Rogers v. King

161 So. 2d 258
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedJanuary 28, 1964
DocketNo. E-371
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 161 So. 2d 258 (Rogers v. King) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rogers v. King, 161 So. 2d 258 (Fla. Ct. App. 1964).

Opinions

STURGIS, Chief Judge.

D. L. Rogers and Doris Rogers, the petitioners, have applied for a writ of cer-tiorari to review an order of the Florida Real Estate Commission revoking their licenses as real estate salesmen for alleged violations of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes 1961, F.S.A. Certiorari is granted and the order is quashed in so far as it applies to the petitioners, without prejudice to the right of the Commission to punish the petitioners in like manner as by said order it punished their co-defendant, Charles H. Race.

On July 13, 1962, the Commission filed an information in five counts charging the petitioners, registered real estate salesmen, and one Charles H. Race, a registered real estate broker under whom they operated at all times pertinent to this cause, as follows:

COUNT ONE charged the petitioners with violation of Section 475.42(1) (a), Florida Statutes 1961, F.S.A.,1 by the use of certain signs which are alleged to reflect that they unlawfully held themselves out to be and operated as real estate brokers, contrary to said statute and punishable as provided by Section 475.25(1) (d), Florida Statutes 1961, F.S.A.2

COUNT TWO realleged Count One and further charged that the petitioners by the use of such signs were guilty of misrepresentation and false pretenses in violation of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes 1961, F.S.A.

COUNT THREE realleged Count One and further charged that the petitioners did [260]*260not obtain the consent of real estate broker Charles H. Race, their co-defendant, under whom they operated as salesmen, to place such signs and were thereby guilty of a breach of trust, in violation of said Chapter 475.

COUNT FOUR realleged Count Three and further charged:

“That if defendants D. L. and Doris Rogers did place or cause to be placed such signs as aforesaid with the knowledge and consent of defendant Race, then the defendant Race is guilty of aiding and assisting defendants D. L. and Doris Rogers in their aforesaid violations, false pretenses and operating under a trade name not registered with the Commission, all in violation of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes [F.S. A.].”

COUNT FIVE realleged all previous counts and further charged that by reason thereof petitioners are guilty of a course of conduct or practices which show that they are so incompetent, dishonest, negligent and untruthful that the money, property, transactions and rights of investors or those with whom they may sustain a confidential relation may not safely be entrusted to them, all in violation of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes 1961, F.S.A.

The defendant petitioners severally filed answers generally denying the material allegations of the information.

The answer of defendant Race generally denied the charges and also alleged, affirmatively: That in October 1961 he established a branch real estate brokerage office at Chiefland, Levy County, Florida, registered the same with the Commission, and engaged the petitioners as his real estate salesmen to operate same; that petitioners were duly registered as such salesmen with the Commission; that in October 1961 he inspected the signs at said branch office and found them to read: “Branch Office of Charlie Race [or Charles Race], Registered Real Estate Broker, D. L. Rogers, Salesman, Doris Rogers, Salesman," or similar words; that petitioner D. L. Rogers, without Race’s consent, employed and caused an attorney at law who had customarily handled Race’s legal affairs in Levy County to have the business conducted by Race at the Chiefland office qualified under the fictitious name law to do business in Levy County under the firm name and style of “Rogers Real Estate’’; that “said attorney failed to cause said fictitious name to be filed with the Florida Real Estate Commission”; that upon becoming informed that said branch office was being operated with signs bearing said fictitious name exposed on the side of the building, he (Race) wrote petitioner D. L. Rogers to “contact this defendanfs and D. L. Rogers’ attorney there” and become certain before continuing operations that the business of said branch office was being conducted according to law; that he (Race) made inquiry of said attorney concerning the legality of the use of said fictitious name and was advised by said attorney that all legal requirements had been met and that it was unnecessary to register said fictitious name with the Commission; that he thereafter consulted with his local (Polk County) attorney and as a consequence directed petitioner D. L. Rogers to remove the signs in dispute; that the same had been done and in lieu thereof proper signs bearing the names of Race, as broker, and of the petitioners, as salesmen, had been placed on said branch office.

The answer of defendant Race was verified under oath and evidence adduced at a hearing before an examiner — appointed by the Commission to hear and receive the testimony of the parties and report the same to the Commission with findings of fact and conclusions of law, together with recommended rulings and a recommended order— generally supports the allegations contained therein, except that there was a genuine [261]*261question as to whether Race did in fact see the objectionable signs at the place of business when he visited it in October 1961.

The evidence is undisputed that Mr. and Mrs. Rogers caused to be located or were aware that signs were located as follows:

Sign No. 1 (Commission’s Exhibit No. 1) : On the side of a marquee extending over the sidewalk in front of broker Race’s branch office in Chiefland, Florida, a sign reading “ROGERS REAL ESTATE”; and a circular sign located above the marquee, reading around or nearest the perimeter:

“ROGERS REAL ESTATE Winter Haven, Florida Branch Office CHIEFLAND”

and in the center reading:

“FARMS
RANCHES
ACREAGE”

Sign No. 2 (Commission’s Exhibit No. 2) : A sign in conspicuous lettering installed by Mr. Rogers on the ground floor glass window front of said branch office, reading:

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268 So. 2d 374 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1972)
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181 So. 2d 559 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1965)
Florida Real Estate Commission v. Rogers
176 So. 2d 65 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1965)

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Bluebook (online)
161 So. 2d 258, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rogers-v-king-fladistctapp-1964.