OPINION
FLANDERS, Justice.
Did a retired state employee’s detrimental reliance on advice given to him by agents of the State Retirement Board (board) — advice that was contrary to state law — estop the board from suspending the retiree’s pension when it discovered he was also working full-time for a municipality? Because the alleged representations relied upon were ultra vires and in conflict with state law, we answer this question in the negative. Therefore, we affirm that portion of the trial justice’s ruling holding that the doctrine of equitable estoppel did not preclude the board from suspending future retirement payments to the plaintiff, Paul E. Romano (Romano). We quash, however, the trial justice’s sua sponte order of restitution (requiring Romano to reimburse the state for pension benefits he received but which he was not entitled to under state law) because there was insufficient evidence to determine, as a matter of law, whether it was equitable in these circumstances to require restitution.
Facts and Travel
Romano worked as an engineer for the Rhode Island Department of Transportation (DOT) for twenty-five years. As a state employee, he was a member of the state’s Retirement System (system). In 1989, the Governor announced an early retirement incentive package for state employees that significantly enhanced retirement benefits for those who chose to participate. In addition to other incentives, the package offered participants an additional 10 percent service credit and a more favorable salary basis upon which retirement benefits would be calculated (under the package, retirement benefits would be based upon the participant’s previous twelve-month salary, rather than the three-year salary average generally used). See P.L.1989, ch. 126, art. 43, § 1.
At the time of the Governor’s announcement, the then-administrator of the Town of Bristol (town), Halsey Herreshoff (Her-reshoff), approached Romano and offered him a position as the town’s director of public works. Contemplating this offer, but concerned about its potential impact on his retirement benefits, Romano spoke to a retirement counselor from the system. She told him that, although she knew of no restrictions, if he “wanted to stay out of trouble” he should “go to the retirement board.” Thereafter, acting on Romano’s behalf, Herreshoff allegedly contacted then-executive director of the system, Donald Hickey (Hickey), to confirm what the retirement counselor had told Romano. On July 25, 1989, Hickey sent a letter to Herreshoff and, without referring specifically to Romano or to Romano’s particular situation, he stated his general understanding of the board’s policy “concerning people working for a municipality after retirement from State service without penalty.” He wrote, “[s]ince the municipal system is a different system and only administered by us, there is no prohibition against a state retiree working for and belonging to a municip.;,; system.” He gave no further details or advice concerning the statutory restrictions and conditions governing such reemployment but offered “[i]f further clarification is needed please let me know.”
Romano claims to have understood this letter as one that specifically addressed his case. As a result, he interpreted it to mean that he could simultaneously collect his state retirement pension and receive his full-time salary from the town. Almost immediately after receipt of Hickey’s letter on July 25, 1989, and without making any further inquiries into potential limitations [37]*37and/or conditions that might restrict his reemployment, Romano retired from DOT. Shortly thereafter he accepted the full-time position as the town’s director of public works and he began to receive both his municipal salary as a full-time employee of the town and his state retirement pension.1
According to the system, Romano’s “double dipping” went unnoticed until 1996 when it was uncovered by an internal audit. Upon discovery of the error, the Retirement System informed Romano by letter, dated January 2, 1996, that because his municipal employment had exceeded the annual limit of seventy-five full days or 150 half days (the statutory limit imposed by G.L.1956 § 36-10-36), he would be ineligible to receive pension benefits, effective January 31, 1996. In a letter to Romano, dated January 18, 1996, the executive director of the system, Joann E. Flaminio (Flaminio), issued an administrative decision requiring Romano to “either comply with the 75 working-day limitation (or 150 half-day limitation) enunciated in § 36-10-36 or risk suspension of your pension benefits once the 75 day limit is exceeded.” She also ordered him to “cease employment with the Town of Bristol as of April 17, 1996, of this year in order to continue to receive your current monthly pension payment.”
Romano appealed Flaminio’s administrative decision and the matter was assigned for a determination to an administrative hearing officer from the system. The system agreed to continue paying Romano his monthly pension pending a decision of the hearing officer. On November 18, 1996, however, the hearing officer affirmed Flaminio’s decision, finding that, pursuant to § 36-10-36, Romano’s full-time employment with the municipality disqualified him from receiving state pension benefits.
