MANION, Circuit Judge.
Two-year-old Tiffany Todd died tragically when four-year-old Cori Smith used a Bic lighter to start a fire in Tiffany’s bedroom. Tiffany’s estate sued the lighter manufacturer and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. After rehearing the appeal en banc,1 a majority of [1404]*1404this court concluded that the warning printed on the lighter — “KEEP OUT OF REACH OF CHILDREN” — was adequate, and that summary judgment on the issue of duty to warn was proper. However, to ensure that the law we applied on the other issues in the case was genuine state law, we certified to the Illinois Supreme Court questions which examined the proper application of the consumer contemplation test and the risk-utility test under Illinois products liability law. The Illinois Supreme Court promptly declined to answer the certified questions. These issues thus return to this court sitting en banc.
Generally, this case concerns Illinois strict products liability law. In Illinois and elsewhere, strict products liability law evolved as a “special rule applicable to sellers of products”,2 which went beyond the traditional boundaries of warranty and negligence law, to provide a broader method of recovery for persons injured by defective products. See William L. Prosser, Law of Torts, 641-682 (4th ed. 1971). Although the scope of strict products liability law is broader than negligence or warranty law, it is not unlimited. Only those who sell “unreasonably dangerous” products fall within its reach. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.
In this case we consider whether a manufacturer should be subject to liability for producing a disposable lighter which a child used to start a deadly fire. This inquiry pivots on one basic question: whether a disposable fighter is unreasonably dangerous under Illinois strict products liability law. The district court determined that a lighter is not unreasonably dangerous, and granted summary judgment for the manufacturer. The plaintiff appeals. We now affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
I. Background
Two young families, the Smiths and the Todds, shared a house in rural Earlville, Illinois. All four adults in the house smoked, and all used disposable cigarette lighters. About a week before the fire which caused the death in this case, four-year-old Cori Smith got hold of one of these fighters and set a small fire in her parents’ bedroom. The fire was quickly extinguished, and Cori’s parents admonished her never to play with lighters or matches. The adults also warned the other five children who lived in the house about the dangers of fire.
The next Sunday, March 27, 1988, Cori awoke before her parents and went downstairs, where her brother was watching cartoons. She spied a green lighter on an end-table in the living room. She took the lighter upstairs into a bedroom where twenty-two month old Tiffany Todd was sleeping. Cori used the lighter to ignite some papers which were on the floor. She then took the fighter back downstairs and replaced it on the end-table. The adults did not wake in time to prevent the ensuing conflagration. Tiffany Todd was killed in the fire. Everyone else escaped unharmed.
On behalf of her estate, Tiffany’s father, Rodney Todd, sued the fighter’s manufacturer, Bic Corporation, claiming that the company was negligent and strictly liable for selling a defective product. Todd rested both his negligence and strict liability claims primarily on allegations that the fighter was unreasonably dangerous because it did not include a child-resistant feature, and did not provide an adequate warning. After some discovery, Bic moved for summary judgment. Bic never denied that it was possible to manufacture a fighter with child-resistant features. In fact, undisputed evidence adduced in discovery showed that at the time of the fire Bic had developed a prototype fighter which was child-resistant — because it required greater dexterity to operate — although not child proof. Bic contended, however, that the fighter Cori used was not unreasonably dangerous to consumers. Bic also vigorously defended the adequacy of the warning it placed on the fighter. The warning on the lighter which Cori found on the end-table while her parents slept, read simply, “KEEP OUT OF REACH OF CHILDREN.”
[1405]*1405In a comprehensive order, the district court granted summary judgment for Bic. The court determined that an ordinary lighter, which did nothing more than provide the small flame it was intended to provide, was not defective; therefore, Bic was neither strictly liable nor negligent. The court also considered the lighter’s warning and concluded that it was adequate. Finally, the court addressed the various public policy arguments Todd raised in favor of imposing liability on Bic. The court dismissed these arguments out-of-hand, noting that “public policy only requires holding manufacturers and sellers liable if their product is found to be defective or unreasonably dangerous....” Todd v. Societe Bic, No. 90 C 5487 at page 11, 1992 WL 4971 (N.D.Ill. January 7, 1992).
