in Maricopa County, Arizona.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 12.) Accordingly, Defendants are employers 11 under the AZWA. 12 iv. Summary of the FLSA, AZMWA, and AZWA Claims 13 For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Romero is an employee under the 14 FLSA, the AZMWA, and the AZWA. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1); A.R.S. § 23-362(A); A.R.S. 15 § 23-350(2). In his complaint, Romero argues that he is entitled to statutorily guaranteed 16 unpaid and overtime wages, as well as unpaid minimum wages. (Id. ¶¶ 60-62.) Because the 17 Court takes these allegations as true, NewGen, 840. F.3d at 617, Romero “has stated a claim 18 on which [he] may recover.” Vietnam Reform Party, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 962. The Court 19 finds the second and third Eitel factors favor the entry of default judgment. 20 3. The fourth Eitel factor 21 Under the fourth Eitel factor, the Court considers the amount of money at stake in 22 relation to the seriousness of the defendants’ conduct. See PepsiCo, Inc., 23 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1176. If the sum of money at stake is completely disproportionate or 24 inappropriate, default judgment is disfavored. See Streeter, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 1071. 25 Allegations pertaining to damages are not taken as true when considering a motion for 26 default judgment. See Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560. But the district court has “wide latitude” 27 in determining the amount of damages to award upon default judgment. HTS, Inc. v. Boley, 28 945 F. Supp. 2d 927, 947 (D. Ariz. 2013) (citing James v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 1 310 (5th Cir. 1993)). 2 Here, Romero seeks the unpaid minimum and overtime wages he is owed under the 3 FLSA, the AZMWA, and the AZWA along with liquidated damages. Romero requests 4 $12,603.90 plus post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961, and attorneys’ fees 5 and costs. (Doc. 14 at 12.) Given the claims listed in the complaint, the Court finds the 6 amount requested is reasonable. As such, the fourth Eitel factor favors the entry of default 7 judgment. 8 4. Summary of Eitel Factors 9 After reviewing Romero’s complaint and motion, and analyzing the Eitel factors, 10 the Court finds that factors one through six weigh in favor of granting Romero’s motion. 11 While the final factor weighs against entering default judgment, it is insufficient to 12 outweigh the other factors. Therefore, the Court concludes that Romero is entitled to 13 default judgment. 14 C. Damages 15 Having found that entry of default judgment is proper, the only remaining issue is 16 one of damages. In contrast to the other allegations in a complaint, allegations pertaining 17 to damages are not taken as true when considering a motion for default judgment. Geddes, 18 559 F.2d at 560. Nonetheless, a district court has “wide latitude” in determining the amount 19 of damages to award upon default judgment. James, 6 F.3d at 310. 20 Romero requests entry of judgment against Synergy, for a total amount of 21 $12,603.90. (Doc. 14 at 12.) This amount consists of unpaid wages totaling $3,300— 22 trebled to $9,900 under A.R.S. § 23-355—and the unpaid federal overtime wages of 23 $1,351.95—doubled to $2,703.90 under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). (Id. at 10.) Of the $12,603.90, 24 Romero requests that $7,274.40 be held against Synergy, Mr. Schultz, and Mrs. Schultz 25 jointly and severally. (Id. at 12.) The joint and several damages consist of the unpaid 26 Arizona minimum wage of $1,523.50 that must be trebled under A.R.S. § 23-364(G) for a 27 total of $4,570.50,3 and the amount of the doubled unpaid federal overtime damages of

28 3 Since Romero would receive more under Arizona's minimum wage, $4,570.70, than he would under the federal minimum wage, $1,595.00, the Court uses the Arizona minimum 1 $2,703.90. (Id. 9-10.) Romero asks that the remaining $5,329.50 of the total amount be 2 held only against Synergy. (Id. at 11.) Romero also requests the total amount be enhanced 3 by post-judgment interest under 29 U.S.C. § 1961. (Id. at 12.) Finally, Romero requests the 4 Court allow him to file a separate motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id.) 5 Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a default judgment 6 “not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.” Fed. R. 7 Civ. P. 54(c). Here, Romero listed the requested damages in the complaint (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 60- 8 62), and he does not request damages “different in kind” or in excess of those requested in 9 the complaint. (Doc. 14 at 9-12.) Romero also provided sufficient notice of the potential 10 award through his complaint, enabling Defendants “to decide whether to respond to the 11 complaint in the first instance.” Fisher Printing Inc. v. CRG LTD II LLC, No. CV-16- 12 03692-PHX-DJH, 2018 WL 603299, at *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 22, 2018). 13 The Court may enter a default judgment without a damages hearing when, as here, 14 “the amount claimed is a liquidated sum or capable of mathematical calculation.” HTS, 15 Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d at 947 (quoting Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 16 1981)). In this case, the requested damages are capable of mathematical calculation 17 because they are comprised of hours worked by Romero, the amount in pay he was entitled 18 to receive, and statutory multipliers. (Id. at 6-7, 9-11.) The requested damages are also 19 supported by Romero’s motion and his declaration. (Docs. 14, 14-1.) See Doe v. United 20 States, No. CV-17-01991-PHX-GMS (JZB), 2018 WL 2431774, at *8 (D. Ariz. May 30, 21 2018) (“In determining damages, a court can rely on declarations submitted by the 22 plaintiff[.]”) (citing Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 23 498 (C.D. Cal 2003)). 24 The Court finds that Romero’s motion and declaration establish the damages he 25 suffered. (Docs. 14, 14-1.) Therefore, the Court will enter default judgment against 26 wage calculation. (Doc. 14 at 6.) See e.g., Wong v. White Rock Phlebotomy, LLC, No. CV- 27 23-00234-TUC-EJM, 2024 WL 897002, at *8 (D. Ariz. Feb. 13, 2024) (“Because the Arizona minimum wage is higher than federal law provides, and the A[Z]MWA provides 28 for treble damages, the Court finds Plaintiff entitled to damages . . . in the amount of [the trebled AZMWA damages].”). || Defendants in the amount of $12,603.90 with $7,274.40 to be held jointly and severally 2|| against all Defendants, and the remaining $5,329.50 to be held against Synergy. || Additionally, post-judgment interest will be added to this award. Should Romero seek attorneys’ fees and costs, he may file an application with the Court. 5|| Il. CONCLUSION 6 Accordingly, 7 IT IS ORDERED granting Plaintiff Milton Iturrios Romero’s Motion for Default 8 || Judgment (Doc. 14). 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED awarding Plaintiff Milton Iturrios Romero $12,603.90 plus post-judgment interest at the applicable statutory rate against Defendants Synergy Restoration, LLC, Bradley Schultz, and Sarah Schultz, with $7,274.40 of that 12 |) amount to be held jointly and severally against all defendants and the remaining $5,329.50 13 || to be held against Defendant Synergy Restoration, LLC. 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Milton Iturrios Romero shall have 15} fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs || that complies in all respects with LRCiv 54.2. 17 IT IS FINALLY ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to close this case and 18 |} to enter judgment accordingly. 19 Dated this 6th day of January, 2025. 20 Wichal T. Hburde 22 Michael T. Liburdi 23 United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28

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