In an administrative appeal before the board on December 18, 1996, Romano argued that he had detrimentally relied upon the representations made by the retirement councilor and Hickey and that therefore he should be granted an equitable remedy. The board upheld the hearing officer’s decision, concluding that “where there is a clear statutory mandate, [the board] must comply with [it], and * * * no government official can in fact waive that mandate.” The board notified Romano of its decision by letter, dated December 20, 1996, and informed him that his pension benefits would be suspended effective December 31,1996.
Romano appealed the board’s decision to the Superior Court. On April 15, 1997, at Romano’s request, that court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining- the board from suspending Romano’s monthly retirement benefits pending the outcome of his administrative appeal. The order noted that “[s]hould the Plaintiffs action be unsuccessful, the plaintiff may be obligated to reimburse the State of Rhode Island.”
On June 29, 1999, the Superior Court upheld the board’s decision and vacated the temporary restraining order, thereby allowing the system to suspend future retirement payments to Romano. In addition, the Superior Court ordered sua sponte that Romano “reimburse the State of Rhode Island for any benefits paid him to which he was not entitled.”
I
Suspension of Future Pension Payments
Neither the facts of this case nor the applicable law barred the board from [38]*38suspending the payment of future pension benefits to Romano after it discovered in 1996 that he had been serving as a full-time municipal employee while he was also receiving pension benefits from the state.2 Therefore, we affirm that portion of the Superior Court’s judgment in this case, squarely on the grounds that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should not be applied against a governmental entity like the board when, as here, the alleged representations or conduct relied upon were ultra vires or in conflict with applicable law. See State v. Rhode Island Alliance of Social Services Employees, Local 580, SEIU, 747 A.2d 465, 469 (R.I.2000) (Rhode Island Alliance); Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers v. State Department of Corrections, 707 A.2d 1229, 1237-38 (R.I.1998); Technology Investors v. Town of Westerly, 689 A.2d 1060, 1062 (R.I.1997); Providence Teachers Union v. Providence School Board, 689 A.2d 388, 391-92 (R.I.1997) (Providence Teachers II); Providence Teachers Union v. Providence School Board, 689 A.2d 384, 388 (R.I.1996) (Providence Teachers I); Warwick Teachers’ Union Local No. 915 v. Warwick School Committee, 624 A.2d 849, 851 (R.I. 1993); School Committee of Providence v. Board of Regents for Education, 429 A.2d 1297, 1302 (R.I.1981); Ferrelli v. Department of Employment Security, 106 R.I. 588, 593-94, 261 A.2d 906, 909-10 (R.I.1970).
Here, at all times material to this case, applicable state law, § 36-10-36, required that “[p]ension payments shall be suspended” (emphasis added) whenever any state retiree is reemployed by a municipality within the state for more than seventy-five working days per calendar year. Such legislation, we have held, “was both reasonable and necessary to advance the legitimate public purpose of fostering public confidence in the State’s retirement system by restricting the proclivity of some public pensioners to indulge in what is colloquially referred to as ‘double dipping’ — that is, the simultaneous receipt by retired public employees of both a salary for state reemployment and a state pension.” Retired Adjunct Professors v. Almond, 690 A.2d 1342, 1347 (R.I.1997). After Romano’s retirement from state employment in 1989, he was reemployed by a municipality where he worked for more than seventy-five working days per calendar year. Thus, his pension payments from the state should have been suspended during each of those years. Instead, he continued to collect through 1999 both a full pension from the state and a full salary from the town while apparently failing to report his full-time municipal-employment status to the retirement board on a monthly basis as the law required him to do. See § 36-10-36(b) (“Notice of employment shall be sent monthly to the retirement board by the employer and by the retired member.”). (Emphases added.)3
