UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MARK E. ROBINSON, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 15-0444 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 31 : DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, : : Defendant. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DENYING DEFENDANT’S RULE 54(b) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [31]
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Mark Robinson, a Sergeant with the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”)
worked in the Automated Traffic Enforcement Unit (“ATEU”) full-time starting in 2008. In
December 2011, Mr. Robinson was transferred out of the ATEU as part of a civilianization of the
Unit. Although MPD asserts that no sworn officers worked in the ATEU full-time after 2011,
the Overtime Program continued, meaning hundreds of officers were able to work there outside
of their normal assignments. Mr. Robinson’s requests to work overtime in ATEU, however,
were denied. He believes he was transferred out of the ATEU and denied overtime opportunities
because of his race, and thus sues for discrimination. He also believes that his requests for
reassignment to the ATEU and overtime were continuously denied because he previously had
complained of discrimination, and thus also sues for retaliation.
The District of Columbia moved to dismiss his claims, arguing that neither the
reassignment from the ATEU nor the denial of overtime opportunities constituted sufficiently
adverse employment actions to support a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It further argued that it had a nondiscriminatory reason for transferring Mr. Robinson—it
civilianized the unit, and thus no sworn officer worked in the ATEU on a full-time basis after the
transition in 2011. On August 1, 2017, this Court granted in part and denied in part that motion
concluding that civilianization of the ATEU was indeed a valid nondiscriminatory reason for Mr.
Robinson’s transfer, and Mr. Robinson had not shown any indication that it was not the actual
reason that he was transferred. Thus, the Court granted Defendant summary judgment with
respect to Plaintiff’s claim that his transfer from the ATEU was discriminatory or retaliatory.
But because Mr. Robinson had shown that he sought out and was denied a significant amount of
overtime work in the ATEU while other sworn officers were allowed to work in the ATEU
Overtime Program, the Court concluded that Plaintiff had shown that he suffered an adverse
employment action in the form of loss of significant overtime opportunities. Thus, the Court
denied the District summary judgment for that denial of overtime claim.
The District has now moved for reconsideration of the Court’s denial of summary
judgment over Plaintiff’s denial of overtime claim. Because the District could have raised its
newly refined argument concerning adverse employment actions in its prior motion but failed to
do so, reconsideration is not merited. Nor has the District otherwise established that it has met
the requirements meriting reconsideration under Rule 54. Regardless, the District’s argument
fails to show that there are no material facts in dispute entitling it to summary judgment on this
claim. Consequently, the motion for summary judgment is denied.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR RECONSIDERATION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) governs situations in which a party seeks
reconsideration of an interlocutory order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (“[A]ny order or other
decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and
2 liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties
and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all
the parties' rights and liabilities.”). Relief pursuant to Rule 54(b) is to be provided “as justice
requires,” and may be warranted when a court has “patently misunderstood the parties, made a
decision beyond the adversarial issues presented, made an error in failing to consider controlling
decisions or data, or where a controlling or significant change in the law has occurred.” U.S. ex
rel. Westrick v. Second Chance Body Armor, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 2d 258, 268 (D.D.C. 2012)
(internal citation, quotation, and alteration omitted); see also Cobell v. Norton, 224 F.R.D. 266,
272 (D.D.C.2004). “These considerations leave a great deal of room for the court’s discretion
and, accordingly, the ‘as justice requires’ standard amounts to determining ‘whether [relief upon]
reconsideration is necessary under the relevant circumstances.’” Lewis v. District of Columbia,
736 F. Supp. 2d 98, 102 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Cobell, 224 F.R.D. at 272) (alteration in
original).
At the same time, a court’s discretion under Rule 54(b) is “limited by the law of the case
doctrine and subject to the caveat that where litigants have once battled for the court’s decision,
they should neither be required, nor without good reason permitted, to battle for it again.” Singh
v. George Washington Univ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 99, 101 (D.D.C. 2005) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). Under Rule 54, “[t]he burden is on the moving party to show that
reconsideration is appropriate and that harm or injustice would result if reconsideration were
denied.” Second Chance Body Armor, 893 F.Supp.2d at 268 (citing Husayn v. Gates, 588
F.Supp.2d 7, 10 (D.D.C.2008)). And it is well-established that motions for reconsideration
cannot be used as an opportunity to reargue facts and theories upon which a court has already
ruled, nor as a vehicle for presenting theories or arguments that could have been advanced
3 earlier. See Bailey v. U.S. Marshal Serv., No. 08-cv-0283, 2009 WL 973197, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr.
