KENYON, Circuit Judge
(after stating the facts as above). It is earnestly contended by appellees that the entire South Dakota drainage law is unconstitutional, not only as violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, but also of sections 2 and 13 of article 6 of the South Dakota Constitution. The constitutional questions raised are grave, serious, and doubtful. Their determination is not necessary to the solution of these cases. Therefore, under the well-established rule that federal courts will not [715]*715pass upon the constitutionality of statutes unless absolutely necessary, we leave the questions aside. Howat et al. v. State of Kansas, 258 U. S. 181, 42 Sup. Ct. 277, 66 L. Ed. 550; Weyman-Bruton Co. v. Ladd, 231 Fed. 898, 146 C. C. A. 94; Allen, U. S. Atty., v. Omaha Live Stock Commission Co. et al. (C. C. A.) 275 Fed. 1.
The original drainage ditches No. 1 and No. 2 were properly established for the drainage of agricultural lands. When the spillway washed out, the maintenance of the ditches was impaired. Not only that, but the situation was fraught with grave consequence to many interests. The steep bluff was being torn away by the uncontrolled waters; the waterworks and water supply of the city of Sioux Falls, as well as the penitentiary-lands of the state, were endangered. A not improbable result of the Big Sioux river breaking through the natural barrier into the lateral ditch would be the entire diversion of its waters from their natural channel causing them to flow through said ditches and empty into the river north of the city, leaving Sioux Falls with an intermittent dry river bed.
The board of county commissioners under these conditions took steps to remedy the situation, and upon petition filed stating its object in its caption as follows: “To Reconstruct and Improve Drainage Ditches Numbers One and Two in Minnehaha County, South Dakota, and to Construct a New Spillway or Outlet to Said Drainage Ditches Numhers One and Two and to Pay Therefor by an Assessment upon the Property, Persons and Corporations Benefited Thereby,” proceeded to establish what is termed drainage ditch No. 1 and 2, Minnehaha county, S. D.
Appellees who have property within the area of the original drainage ditches, No. 1 and No. 2, insist that the proceedings established a new drainage ditch known as No. 1 and 2, which is also the position taken by appellants. Other appellees claim that the work was in truth and in fact a project for the repair of drainage ditches No. 1 and No. 2. The court held that the forming of the new ditch was a pretense and • subterfuge resorted to for the purpose of attempting to burden appellees with the cost of maintenance of ditches theretofore constructed; that the commissioners did not act as by law provided for the maintenance and repair of the ditches; and that the proceedings attempting to establish the new drainage ditch were void. We think the court was correct in this holding. It clearly expressed the situation as follows : i
“Under these circumstances the board of county commissioners had absolutely no authority, no right or color of right, were not acting under the provision of any statute of the state when they assumed the right to reach out and attempt to assess the benefits for the repair and maintenance of said ditches against the property of the various plaintiffs. They were mere trespassers, for the reason that no drainage ditch No. 1 and 2 was ever established and has no existence.
“I am of opinion that the proceedings of the board of commissioners in the repair and maintenance of these ditches. No. 1 and No. 2, by assuming the right to constitute a new drainage district, calling it district No. 1 and 2, and to assess benefits to the property of the plaintiffs, in so far as they are located in the city of Sioux Falls, are void. Entertaining this view, it follows that plaintiffs’ prayer for an injunction should be granted.”
Record, p. 90, Case No. 6313.
[716]*716The proceedings, regardless of how designated, were in fact for repair and maintenance, and were governed as to assessments to pay for the same' by section 8470 of the South Dakota Statutes, which section is as follows:
“Assessments for Maintenance. — For the cleaning and maintenance of any drainage established under the provisions of this article, assessments may be made upon the landowners affected in'the proportions determined for such drainage at any time upon the petition of any person setting forth the necessity thereof, and after due inspection by the board of county commissioners. Such assessments shall be made as other assessments for the construction of drainage, certificates may be issued thereon and such assessments and certificates shall be liens, interést-bearing, perpetual and enforceable, in all respects as original assessments and maybe sold at not less than par by the board of county commissioners, turned over to persons contracting for such cleaning and maintenance, or may be collected directly by the board of county commissioners.” Section 13, c. 98, 1905; section 13, c. 134, 1907.