[39]*39To cite just one recent example of a case where we have refused to estop a governmental entity when to do so would contravene state law, in Technology Investors, 689 A.2d at 1062, we held that a trial justice had erred in concluding that a municipality was estopped from claiming that its grant of a tax abatement was unenforceable. The town had granted the abatement to a business that had relocated to that town based upon the tax-abatement assurances of the town and its agents. Id. But we held that the abatement was unenforceable because it was contrary to state law and, therefore, the local government’s representations and actions to the contrary were deemed ultra vires. Id. For this reason, the taxpayer was unable to estop the town from reneging on its tax-abatement promises merely because it had relied upon the town’s actions and assurances to its financial detriment. Id. We ruled there that “[t]he significant policy that undergirds this rule [no municipal tax abatements for relocating businesses] cannot be set aside by estoppel.” Id. As we noted again last tenn, “notions of promissory estoppel that are routinely applied in private contractual contexts are ill-suited to publie-con-tract-rights analysis.” D. Corso Excavating, Inc. v. Poulin, 747 A.2d 994, 1001 (R.I.2000) (quoting Retired Adjunct Professors, 690 A.2d at 1346). Indeed, in Retired Adjunct Professors, we observed that “courts have consistently refused to give effect to government-fostered expectations that, had they arisen in the private sector, might well have formed the basis of a contract or an estoppel.” 690 A.2d at 1346 (quoting Pineman v. Fallon, 662 F.Supp. 1311, 1316 (D.Conn.1987), aff'd, 842 F.2d 598 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824, 109 S.Ct. 72, 102 L.Ed.2d 48 (1988)). Most recently, we landed with an audible thud on separate attempts by two Johnston nightclubs to parlay alleged verbal assurances from individual government officials — supposedly approving of or immunizing their illegal conduct — into an equitable estoppel defense against the government’s attempts to enforce the applicable law against the offending parties. See Casa DiMario, Inc. v. Richardson, 763 A.2d 607, 612-13 (R.I.2000); El Morocco Club, Inc. v. Richardson, 746 A.2d 1228, 1233-34 (R.I.2000).
Here, too, neither the retirement counselor nor the board’s executive director possessed any actual or apparent authority to vary or contradict “a valid employment requirement prescribed by state law.” Rhode Island Alliance, 747 A.2d at 468 (quoting Pawtucket School Committee v. Pawtucket Teachers’ Alliance Local No. 930, 652 A.2d 970, 972 (R.I.1995)). Although “in an appropriate factual context the doctrine of estoppel should be applied against public agencies to prevent injustice and fraud where the agency or officers thereof, acting within their authority, made representations to cause the party seeking to invoke the doctrine either to act or refrain from acting in a particular manner to his [, her, or its] detriment,” Ferrelli, 106 R.I. at 594, 261 A.2d at 910 (emphasis added), neither a [40]*40government entity nor any of its representatives has any implied or actual authority to modify, waive, or ignore applicable state law that conflicts with its actions or representations. See Technology Investors, 689 A.2d at 1062; cf. Rhode Island Alliance, 747 A.2d at 469 (“statutory obligations cannot be bargained away via contrary provisions in a [collective bargaining agreement], nor can they be compromised by the past or present practices of the parties”). As we have stated repeatedly, such an estoppel cannot be applicable when the acts in question are “clearly ultra vires.” Technology Investors, 689 A.2d at 1062. Thus, “[t]his Court has squarely rejected the proposition that a municipality may be bound by the actions of an agent without actual authority.” Providence Teachers II, 689 A.2d at 391.4
Indeed, just last term, in Rhode Island Alliance, we stated that “the renegade legal interpretations of a high-ranking state official can[not] override a state law that plainly provides otherwise.” 747 A.2d at 470. As a result, we concluded, “if a statute contains or provides for nondelegable and/or nonmodifiable duties, rights, and/or obligations, then neither contractual provisions nor purported past practices nor arbitration awards that would alter those mandates are enforceable.” Id. at 469. We can fathom no reason for us to depart from this rationale in this case. Although we are not dealing here with a public union or its members but rather with a former state engineer who is now a management-level municipal-government employee, the same principle should be controlling. What is sauce for the union goose should be sauce for the managerial gander.