2, 2009).
III. ANALYSIS
The entirety of the District’s motion for reconsideration is premised on what appears to
be a refinement of its prior argument that plaintiff’s denial of overtime claim fails because he has
failed to allege a sufficiently adverse action on which to premise a discrimination or retaliation
claim. This refinement also is based on Bell v. Gonzales, 398 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2005), a
case the District also cited and analyzed in its previous motion for summary judgment. But as
set forth above, motions for reconsideration cannot be used as an opportunity to reargue facts and
theories upon which a court has already ruled, nor as a vehicle for presenting theories or
arguments that could have been advanced earlier. This is exactly what the District attempts with
the instant motion for reconsideration. On this basis alone, the motion is properly denied. Nor
does the District’s motion for reconsideration alert the Court to new facts or a significant change
in the law that could not have been addressed in its prior motion. To the contrary, the District’s
motion simply attempts to refine its prior arguments based on the same case law it had
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MARK E. ROBINSON, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 15-0444 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 31 : DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, : : Defendant. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DENYING DEFENDANT’S RULE 54(b) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [31]
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Mark Robinson, a Sergeant with the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”)
worked in the Automated Traffic Enforcement Unit (“ATEU”) full-time starting in 2008. In
December 2011, Mr. Robinson was transferred out of the ATEU as part of a civilianization of the
Unit. Although MPD asserts that no sworn officers worked in the ATEU full-time after 2011,
the Overtime Program continued, meaning hundreds of officers were able to work there outside
of their normal assignments. Mr. Robinson’s requests to work overtime in ATEU, however,
were denied. He believes he was transferred out of the ATEU and denied overtime opportunities
because of his race, and thus sues for discrimination. He also believes that his requests for
reassignment to the ATEU and overtime were continuously denied because he previously had
complained of discrimination, and thus also sues for retaliation.
The District of Columbia moved to dismiss his claims, arguing that neither the
reassignment from the ATEU nor the denial of overtime opportunities constituted sufficiently
adverse employment actions to support a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It further argued that it had a nondiscriminatory reason for transferring Mr. Robinson—it
civilianized the unit, and thus no sworn officer worked in the ATEU on a full-time basis after the
transition in 2011. On August 1, 2017, this Court granted in part and denied in part that motion
concluding that civilianization of the ATEU was indeed a valid nondiscriminatory reason for Mr.
Robinson’s transfer, and Mr. Robinson had not shown any indication that it was not the actual
reason that he was transferred. Thus, the Court granted Defendant summary judgment with
respect to Plaintiff’s claim that his transfer from the ATEU was discriminatory or retaliatory.
But because Mr. Robinson had shown that he sought out and was denied a significant amount of
overtime work in the ATEU while other sworn officers were allowed to work in the ATEU
Overtime Program, the Court concluded that Plaintiff had shown that he suffered an adverse
employment action in the form of loss of significant overtime opportunities. Thus, the Court
denied the District summary judgment for that denial of overtime claim.
The District has now moved for reconsideration of the Court’s denial of summary
judgment over Plaintiff’s denial of overtime claim. Because the District could have raised its
newly refined argument concerning adverse employment actions in its prior motion but failed to
do so, reconsideration is not merited. Nor has the District otherwise established that it has met
the requirements meriting reconsideration under Rule 54. Regardless, the District’s argument
fails to show that there are no material facts in dispute entitling it to summary judgment on this
claim. Consequently, the motion for summary judgment is denied.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR RECONSIDERATION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) governs situations in which a party seeks
reconsideration of an interlocutory order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (“[A]ny order or other
decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and
2 liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties
and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all
the parties' rights and liabilities.”). Relief pursuant to Rule 54(b) is to be provided “as justice
requires,” and may be warranted when a court has “patently misunderstood the parties, made a
decision beyond the adversarial issues presented, made an error in failing to consider controlling
decisions or data, or where a controlling or significant change in the law has occurred.” U.S. ex
rel. Westrick v. Second Chance Body Armor, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 2d 258, 268 (D.D.C. 2012)
(internal citation, quotation, and alteration omitted); see also Cobell v. Norton, 224 F.R.D. 266,
272 (D.D.C.2004). “These considerations leave a great deal of room for the court’s discretion
and, accordingly, the ‘as justice requires’ standard amounts to determining ‘whether [relief upon]
reconsideration is necessary under the relevant circumstances.’” Lewis v. District of Columbia,
736 F. Supp. 2d 98, 102 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Cobell, 224 F.R.D. at 272) (alteration in
original).
