IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Robert A. Rosenbourgh, FILED Appellant-Defendant Sep 19 2025, 8:41 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals v. and Tax Court
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
September 19, 2025 Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-CR-1576 Appeal from the La Porte Superior Court The Honorable Jaime M. Oss, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 46D01-2012-F4-001631
Opinion by Judge Felix Judges Pyle and Weissmann concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1576 | September 19, 2025 Page 1 of 18 Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case [1] Robert Rosenbourgh violated the terms of his probation. As a result, the trial
court revoked Rosenbourgh’s probation and executed the remainder of his
suspended sentence. Although Rosenbourgh timely requested to appeal the
revocation, counsel did not file a notice of appeal until after the deadline to do
so. Between them, the parties raise several issues for our review, which we
restate as follows:
1. Whether extraordinarily compelling reasons exist to warrant restoring Rosenbourgh’s forfeited right to appeal; 2. Whether the trial court erred by revoking Rosenbourgh’s probation; 3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by executing the remainder of Rosenbourgh’s suspended sentence.
Because we determine extraordinarily compelling reasons exist to resurrect
Rosenbourgh’s right to appeal, we address the merits of his appeal and affirm.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [3] In 2023, Rosenbourgh pled guilty to dealing in methamphetamine as a Level 4
felony. The trial court sentenced Rosenbourgh to six years, with two-and-a-half
years of those years executed as time served and the remaining three-and-a-half
years suspended to probation. As part of the terms of his probation,
Rosenbourgh agreed to notify probation within 24 hours if he was charged with
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1576 | September 19, 2025 Page 2 of 18 a new criminal offense, report to probation appointments as directed, and not
possess illegal drugs or other drugs without a prescription.
[4] On January 2, 2024, the State filed a petition to revoke Rosenbourgh’s
probation, alleging that he violated the terms of his probation by committing a
new criminal offense—dealing in a narcotic drug as a Level 4 felony—and
possessing Percocet pills without a prescription. On January 10, the State filed
a second petition to revoke Rosenbourgh’s probation, alleging that
Rosenbourgh (1) committed six new felony criminal offenses, including
attempted murder, unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon,
pointing a firearm at another, and unlawful possession of a handgun; (2)
traveled outside the county without permission; and (3) failed to report to a
December 28, 2023, probation meeting. On February 5, the State filed a third
petition to revoke Rosenbourgh’s probation, alleging that he committed two
new criminal offenses: strangulation and domestic battery.
[5] At a hearing on all three petitions, Rosenbourgh admitted that he failed to
notify probation that he had been charged with new criminal offenses; he failed
to attend a probation appointment on December 28, 2023; and he possessed
Percocet pills. In addition to his admissions, Rosenbourgh’s probation officer
testified that Rosenbourgh did not notify her within 24 hours that he had been
charged with new criminal offenses, and that Rosenbourgh failed to report to
his December 28, 2023, probation appointment as directed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1576 | September 19, 2025 Page 3 of 18 [6] The trial court found that Rosenbourgh violated the terms and conditions of his
probation when he (1) “failed to notify probation within 24 hours of the new
offenses charged,” (2) “possess[ed] the Percocet pills with no prescription,” and
(3) “failed to report to Probation on December 28, 2023.” Tr. Vol. II at 53.
The trial court revoked Rosenbourgh’s probation and ordered him to serve the
remaining two-and-a-half years of his suspended sentence in the Indiana
Department of Correction (“DOC”).
[7] After imposing the sanction, the trial court advised Rosenbourgh of his right to
appeal and asked him if he was “planning on appealing.” Tr. Vol. II at 56.
Rosenbourgh replied, “No.” Id. The trial court told Rosenbourgh, “So if you
do change your mind, . . . and you decide that you want to appeal, please let
[defense counsel] or the Court know, and then I will appoint a public defender
for you, okay?” Id. Rosenbourgh replied, “Thank you.” Id. at 57.