In this case, the executive director and the retirement counselor who spoke with Romano before he retired possessed no more authority to waive the municipal-employment limits on Romano’s receipt of state retirement benefits (as set forth in § 86-10-36) than the school board possessed in Providence Teachers II to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with the teacher’s union without the ratification of the city council. See Providence Teachers II, 689 A.2d at 391. Therefore, to the extent they may have advised Romano that he could work for a municipality on a full-time basis without suffering any dimin-ishment of his state pension, the agents of the retirement board, like the school board itself in the Providence Teachers cases, were acting ultra vires and lacked any authority to bind the state to provide retirement benefits to Romano beyond those allowed by state law. See Providence Teachers II, 689 A.2d at 391; Providence Teachers I, 689 A.2d at 386. Indeed, perhaps in recognition of her limited authority, the retirement counselor told Romano that if he had any questions whatsoever about post-retirement reemployment, he should “go to the retirement board to stay out of trouble.” See G.L.1956 § 42-35-8 (empowering agencies like the board to issue advisory opinions “as to the applicability of any statutory provision or of any rule or order of the agency”). Thus, contrary to the dissent’s conclusion, Romano had every reason to believe that the retirement counselor was not speaking for the board when she supposedly told him he could work for the town without affecting his state pension; otherwise, why would she then tell him in the same breath that he should “go to the retirement board to stay out of trouble”? The dissent’s further suggestion that “it is far more likely that she meant that he should consult with the [board’s] staff’ is most unpersuasive; after all, the retirement counselor herself ivas part of the board’s staff. So why, we submit, would a board staffer tell Romano that he should go to the board itself to [41]*41stay out of trouble — yet really mean that he should just consult with other board staff? Further, given § 42-35-8, we conclude that Romano possessed standing to request the board to provide him with an advisory opinion concerning whether he could accept a salary based upon his working at full-time municipal employment after retiring from state service, yet still receive his full state-pension benefits while doing so. Nonetheless, we have no indication that Romano ever submitted such a request or otherwise went to the board as the retirement counselor advised him to do.5
In Ferrelli, this Court quoted with approval from the Maryland Supreme Court’s decision in the case of City of Baltimore v. Chesapeake Marine Railway Co., 233 Md. 559, 197 A.2d 821, 831-32 (1964), citing it for the following proposition: “Estoppel against a municipal corporation growing out of affirmative action must be predicated upon the acts or conduct of its officers, agents or official bodies acting within the scope of their authority. 10 McQuillan, Mun. Corp. (3rd Ed.), Sec. 28.56 * * (Emphasis added.) 106 R.I. at 592-93, 261 A.2d at 909.6
[42]*42Moreover, we do not abrogate the doctrine of equitable estoppel by following the Ferrelli rule that government officials must be duly authorized — acting within their authority and consistently with state statutes — before governmental entities can be subject to equitable estoppel based upon their representations or conduct. There have been and will continue to be many situations, such as those in Schiavulli v. School Committee of North Providence, 114 R.I. 443, 444-51, 334 A.2d 416, 417-20 (1975), and Greenwich Bay Yacht Basin Associates v. Brown, 537 A.2d 988, 989-93 (R.I.1988), in which the doctrine of estoppel can be applied against governmental entities without doing violence to any state statutory mandate or to the requirement that officials be duly authorized before their agencies will be estopped. In Schiavulli, a school committee was es-topped to deny a tenured teacher’s request for an unpaid leave of absence when the committee was found to have a duty to vote on the teacher’s unpaid leave request instead of failing to act on it at all. Schiavulli, 114 R.I. at 449-51, 334 A.2d at 419-20. But there was no suggestion that granting the teacher’s leave request would have been ultra vires or contrary to any state statute or other law prohibiting such leave. See id. On the contrary, it was plain that the school committee had this authority and, therefore, its inaction in the face of a duty to respond could be and properly was found to constitute an estoppel. See id. Likewise, in the Greenwich Bay case, the state agency in question was not acting ultra vires or contrary to state law when it represented to the applicant that it would evaluate its request for approval under the regulatory program that existed when the request was submitted. Greenwich Bay, 537 A.2d at 989-91. Thus, we overrule neither Schiavulli nor Greenwich Bay by adhering to the requirement espoused in Ferrelli and followed in Technology Investors that “[e]s-toppel against a [public entity] * * * must be predicated upon the acts or conduct of its officers, agents or official bodies acting within the scope of their authority .” Ferrelli 106 R.I. at 592-93, 261 A.2d at 909; see also Technology Investors, 689 A.2d at 1062; Greenwich Bay, 537 A.2d at 991-93; Loiselle v. City of East Providence, 116 R.I. 585, 591, 359 A.2d 345, 349 (1976) (holding that municipality was not es-topped to enforce a residency requirement against a municipal official whose conduct in the matter at issue was also blameworthy); Schiavulli 114 R.I. at 449, 334 A.2d at 419.7