At the same time, a court’s discretion under Rule 54(b) is “limited by the law of the case
doctrine and subject to the caveat that where litigants have once battled for the court’s decision,
they should neither be required, nor without good reason permitted, to battle for it again.” Singh
v. George Washington Univ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 99, 101 (D.D.C. 2005) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). Under Rule 54, “[t]he burden is on the moving party to show that
reconsideration is appropriate and that harm or injustice would result if reconsideration were
denied.” Second Chance Body Armor, 893 F.Supp.2d at 268 (citing Husayn v. Gates, 588
F.Supp.2d 7, 10 (D.D.C.2008)). And it is well-established that motions for reconsideration
cannot be used as an opportunity to reargue facts and theories upon which a court has already
ruled, nor as a vehicle for presenting theories or arguments that could have been advanced
3 earlier. See Bailey v. U.S. Marshal Serv., No. 08-cv-0283, 2009 WL 973197, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr.
2, 2009).
III. ANALYSIS
The entirety of the District’s motion for reconsideration is premised on what appears to
be a refinement of its prior argument that plaintiff’s denial of overtime claim fails because he has
failed to allege a sufficiently adverse action on which to premise a discrimination or retaliation
claim. This refinement also is based on Bell v. Gonzales, 398 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2005), a
case the District also cited and analyzed in its previous motion for summary judgment. But as
set forth above, motions for reconsideration cannot be used as an opportunity to reargue facts and
theories upon which a court has already ruled, nor as a vehicle for presenting theories or
arguments that could have been advanced earlier. This is exactly what the District attempts with
the instant motion for reconsideration. On this basis alone, the motion is properly denied. Nor
does the District’s motion for reconsideration alert the Court to new facts or a significant change
in the law that could not have been addressed in its prior motion. To the contrary, the District’s
motion simply attempts to refine its prior arguments based on the same case law it had
previously relied upon.1 Neither does the District’s motion direct the Court’s attention to any
instances in which it patently misunderstood the parties, made a decision beyond the adversarial
issues presented, or made an error in failing to consider controlling decisions or data. In short,
the District has failed to provide the Court with any meritorious basis upon which to grant it
reconsideration.
1 When asked during a status hearing whether counsel for defendant had previously addressed his reconsideration argument in the District’s motion for summary judgment, he responded “Yes. I just gave it rather short shrift.”
4 Regardless, even considering anew the District’s recycled argument the motion fails. The
single point raised in the motion for reconsideration is that plaintiff’s claim does not amount to
an adverse action because, although he alleges that he was not able to obtain as many overtime
hours as he used to obtain in the ATEU, he “has not shown (or even alleged) that he did not have
other overtime opportunities available to him that, if applied for, would have earned Plaintiff as
much or more overtime pay, than he earned before transfer” from the ATEU. Mot. for
Reconsideration at 2. Despite raising this argument, the District did not provide any evidence
indicating that additional overtime hours were available to plaintiff in the new unit to which he
was detailed, the Special Events Branch (“SEB”), or in any other MPD unit other than the
ATEU. In response, the plaintiff provides a supplemental affidavit plausibly asserting that he
already works as many overtime hours as he reasonably can obtain in the SEB and, if he were
allowed to, he would obtain far more hours in the ATEU which has overtime hours available 24
hours per day, six days per week, 52 weeks per year. Aff. of Mark Robinson ¶¶ 3–5, ECF No.
35-1. The District did not file a reply brief in response, seemingly conceding the point. Thus,
with this dispute of fact, the Court is left where it was before: “whether Mr. Robinson suffered
an adverse employment action and/or a materially adverse employment action is a question for
the finder of fact.” Mem. Op. at 15, n.4 (Aug. 1, 2017) (citing Ortiz-Diaz v. United States Dep’t
of Hous. & Urban Dev., 831 F.3d 488, 492 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). Accordingly, reconsideration
is not justified as justice does not require it.
5 IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the District’s Rule 54(b) Motion for Reconsideration is
DENIED. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and
contemporaneously issued.
Dated: February 16, 2018 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge