Robinson v. Sedgwick Claims Management Service

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedApril 15, 2024
Docket1:23-cv-10782
StatusUnknown

This text of Robinson v. Sedgwick Claims Management Service (Robinson v. Sedgwick Claims Management Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Robinson v. Sedgwick Claims Management Service, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK LAKIEA L. ROBINSON, Plaintiff, -against- 23-CV-10782 (LTS) SEDGWICK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT ORDER TO AMEND SERVICES; INDEMNITY INS. OF N. AMERICA, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who resides in Connecticut, is appearing pro se. She brings this complaint against Sedgwick Claims Management Services Inc. and Indemnity Insurance Company of North America, asserting claims arising from her employment at the Coca Cola Company’s factory in Elmsford, New York.1 By order dated December 12, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis, that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must

1 Plaintiff’s former employer is referred to in public records as the Coca Cola Company and Coca Cola Refreshments USA, Inc. Neither entity is a defendant in this action. also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. BACKGROUND The following factual allegations can be gleaned from Plaintiff’s complaint and the documents attached thereto. Plaintiff began working for Coca Cola on August 1, 1995, and she continued to work there until April 1, 2017. (ECF 1 at 9.) Plaintiff worked on the “bottle line” at the production center in Elmsford, New York, in Westchester County. (Id. at 10.)

Due to “mental stress,” allegedly as a result of harassment at work, Plaintiff sought medical care in the emergency room of Saint Vincent de Paul Hospital. (Id. at 11.) She also filed a claim with the New York State Workers Compensation Board (WCB). Plaintiff initially received from Sedgwick a notice of approval of her claim, but two days later, received a letter notifying her that her claim for workers’ compensation benefits instead would be denied. (Id. at 5.) Coca Cola had “investigators follow [her]” and they saw her “with one man,” who is now her husband. (Id.). According to Plaintiff, Coca Cola had reported to the WCB that Plaintiff “was sexually promiscuous” and was spreading “HSV (Herpes).” (Id.) Plaintiff indicates that years earlier, she had seen an employee on the “can line” with “some form of outbreak on her mouth,” for which the employee suffered no apparent consequences. Plaintiff also seems to suggest that herpes “was going around the building” and that she may have contracted it from using the restroom in the building. (Id.)

A notice of decision from the WCB states that, at the hearing on July 19, 2017, Plaintiff “did not appear . . . or was otherwise not prepared.” (Id. at 17.) The workers’ compensation claim was denied on the ground that there had been no compensable accident, and because the stress that Plaintiff was suffering was deemed not causally related to work and did not meet the definition of an accident. (Id. at 19.) Plaintiff sues Sedgwick Claims Management, which she alleges is a citizen of New York, and Indemnity Insurance of North America, which she indicates is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business in New York. (Id. at 3.) It appears from the attachments to the complaint that the Coca Cola Company was the insured entity on an insurance policy with Indemnity Insurance of North America. Sedgewick Claims Management Services, Inc. appears to

have been the claim administrator for Plaintiff’s worker’s compensation claim. (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff asserts claims for defamation, slander, “claim rejection,” and “bad faith insurance wrongfully denied.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff asks that Defendants be directed “to send a correction to the New York Compensation Board,” that she and her husband be “fully compensated,” and that Defendants “pay for an emotional service animal of [her] choice – [a] puppy.” (Id. at 6.) In addition to this action, Plaintiff has brought separate actions arising out of her employment at the Coca Cola factory. She has pending suits under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act against her former employer, Coca Cola, Robinson v. Coca Cola, No. 1:23-CV- 10552, 1 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y.), and health insurance company Aetna, Robinson v. Aetna, No. 1:23-CV-1100, 1 (S.D.N.Y.) (complaint alleging, among other things, that in 2017, Robinson was denied leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act). Plaintiff also sued health insurance company Magna Care, alleging that charges for her

February 21, 2017, emergency room visit to Saint Vincent de Paul Hospital should have been handled by Sedgwick, not Magna Care. See Robinson v. Magna Care, No. 1:24-CV-00869, 1 (S.D.N.Y.).2 The medical bill attached to that complaint indicates that Plaintiff did not owe any payment, and it is unclear why Plaintiff believes that Sedgwick should have handled the matter. Finally, Plaintiff also has a suit in which she alleges that individuals with links to Coca Cola defamed her. Robinson v. Bagwell, No. 1:24-CV-0621, 1 (S.D.N.Y.). DISCUSSION A. Subject matter jurisdiction The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth generally in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under these statutes, a federal district court has jurisdiction only when a “federal question” is presented or when plaintiff and defendant are

citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. “‘[I]t is common ground that in our federal system of limited jurisdiction any party or the court

2 In her suit against Magna Care, Plaintiff attached to her complaint a bill reflecting that the charges for her emergency room visit on February 21, 2017, were $1482.13, that Magna Care paid most of the balance ($1333.92), and the remainder was taken care of by an adjustment. She asserts in that complaint that:

The management team of Coca Cola told Sed[g]wick to deny claim and Magna Care to accept bill.

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