[43]*43We also have long held that a person’s failure to discover the true scope of a government agent’s actual authority will not provide any grounds to relieve that person’s detrimental reliance upon the agent’s representations or actions. See Providence Teachers II, 689 A.2d at 392 (citing Vieira v. Jamestown, Bridge Commission, 91 R.I. 350, 358, 163 A.2d 18, 23 (1960); Murphy v. Duffy, 46 R.I. 210, 215-16, 124 A. 103, 105 (1924)). Indeed, to rule otherwise would undermine the integrity and structure of our state government because it would allow every government official to act as his own mini-legislature, cashiering those laws he or she dislikes, is ignorant of, or misinterprets, and instead molding the law to be whatever the government official claims it to be.
Thus, even in cases in which a government agent is acting with limited actual authority, as in Warwick Teachers’ Union, we have held that persons dealing with that agent may not reasonably rely upon actions which exceed that agent’s actual but limited authority. See Wanvick Teachers’ Union, 624 A.2d at 851. In Warwick Teachers’ Union, a school committee appointed negotiators to enter into a new collective bargaining agreement with the teachers’ union. Id. at 850. The negotiators agreed to certain terms that exceeded their authority, but we held that the agreement was not binding because the negotiators lacked actual authority to bind the municipality to these terms. Id. at 851. Accordingly, even if the executive director and retirement counselor in this case had possessed some actual authority to give advice on behalf of the retirement board, they had no authority whatsoever to exempt Romano from a clear statutory mandate, one that prohibited a retired state employee from receiving full state pension benefits while simultaneously working full-time for a municipality and collecting a full municipal salary. Any such representations would have exceeded any actual or apparent authority they may have possessed. Hence, as in Warwick Teachers’ Union, Romano was not entitled to rely upon those representations to support a defense of equitable estoppel because “the authority of a public agent to bind * * * must be actual.” Id. at 851 (citing School Committee of Providence, 429 A.2d at 1302).
In sum, following the teaching of Casa DiMario, El Marocco Club, Technology Investors, Ferrelli, Loiselle, Schiavulli, and the other cases cited in this opinion, we rule in this case that the doctrine of equitable estoppel did not preclude the state’s retirement system from suspending the pension overpayments received by Romano while he was also working full-time for the municipality in violation of applicable state law. See Casa DiMario, Inc., 763 A.2d at 612-13; El Marocco Club, 746 A.2d at 1233-34; Technology Investors, 689 A.2d at 1062; Loiselle, 116 R.I. at 592-93, 359 A.2d at 349; Schiavulli, 114 R.I. at 449, 334 A.2d at 419; Ferrelli, 106 R.I. at 592, 261 A.2d at 909. Thus, in contrast to the dissent, we conclude that this is not an appropriate occasion to temper our long-followed “actual-authority” rule in cases involving the actions of government agents by applying an equitable, case-by-case evaluation of the circumstances. Such a relaxation of the rule would open the door — unnecessarily, we believe — to ad hoc and unpredictable adjudications in these types of cases.
II
The Propriety of Restitution
With respect to whether the trial justice was correct in ordering Romano to reimburse the state for those pension benefits he received that should not have been paid to him because of his full-time municipal employment, we remand this case to the Superior Court for a new trial on this issue. The trial justice ordered Romano to reimburse the state sua sponte — even though the board never asked for this relief and even though Romano never had the chance to demonstrate why such a remedy would be inequitable. Thus, the [44]*44parties never had the chance to introduce evidence concerning whether such relief would be appropriate in this case. Moreover, the trial justice did not distinguish between the retirement benefits paid to Romano from the date of his retirement in 1989 through 1996, when the board notified him of its decision to suspend his benefits in accordance with state law, and those paid thereafter from 1997 to 1999, when Romano continued to receive such benefits after seeking and obtaining a temporary injunction preventing the board from suspending his benefits.