There is no provision in this statute for the taking in of other lands to help bear the assessment of burdens created in maintaining the original drainage. This was the statute under which the board of county commissioners could have' provided for payment of maintenance and repairs to the established ditches.
Section 8489 provides for a method of abandonment of drains under certain circumstances and the construction of new ones in the same location. Said statute is as follows:
“Invalid or Abandoned Proceedings. — If any proceeding for the location, establishment or construction of any drain under the provisions of a previous law has been heretofore enjoined, vacated, set aside, declared void, dismissed or voluntarily abandoned, or if, any such proceeding or like proceeding under this article be hereafter enjoined, vacated; set aside, declared void, dismissed or voluntarily abandoned in consequence of any error, defect, irregularity or want of jurisdiction affecting the validity of such proceeding or for any cause, the board of county commissioners may nevertheless proceed to locate a drain or drains under the same or different names and in the same or different locations from those described in the invalid or abandoned proceedings under the provisions of this article. In case any new proceeding be had resulting in the location of a drain in the same or substantially the same location as that described in the invalid or abandoned proceeding, the board of county commissioners shall proceed to ascertain the real value of the services rendered, money expended and work done under such invalid, abandoned or dismissed proceeding, and the, extent' to which the same' will contribute to the location, establishment or completion of such new drain. Such value shall be determined at a hearing upon the same notice as the equalization of benefits or assessments, and may be at the same time or at any other time, and the notice of such hearing may be a'part of the'notice of the hearing upon the equalization of benefits or assessments or separate therefrom, but the board shall in any case notify all persons interested to show cause why the determination of the board thereupon shall not be final. When finally fixed such value shall become a part of the cost of the new drainage. No use shall be made by any board of county commissioners in the laying out or completion of any drain or ditch under this article of any map, chart, survey, or other work done under any former law. or under this article without having paid therefor; and all sums allowed for any work or material or money expended under the provisions of any previous law or under this article shall be paid to the persons who have paid therefor in proportion to the amounts severally paid by such persons.” Section 33, c. 134, 19,07.
The proceedings establishing drainage ditches No. 1 ’and No. 2 have never been set aside or abandoned under this statute. It is true a small [717]*717portion of old ditch No. 1 was abandoned by the resolution adopted in the Coveil’s Lake proceeding, but the ditches were in no way abandoned. The Covell’s Lake proceeding was itself abandoned and the ditches were left as they originally were, so it is apparent that the action of the board was not taken under section 8489. Either the proceedings were to repair and maintain ditches already constructed, or they were to take care of a situation resulting from their imperfect or inadequate construction. By reason of the water of the river breaking through into the lateral threatening a change of the river’s course and the possible destruction of state lands, a situation was presented, not with relation to the drainage of agricultural lands, but rather to the failure of the ditches, due to inadequate or imperfect construction, to carry the increased flow of water. In other words, the project, if an entirely new one, was not for the drainage of agricultural lands. The 'court said in his opinion:
^ “Pursuant to this provision of the Constitution, the Legislature of the state has provided for the drainage of agricultural lands; but nowhere is there any statutory enactment under which drainage districts may be formed for the drainage of lands ‘for any public use.’ ”
We are satisfied that under the South Dakota Constitution, section 6, art. 21, drainage of lands for any public use other than the drainage of agricultural lands, must be carried out by drainage districts, and no legislation at the time of these proceedings had been provided for the establishment of such drainage districts. Whichever way, therefore, the matter is viewed, the board was acting without legal authority in its apportionment of benefits and threatened assessment of taxes.
Appellants challenge the jurisdiction of the court, claiming there was a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law; that there was no equity in the bill; that action was premature, and that the necessary jurisdictional amount was not involved. These in their order.
It is fundamental that equity cannot give relief where there is a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law. It is provided by the federal Judicial Code, Compiled {¡Stat. 1918, § 1244, as follows:
“Suits in Equity. — Suits in equity shall not be sustained in any court of the United States in any case where a plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had at law. (it. S. § 723. March 3, 1011, c. 231, § 267, 36 Stat. 1163.)”