Rosenbourgh’s notice of appeal was due by May 20, 2024. See Ind. Appellate
Rule 9(A)(1).
[8] On May 14, 2024, the trial court received a letter, dated May 1, from
Rosenbourgh, titled “Appeal on Evidentiary Hearing Held,” (the “Appeal 1 Letter”). The Appeal Letter stated that Rosenbourgh was “requesting [an]
Appeal Hearing” and “appeal[ing the] hearing held 4/19/2024.” The trial
1 Rosenbourgh did not include in his appendix on appeal the Appeal Letter he sent to the trial court in May 2024. See Ind. Appellate Rule 50(B). We have taken judicial notice of the contents of that letter pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 27.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1576 | September 19, 2025 Page 4 of 18 court appointed a public defender to represent Rosenbourgh on May 15. On
June 3 and June 4, respectively, appointed counsel sought and received
permission from the trial court under Post–Conviction Rule 2 to file a belated
notice of appeal of Rosenbourgh’s probation revocation. Rosenbourgh, by
counsel, filed his belated notice of appeal on July 3, 2024. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision 1. Extraordinarily Compelling Reasons Exist to Warrant Restoring Rosenbourgh’s Forfeited Right to Appeal
[9] The State argues on cross-appeal that Rosenbourgh forfeited his right to appeal
because he did not file the notice of appeal within the required thirty days, and
Post–Conviction Rule 2 (“PCR 2”) does not allow a belated appeal of post-
conviction rulings. See Ind. Appellate Rule 9(A)(5). Rosenbourgh did not 2 respond to the State’s allegation that we should dismiss his appeal. “In such a
circumstance, if we find prima facie error, we may reverse.” Amphonephong v.
State, 32 N.E.3d 825, 829–30 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Townsend v. State,
843 N.E.2d 972, 974 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied). “In this context, prima
facie is defined as at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
2 We observe that Rosenbourgh’s appellate counsel sought and obtained from this court an extension of time in which to file a reply brief. However, counsel did not file a reply brief in this case.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1576 | September 19, 2025 Page 5 of 18 [10] To initiate an appeal, a party must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after
entry of a final judgment is noted in the chronological case summary. App. R.
9(A)(1). “[A] party loses his or her right to appeal for failing to file timely a
Notice of Appeal.” In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 971 (Ind. 2014). As
our Supreme Court explained in In re Adoption of O.R., this forfeiture is not a
jurisdictional defect that deprives us of our authority to entertain the appeal. Id.
In limited circumstances, a party can file a belated notice of appeal pursuant to
PCR 2, but this rule does not permit a belated notice of appeal from a probation
revocation proceeding. Dawson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 841, 846 (Ind. Ct. App.
2010), opinion adopted, 943 N.E.2d 1281 (Ind. 2011) (per curiam).
[11] Rosenbourgh has forfeited his right to appeal the trial court’s revocation of his
probation and accompanying sanction because he did not file his notice of
appeal within the required 30 days and because PCR 2 does not allow a belated
appeal of post-conviction rulings. See App. R. 9(A)(5) (“Unless the Notice of
Appeal is timely filed, the right to appeal shall be forfeited except as provided
by P.C.R. 2.”). However, Indiana Appellate Rule 1, which provides that we
may permit deviation from the Appellate Rules, allows us to resurrect an
otherwise forfeited appeal. O.R., 16 N.E.3d at 972 (citing App. R. 1). To do so,
the party who has forfeited its right to appeal must demonstrate that there are
“extraordinarily compelling reasons” to restore the forfeited right. Id. at 971.
To determine whether the party qualifies for this limited exception, we consider
whether the party worked diligently to prosecute his appeal, id. at 972; the
nature of the party’s rights at stake, id.; whether there is a “unique confluence”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1576 | September 19, 2025 Page 6 of 18 of factors giving rise to a strong desire to decide the case on the merits, id.; and
any obvious injustice, Cannon v. Caldwell, 74 N.E.3d 255, 258–59 (Ind. Ct. App.