In this case, from 1989 to 1996 the state mistakenly paid retirement benefits to Romano, money that he was ineligible to receive under state law because of his full-time municipal employment. Thereafter, until 1999, it continued to pay retirement benefits to Romano pursuant to a court order requiring it to do so. But the board did not discover Romano’s full-time municipal-employment status until 1996. Even if the board was at fault for failing to discover this information sooner, a party who has conferred a benefit upon another by mistake is not precluded from maintaining an action for restitution because the mistake was caused by that party’s own lack of care. See Toupin v. Laverdiere, 729 A.2d 1286, 1289 (R.I.1999) (holding that a party has “a cognizable action to seek the return of his money even though the overpayment might have been the product of his own negligence”); see also Woonsocket Teachers Guild Local Union 951 v. Woonsocket School Committee, 694 A.2d 727, 729 (R.I.1997).8
Although § 36-10-36 allowed Romano and other retired state employees to accept work from municipalities while continuing to receive their full state pension benefits, it also required in return that they work no -more than seventy-five days in a calendar year (or 150 half days) and that they send monthly notices to the retirement board of any municipal employment they obtained. Romano worked for the town for more than seventy-five days in every calendar year after he retired from the state in 1989, but the record contains no indication that he ever filed any notices of his full-time municipal employment with the board as § 36 — 10—36(b) required him to do. Presumably, the General Assembly included the monthly notice requirement in the law so that the board could track the municipal employment of working retirees like Romano and ensure that they did not evade the law as Romano did for many years. Having failed to comply with the statute’s burden, Romano, like the teacher in Woonsocket Teacher’s Guild, might well be found after a retrial to have forfeited his right to retain all or certain portions of the pension overpay-ments — benefits he should not have been able to obtain in the first place had he (1) heeded the retirement counselor’s injunction to “go to the retirement board to stay out of trouble” concerning any post-retirement reemployment questions and (2) filed the requisite monthly notices with the board of his continuing municipal employ[45]*45ment beyond the statutory seventy-five-day cap. See Woonsocket Teachers’ Guild, 694 A.2d at 729. On the other hand, Romano may have so changed his circumstances in reliance upon his receipt of the excessive pension payments that requiring him to reimburse the state in whole or in part for this money would be unjust and inequitable. But this calculus depends on the results of a factual and equitable inquiry before the trial court that has yet to occur in this case.
This Court addressed a similar situation some years ago in the case of Jonklaas v. Silverman, 117 R.I. 691, 370 A.2d 1277 (1977). Jonklaas involved a stockbroker’s suit against a customer to recover a mistaken overpayment of stock-sale proceeds. Id. at 692, 370 A.2d at 1279. The stockbroker brought suit against the customer some five years after the mistaken overpayment. Id. This Court, in a three-to-two decision, reversed the trial justice’s restitution order and remanded the case for a new trial because “the trial justice overlooked the law which provides that where there is a change of circumstances that could make restitution unjust and inequitable the loss must be borne by the party making the mistake.” Id. at 698-99, 370 A.2d at 1282. Because the trial justice excluded evidence tending to show that the recipient of the mistaken overpayment had experienced a change in circumstances that would have made restitution unjust and inequitable, the Jonklaas court ordered a new trial. Id. at 699, 370 A.2d at 1282. Justices Joslin and Kelleher, however, dissented — even though they agreed with the majority that money paid under a mistake of fact may not be recovered if the recipient has so changed his or her position by reason of the overpayment as to make it inequitable to require restitution. Id. The dissenting justices were of the opinion that “what constitutes a requisite change of circumstances under that rule is often a very close question, and the answer will turn on the facts of the particular case.” (Joslin, J., dissenting). Id. Because the recipient of the mistaken overpayment had failed to make an offer of proof concerning why he was not unjustly enriched and showing that the alleged change in his circumstances had rendered inequitable the stockbroker’s claim for restitution, they believed that the trial justice’s ruling ordering reimbursement of the overpayment should have been upheld. Id. at 700-01, 370 A.2d at 1282-83.
Significantly for our purposes, Justices Joslin and Kelleher noted that “not every change of circumstances is available as a defense” to a restitution claim. Id. at 699, 370 A.2d at 1279.
“[T]he recipient will not be required to make restitution if by reason of the mistaken payment he has assumed liabilities and obligations that he would not otherwise have assumed, * * * or if he has turned over the money to a third party to whom he was under a legal or contractual obligation to pay all or part of the funds so received. * * * It follows that evidence to establish those facts is admissible. On the other hand, restitution will be required if the recipient has used the money to cover living expenses or to pay preexisting debts. * * * Consequently, the recipient is not entitled to introduce evidence to establish such use of the erroneous payment.” Id. at 699-700, 370 A.2d at 1282.
Moreover, in this case, unlike Jonklaas, we are dealing with excessive pension payments involving public funds. Hence, all the more reason why we should be very careful before concluding that the government is not entitled to recover any of the overpayments. Indeed, the case law that restricts the availability of the equitable-estoppel doctrine for use against governmental entities ensures that “public funds will be spent according to the letter of the difficult judgments reached by [the elected legislature] as to the common good and not according to the individual favor of [unelected and unauthorized] government agents or the individual pleas of litigants.” Office of Personnel Management v. Rich[46]*46mond, 496 U.S. 414, 428, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 2473, 110 L.Ed.2d 387, 395 (1990).
In any event, the present record is simply inadequate to determine whether restitution is appropriate. The reason for this is because the trial justice ordered the remedy of restitution sua sponte — even though the board never asked for this relief and even though the evidence was insufficient to determine, as a matter of law, whether the board was entitled to restitution. For example, we have no idea what Romano did with the pension over-payments, yet he bore the burden “to prove that it will be inequitable to require restitution.” Jonklaas, 117 R.I. at 698, 370 A.2d at 1281. And because the board had not asked either Romano or the court for this relief, Romano had no notice that restitution was at issue — at least before the board notified Romano in 1996 of its intention to suspend his benefits. Thus, the trial justice ordered restitution out of the blue without giving the parties any notice that this relief was in the offing.9 Thus, the record is barren of the facts and circumstances that should have informed the trial justice’s decision on this point under the Jonklaas case. See id. at 699-700, 370 A.2d at 1282.
To rule on this issue with an appropriate factual predicate, the parties should have been directed to introduce and the trial justice should have obtained evidence on at least the following issues, among others, that may be pertinent to the equities of this situation: what has Romano done with the pension overpayments? Has he assumed liabilities and obligations that he would not have otherwise assumed? Has he turned over the money to a third party to whom he was under a legal or contractual obligation to pay all or part of the funds received? If so, it may be inequitable to require him to make restitution. Id. Or, conversely, has he merely stockpiled the funds in a savings account or used the money to cover his living expenses or to pay his preexisting debts? If so, then restitution may not be inequitable, especially during the period from 1997 to 1999 when the Superior Court had enjoined the board from suspending his benefits during the pendency of Romano’s administrative appeal. Id.10
Conclusion
For these reasons, we grant, in part, the petition for certiorari, we quash the order of restitution, and remand this case for a new trial to determine whether restitution is an appropriate remedy in this case and, if so, to what extent restitution would be equitable under the circumstances. Thus, far from directing a Superior Court justice to require Romano to repay all or a significant portion of the illegal benefits that he [47]*47received, as the dissent perceives us to be doing, we are simply requiring the court on remand to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding what Romano did with the illegal pension money he received and to determine whether it would be inequitable to require him to reimburse the state, in whole or in part, for any of that money. But in so doing, we also deny the remaining portion of the petition for cer-tiorari and affirm the trial justice’s ruling that the doctrine of equitable estoppel did not preclude the board from suspending Romano’s future pension payments for so long as he remained a full-time municipal employee.
Justice FLANDERS did not attend the oral argument but participated on the basis of the briefs.