Robert A. Johnson v. Ravenwood Homeowners Association and Carl E. Krieger

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: April 3, 2026
• Docket: 3:24-cv-05087
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 AT TACOMA 6 ROBERT A JOHNSON, Case No. 3:24-cv-05087-TLF 7 Plaintiff, v. ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 8 REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS RAVENWOOD HOMEOWNERS 9 ASSOCIATION AND CARL E. KRIEGER 10 Defendants. 11 This matter comes before the Court on the Court’s request for additional briefing 12 regarding defendants Ravenwood Homeowners Association and Carl E. Krieger’s 13 request for attorney’s fees in response to pro se plaintiff Robert A. Johnson’s Motion to 14 Strike Defendant’s Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim (Dkt. 90). Dkt. 103. 15 Plaintiff alleged defendant Krieger’s answer was procedurally defective because 16 it allegedly contained redundant material under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) and improperly 17 asserted a counterclaim. Dkt. 90. He also argued that defendant Krieger could not 18 assert defenses or seek relief in an official capacity and was prohibited from bringing a 19 counterclaim under the “law of the case” doctrine based on the Court’s summary 20 judgment ruling. Id. The Court denied the entire motion on January 20, 2026, concluding 21 that the arguments regarding official capacity and redundant answers under Rule 12(f) 22 lacked merit and the “law of the case” doctrine was inapplicable. Dkt. 102. 23 24 1 Defendants asserted the motion was “frivolous and has no basis in the FRCP 2 and related law.” Dkt. 96 at 5. Defendants requested an award of reasonable attorney’s 3 fees. Id. The Court ordered the parties to file briefs concerning the authority for 4 sanctions and whether sanctions should be ordered. Defendants claim attorney’s fees 5 are available under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, and the Court’s inherent

6 authority. Dkt. 105. Defendants requested that the Court utilize this authority to “(a) 7 reimburse Defendants’ their attorneys’ fees in responding to the Motion to Strike; and 8 (b) advise Plaintiff to stop unnecessarily increasing the cost of these proceedings.” Dkt. 9 109 at 3. 10 The Court, having reviewed the record and defendants’ briefing, declines to 11 impose sanctions under § 1927, Rule 11, or its inherent authority. 12 Discussion 13 A. Plaintiff’s Untimely Response 14 Defendants timely filed their supplemental brief in response to the Court’s order

15 requesting additional briefing on sanctions. Dkt. 103,105. Plaintiff filed his reply one day 16 after the February 9, 2026 deadline and contemporaneously submitted a Motion for 17 Leave to File Plaintiff’s Response Out of Time. Dkt. 108. Although plaintiff sought relief 18 under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B), his request did not comply with the U.S. District Court 19 for the Western District of Washington Local Civil Rule (“LCR”) governing requests for 20 extensions of time. 21 Local Rules are “law of the United States.” United States v. Hvass, 355 U.S. 570, 22 575–76 (1958). Courts construe pro se filings liberally. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 23 106 (1976). However, pro se litigants practicing in this district are required to comply 24 1 with the local rules. See Muñoz v. United States, 28 F.4th 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2022) (“pro 2 se litigants, whatever their ability level, are subject to the same procedural requirements 3 as other litigants.”). 4 Under LCR Rule 7(j) “[i]f a true, unforeseen emergency exists that prevents a 5 party from meeting a deadline, and the emergency arose too late to file a motion for

6 relief from the deadline” the parties should then contact opposing counsel to meet and 7 confer regarding an extension and file a stipulation and proposed order with the Court. 8 This Rule reflects the Court’s strong preference for cooperative case management and 9 resolving issues by agreement wherever possible to promote efficiency in the court 10 system. 11 Plaintiff’s response was due February 9, 2026. Dkt. 103. Plaintiff filed his 12 response on February 10, 2026, with a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). Dkt 108. 13 Plaintiff contends that he “acted in good faith and without delay,” and “despite diligent 14 efforts [he] was unable to complete and file the response by the original deadline.” Dkt.

