Roland Thomas Koch v. Sheriff, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: January 16, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01791
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROLAND THOMAS KOCH, No. 2:25-cv-1791 AC P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 SHERIFF, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a former civil detainee who filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 18 § 1983 without a lawyer. He has requested leave to proceed without paying the full filing fee for 19 this action, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. ECF No. 12. Plaintiff has submitted a declaration showing 20 that he cannot afford to pay the entire filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Accordingly, 21 plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. 22 I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 23 A. Legal Standard 24 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against “a 25 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). A 26 claim “is [legally] frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. 27 Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The court may dismiss a claim as frivolous if it is based on 28 an indisputably meritless legal theory or factual contentions that are baseless. Id. at 327. The 1 critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable 2 legal and factual basis. Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989), superseded by 3 statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 4 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 5 “naked assertion[s],” “labels and conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 6 cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007). In other words, 7 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 8 statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim upon which the 9 court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial 10 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 11 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation 12 omitted). When considering whether a complaint states a claim, the court must accept the 13 allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), and construe the 14 complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 15 (1969) (citations omitted). 16 B. Factual Allegations of the Complaint 17 The complaint alleges the sheriff of Sacramento County Main Jail (SCMJ) and Rio 18 Consumnes Correctional Center (RCCC) and the facility commanders at each institution violated 19 plaintiff’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. ECF 20 No. 1. Specifically, the complaint alleges that despite the need for separate housing for SVPs/290 21 registrants,1 and despite plaintiff’s prior three lawsuits that resulted in settlements,2 defendants

22 1 California’s Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) authorizes the civil commitment of 23 “sexually violent predators” (SVPs) under California Welfare and Institutions Code (WIC) §§ 6600 et seq. King v. County of Los Angeles, 885 F.3d 548, 553 (9th Cir. 2018). California 24 Penal Code § 290 requires individuals with certain sex crimes to register as sex offenders. Plaintiff alleges he is designated as a 290 registrant but disputes this status. ECF No. 1 at 3. 25 2 Plaintiff has filed fifteen civil rights actions in this district. Plaintiff’s complaint appears to be 26 referring to Koch v. Sacramento County, No. 2:15-cv-0739 (E.D. Cal.), Koch v. Jones, No. 2:18- cv-2581 CKD (E.D. Cal.), and Koch v. Jones, No. 2:19-cv-1535 JAM CKD (E.D. Cal.)—three 27 cases in which he alleged violations based on the conditions of his confinement as a civil detainee under WIC § 6600 and resulted in settlement agreements. See Koch v. Sacramento County, No. 28 2:15-cv-0739 JAM CKD, ECF Nos. 1, 22-24; Koch v. Jones, 2:18-cv-2581 CKD, ECF Nos. 30, 1 continue to subject SVPs/290 registrants, like plaintiff, to worse conditions of confinement than 2 convicted criminals and expose them to physical danger while in their custody. ECF No. 1 at 3-5. 3 The complaint alleges that plaintiff was transferred to RCCC, placed in a large dorm with 4 almost one hundred inmates, identified as a 290 registrant, and threatened by inmates due to his 5 290-registrant status. Id. at 3. When plaintiff reported the threats to staff, he was transferred to 6 another similarly large dorm. Id. Once there, an inmate from his prior dorm was allowed to 7 follow him to his new dorm, putting him at risk if the inmate revealed plaintiff’s status as a 290 8 registrant. Id. It appears plaintiff again informed staff of the threat to his safety and was 9 transferred to a “pod” unit. Id. The same prisoner who was aware of his status as a 290 registrant 10 was again allowed to follow plaintiff to his new “pod” unit due to lack of training of staff. Id. 11 Plaintiff alleges he could have been stabbed, killed, maimed, and/or otherwise hurt due to his 