Robinhood Markets, Inc., et al. v. Libin Zhu, et al.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: April 3, 2026
• Docket: 3:26-cv-02469
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ROBINHOOD MARKETS, INC., et al., Case No. 26-cv-02469-JST

8 Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING EX PARTE 9 v. MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; ORDER TO 10 LIBIN ZHU, et al., SHOW CAUSE REGARDING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Defendants. 11 Re: ECF No. 4 12 13 Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for an ex parte temporary restraining order and order 14 to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue. ECF No. 1. The Court will deny the 15 motion for temporary restraining order but order Defendants to show cause why they should not 16 be preliminarily enjoined pending resolution of this action. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Plaintiffs Vladimir Tenev and Robinhood Markets, Inc. (Robinhood) filed this complaint 19 against Defendants Libin Zhu, Dynadot Inc. (“Dynadot”), and Does 1-10 for violation of the 20 Lanham Act and the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”), unfair 21 competition, common law trademark infringement, and misappropriation under Cal. Civil Code 22 § 3344. ECF No. 1 ¶ 2–3. Tenev, who goes by “Vlad Tenev,” is the founder of Robinhood, an 23 investment platform. Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiffs claim that Tenev utilizes the mark “Vlad Tenev” to 24 promote himself and his offerings as a public speaker. Id. ¶ 33–34, 41. 25 Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Zhu registered the domain name vladtenev.com several 26 months ago with the domain registrar Defendant Dynadot. Id. ¶¶ 16, 44–45. Plaintiffs allege that 27 as of January 5, 2026, the website hosted on the domain offered the domain name for sale for $ 1 customers and that the Defendants adopted the mark in bad faith to trade on Plaintiffs’ business 2 goodwill. Id. ¶¶ 48–54. Plaintiffs initiated a Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy 3 (“UDRP”) proceeding in front of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Forum in January 2026. Id. ¶ 4 61. In February 2026, the appointed panelist denied the UDRP claim. Id. ¶¶ 62–63. 5 Plaintiffs filed this complaint on March 20, 2026. ECF No. 1. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiffs 6 filed the instant motion for an ex parte temporary restraining order and an order to show cause 7 why a preliminary injunction should not issue. ECF No. 4. 8 II. JURISDICTION 9 This Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 10 The Court has jurisdiction over the state claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 11 III. LEGAL STANDARD 12 Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear 13 showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 14 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction “must establish that he is likely to 15 succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 16 relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” 17 Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 18 Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). 19 To grant preliminary injunctive relief, a court must find that “a certain threshold showing 20 [has been] made on each factor.” Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2011) (per 21 curiam). As to the first factor, a plaintiff is “not required to prove their claim but only must show 22 that they [are] likely to succeed on the merits.” Glossip v. Gross, 135 S.Ct. 2726, 2792 (2015). 23 The Ninth Circuit employs a “sliding scale” approach to the four factors relevant to preliminary 24 injunctive relief. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). Under 25 the sliding scale approach, “‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a balance of hardships that 26 tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary injunction, so long as the 27 plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the 1 In addition, a movant seeking the issuance of an ex parte TRO must satisfy Federal Rule 2 of Civil Procedure 65(b), which requires that “specific facts . . . clearly show that immediate and 3 irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard 4 in opposition” and certification of “efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not 5 be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). 6 IV. DISCUSSION 7 Plaintiffs seek a temporary restraining order pursuant to the Lanham Act, ACPA, and 8 California Civil Code § 3344 to prevent Defendants’ illegal cybersquatting. Because Tenev’s 9 personal name is unlikely to be protected under the Lanham Act, the court does not find that the 10 Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their Lanham Act, ACPA, or § 3344 11 misappropriation claims. 