Roberts v. Amtrack Railroad Company

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 16, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-08093
StatusUnknown

This text of Roberts v. Amtrack Railroad Company (Roberts v. Amtrack Railroad Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Roberts v. Amtrack Railroad Company, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JAZMINE IMAN ROBERTS, Plaintiff, -against- 23-CV-8093 (LTS) AMTRACK RAILROAD COMPANY; PETE ORDER TO AMEND BUTTIGIEG, SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, invokes the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, alleging that Defendants violated her rights. Plaintiff sues “Amtrack Railroad Company,” which the Court understands to be Amtrak, also known as the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and United States Secretary of Transportation Pete Buttigieg. By order dated September 14, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days’ leave to file an amended complaint. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits –

to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Jazmine Iman Roberts brings her claims using the court’s general complaint form. She checks the box on the form to invoke the Court’s federal question jurisdiction. In response to the question asking which of her federal constitutional or federal statutory rights have been violated, Plaintiff states, “I’m not sure. All that I say to the court is my rights were violated as a human being, resident or national of the United States, single woman and a consumer.” (ECF 1, at 2.) The following allegations are taken from the complaint. On September 6, 2023, Plaintiff went to the Amtrak station in Manhattan to take a train to Washington, D.C. The customer service representative told Plaintiff that her “consumer rewards online account couldn’t be accessed with [her] email.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff requested to speak to a manager or supervisor “and this employee concurred.” (Id.)

Plaintiff boarded the train, went to the food car, and then began searching for “a dis[]ability seat.” (Id.) There was no disability seat available, and when Plaintiff asked an employee about the process of getting such a seat, the employee “[e]xplained to [her] that there was a p[a]rticular price or designation for a dis[]ability seat besides having a dis[a]ability discount.” (Id.) The employee scanned Plaintiff’s ticket and they proceeded to seating section for people with disabilities. Plaintiff and the employee “experienced a mis-communication or confrontation” and the employee’s “voice became raised then [Plaintiff’s] voice became raised in regard to the dis[]ability designated seating area and satisfying qualifications.” (Id. at 6.) The employee informed Plaintiff that she would be “removed from the train” at the next

stop and Plaintiff chose a seat in the disability seating section. When the train reached New Jersey, “the New Jersey Police Department officials requested hostilly to remove [Plaintiff] from the train [and she] obliged.” (Id.) Plaintiff described her injuries as being subjected to “[p]syhological abuse” and being removed from a train after she paid $144.90 for a ticket. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff seeks a refund for ticket and “psychological abuse compensation.” (Id.) DISCUSSION A. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act The Court liberally construes the complaint as attempting to assert claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”). Title II provides that no person shall be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of a public entity by reason of a disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132.1 To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that she has a qualified disability, that the defendant is subject to the statute, and that she was denied access to covered services, programs, or activities because of her disability. See McElwee v. Cnty. of Orange, 700

F.3d 635, 640 (2d Cir. 2012). In other words, the plaintiff must allege that her mistreatment “was motivated by either discriminatory animus or ill will due to disability,” because the purpose of the ADA is “to ensure evenhanded treatment between the disabled and the able-bodied.” Feliz v. City of New York, No. 18-CV-5023 (PAE) (SN), 2019 WL 6831552, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2019) (citing Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr. of Bklyn., 280 F.3d 98, 112 (2d Cir. 1998)), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 4386017 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2019). The ADA defines a disability as “[a] physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities . . . or being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(a-c). The statute requires that disabled individuals receive “reasonable

accommodations” that allow them to have access to and take a meaningful part in public services. Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 273-74 (2d Cir. 2003).

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Bluebook (online)
Roberts v. Amtrack Railroad Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/roberts-v-amtrack-railroad-company-nysd-2023.