12 known status as a 290 registrant. Id. 13 The complaint also alleges that defendants have “failed to create and/or maintain a 14 living/holding area for SVPs/290 registrants that equates reasonable detainment conditions of 15 even EQUAL to convicted criminals.” Id. at 4. Convicted criminals are not celled all day and 16 night, have access to showers, games, socialization, TV, radio, can socialize and have a lot of 17 yard and/or outside time. Id. In contrast, SVPs/290 registrants do not have these recreational 18 opportunities and are celled for over twenty hours a day. Id. Due to defendants’ indifference and 19 lack of training, plaintiff is living in a “bathroom” with no access to a TV, movies, music, no 20 money for food, and no ability to work out to pass the time. Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges that 21 designating a pod or unit for SVPs/290 registrants would offer equal recreational time and protect 22 SVPs/290 registrants from physical danger without jeopardizing facility security. Id. at 4. 23 Plaintiff sues each defendant in their “professional” and “personal” capacities and “others 24 under their command.” Id. at 2. By way of relief, plaintiff seeks compensation in the amount of 25 $580,000,000. Id. at 6. Plaintiff also requests that Honorable Deborah Barnes be assigned to this 26 action. Id. 27

28 34-35; Koch v. Jones, No. 2:19-cv-1535 JAM CKD, ECF Nos. 1, 25, 27-28. 1 C. Cognizable Claims 2 After conducting the screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), liberally construed, the 3 complaint sufficiently states the following claims: Fourteenth Amendment claims against the 4 current sheriff of SCMJ/RCCC and facility commanders at SCMJ and RCCC in their official 5 capacities3 for (1) failure to protect SVPs/290 registrants (a) by housing civil detainees together 6 with their criminal counterparts and (b) by failing to train SCMJ/RCCC staff on how to protect 7 SVPs/290 registrants; and (2) the punitive conditions of SVPs/290 registrants confinement at 8 RCCC; as well as Fourteenth Amendment claims against the sheriff of SCMJ/RCCC and the 9 facility commander at RCCC (from June 2025) in their individual capacities for (1) their 10 implementation of policies and/or practices of (a) housing civil detainees together with their 11 criminal counterparts and (b) subjecting civil detainees to punitive conditions of confinement; and 12 (2) their personal roles in failing to train their subordinates on how to protect and properly house 13 civil detainees at RCCC. 14 As discussed below, plaintiff will be given the option to proceed on the above claims or 15 amend the complaint. If plaintiff elects to proceed on the complaint, the current sheriff of 16 SCMJ/RCCC will be served and required to answer on the official capacity claims. Service of 17 3 Because official capacity claims against a government official are treated as suits against the 18 governmental entity, plaintiff’s official capacity claims against the sheriff of SCMJ/RCCC and 19 the facility commanders at SCMJ and RCCC are all necessarily construed as claims against Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 20 436 U.S. 658, 690-92 (1978) (“local officials sued in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983 in those cases in which . . . a local government would be suable in its own name”); 21 Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167, n.14 (1985) (“There is no longer a need to bring official-capacity actions against local government officials, for under Monell, supra, local 22 government units can be sued directly for damages and injunctive or declaratory relief.”); 23 Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 472 (1985) (a suit against a department head in his official capacity is a suit against the local government entity). Given the redundancy of this approach, 24 and the fact that the entity rather than the individual would be held responsible for official capacity claims, plaintiff should amend his complaint to name Sacramento County Sheriff’s 25 Department as the defendant for his “official capacity” claims against the sheriff and facility 26 commanders at SCMJ and RCCC. If plaintiff does not amend the complaint, the individual facility commanders may later seek to dismiss the official capacity claims against them as 27 unnecessarily redundant. See Thomas v. Baca, 703 F. App’x 508, 512 (9th Cir. 2017) (district court did not err in granting judgment on the pleadings for official-capacity claims against county 28 supervisors because they were duplicative of official-capacity claim against sheriff). 1 process against the sheriff of SCMJ/RCCC and the facility commander at RCCC on the 2 individual capacity claims, however, will not be ordered until plaintiff identifies their real names 3 and files a motion to amend the complaint to substitute their real names. See Mosier v. Cal. Dep’t 4 of Corr. & Rehab., No. 1:11-cv-1034 MJS PC, 2012 WL 2577524, at *3, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 5 92286, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 3, 2012), Robinett v. Corr. Training Facility, No. C 09-3845 SI (PR), 6 2010 WL 2867696, at *4, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76327, at *12-13 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2010). 