Drew v. Insurance Commissioner & Treasurer

330 So. 2d 794, 1976 Fla. App. LEXIS 15086
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedApril 30, 1976
DocketNo. X-427
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 330 So. 2d 794 (Drew v. Insurance Commissioner & Treasurer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Drew v. Insurance Commissioner & Treasurer, 330 So. 2d 794, 1976 Fla. App. LEXIS 15086 (Fla. Ct. App. 1976).

Opinion

RAWLS, Acting Chief Judge.

John Drew, a licensed insurance agent, seeks review of an administrative order1 entered by the Insurance Commissioner imposing an administrative fine of $2,250.00 2 and placing him on probation for a period of two years.

Drew is licensed by the Insurance Commissioner as a general lines and an ordi[795]*795nary life, including disability, insurance agent. He was employed either as a “direct lines agent”, or an “independent agent” and his earnings were based upon a percentage of the insurance premium, usually fifteen percent in the case of automobile insurance, which is the only type of insurance involved in this appeal. At some point in time, Drew decided the premium commissions he received from various insurance companies were not sufficient to compensate him for certain overhead expenses, such as long distance telephone calls, time and clerical help in servicing policies, losses on bad checks in which he not only loses his commission but loses the entire premium,3 and time spent for selling policies for which he is unable to collect commissions when the policies are subsequently cancelled. Drew, after consulting his attorney, initiated a charge to his customers of a “contingency fee” of $10.50.4 In May, 1974, Drew met with a deputy commissioner of the Insurance Department, who advised him that he was of the opinion that the contingency fee was illegal. Drew immediately ceased collecting any such fee. Nevertheless, in August of 1974, the Insurance Commissioner filed formal charges against Drew alleging that on seven different occasions he had, in procuring the sale of automobile insurance, extracted from the purchaser of the insurance a premium plus a contingency fee of $10.50. The Insurance Commissioner contended that on each occasion this collection by Drew was unlawful in that: 5

Count I: (a) He knowingly collected as a premium a sum in excess of the charge applicable to such insurance (F.S. 626.-970[2]);
(b) He collected a service fee (F.S. 626.970 [2]);
(c) He willfully used his license to circumvent the requirements of the insurance code (F.S. 626.611 [4]) ;
(d) He demonstrated lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance (F.S. 626.611 [7]);
(e) He committed fraudulent or dishonest practices (F.S. 626.611 [9]) ;
(f) He misappropriated money belonging to others in the conduct of business under his license (F.S. 626.611 [10]) ;
(g) He violated a provision of the insurance code in the dealing under his license (F.S. 626.621 [2]); and
(h) He failed to properly account for funds belonging to insurers or others (F.S. 626.561).
[796]*796Count II: In explaining to a customer and charging a contingency fee of $10.-50, Drew violated Florida Statutes 627.-403, 626.611(4), 626.611 (7), 626.611(9), 626.611(10), 626.621(2) and 626.561. “Charge I” is fully incorporated by reference.
Counts III, IV, V, VI and VII charge Drew with similar transgressions except each count names a specific individual. These counts also incorporated by reference “Charge I”.

Distilling the charges into the essence of Drew’s alleged transgressions, it is that he collected from seven named individuals a contingency fee of $10.50 each, which he candidly admitted. It appears, to use an appropriate colloquilism, that the Insurance Commissioner “threw the book at him”.

The first point raised by Drew is that the hearing procedure afforded did not comport with elemental principles of “due process”, because he' was subject to “house justice”.6 The administrative process utilized did not, as a matter of law, deprive Drew of a fair and impartial hearing.7 However, the transcript of the proceedings discloses a total lack of impartiality on the part of the hearing examiner. Drew called one witness other than himself. On direct examination that witness’s testimony encompassed six and one-half pages. The commissioner’s trial counsel’s cross examination of this witness is reported in three and one-half pages. The “impartial” hearing examiner then proceeded to cross examine the witness and, in many instances, badgered her for a total of fourteen pages. Similar conduct is reflected in the examiner’s extensive cross examination of Mr. Drew.8 An administrative proceeding should provide a citizen with a fair, open, and impartial hearing.9 Such was not allowed Mr. Drew in the instant proceeding.

At the outset of the hearing, Mr. Drew stipulated that he sold insurance to the persons named in each charge, that he collected the premiums from each of these persons as alleged in each charge, and that he collected a contingency fee in addition to the premium in each charge. Thus, the evidence in this case is unquestionably sufficient to support the examiner’s finding that Mr. Drew was guilty of violation of Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, by charging and collecting a contingency fee of $10.50 from each of the seven named purchasers of automobile insurance.

Upon fully reviewing this record, we address ourselves to a consideration of the severity of the punishment meted out to Mr. Drew. As in Rogers v. King,10 Mr. Drew consulted with his attorney prior to instituting the contingency fee charge, and upon being advised by the deputy commissioner that in his opinion such constituted a violation, Drew immediately desisted from such practices. Upon the authority of Rogers, supra, we modify the order of the Insurance Commissioner. Paragraph one, requiring Mr. Drew to pay an administrative monetary fine of $2,250.00; paragraph two, placing Mr. Drew on probation; and paragraphs three (a) and four, specifying certain terms and conditions of probation, are hereby quashed. Paragraphs three (b) and three (c), requiring Dr. Drew to refund the contingency fee to [797]*797each customer from whom the fee was collected, and paragraph three (d), requiring Dr. Drew to cease and desist from violating insurance rules, regulations and laws, are affirmed.

MILLS and SMITH, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)
330 So. 2d 794, 1976 Fla. App. LEXIS 15086, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/drew-v-insurance-commissioner-treasurer-fladistctapp-1976.