Todd appealed, claiming that the district court ignored questions of fact about the inherent defects in disposable lighters. He maintained that Illinois authorized two tests to determine whether a product is unreasonably dangerous: the consumer contemplation test and the risk-utility test. He argued that a disposable lighter might be considered unreasonably dangerous under either test. He also insisted that the district court’s failure to even consider aspects of the risk-utility test required reversal of the summary judgment. Finally, he continued to challenge the adequacy of the warning, claiming that deficiencies in the warning, standing alone, rendered the fighter unreasonably dangerous.
A divided panel of this court agreed with Todd and reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. 991 F.2d 1334 (1993). The full court vacated that holding, and decided to rehear the case era banc. 991 F.2d 1344 (1993). “Concern about the implications of the panel’s reasoning lead the full court to vacate the panel’s decision and set the case for rehearing era banc.” Todd, 9 F.3d at 1218. After the rehearing, the full court was divided on what the proper disposition of this case should be. The court unanimously agreed that the district court was correct in its conclusion that the warning on the fighter was adequate as a matter of law. However, a majority of the court decided to certify certain questions about strict products liability law to the Illinois Supreme Court. Todd, 9 F.3d at 1216.
The Illinois Supreme Court declined certification. Todd, No. 7643 (November 22, 1993). That decision placed this case back before the era banc court. We will resolve the issues of state law which this case presents in accordance with the decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court. See Charles A Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4507 at 89 (1982) (“federal court must determine issues of state law as it believes the highest court of the state would determine them”). Where areas of state law are not developed, we will resort to other persuasive authority in an attempt to determine what the Illinois Supreme Court would decide. See Heller Intern. Corp. v. Sharp, 974 F.2d 850, 858 (7th Cir.1992).
II. Analysis
A Section J/.02A
Strict products liability grew out of a jurisprudential movement to adjust traditional tort and warranty theories in order to facilitate recovery for consumers injured by defective products. See William L. Prosser, Law of Torts, 641-682 (4th ed. 1971). This movement spawned the notion that a manufacturer should be liable to an injured consumer regardless of the degree of care employed in producing the product. Id. at 656-657. The concept of strict products liability gained widespread acceptance in the early 1960’s after the American Law Institute reduced the broad hypothesis to more definite standards when drafting the Second Restatement of Torts, Section 402A. Illinois soon joined other jurisdiction in adopting Section 402A, Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
Negligence and warranty theories are still available for plaintiffs injured by defective products. See Section 402A, cmts. a and m. In fact, Todd has made a negligence claim in this case, which we will address later. But injured plaintiffs seem to favor strict products liability, primarily, because it does not include traditional warranty law’s damage and privity limitations, or traditional negli[1406]*1406gence law’s fault element. See Section 402A, emts. a and m; see also Suvada, 210 N.E.2d 182 (providing history of strict products liability in relation to traditional contract and tort law). While broader than historic negligence and warranty law, strict products liability is not all-encompassing; it does not cover every injury involving a product. Some aggressive litigants, nevertheless, consider Section 402A as a mandate to compensate every consumer injured by a manufactured product. The Illinois Supreme Court has specifically criticized this approach on a number of occasions. See, e.g., Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill.2d 26, 37 Ill.Dec. 304, 309, 402 N.E.2d 194, 199 (1980) (“[sjtrict liability is not the equivalent of absolute liability”); Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 97 Ill.2d 104, 73 Ill.Dec. 337, 340, 454 N.E.2d 197, 200 (1983) (“imposition of strict liability was not meant to make the manufacturer an absolute insurer”); Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 Ill.2d 222, 148 Ill.Dec. 22, 42, 560 N.E.2d 824, 344 (1990) (unwarranted expansion of strict liability law is not appropriate “to achieve what is perceived as socially satisfying result.”).
Therefore, although broad, strict products liability law is limited by certain formulas and boundaries. Section 402A generally sets forth these limitations:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
The comments to Section 402A also define its limits. Basically, in order to recover under that section, “[t]he plaintiffs must prove that their injury or damage resulted from the condition of the product, that the condition was an unreasonably dangerous one and that the condition existed at the time it left the manufacturer’s control.” Suvada, 210 N.E.2d at 188.