2017). As our Supreme Court noted in State v. B.H., “[t]he narrow exception
reinstating otherwise forfeited appeals effectively ‘acts as a fail-safe’ when
dismissal would be ‘shockingly unfair.’” 260 N.E.3d 953, 959 (Ind. 2025)
(quoting Sevion v. State, 223 N.E.3d 1154, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023)).
[12] Diligent Prosecution. At the end of the April 19 probation revocation hearing,
the trial court told Rosenbourgh that if he changed his mind about appealing
the trial court’s determination, he should “let [defense counsel] or the Court
know,” and the trial court would appoint a public defender to represent him on
appeal. Tr. Vol. II at 56. Rosenbourgh’s notice of appeal was due by May 20.
The Appeal Letter was dated May 1, and the envelope that contained the
Appeal Letter had a United States Postal Service (“USPS”) barcode dated May
5. The Chronological Case Summary (“CCS”) indicates that the Appeal Letter
was filed in the trial court on May 14, six days before the deadline for filing the
notice of appeal passed. Even if we chose to disregard Rosenbourgh’s
handwritten date of May 1, we cannot overlook the USPS’s barcode stamped
May 5. In other words, the Appeal Letter was sent 15 days before the deadline
to appeal. Rosenbourgh did what was necessary to initiate this appeal.
[13] The trial court acted promptly once the Appeal Letter was received, and on
May 15, appointed a public defender to represent Rosenbourgh. On June 3,
appointed counsel sought permission from the trial court to file a belated notice
of appeal of Rosenbourgh’s probation revocation pursuant to PCR 2. On June
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1576 | September 19, 2025 Page 7 of 18 4, the trial court granted Rosenbourgh permission to file a belated notice of
appeal. On July 3, Rosenbourgh filed that notice of appeal. It is unclear why it
took Rosenbourgh’s appellate counsel approximately 29 days to file the notice
of appeal; presumably, appellate counsel believed she had 30 days to do so
pursuant to PCR 2(1)(f) (“If the court grants permission to file a belated notice
of appeal, the time and procedure for filing such notice of appeal is governed by
App. R. 9(A).”) and Appellate Rule 9(A)(1) (providing for 30 days to file a
Notice of Appeal). Regardless, this delay does not appear to be Rosenbourgh’s
fault. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Rosenbourgh worked
diligently to prosecute his appeal—he followed the trial court’s instructions and
made a timely attempt to initiate his appeal before the deadline passed.
[14] Nature of Rights at Stake. As for the rights at stake, Rosenbourgh experienced
a loss of liberty interest when the trial court ordered him to serve the remainder
of his previously suspended sentence. And Rosenbourgh’s loss-of-liberty
interest is significant. See, e.g., Weaver v. State, 725 N.E.2d 945, 947 n.6 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2000) (addressing appeal on merits in part because the appellant’s liberty
interest in not being incarcerated was at stake).
[15] Still, we are mindful of our Supreme Court’s recent decision in B.H. and the
high standard it sets for establishing extraordinarily compelling reasons to
reinstate a forfeited right to an appeal. 260 N.E.3d 953. In B.H., the State
missed the deadline for filing an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the
State’s request to file a juvenile delinquency petition, but the State argued that
its forfeited appeal should be reinstated. Id. at 955–56. The B.H. Court
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1576 | September 19, 2025 Page 8 of 18 dismissed the State’s appeal, concluding that the State failed to present “any
extraordinarily compelling reasons to restore its right to appeal,” and the State’s
appeal did not involve a fundamental liberty interest. Id. at 959.
[16] Here, however, Rosenbourgh has liberty interests at stake. Rosenbourgh
experienced a loss of liberty when the trial court ordered him to serve the
remainder of his previously suspended sentence in the DOC.