7 D. Failure to State a Claim 8 The allegations in the complaint are not sufficient to state an individual capacity claim 9 against the facility commander at SCMJ, an Eighth Amendment claim, and/or a Fourteenth 10 Amendment Equal Protection Clause claim. 11 The claims against the facility commander at SCMJ in that person’s individual capacity 12 are insufficient because it’s unclear how the facility commander at SCMJ, a different facility than 13 the one where plaintiff was held, was involved, if at all, in the alleged conduct. To state a claim 14 against the facility commander at SCMJ, plaintiff must link the facility commander to some 15 affirmative act or omission that shows his involvement in the violation of plaintiff’s federal 16 rights. 17 Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim because the Eighth Amendment only 18 applies to prisoners who are serving criminal sentences and not to civil detainees such as plaintiff. 19 Failure to protect claims and/or claims regarding the conditions of a civil detainee’s confinement 20 are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 21 Lastly, plaintiff fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim because sex 22 offenders are not a “protected class,” and because plaintiff has not alleged that “similarly situated 23 individual”—such as SVPs/290 registrants—were intentionally treated differently without a 24 rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose. SVPs/290 registrants are not similarly 25 situated to prisoners who have been convicted of a crime. 26 It appears to the court that plaintiff may be able to allege facts to fix his Fourteenth 27 Amendment claim. Therefore, plaintiff will be given the option of filing an amended complaint. 28 //// 1 E. Options from Which Plaintiff Must Choose 2 Based on the court’s screening, plaintiff has a choice to make. After selecting an option 3 from the two options listed below, plaintiff must return the attached Notice of Election form to 4 the court within 21 days from the date of this order. 5 The first option available to plaintiff is to proceed immediately against the sheriff of 6 SCMJ/RCCC and the facility managers of SCMJ and RCCC in their individual and official 7 capacities on his Fourteenth Amendment due process claims. By choosing this option, plaintiff 8 will be agreeing to voluntarily dismiss individual capacity claims against defendant facility 9 manager at SCMJ and his Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 10 claims. The court will proceed to immediately serve the complaint and order a response from the 11 current sheriff and facility commanders of SCMJ/RCCC on the official capacity claims. Service 12 of process against the sheriff of SCMJ/RCCC and the facility commander at RCCC on the 13 individual capacity claims, however, will not be ordered until plaintiff identifies their real names 14 and files a motion to amend the complaint to substitute their real names. 15 The second option available to plaintiff is to file an amended complaint to fix the 16 problems described in Section I.D. against defendant facility manager of SCMJ and his 17 Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause claim. If plaintiff chooses this option, the court 18 will set a deadline in a subsequent order to give plaintiff time to file an amended complaint. 19 II. Requests and Motions to Assign Alternative Judge (ECF Nos. 1, 6, 14) 20 As noted above, the complaint requests that Magistrate Judge Deborah Barnes be assigned 21 to this action. ECF No. 1 at 6. Plaintiff has also filed two motions seeking the assignment of an 22 alternate judge—either Magistrate Judge Deborah Barnes or Magistrate Judge Carolyn Delaney. 23 ECF Nos. 6, 14. In each request, plaintiff explains that he seeks reassignment of this case to the 24 named magistrate judges because they have handled his past cases and are familiar with the 25 issues. ECF no. 1 at 6; ECF No. 6 at 1; ECF No. 14 at 1. Plaintiff further explains that there is 26 no issue with this case proceeding before Magistrate Judge Allison Claire and that his requests are 27 based solely on an attempt to save the undersigned time in catching up on plaintiff’s prior cases, 28 which involve the same defendants and issues. See ECF No. 6 at 1; ECF No. 14 at 1. 1 The request will be denied for the following reasons. First, plaintiff has not presented a 2 basis for the undersigned’s recusal or disqualification. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)-(b) (“Any justice, 3 judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in 4 which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned” and in certain more specific 5 circumstances, including “[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or 6 personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.”); 28 U.S.C. § 144 7 (requires that plaintiff file “a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter 8 is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party). 9 Second, plaintiff “does not have the authority to choose which judge hears this case.” Sgromo v. 10 Scott, No. 19-cv-8170 HSG, 2020 WL 6136092, at *3, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193213, at *9-10 11 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2020). Third, the undersigned has access to the documents filed in plaintiff’s 12 prior suits and can consider them to the extent, if any, that they are relevant. The prior familiarity 13 of a judge with a party is not relevant or appropriately considered. 14 III. Plain Language Summary of this Order for Party Proceeding Without a Lawyer 15 Some of the allegations in the complaint state claims against the defendants and some do 16 not. You have sufficiently stated Fourteenth Amendment due process claims against the current 17 sheriff of SCMJ/RCCC and facility commanders at SCMJ and RCCC in their official capacities, 18 which are essentially claims against Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department, for failing to 19 protect you and the punitive conditions of confinement of SVPs/290 registrants, like you, at 20 RCCC. You have also sufficiently stated individual capacity Fourteenth Amendment due process 21 claims against the June 2025 sheriff of SCMJ/RCCC and the facility commander at RCCC. 22 However, you have not stated any individual capacity claims against the facility commander at 23 SCMJ, any Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claims, or any Fourteenth 24 Amendment Equal Protection claims. 25 You have a choice to make. You may either (1) proceed immediately on your Fourteenth 26 Amendment due process claims as stated in the prior paragraph and voluntarily dismiss the other 27 claims; or, (2) try to amend the complaint. To decide whether to amend your complaint, the court 28 has attached the relevant legal standards that may govern your claims for relief. See Attachment 1 | A. Pay particular attention to these standards if you choose to file an amended complaint. 2 IV. CONCLUSION 3 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 4 1. Plaintiffs request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 12) is GRANTED. 5 2. Plaintiffs motions to assign an alternative judge to this action (ECF Nos. 6, 14) are 6 || DENIED. 7 3. Plaintiff's claims against the facility commander at SCMJ in his individual capacity do 8 || not state claims for which relief can be granted. Plaintiff also fails to state cognizable Eighth 9 || Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claims against any defendant. 10 4. Plaintiff may either (1) proceed immediately on his Fourteenth Amendment due 11 || process claims against the current sheriff of SCMJ/RCCC and the facility commanders at SCMJ 12 || and RCCC in their official capacities and against the sheriff and facility commander at RCCC at 13 || the time of the alleged incidents in their individual capacities, as set forth in Section I.C. above, 14 | or (2) file an amended complaint. 15 5. Within 21 days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete and return the 16 || attached Notice of Election form notifying the court whether he wants to proceed on the screened 17 || complaint or whether he wants to file an amended complaint. 18 6. If plaintiff does not return the form, the court will assume that he is choosing to 19 || proceed on the complaint as screened and will recommend dismissal without prejudice of 20 || plaintiffs Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause claims 21 || against all defendants, and his individual capacity claims against the facility commander at 22 | SCMJ. 23 || DATED: January 16, 2026 ~ 24 AMhan—lThne ALLISON CLAIRE 25 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 26 27 28

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROLAND THOMAS KOCH, No. 2:25-cv-1791 AC P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. NOTICE OF ELECTION 14 SHERIFF, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Check one: 18 _____ Plaintiff wants to proceed immediately on his Fourteenth Amendment due process claims 19 against the current sheriff of SCMJ/RCCC and the facility commanders at SCMJ and RCCC in their official capacities, and against the sheriff of SCMJ/RCCC and facility 20 commander at RCCC (during June 2025) in their individual capacities, without amending 21 the complaint. Plaintiff understands that by choosing this option, plaintiff’s Eighth 22 Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claims, and his individual 23 capacity claims against the facility commander at SCMJ will be voluntarily dismissed 24 without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). 25 _____ Plaintiff wants time to file an amended complaint.