In this case, the district court applied Section 402A to the undisputed facts, and determined that a cigarette lighter is not unreasonably dangerous. Whether a product may be considered unreasonably dangerous is a question of Illinois law which we review de novo. Derrico v. Bungee Intern. Mfg. Co., 989 F.2d 247, 249 (7th Cir.1993); Belline v. K-Mart Corp., 940 F.2d 184, 186 (7th Cir.1991).
1. Consumer Contemplation Test.
Section 402A authorizes a simple test to determine whether a product is unreasonably dangerous: “[t]he article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.” Section 402A, cmt. i. That test has come to be known as the consumer contemplation test. W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 698-99 (5th ed. 1984). The Illinois Supreme Court follows the Restatement’s formulation of the test almost verbatim: “[a] product is ‘unreasonably dangerous’ when it is ‘dangerous to extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.’” Lamkin v. Towner, 138 Ill.2d 510, 150 Ill.Dec. 562, 570, 563 N.E.2d 449, 457 (1990).
The consumer contemplation test separates defective products from the universe of ordinary products which may be involved in causing injury. Under this test, a product is only considered defective or unreasonably dangerous if it fails to perform in a manner [1407]*1407the ordinary consumer would expect. Therefore, a pair of rubber soled shoes are not unreasonably dangerous simply because the person wearing them slips on a wet floor, because “[i]t is a matter of common knowledge that shoes are more likely to slip when wet than dry....” Fanning v. LeMay, 38 Ill.2d 209, 230 N.E.2d 182, 184 (1967). But if a hammer breaks when striking a steel peg, sending a metal fragment into the user’s eye, the hammer is unreasonably dangerous because ordinary consumers do not expect hammers. to chip on impact. Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill.2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969). Law reporters are full of cases illustrating the important distinction between those products that meet consumer expectations and those that do not. The Restatement’s drafters provided a simple exercise to clarify this distinction:
Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some people drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whisky, containing a dangerous amount of fuel oil, is unreasonably dangerous. Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous. Good butter is not unreasonably dangerous merely because, if such be the case, it deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to heart attacks; but bad butter, contaminated with poisonous fish oil, is unreasonably dangerous.
Section 402A, cmt. i.
The consumer contemplation test is an important aspect of Section 402A, because it prevents imposing absolute liability on manufacturers. Without this test, injured plaintiffs would be heard to argue that the fact of their injury establishes a product’s dangerous propensities. The test heads off this type of after-the-fact rationale by recognizing that virtually any product can cause injury when put to certain uses: “ordinary sugar is deadly poison to diabetics, and caster oil found use under Mussolini as an instrument of torture.” Section 402 A, cmt. i. The consumer contemplation test assures that products are not considered unreasonably dangerous simply because they have conceivable unsafe uses. The test focuses not in hindsight on the injury which occurred, but on the ordinary consumer’s expectations when purchasing and using the product.
This discussion brings us to the seminal question in this case: what does an ordinary consumer expect when he purchases a lighter? Quite obviously, the consumer expects the lighter, when activated, to provide a flame. That is exactly how the lighter in this case performed. But the lighter was used to do more; the small flame it produced was used to ignite some papers, causing a deadly fire. The ordinary consumer expects that if a lighter’s ñamé is put to some other combustible object, a larger fire ensues. This makes a lighter dangerous. But it does not make a lighter unreasonably dangerous under the consumer contemplation test. As the Illinois Supreme Court has stated, “Virtually any product is capable of producing injury when put to certain uses or misuses .... Injuries are not compensable in products liability if they derive merely from those inherent properties of a product which are obvious to all who come in contact with the product. The injuries must derive' from a distinct defect in the product, a defect which subjects those exposed to the product to an unreasonable risk of harm.” Hunt v. Blasius, 74 Ill.2d 203, 23 Ill.Dec. 574, 578, 384 N.E.2d 368, 372 (1978). The fact that a lighter starts a fire is one of its inherent properties. That fact does not breach consumer expectations; really it fulfills them. Therefore, a lighter which does nothing more than provide a small flame is not unreasonably dangerous under the consumer contemplation' test.
a. Foreseeable user versus ordinary consumer.