15 108 at 2. He also argues that the one-day extension would not prejudice defendants 16 and that “Courts routinely grant short extensions under Rule 6(b) where, as here, good 17 cause exists, and the delay is minimal.” Id. 18 While a court may, in appropriate circumstances, grant short extensions where 19 good cause is shown, plaintiff failed to follow the procedures of LCR 7(j), which provides 20 the emergency procedure for relief from deadlines. He did not demonstrate he tried to 21 confer with opposing counsel or seek a stipulated extension. It appears he contacted 22 defendants for the first time regarding the extension when he served the motion on 23 February 10, 2026. Dkt. 108 at 7. Because compliance with the Court’s local rules is 24 1 mandatory and plaintiff failed to do so, the Court will not consider his responsive brief. 2 All parties are required to adhere to local rules; here, failure to follow a local rule 3 designed to promote efficiency and cooperation between parties will not be excused. 4 B. Sanctions 5 A court has broad authority to impose sanctions: under Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. §

6 1927, and the court’s own inherent authority. Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 7 1131 (9th Cir. 2002). “Each of these sanctions alternatives has its own particular 8 requirements, and it is important that the grounds be separately articulated to assure 9 that the conduct at issue falls within the scope of the sanctions remedy.” Id. 10 Courts should exercise caution when a litigant proceeds pro se because “pro se 11 plaintiffs cannot simply be assumed to have the same ability as a plaintiff represented 12 by counsel to recognize the objective merit (or lack of merit) of a claim.” Miller v. Los 13 Angeles Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 617, 620 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 14 449 U.S. 5, 15 (1980) and Reis v. Morrison, 807 F.2d 112, 113 (7th Cir.1986)).

15 Furthermore, courts should be weary of awarding attorney’s fees when the court cannot 16 conclude that the action may be dismissed without proceeding to trial. Miller, 827 F.2d 17 at 620.1 18 • 28 U.S.C. § 1927 19 Section 1927 authorizes courts to require “any attorney or other person admitted 20 to conduct cases in any court of the United States” who “multiplies the proceedings in 21 22 1 Defendant’s reply cites Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). Dkt. 109. The case 23 is inapplicable because it deals with a different statutory scheme that gives the court the discretion to award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in certain civil rights lawsuits if the court finds that the 24 plaintiff's action is “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Id. at 421. 1 any case unreasonably and vexatiously” to personally satisfy the “excess costs, 2 expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” 28 3 U.S.C.A. § 1927. The statute is intended to limit abuse of judicial processes and to 4 discourage dilatory litigation practices. Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 760 5 (1980).

6 Although § 1927 is most often applied to attorneys, it may also apply to pro se 7 litigations in appropriate circumstances See Wages v. I.R.S., 915 F.2d 1230 (9th Cir. 8 1990). 9 To impose sanctions under § 1927, the Court must find that (1) the attorney 10 multiplied the proceedings; (2) the attorney's conduct was unreasonable and vexatious; 11 and (3) the conduct resulted in an increase in the cost of the proceedings. B.K.B. v. 12 Maui Police Dep't, 276 F.3d 1091, 1107 (9th Cir.2002), overruled on other grounds by 13 Fort Bend Cnty., Texas v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541 (2019). “The key term in the statute is 14 ‘vexatiously’; carelessly, negligently, or unreasonably multiplying the proceedings is not

15 enough.” In re Girardi, 611 F.3d 1027, 1061 (9th Cir. 2010). Section 1927 requires a 16 showing of recklessness or subjective bad faith. United States v. Blodgett, 709 F.2d 17 608, 610 (9th Cir.1983); New Alaska Development Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 18 1306 (9th Cir.1989). “…[i]f a filing is submitted recklessly, it must be frivolous, while if it 19 is not frivolous, it must be intended to harass.... [R]eckless nonfrivolous filings, without 20 more, may not be sanctioned.” In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., Sec. Lit.,78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th 21 Cir.1996). “Bad faith is present when an attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a 22 frivolous argument or argues a meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an 23 opponent.” Est. of Blas v. Winkler, 792 F.2d 858, 860 (9th Cir.1986). 24 1 Plaintiff arguably satisfies the first element by filing a motion that was meritless 2 and required defendants to respond. Defendants argue his actions amount to bad faith 3 because he attempted to “bury [defendant] Krieger in litigation paperwork, forcing him to 4 beg, repeatedly, for the right to defend himself,” which was “unnecessary and 5 demeaning.” Dkt. 105 at 4. Still, the record does not support a finding that plaintiff acted