12 A. Lanham Act and ACPA Claim 13 Congress passed the ACPA in 1999, amending the Lanham Act and adding two new 14 causes of action aimed specifically at cybersquatting. Petroliam Nasional Berhad v. 15 GoDaddy.com, Inc., 737 F.3d 546, 549 (9th Cir. 2013). “[C]ybersquatting occurs when a person 16 other than the trademark holder registers the domain name of a well-known trademark and then 17 attempts to profit from this by either ransoming the domain name back to the trademark holder or 18 by using the domain name to divert business from the trademark holder to the domain name 19 holder.” Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir.2005) (quoting 20 DaimlerChrysler v. The Net, Inc., 388 F.3d 672, 689 (6th Cir. 2004)). To prevail on a 21 cybersquatting claim under the ACPA, “the owner of a mark, including a personal name which is 22 protected as a mark under this section” must show that the defendant:

23 (i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a personal name which is protected as a mark under this section; 24 and (ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that— 25 (a) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registration of the domain name, is identical or 26 confusingly similar to that mark; (b) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of 27 registration of the domain name, is identical or section 706 of title 18 or section 220506 of title 36. 15 1 U.S.C. 2 § 1125(d)(1)(A). 3 Here, the key language is the statute’s reference to “a personal name which is protected as 4 a mark under this section.” Id. (emphasis added). Under the Lanham Act, a personal name is a 5 descriptive term. Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1222 (C.D. Cal. 2000). “A 6 descriptive mark receives trademark protection only when it establishes ‘secondary meaning’ in 7 the marketplace.” Black v. Irving Materials, Inc., 2019 WL 1995342, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 8 2019) (citing Yellow Cab Co. of Sacramento v. Yellow Cab of Elk Grove, Inc., 419 F.3d 925, 927 9 (9th Cir. 2005); see also 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair 10 Competition, § 13:2 (5th ed. 2025). And secondary meaning only “occurs when ‘in the minds of 11 the public, the primary significance of [the name] is to identify the source of the product rather 12 than the product itself.’” Polin v. Behrman, 2010 WL 11545054 at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2010), 13 aff'd, 429 F. App’x 682 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 14 U.S. 205, 211(2000)). 15 Here, Defendants are using Vlad Tenev’s personal name in the domain name of a website, 16 vladtenev.com. While the ACPA can apply to personal names, § 1125(d)(1)(A) clarifies that a 17 cause of action is available only when the infringing domain includes “a personal name which is 18 protected as a mark under this section [the Lanham Act].” Plaintiffs suggest that “Vlad Tenev” is 19 a “trademark” that uniquely identifies him “with respect to his public speaking services.” ECF 20 No. 4-1 at 8. The Court is not persuaded. For “Vlad Tenev” to have acquired secondary meaning 21 in this way, that mark would have to identify “public speaking services” in the minds of the public 22 rather than Vlad Tenev the individual. Cairns, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 1222 (citing Wal–Mart Stores, 23 Inc., v. Samara Brothers Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000). Visser v. Macres, 214 Cal.App.2d 249, 24 253 (1963) (secondary meaning does not attach as a word identifying goods or services until the 25 goods or services submerge the primary meaning of the name as a word identifying a person). 26 “Such secondary meaning grows out of long association of the name with the business, and 27 thereby becomes the name of the business as such; is acquired when the name and the business 1 word identifying a person, in favor of its meaning as a word identifying that business.” Visser v. 2 Macres, 214 Cal. App. 2d 249, 253 (1963). The Court finds it implausible that the meaning of 3 “Vlad Tenev” as a public speaker has submerged its meaning as a way of identifying a person. 4 Cairns is instructive. In that case, Plaintiffs alleged that the name “Princess Diana of 5 Wales” had acquired the secondary meaning of identifying charitable and humanitarian services 6 rather than the individual herself, but the court was not persuaded. It found that “[a] finding of 7 secondary meaning in this case would mean that the words ‘Diana, Princess of Wales’ would no 8 longer primarily identify the individual, Princess Diana, but instead identify plaintiffs' charitable 9 activities. This is an absurd contention to say the least.” Cairns, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 1222; see also 10 Polin, 2010 WL 11545054 at *4 (finding that the name of a plaintiff who practiced family law had 11 not gained secondary meaning as long as the name identified the plaintiff rather than services she 12 offered). 