The plaintiff argues that instead of looking to the expectations of the ordinary consumer, we should look to those of the foreseeable user—in this case a child—when assessing liability under the consumer contemplation test. This expansive view is required, the plaintiff contends, because a child [1408]*1408ultimately used a lighter in this case.3 Some of the leading academic commentators in the area of strict products liability support a reformulation of the consumer contemplation test which measures the expectations of foreseeable users, rather than ordinary consumers. See W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Kee-ton on Torts, 698-99 (5th ed. 1984). But we need not concern ourselves with academic speculation when Illinois law is clear. Both the Restatement and the Illinois cases which have adopted it, speak in terms of the “ordinary consumer ... with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to [the product’s] characteristics.” See Lamkin, 150 Ill.Dec. at 570, 563 N.E.2d at 457. We therefore look to the expectations of the ordinary consumer, and not the foreseeable user, when assessing liability under the consumer contemplation test.4
Reason dictates that children are not ordinary consumers under the consumer contemplation test. Unlike ordinary consumers, children lack knowledge common to the community regarding consumer products. This lack of knowledge makes children particularly unfit subjects for any test meant to measure expectations. Consider the absurd results if courts were required to look to the expectations of children when gauging a product’s dangerousness. The pair of shoes in Fanning, which the Illinois Supreme Court considered not defective because “[i]t is a matter of common knowledge that shoes are more likely to slip when wet than dry”, would be considered defective under any formulation of the consumer contemplation test which measured a child’s expectations. Fanning, 230 N.E.2d at 184. Children do not share the community’s knowledge about a shoe’s propensity to slip when wet.
Nor do children perceive the dangers inherent in just about any product. We all had the experience as children of putting a hand on a hot pot or stove. Recall the story about the unfortunate child who expected his Superman cape to allow him to fly. Children engage in these dangerous activities because, in their limited experience, they cannot comprehend the possibility of injury. Any reformulation of the consumer contemplation test which requires a court or jury to assess liability based on a child’s product expectations, removes well-designed limitations from Section 402A in all cases where a child is injured. Under such a test, manufacturers would face absolute liability every time a child was injured by a product. The child’s attorney would march into court and claim the product failed to perform in the manner the child expected. The attorney would be right, but the failure would be due not to a deficiency in the product, but to the natural deficiency children have in their knowledge of consumer products.
In any event, no Illinois court authorizes an expansion of the consumer contemplation test to the realm of foreseeable users. Rather, Illinois courts, as well as the Restatement, confine the test to the ordinary consumer. It works an absurdity to abandon the ordinary consumer standard for the foreseeable user standard, especially where children are concerned. Children lack knowledge about consumer products. Therefore, children should not be the standard to measure consumer expectations. In the case [1409]*1409presently before the court, the ordinary consumer — if not a four-year-old child — is deemed to expect that lighters cause fires. Therefore, lighters are not unreasonably dangerous.5
2. Risk-Utility Test.
Under the Restatement, the consumer contemplation test was the only standard authorized to determine whether a product was unreasonably dangerous. But tort commentators soon began to express dissatisfaction with the test’s restrictions on manufacturer liability. These criticisms evolved into case law. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d 121, 104 Cal.Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153 (1972), and Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal.3d 413, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443 (1978), and articles cited therein. The California Supreme Court, which earlier had pioneered the movement away from traditional liability based on contract and negligence, to a theory of strict products liability, see Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963), generated a new test — the risk-utility test — to be used in defective design cases. This innovation began in Cronin and culminated in Barker, where the court squarely confronted whát it perceived as the limitations of the consumer contemplation test.
Barker involved a construction worker who was seriously injured when the lift truck he was operating became unbalanced on a steep grade, and dropped the lumber it was carrying. The worker jumped out of the cab of the truck when it started to tip. Unfortunately, he jumped directly into the path of the falling lumber. He sued the truck manufacturer claiming, among other things, that the truck should have been equipped with “outriggers” — large mechanical arms extending from the sides of the machine — to provide stability on steep grades. The manufae-turer responded that the truck was not meant for steep terrain — that cranes and not lift trucks were designed to be used on steep terrain.
