Roderick Washington v.Shen Jay Fern

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedJune 24, 2022
Docket2:22-cv-03564
StatusUnknown

This text of Roderick Washington v.Shen Jay Fern (Roderick Washington v.Shen Jay Fern) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Roderick Washington v.Shen Jay Fern, (C.D. Cal. 2022).

Opinion

Case 2:22-cv-03564-CBM-AS Document 5 Filed 06/24/22 Page 1 of 9 Page ID #:43

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 RODERICK WASHINGTON, ) Case No. CV 22-03564-CBM (AS) ) 13 Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER TO PAY THE FILING FEE OR 14 v. ) SHOW CAUSE WHY THIS ACTION ) SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED PURSUANT 15 SHEN Jay FERN, et al., ) TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) ) 16 Defendants. ) ) 17 ) 18 19 Plaintiff filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on May 23, 2022. 20 (Dkt. No. 1). Plaintiff did not prepay the filing fees. Instead, Plaintiff filed a Request to Proceed 21 WIthout Prepayment of Filing Fees, or In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Request”). (DKt No. 2). Plaintiff’s 22 IFP Request is accompanied by a Trust Account Statement from the Los Angeles County Sheriff's 23 Department that is dated May 9, 2022. (Dkt. No. 2 at 3). Plaintiff states that he is a pre-trial 24 detainee at the Los Angeles Men’s Central Jail. The complaint names thirteen defendants 25 including judges with the Los Angeles County Superior Court, members of the Los Angeles County 26 Sheriff’s Department, Deputy District Attorneys, and counsel for the Los Angeles County District 27 Attorney’s Office. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages based on asserted claims of constitutional 28 deprivations arising from Plaintiff’s arrest and prosecution in various criminal matters, including Case 2:22-cv-03564-CBM-AS Document 5 Filed 06/24/22 Page 2 of 9 Page ID #:44

1 the fabrication of evidence, denial of his rights to a speedy preliminary hearing and a speedy trial, 2 denial of access to the law library and the Courts, and cruel and unusual punishment based on 3 his placement in administrative segregation.1 4 5 Plaintiff’s litigation history reflects that he is subject to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 6 Courts may raise § 1915(g) sua sponte. See, e.g., Strope v. Cummings, 653 F.3d 1271, 1273 7 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e may raise the issue of [Section 1915(g)] strikes sua sponte”; and a district 8 court has the discretion to revoke IFP privilege); Harris v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 18, 23 (2nd 9 Cir. 2010) (“district courts may apply the three strikes rule sua sponte”); Maxton v. Bureau of 10 Prisons Dir., 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 121840, at *4, 2019 WL 3287832 (C.D. Cal. July 18, 2019) 11 (“Courts may raise Section 1915(g) sua sponte and dismiss the action after providing the plaintiff 12 with an opportunity to be heard.”). Further, the provisions of § 1915(g) are not limited to actions 13 that prisoners filed subsequent to the effective date of the statute. See, e.g., Tierney v. Kupers, 14 128 F.3d 1310, 1311 (9th Cir. 1997) (§ 1915(g) applies to cases dismissed prior to the current 15 proceedings, which includes “dismissals that preceded the effective date of the act”); see also 16 Witherow v. Crawford, 339 Fed. Appx. 785 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Tierney, 128 F.3d at 1311-12, 17 to support the applicability of § 1915(g) to actions dismissed prior to the statute’s effective date) 18 (now citable for its persuasive value pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3). 19 20 Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner may not “bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil 21 action or proceeding” without prepayment of the filing fees: 22 if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was 23 dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious 24 25 1 The Court has issued Orders directing Plaintiff to pay the Filing Fee or Show Cause why 26 this action should not be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) in two cases that Plaintiff has filed in this district nearly contemporaneously with this action: Case No. CV 22-1552-GW (AS), 27 filed on March 7, 2022, and Case No. CV 22-1699-CBM (AS), filed on March 14, 2022. The Court notes that the Complaint filed in this action asserts claims that are duplicative of claims asserted 28 in the actions filed on March 7 and march 14, 2022. 2 Case 2:22-cv-03564-CBM-AS Document 5 Filed 06/24/22 Page 3 of 9 Page ID #:45

1 physical injury. 2 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Such dismissal is deemed a “strike.” As used in § 1915(g), a “prisoner” is 3 “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, 4 or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, 5 probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). 6 7 The Ninth Circuit has held that the phrase “fails to state a claim on which relief may be 8 granted” as used in § 1915(g), parallels the language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and carries the 9 same interpretation; that the word “frivolous” refers to a case that is “of little weight or importance: 10 having no basis in law or fact”; and the word “malicious” refers to a case “filed with the ‘intention 11 or desire to harm another.’” See Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining 12 the terms used in § 1915(g)). In addition, the Ninth Circuit has held that the prior denial of IFP 13 status on the basis of frivolity or failure to state a claim constitutes a “strike” for purposes of 14 §1915(g)). See O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2008). Further, the Supreme 15 Court has confirmed that § 1915(g) applies “to any dismissal for failure to state a claim, whether 16 with prejudice or without.” Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1723, 207 L. Ed. 2d, 132 17 (2020). 18 19 Once a plaintiff has accumulated three “strikes,” he is prohibited from pursuing any 20 subsequent civil action in federal court without prepayment of the filing fees, unless he makes a 21 showing that he was “under imminent danger of serious physical injury” based on the 22 circumstances “at the time the complaint was filed, not at some earlier or later time.” Andrews v. 23 Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 2007); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Further, “the prisoner 24 bears the ultimate burden of persuading the court that § 1915(g) does not preclude IFP status.” 25 Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2015). 26 27 In light of the foregoing standards, the Court takes judicial notice of the following prior civil 28 actions filed by Plaintiff (while he was a prisoner) in the United States District Courts of California 3 Case 2:22-cv-03564-CBM-AS Document 5 Filed 06/24/22 Page 4 of 9 Page ID #:46

1 that qualify as “strikes” for purposes of § 1915(g). See Fed. R.

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Related

Harris v. City of New York
607 F.3d 18 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Strope v. Cummings
653 F.3d 1271 (Tenth Circuit, 2011)
Andrews v. Cervantes
493 F.3d 1047 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
O'NEAL v. Price
531 F.3d 1146 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Andrews v. King
398 F.3d 1113 (Ninth Circuit, 2005)
Thomas Richey v. D. Dahne
807 F.3d 1202 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
Adonai El-Shaddai v. Jeffrey Wang, Md
833 F.3d 1036 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez
590 U.S. 595 (Supreme Court, 2020)
Tierney v. Kupers
128 F.3d 1310 (Ninth Circuit, 1997)
Witherow v. Crawford
339 F. App'x 785 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)

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Bluebook (online)
Roderick Washington v.Shen Jay Fern, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/roderick-washington-vshen-jay-fern-cacd-2022.