13 Here, other than conclusory assertions that “Vlad Tenev” has acquired the secondary 14 meaning of a trademark identifying Tenev’s public speaking services, Plaintiffs provide no 15 evidence that Tenev’s personal name references his financial and motivational speaking services 16 rather than identifying Tenev himself. ECF No. 4-1 at 8–9. In fact, as Plaintiffs repeatedly 17 mention in their motion, Tenev is known in substantial part due to his co-founding and 18 chairmanship of Robinhood, a well-known trading platform. ECF No. 4-1 at 9–10. If anything, it 19 seems likely that this notoriety, rather than anything intrinsic to the mark, explains the demand for 20 Tenev’s speaking services. 21 Accordingly, at this stage, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not made a sufficient 22 showing on the merits as to their ACPA or Lanham Act claims. 23 B. California Right to Publicity Claim 24 Plaintiffs also seek a temporary restraining order based on their claim under California’s 25 right of publicity statute. Cal. Civ. Code § 3344 et seq. To state a cause of action under § 3344, 26 plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to establish “(1) the defendant's use of the plaintiff's identity; 27 (2) the appropriation of plaintiff's name or likeness to defendant's advantage, commercially or 1 (6) “a direct connection between the alleged use and the commercial purpose.” Downing v. 2 Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 3 Cal. App. 3d 409, 416 (1983)). When section 3344 has been violated, a plaintiff may recover “in 4 an amount equal to the greater of seven hundred fifty dollars ($750) or the actual damages suffered 5 by them as a result of the unauthorized use, and any profits from the unauthorized use that are 6 attributable to the use.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(a)(1). As of January 1, 2026, the statute also 7 authorizes parties to seek an injunction or temporary restraining order under Cal. Civ. P. Code 8 § 527. Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(a)(2). 9 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ usage of vladtenev.com without Tenev’s consent meets 10 the elements of section 3344, and specifically that “this use was for the purpose of selling or 11 soliciting the sale of a domain name, which is clearly a commercial use.” ECF No. 4-1 at 19–20. 12 Plaintiffs claim that Defendants’ knowledge is established by Zhu’s ownership of other websites 13 and illegally registered marks, and that there is a direct connection between the use of the 14 vladtenev.com website registration and the commercial use in Defendants’ (now removed) efforts 15 to sell the domain name for thousands of dollars. Id. 16 The elements of a claim under § 3344 have been stated at different levels of generality. 17 The California state court pattern instruction for this claim requires a plaintiff to prove that the 18 defendant “knowingly used plaintiff’s” name on merchandise “or to advertise or sell” a product. 19 CACI No. 1804A. It is unclear at best that Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants are using Vlad 20 Tenev’s name to advertise or sell any product or merchandise. While the website may have 21 attempted to sell the domain name itself, it does not utilize Vlad Tenev’s name to advertise or sell 22 the product simply by using the mark in the domain title. Pattern jury instructions, however, “are 23 not themselves the law, and are not authority to establish legal propositions or precedent.” People 24 v. Reynoza, 15 Cal. 5th 982, 1011 (2024). Also, some courts have described section 3344 claims 25 at a level of generality that is broad enough potentially to encompass the facts before the Court. 26 See, e.g., Robinson v. Delicious Vinyl Recs. LLC, No. CV134111CASPLAX, 2013 WL 12144100, 27 at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2013) (“Section 3344 of the California Civil Code permits a plaintiff to 1 without his consent.”). While Plaintiffs do not cite, and the Court has been unable to locate, 2 authority finding a violation of section 3344 on similar facts, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs 3 have shown at least serious questions going to the merits of their section 3344 claim. 4 However, the Court does not find that a temporary restraining order is warranted because 5 Plaintiffs delayed excessively in seeking relief. Plaintiffs learned of the domain takeover and 6 advertisement for sale as early as January 5, 2026, ECF No. 1 ¶ 45, but did not seek relief from 7 this Court until March 20, 2026. ECF No. 1. 