At the trial, the court instructed the jury under the consumer contemplation test, and the jury returned a verdict for the manufacturer. Essentially, the jury found that the ordinary consumer would expect the lift truck to tip on steep terrain. The California Supreme Court reversed, on the ground that the consumer contemplation test represented “undue restriction on the application of strict liability principles.” Barker, 143 Cal.Rptr. at 233, 573 P.2d at 451. The court explained that “[i]n Cronin ... we flatly rejected the suggestion that recovery in a products liability action should be permitted only if a product is more dangerous than contemplated by the average consumer, refusing to permit the low esteem in which the public might hold a dangerous product to diminish the manufacturer’s liability for injuries caused by the product.” Id. To deal with this perceived inadequacy, the court fashioned a second test to gauge a manufacturer’s liability for designing a defective product. The court specifically held that “a product may be found defective in design, even if it satisfies ordinary consumer expectations, if through hindsight the jury determines that the product’s design embodies ‘excessive preventable danger,’ or, in other words, if the jury finds that the risk of danger inherent in the challenged design outweighs the benefit of such design.” Id. at 236, 573 P.2d at 454. By introducing this element of hindsight into the strict liability equation, the so-called risk-utility test fundamentally changed that equation. Under the new test, juries would no longer be asked merely to view the foresight of the ordinary consumer. Instead, juries would be asked, in hindsight, to weigh the risk inherent in the product’s design.6
[1410]*1410The California Supreme Court decided Barker on January 16, 1978. The case did not gain immediate acceptance in other jurisdictions. It represented a significant expansion upon the Restatement approach, which itself was a significant expansion upon traditional contract and tort law.7 Within a year after Barker was decided, the Illinois Supreme Court continued to cling exclusively to the Restatement approach, declaring in a decision on December 4, 1978 that “[a]n action is not maintainable in products liability merely because the design used was not the safest possible.” Hunt, 23 Ill.Dec. at 578, 384 N.E.2d at 372. But within two months the court seemed to change course. In Anderson v. Hyster Co., 74 Ill.2d 364, 24 Ill.Dec. 549, 551, 385 N.E.2d 690, 692 (1979), the court declared, without citation, that a design defect may be proved “by evidence of the availability and feasibility of alternative designs at the time of its manufacture, or that the design used did not conform with the design standard of the industry, design guidelines provided by authoritative voluntary association or design criteria set by legislation or governmental regulations.” Later Illinois cases which have applied variations of the risk-utility test have cited Anderson and Barker as authority for the test. See Lamkin, 150 Ill.Dec. at 570, 563 N.E.2d at 457; Palmer v. Avco Distributing Corp., 82 Ill.2d 211, 45 Ill.Dec. 377, 381, 412 N.E.2d 959, 963 (1980); Kerns v. Engelke, 76 Ill.2d 154, 28 Ill.Dec. 500, 505, 390 N.E.2d 859, 864 (1979).
Thus did the risk-utility test gain root in Illinois strict products liability law. How deeply it is rooted remains another question. True, the Illinois Supreme Court has sanctioned variations of the test, in certain cases, to determine whether a product is unreasonably dangerous. See, e.g., Lamkin, 150 Ill. Dec. at 570, 563 N.E.2d at 457; Palmer, 45 Ill.Dec. at 382, 412 N.E.2d at 964; Kerns, 28 Ill.Dec. at 506, 390 N.E.2d at 865; and Anderson, 24 Ill.Dec. at 551, 385 N.E.2d at 692. But in other cases, the court has summarily determined that certain products simply are not unreasonably dangerous, without reference to the test. See West v. Deere & Co., 145 Ill.2d 177, 164 Ill.Dec. 122, 123-24, 582 N.E.2d 685, 686-87 (1991); Dubin v. Michael Reese Hospital, 83 Ill.2d 277, 47 Ill.Dec. 345, 347, 415 N.E.2d 350, 352 (1980); Hunt, 23 Ill.Dec. at 578, 384 N.E.2d at 372. The idea that the test is a sweeping pronouncement of strict products liability law, meant to apply to all products, comes from some broad language in Lamkin, where the court stated: “[a] plaintiff may demonstrate that a product is defective in design, so as to subject a retailer and a manufacturer to strict liability for resulting injuries, in one of two ways: (1) by introducing evidence that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner or (2) by introducing evidence that the product’s design proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to prove that on balance the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such designs.” Lamkin, 150 Ill.Dec. at 570, 563 N.E.2d at 457.