[17] Unique Confluence. Next, we examine whether there is a unique confluence
of a liberty interest and other factors in this case, O.R., 16 N.E.3d at 972, or any
obvious injustice in not restoring Rosenbourgh’s forfeited right to appeal,
Cannon, 74 N.E.3d at 258–59. In O.R., for example, our Supreme Court
determined there was a “unique confluence” of the petitioner’s fundamental
liberty interest in parenting his child “along with ‘one of the most valued
relationships in our culture,’” which, in addition to his diligence in prosecuting
his appeal, led the Supreme Court to conclude that the petitioner’s “otherwise
forfeited appeal deserve[d] a determination on the merits” and the Supreme
Court, ultimately, restored the petitioner’s right to appeal. 16 N.E.3d at 972.
In Cannon, the appellant sought to file a belated notice of appeal concerning a
child support modification order. 74 N.E.3d at 256. Because that order was
“on its face in clear violation of the Child Support Guidelines,” we concluded
“that this obvious injustice is an extraordinarily compelling reason to restore
[the appellant]’s forfeited right to appeal and decide the appeal on the merits.”
Id. at 258–59. Here, there is no obvious injustice in the trial court’s revocation
decision, so this factor works against restoring the forfeited appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1576 | September 19, 2025 Page 9 of 18 [18] On the other hand, here, Rosenbourgh was diligent in prosecuting his appeal,
and his loss-of-liberty interest is significant. In addition, Rosenbourgh’s Appeal
Letter was filed with the trial court six days before the deadline for filing the
notice of appeal had passed, and it does not appear that Rosenbourgh was at
fault for the 29-day delay in his appellate counsel’s filing of the notice of appeal.
Recently, another panel of this court, faced with similar facts, also determined
that the appellant’s forfeited appeal should be restored. Clemons v. State, 260
N.E.3d 1010, 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. not sought. In Clemons, the panel
declined to dismiss an untimely appeal on procedural grounds where (1) the
defendant tried to initiate the appeal process before the 30-day deadline had
passed; (2) defendant’s letter requesting assistance with his appeal took eight
days to reach the trial court “for reasons largely beyond” his control; (3) the
“relatively brief” delay in filing the notice of appeal did not appear to prejudice
the State; and (4) addressing the merits served this court’s “interests in judicial
economy.” Id. As the O.R. Court noted, “our procedural rules are merely
means for achieving the ultimate end of orderly and speedy justice.” 16 N.E.3d
at 972 (internal quotations omitted).
[19] Thus, we conclude that under the facts and circumstances of this case, there is a
unique confluence of a fundamental liberty interest and other factors that give
rise to a desire to address Rosenbourgh’s case on the merits. Based on the
foregoing, “extraordinarily compelling reasons” exist here that warrant
reinstatement of Rosenbourgh’s appeal, O.R., 16 N.E.3d at 971. We therefore
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1576 | September 19, 2025 Page 10 of 18 exercise our discretion under Appellate Rule 1 and address the issues
Rosenbourgh raises on appeal.
2. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Revoking Rosenbourgh’s Probation
[20] Rosenbourgh argues that the trial court erred when it revoked his probation.
“Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which
a criminal defendant is entitled.” Smith v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1110, 1112 (Ind.
2012) (quoting Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007)). We review a
trial court’s probation revocation decision for an abuse of discretion, which
“occurs ‘where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188). “A probation
hearing is civil in nature, and the State need only prove the alleged violations by
a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (citing Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 551
(Ind. 1999)). A trial court may revoke a person’s probation for a single
violation. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(a)(1); Hammann v. State, 210 N.E.3d 823, 832
(Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Killebrew v. State, 165 N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2021), trans. denied, 168 N.E.3d 741 (Ind. 2021)), reh’g denied (July 11,
2023), trans. denied, 220 N.E.3d 54 (Ind. 2023).
[21] Specifically, Rosenbourgh argues that: (a) the trial court violated his due
process rights when it found a probation violation based on his failure to report
his new criminal charges to his probation officer within 24 hours; and (b) the
State presented insufficient evidence to support the revocation of his probation.
We address each argument in turn.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1576 | September 19, 2025 Page 11 of 18 a. Due Process
[22] Rosenbourgh’s initial claim is that the trial court violated his due process rights
when it found a probation violation based on his failure to report his new
criminal charges to his probation officer within 24 hours. According to
Rosenbourgh, his right to due process was violated because “[n]one,”
Appellant’s Br. at 9, of the probation revocation petitions provided notice to
him that the State intended to seek revocation of his probation on that basis.
Rosenbourgh maintains that the petitions “only allege that [he] violated [that
particular condition of his probation] by committing new crimes” and did not
notify him that his probation could be revoked for failing to report the crimes to
his probation officer promptly. Id. In fact, he was notified. For example, the
first probation revocation petition reads in relevant part:
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 31.
[23] “Although probationers are not entitled to the full array of constitutional rights
afforded defendants at trial, ‘the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does impose procedural and substantive limits on the revocation of
the conditional liberty created by probation.’” Debro v. State, 821 N.E.2d 367,
374 (Ind. 2005) (quoting Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 549). In Woods v. State, our
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1576 | September 19, 2025 Page 12 of 18 Indiana Supreme Court stated the following regarding the minimum
requirements of due process provided to a probationer at a revocation hearing:
The minimum requirements of due process that inure to a probationer at a revocation hearing include: (a) written notice of the claimed violations of probation; (b) disclosure of the evidence against him; (c) an opportunity to be heard and present evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; and (e) a neutral and detached hearing body.
892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008) (citing Isaac v. State, 605 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ind.
1992), cert. denied). Whether a given procedure satisfies the requirements of due
process is a question of law. Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 857 (Ind. 2024)
(citing Holmes v. Randolph, 610 N.E.2d 839, 844 (Ind. 1993)), cert. denied, 145 S.
Ct. 424. We review questions of law de novo. Id. (citing State v. Moss-Dwyer,
686 N.E.2d 109, 110 (Ind. 1997)).
[24] We are unpersuaded by Rosenbourgh’s due process claim. Rosenbourgh signed
the order of probation, attesting that he had read the terms and conditions of his
probation and “agreed to comply with each of them.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II
at 26. The first condition of his probation clearly provided that Rosenbourgh
must “advise the probation department within twenty-four (24) hours if charged
with a Misdemeanor or a Felony.” Id. at 23. Thus, Rosenbourgh was informed
that his probation could be revoked if he failed to report new criminal charges
to his probation officer within 24 hours. As for the State’s probation revocation
petitions, the petitions clearly listed the conditions of probation that
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1576 | September 19, 2025 Page 13 of 18 Rosenbourgh allegedly violated, which included the need to notify a probation
officer within 24 hours of any new criminal charges.
[25] Also, the State’s petitions to revoke Rosenbourgh’s probation were filed on
January 2, January 10, and February 5, 2024, well before the probation
revocation hearing held on April 19. And, importantly, Rosenbourgh has failed
to demonstrate how his due process rights were denied because of the claimed
lack of notice.
[26] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not violate
Rosenbourgh’s due process rights when it found a probation violation based on
his failure to report his new criminal charges to his probation officer within 24
hours. The probation revocation petitions provided Rosenbourgh with notice
that the State sought the revocation of his probation on that basis.
b. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support the Revocation of Rosenbourgh’s Probation
[27] Next, Rosenbourgh argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to
support the trial court’s decision to revoke his probation. When faced with a
challenge to the sufficiency of the State’s evidence at a probation revocation
hearing, “we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment—
without regard to weight or credibility—and will affirm if ‘there is substantial
evidence of probative value to support the trial court’s conclusion that a
probationer has violated any condition of probation.’” Murdock v. State, 10
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1576 | September 19, 2025 Page 14 of 18 N.E.3d 1265, 1267 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Braxton v. State, 651 N.E.2d 268, 270
(Ind. 1995)).
[28] First, Rosenbourgh contends that the State failed to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that he failed to report his new criminal charges to his probation
officer within 24 hours. He argues that the State’s evidence “does not indicate
when [he] discovered the new charges to establish that he failed to advise
probation within 24 hours.” Appellant’s Br. at 10 (emphasis added). He claims
that he was unaware of the charges and could not notify probation within 24
hours because he was incarcerated in Porter County when he learned of the
charges. He also claims he “notified probation as soon as an avenue of
communication was available.” Id. at 11. We are unpersuaded.
[29] As a condition of his probation, Rosenbourgh agreed to notify probation within
24 hours if he was charged with a new criminal offense. He failed to do so.
Moreover, at the April 19 probation revocation hearing, Rosenbourgh admitted
to violating his probation on these bases. Defense counsel asked Rosenbourgh,
if he “admit[ted]” he failed to advise probation that he was charged with new
offenses, and Rosenbourgh answered, “Yes. That’s correct.” Tr. Vol. II at 47.
While Rosenbourgh claimed it was difficult to communicate with his probation
officer, he admitted he had “bonded out,” id. at 49, and admitted waiting well
over two weeks to report his Porter County and other criminal offenses, id. at
50. Rosenbourgh’s probation officer testified that Rosenbourgh did not notify
her within 24 hours that he had been charged with new criminal offenses.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1576 | September 19, 2025 Page 15 of 18 [30] Likewise, we are unpersuaded by Rosenbourgh’s argument that the State failed
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he possessed Percocet pills
without a prescription. Rosenbourgh admitted at the probation revocation
hearing that he possessed the Percocet pills. He also admitted that at the time
he possessed those pills, he had been struggling with a drug addiction.
[31] In light of these facts, we conclude that there is substantial evidence of
probative value to support the trial court’s conclusion that Rosenbourgh
violated his probation by failing to report his new criminal charges to the
probation department within 24 hours and by possessing Percocet pills without
a prescription. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking
Rosenbourgh’s probation on these grounds.
3. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Executing the Remainder of Rosenbourgh’s Suspended Sentence
[32] Finally, Rosenbourgh contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
ordering him to serve the remaining two-and-a-half years of his suspended
sentence in the DOC. We review a trial court’s sentencing decision on a
probation violation for an abuse of discretion. Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188 (citing
Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ind. Ct. App 2005)).
[33] Rosenbourgh contends that “the only viable ground for [his] violation was a
single missed appointment [with probation]” that occurred “while Rosenbourgh
was suffering from a suspected concussion.” Appellant’s Br. at 13. According
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1576 | September 19, 2025 Page 16 of 18 to Rosenbourgh, a two-and-a-half-year sanction “is inappropriate for a missed
appointment.” Id.
[34] First, Rosenbourgh’s argument is a request for us to reweigh the evidence and
reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do, see Smith, 963 N.E.2d at 1112
(citing Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 551). Second, Rosenbourgh’s missed appointment
was not the “only viable ground” for the revocation of his probation.
Appellant’s Br. at 13. And Rosenbourgh did not make an argument in the
alternative in case we disagreed with his earlier arguments. Having disagreed
with his contention that there is only one viable reason to violate his probation,
we also disagree with the argument that the resulting sentence was
unwarranted. Having found three viable reasons to support the violation of
Rosenbourgh’s probation, we cannot say the resulting sentence was
unwarranted. And based on the foregoing, we cannot say the trial court abused
its discretion when it ordered Rosenbourgh to serve the remainder of his
suspended sentence in the DOC. We therefore affirm the trial court’s decision.
Conclusion [35] In sum, extraordinarily compelling reasons exist here that warrant
reinstatement of Rosenbourgh’s appeal. Rosenbourgh was provided sufficient
notice of his probation violation allegations such that his right to due process
was not violated, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking
Rosenbourgh’s probation or by executing the balance of Rosenbourgh’s
sentence. We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1576 | September 19, 2025 Page 17 of 18 [36] Affirmed.
Pyle, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Jessica R. Merino Wyatt, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Brandon D. Smith Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-1576 | September 19, 2025 Page 18 of 18