8 “A plaintiff’s delay in seeking relief weighs against granting a TRO or preliminary 9 injunction.” Perez v. City of Petaluma, No. 21-cv-06190-JST, 2021 WL 3934327, at *1 (N.D. 10 Cal. Aug. 13, 2021); see also Dahl v. Swift Distrib., Inc., No. CV 10-00551 SJO (RZx), 2010 WL 11 1458957, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2010) (concluding that an 18-day delay “implies a lack of 12 urgency and irreparable harm”). While Plaintiffs sought relief in a UDRP proceeding within 13 weeks of their discovery, they could have concurrently sought relief in federal court. See Super- 14 Krete Intern., Inc. v. Sadleir, 712 F.Supp.2d 1023, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (discussing that court 15 proceedings can occurring before, during, and after a UDRP dispute resolution procedure is 16 invoked). Further, Plaintiffs waited more than a month after the UDRP verdict on February 13, 17 2026 to file this ex parte TRO request. “Parties facing the threat of immediate and irreparable 18 harm generally seek a temporary restraining order as quickly as possible.” Lee v. Haj, No. 1:16- 19 cv-00008-DAD-SAB, 2016 WL 8738428, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2016). Plaintiffs’ unexplained 20 delay in seeking relief undermines their claim that they will suffer irreparable harm in the absence 21 of a TRO. Devasahayam v. DMB Cap. Grp., No. 3:17-cv-02095-BEN-WVG, 2017 WL 6547897, 22 at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2017) (holding that one month delay was “reason enough to deny a 23 TRO”). In the absence of a showing of irreparable harm, the Court need not examine the 24 remaining Winter factors. Plaintiffs’ request for a TRO is denied. 25 CONCLUSION 26 For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies the motion for a temporary restraining 27 order. 1 enjoined as follows: 2 1. That Defendant Dynadot, and any other domain registrar of the Disputed Domain, 3 shall immediately transfer the Disputed Domain to Plaintiffs; 4 2. That Defendants, their employees, agents, officers, directors, attorneys, successors, 5 affiliates, subsidiaries, and assigns, and all persons in active concert or participating with any of 6 them, be preliminarily enjoined from: 7 a. advertising, marketing, promoting, selling, offering for sale or authorizing 8 any third party to advertise, market, promote, sell and offer for sale any goods or services bearing 9 the VLAD TENEV mark, or any other mark that is a counterfeit, copy, simulation, confusingly 10 similar variation, or colorable imitation of the VLAD TENEV mark; 11 b. engaging in any activity that infringes Plaintiffs’ rights in the VLAD 12 TENEV mark; 13 c. engaging in any activity that constitutes unfair competition with Plaintiffs; 14 d. using or authorizing any third party to use any other false designation of 15 origin or false description or representation or any other thing calculated or likely to cause 16 confusion or mistake in the mind of the trade or public or to deceive the trade or public into 17 believing that Defendants’ products or activities are in any way sponsored, licensed or authorized 18 by or affiliated or connected with Plaintiffs; 19 e. making or displaying any statement, representation, or depiction that is 20 likely to lead the public or the trade to believe that the products or services promoted, offered, or 21 sponsored by Defendants are in any manner approved, endorsed, licensed, sponsored, authorized, 22 or franchised by or associated, affiliated, or otherwise connected with Plaintiffs, or that Plaintiffs’ 23 products and services are in any manner approved, endorsed, licensed, sponsored, authorized, or 24 franchised by or associated, affiliated, or otherwise connected with Defendants; 25 f. registering or applying to register any trademark, service mark, domain 26 name, trade name, or other source identifier or symbol of origin consisting of or incorporating the 27 VLAD TENEV mark or any other mark that infringes or is likely to be confused with the VLAD ] g. assisting, aiding, or abetting any other person or business entity in engaging 2 || □□ □□ performing any of the activities referred to in the above subparagraphs, or effecting any 3 assignments or transfers, forming new entities or associations, or utilizing any other device for the 4 || purpose of circumventing or otherwise avoiding the prohibitions set forth in above subparagraphs. 5 A hearing on this order to show cause will be held on April 30, 2026 at 9:30 a.m. 6 || Plaintiffs shall serve this order on Defendants forthwith. Defendants’ opposition shall be filed no 7 || later than April 17, 2026. Plaintiffs’ reply is due April 23, 2026. 8 Subject to the Court’s availability, the parties may stipulate to modify the briefing and 9 || hearing schedule. Plaintiffs’ requests for expedited discovery are denied without prejudice. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED.

11 Dated: April 3, 2026 12 JON S. TIGA! 13 United States District Judge

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