Does this pronouncement require that we mechanically apply the risk-utility test to all design defect claims, or may we— as the Illinois Supreme Court has done on occasion — summarily determine that a product is not defective? In Scoby v. Vulcan-Hart Corp., 211 Ill.App.3d 106, 155 Ill.Dec. 536, 569 N.E.2d 1147 (1991), an Illinois Appellate Court grappled with this question in a case similar to this one, and its decision is [1411]*1411instructive. There, the plaintiff sued a deep fat fryer manufacturer for burns he sustained when he slipped at work and his arm became submerged in the hot oil contained in the fryer. He argued that the fryer should have had a simple cover, which the parties agreed would have prevented the injury. The trial court granted summary judgment for the fryer manufacturer and the appellate court affirmed, determining that the fryer without a.cover was not unreasonably dangerous. The appellate court considered whether Lamkin’s broad authorization of the risk-utility test (the appellate court called this the danger-utility test), meant that the test should be applied in all eases. The court determined that in certain cases, the risk-utility test should not be applied, stating:
We do not deem Lamkin or other cases applying aspects of the danger-utility test intend that all manufacturers of products ... should be subject to liability depending on the trier of fact’s balancing under that test, when suit is brought by one injured by such a product. Somewhere, a line must be drawn beyond which the danger-utility test cannot be applied. Considering not only the obvious nature of the danger here but, also, the simple nature of the mechanism involved, we conclude that the circuit court properly applied only the consumer-user contemplation test. Under that test, summary judgment for the defendant was clearly proper.
Scoby, 155 Ill.Dec. at 540, 569 N.E.2d at 1151.
The court in Scoby alluded to the absurdity of applying the risk-utility test to simple but obviously dangerous products. Consider, as the defendant in Scoby proposed, the ordinary kitchen knife. Suppose someone cut by such a knife sued its manufacturer for failing to design a permanent retractable sheath for the knife. Should that person be able to avoid summary judgment simply by presenting statistics showing the feasibility of a permanent retractable sheath? The logical answer is no. As the court in Scoby recognized “many manufactured products have potential to cause substantial injury and most can be made safer by different design.” Scoby, 155 Ill.Dec. at 540, 569 N.E.2d at 1151. For certain products, at least, the manufacturer should not be subject to liability just because it failed to choose the safest (and probably more expensive) alternative design.
So how then do we read the broad statement in Lamkin ? Really, the statement says nothing more than Illinois authorizes the risk-utility test in products liability cases. The statement does not address whether this authorization extends to simple but obviously dangerous products. To the extent that one might read the statement as covering simple but obviously dangerous products, the statement is mere dictum. Indeed, Lamkin had nothing to do with such products; therefore, whether or not the risk-utility test is appropriate for such products was not a question presented to the court. If the court answered that question—as those who would apply the risk-utility test to this ease suggest—the answer was “not addressed to the outcome of the ... case and therefore perhaps not as fully considered as it would have been if essential to the outcome.” United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, 292 (7th Cir.1988). In Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. v. Maggio, 976 F.2d 320, 323 (7th Cir.1992), we discussed the force we should give to state supreme court dicta in a diversity case:
Judicial opinions .are frequently drafted in haste, with imperfect foresight, and without due regard for the possibility that words or phrases or sentences may be taken out of context and treated as doctrines. We shouldn’t like this done to our opinions and are therefore reluctant to do it to the opinions of other courts. No court, even a federal court in a diversity suit, is obliged to treat a dictum of another court (or, for that matter, its own dicta) as binding precedent.
No Illinois court has applied the risk-utility test to a simple but obviously dangerous product. We need not expand upon the Illinois Supreme Court’s already broad statement in Lamkin, and apply the test to such a product. If the question before us was, simply, “Does Illinois authorize the risk-utility test to determine whether a product is unreasonably dangerous?” the answer would be clear. Certainly, the Illinois Supreme Court has authorized use of the test [1412]*1412in some cases. But the question before us is slightly different: “Does Illinois authorize use of the risk-utility test for a simple product which poses an obvious danger?” The answer to this question is not so clear. The Illinois Supreme Court has never applied the test to such a product. An intermediate appellate court has determined that it never will. Scoby, 155 Ill.Dec. at 540, 569 N.E.2d at 1151. Our task in a diversity case is to predict what the state’s highest court would do if presented with the same issue. See Heller, 974 F.2d at 858; see also Wright, Miller and Cooper, § 4507 at 94 (“If a state’s highest court has not ruled on an issue, intermediate appellate court decisions constitute the next best indicia of what state law is.”).8 Based on our examination of past and current Illinois case law, we agree with the appellate court which decided Scoby, that the Illinois Supreme Court would not apply the risk-utility test to simple but obviously dangerous products. Accord Mason v. Ashland Exploration, Inc., 965 F.2d 1421, 1428 (7th Cir.1992) (treating Scoby as authoritative reading of Lamkin).
In summary, whether Illinois authorizes use of the risk-utility test is not disputed; clearly it does. See Lamkin, 150 Ill.Dec. at 570, 563 N.E.2d at 457. Whether this authorization requires that courts apply the test to all products liability eases is a point of contention. See Scoby, 155 Ill.Dec. at 540, 569 N.E.2d at 1151. When given a choice between an interpretation of Illinois law which reasonably restricts liability, and one which greatly expands liability, wé should choose the narrower and more reasonable path (at least until the Illinois Supreme Court tells us differently). The dictum in Lamkin notwithstanding, we may assume, as an Illinois appellate court has done, that the Illinois Supreme Court would not apply the risk-utility test to a simple but obviously dangerous product. An ordinary disposable lighter is such a product. Therefore, the district court was correct to determine that such a lighter is obviously dangerous, but not unreasonably dangerous, without reference to the risk-utility test.
B. Other Issues
Two final issues remain for our consideration. First, Todd has appealed the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment for Bic on his negligence claim. In his complaint, Todd claimed that Bic was negligent for breaching its duty to manufacture a safe lighter. It is true that manufacturers have a legal duty, under Illinois negligence and strict products liability law, to produce reasonably safe products. Coney, 73 Ill.Dec. at 343, 454 N.E.2d at 203. If the manufacturer breaches this duty, it is strictly liable; if the manufacturer breaches this duty because it failed to employ the requisite degree of care, it is also negligent. Id.; see also Phillips v. United States Waco Corp., 163 Ill.App.3d 410, 114 Ill.Dec. 515, 519, 516 N.E.2d 670, 674 (1987) (“the breach of duty is the same in both a negligence and a strict products liability claim, but the key distinction between a negligence claim and a strict liability claim lies in the fault concept.”). We have already determined that the lighter in question was not unreasonably dangerous. It follows that Bic did not breach its duty to produce a reasonably safe product.
Secondly, in his appellate brief, Todd claimed that the warning Bic placed on the lighter was insufficient, and that the insufficiency made the lighter unreasonably dangerous. In the course of certifying this case to the Illinois Supreme Court, however, we decided the warning issue. We agreed, with the district court that the warning Bic placed on the lighter was adequate as a matter of law. See Todd, 9 F.3d at 1219 (“Bic accordingly is entitled to summary judgment on the warning branch of this case.’.’). We incorporate the sum and substance of that decision into this opinion. Certainly, the plain admo[1413]*1413nition “KEEP OUT OF REACH OF CHILDREN” provided adequate warning that the cigarette lighter should have been kept out of the reach of four-year-old Cori Smith.
III. Conclusion
The district court was correct in its conclusion that, as a matter of law, an ordinary disposable cigarette lighter is not unreasonably dangerous. Because Bic did not produce an unreasonably dangerous product, it was neither strictly liable nor negligent. Therefore, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.