6 recklessly or in subjective bad faith to knowingly advance theories he knew to be 7 frivolous or acted with the intent to harass. Accordingly, sanctions under § 1927 are 8 unwarranted. 9 • Rule 11 10 The Court has discretion to impose sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 “when a 11 motion is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation, or is brought for 12 an improper purpose. Warren v. Guelker, 29 F.3d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir.1994). Although 13 Rule 11 applies to pro se plaintiffs, the Court must account for a plaintiff's pro se status 14 when it determines whether the filing was reasonable. Id. (citations omitted).

15 Rule 11 mandates that, by presenting a paper to the court, an “unrepresented 16 party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed 17 after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: 18 (1) It is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) 19 the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing 20 existing law or for establishing new law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified will likely have evidentiary 21 support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, 22 if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.” 23 24 1 Fed. R. Civ. P 11(b). “Under the plain language of the rule, when one party files a 2 motion for sanctions, the court must determine whether any provisions of subdivision (b) 3 have been violated”. Warren, 29 F.3d at 1389. 4 The standard for deciding whether sanctionable conduct has occurred is 5 objective. C.W. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 784 F.3d 1237, 1248-49 (9th Cir.2015).

6 If a submission violates Rule 11, the Court may impose on the person who signed the 7 submission an appropriate sanction, including reasonable attorney's fees. Fed. R. Civ. 8 P. 11(c)(4). However, “Rule 11 is an extraordinary remedy, one to be exercised with 9 extreme caution.” Operating Eng'rs Pension Trust v. A–C Co., 859 F.2d 1336, 1345 (9th 10 Cir.1988). Courts should “reserve sanctions for the rare and exceptional case where the 11 action is clearly frivolous, legally unreasonable or without legal foundation, or brought 12 for an improper purpose.” Id. at 1344. 13 Defendants argue that Rule 11 was violated because plaintiff failed to exercise 14 due diligence and “simply made something up.” Dkt. 105 at 6. Plaintiff’s motion appears

15 to have been an attempt to interpret and apply case law and the Federal Rules of Civil 16 Procedure. While his motion was ultimately denied, the record does not demonstrate it 17 was filed for an improper purpose or without any reasonable basis. Imposing sanctions 18 under these circumstances may risk discouraging access to the courts, particularly for 19 unrepresented parties. As the Ninth Circuit has cautioned “[i]t is essential that free 20 access to the judicial system be maintained; Rule 11 was not intended to impede such 21 access.” Operating Engineers,859 F.2d at 1344. The Court declines to apply Rule 11 22 sanctions. 23 24 1 • Court’s Own Inherent Authority 2 “The inherent power of federal courts are those that are ‘necessary to the 3 exercise of all others.’” Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, 648 (9th 4 Cir. 1997) (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980)). In 5 sanctioning parties, “[c]ourts may not invoke [inherent] powers without a ‘specific finding

6 of bad faith.’” Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 628 (9th Cir.1993) (quoting 7 United States v. Stoneberger, 805 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir.1986)). The Court has 8 already found there is no evidence of bad faith in the record and declines to issues 9 sanctions under its inherent authority. 10 Conclusion 11 Although plaintiff’s motion was denied on all grounds and resulted in additional 12 proceedings, the record does not reflect the requisite standards required to impose 13 sanctions under § 1927, Rule 11, or the Court’s inherent authority. Accordingly, the 14 defendant’s request for reasonable attorney’s fees is DENIED and the Clerk’s office is

15 directed to terminate plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Plaintiff’s Response to 16 Defendants’ Request for Attorneys Fees (Dkt. 108). 17 18 Dated this 3rd day of April, 2026. 19 20 A 21 Theresa L. Fricke 22 United States Magistrate Judge

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