26 27 DATED:_______________________

Roland Thomas Koch 28 Plaintiff pro se 1 Attachment A 2 This Attachment provides, for informational purposes only, the legal standards that may 3 apply to your claims for relief. Pay particular attention to these standards if you choose to file an 4 amended complaint. 5 I. Legal Standards Governing Amended Complaints 6 If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he must demonstrate how the conditions 7 about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Rizzo v. Goode, 8 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). Also, the complaint must specifically identify how each named 9 defendant is involved. Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). 10 There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or 11 connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Id.; Johnson v. Duffy, 12 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official 13 participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 14 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). 15 Plaintiff is also informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make 16 his amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. This is because, as a general rule, an 17 amended complaint replaces the prior complaint. Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967) 18 (citations omitted), overruled in part by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 19 2012). Therefore, in an amended complaint, every claim and every defendant must be included. 20 II. Legal Standards Governing Substantive Claims for Relief 21 A. Section 1983 22 Section 1983 provides in relevant part: 23 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 24 Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 25 deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action 26 at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 27 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, “the requirements for relief under [§] 1983 have been 28 1 articulated as: (1) a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, 2 (2) proximately caused (3) by conduct of a ‘person’ (4) acting under color of state law.” 3 Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). 4 B. “Persons” and “Official Capacity” 5 Municipalities are considered “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore may be 6 liable for causing a constitutional deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Long v. 7 County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). Local government officials are also 8 “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. 9 Under Monell, “[t]here is no longer a need to bring official-capacity actions against local 10 government officials” because “local government units can be sued directly for damages and 11 injunctive or declaratory relief.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167, n.14 (1985). A suit 12 against a department head in his official capacity is a suit against the local government entity. 13 Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 472 (1985). 14 C. Monell Claims 15 Municipalities cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of their 16 employees. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 585 at 691, 694 (1978). “Instead, it is 17 when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those 18 whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the 19 government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694. To properly plead a Monell 20 claim based on an unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy, plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) 21 he possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) the municipality had a policy; 22 (3) such policy amounts to deliberate indifference to plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) the 23 policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation. See Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 24 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997). The municipal policy at issue must be the 25 result of a “‘longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure 26 of the local government entity.’” Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ulrich 27 v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2002)). 28 1 D. Eighth Amendment 2 The Eighth Amendment only applies to prisoners and not civil detainees such as plaintiff. 3 See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931 (9th Cir. 2004). 4 E. Fourteenth Amendment 5 i. Failure to Protect 6 To state a claim for failure to protect, plaintiff must allege facts showing that: 7 (1) The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; 8 (2) Those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering 9 serious harm; 10 (3) The defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable officer in the circumstances 11 would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and 12 (4) By not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s 13 injuries. 14 Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). The allegations 15 must demonstrate “more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to 16 reckless disregard,” and “the defendant’s conduct must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. 17 ii. Conditions of Confinement 18 Condition of confinement claims by civil detainees are analyzed under the Fourteenth 19 Amendment, not the deliberate indifference standard under the Eighth Amendment. See Jones v. 20 Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 926, 934 (9th Cir. 2004) (civil detainees may be subject to “[l]egitimate, 21 non-punitive government interests” such as “maintaining jail security, and effective management 22 of [the] detention facility). “The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits punishment of detainees who 23 have not yet been convicted. Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation 24 omitted); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (“[U]nder the Due Process Clause, a detainee 25 may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.”). In 26 examining the conditions of pretrial detention, the question “is whether those conditions amount 27 to punishment of the detainee.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 535. “For a particular governmental action to 28 constitute punishment, (1) that action must cause the detainee to suffer some harm or ‘disability,’ 1 and (2) the purpose of the governmental action must be to punish the detainee.” Demery, 378 2 F.3d at 1029 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 538). “Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish 3 on the part of detention facility officials, that determination generally will turn on ‘whether an 4 alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and 5 whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it].’” Bell, 441 6 U.S. at 538 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). A court may infer punitive intent if the 7 challenged condition is “arbitrary or purposeless,” id. at 539, or if the civil detainees are subject 8 to identical, or similar, or more restrictive conditions of confinement than those under which the 9 criminally convicted are held. See Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2000) 10 (civilly confined individuals must receive “more considerate” treatment than inmates at the 11 correctional center (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982)). 12 iii. Equal Protection Clause 13 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause requires the State to treat all 14 similarly situated people equally. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 15 (1985) (citation omitted). “To state a claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a 16 plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against him 17 based upon his membership in a protected class.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th 18 Cir. 2003) (citing Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)). Alternatively, a 19 plaintiff may state an equal protection claim if he shows similarly situated individuals were 20 intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate government 21 purpose. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (citations omitted). 22 Sex offenders are not a “protected class” under the Fourteenth Amendment. Richardson 23 v. Barr, 827 F. App’x 624, 627 (9th Cir. 2020); United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1030-31 24 (9th Cir. 2001). Individuals committed under the SVPA are not similarly situated to individuals 25 committed under other civil commitment statutes. See Taylor v. San Diego Cty., 800 F.3d 1164, 26 1169 (9th Cir. 2015); Munoz v. Kolender, 208 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1136 (S.D. Cal. 2002). 27 28