It must be a remedy as certain, complete, prompt, and efficient to attain the ends of justice as that in equity. Monmouth Inv. Co. et al. v. Means, 151 Fed. 159, 80 C. C. A. 527; McMullen Lumber Co. v. Strother et al., 136 Fed. 295, 69 C. C. A. 433; Morgan v. Beloit, City and Town, 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 613, 19 L. Ed. 203; McConihay v. Wright, 121 U. S. 201, 7 Sup. Ct. 940, 30 L. Ed. 932; Tyler v. Savage, 143 U. S. 79, 12 Sup. Ct. 340, 36 L. Ed. 82; Boise Artesian Hot & Cold Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U. S. 276, 29 Sup. Ct. 426, 53 L. Ed. 796; Greene, Auditor, et al., etc., v. Louisville & Interurban Railroad Co., 244 U. S. 499, 37 Sup. Ct. 673, 61 L. Ed. 1280, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 88; Coler et al. v. Board of Com’rs of Stanly County et al. (C. C.) 89 Fed. 257.
[718]*718It must be a remedy on the law side of the federal court. A remedy in the state court that cannot be pursued in the federal court is not an adequate remedy. Sheffield Furnace Co. v. Witherow, 149 U. S. 574, 13 Sup. Ct. 936, 37 L. Ed. 853; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 516, 18 Sup. Ct. 418, 42 L. Ed. 819; United States Life Ins. Co. in City of New York v. Cable, 98 Fed. 761, 39 C. C. A. 264; Brun et al. v. Mann, 151 Fed. 145, 80 C. C. A. 513, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 154.
The question is: Has party the adequate remedy at law in the federal court?
In Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 391, 14 Sup. Ct. 1047, 1052 (38 L. Ed. 1014), the court said:
“Nor can it be said in such a ease .that relief is obtainable only in the courts of the state. For it may be laid down as a general proposition that, whenever a citizen of a state can go into the courts of a state to defend his property against the illegal acts of its officers, a citizen of another state may invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court's to maintain a like defense. A state cannot tie up a citizen of another state, having property rights within its territory invaded by unauthorized acts of its own officers, to suits for redress in its own courts. Given a ease where a suit can be maintained in the courts of the state tg protect property rights, a citizen of another state may invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts.”
It has been held that where the state statute provided an action at law against the county for the recovery of sums paid on account of invalid taxes that the same constitutes a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Board of Com’rs of Weld County, Colo., 217 Fed. 540, 133 C. C. A. 392. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the North Dakota statute permitting actions respecting title of the property or accruing on contract to b£ brought against the state the same as against a private person does not clearly allow an adequate remedy; and there, injunction restraining defendants from taking steps to enjoin certain taxes, was upheld. Wallace et al. v. Hines, Director General of Railroads, et al., 253 U. S. 66, 40 Sup. Ct. 435, 64 L. Ed. 782. There was no such proceeding as discussed in Únion Pac. R. Co. v. Board of Com’rs of Weld County, Colo., supra, in the South Dakota statutes. The only remedy was to appear before the board of county commissioners (claimed by appellees to be acting without authority), and then appeal from their finding to the state court. Such was not the adequate remedy contemplated by the federal statute.
While the frequent exercise of equity jurisdiction is in staying the collection of taxes illegal in whole or in part, a suit in equity will not lie to restrain the assessment or collection of a tax on the sole ground that it is illegal. There must be special circumstances bringing the case under some recognized head of equity jurisdiction. The right to such equitable relief must be clear where' it is -asked to restrain the collection of a state tax.
In Hannewinkle v. Georgetown, 15 Wall. 547, 548 (21 L. Ed. 231), it is said:
“It bas been the settled law of the country for a. great many years,- that an injunction bill to restrain the collection of a tax, on the sole ground of the •illegality of the tax, cannot be maintained. There must be an allegation of [719]*719fraud; that it creates a cloud upon the title; that there is apprehension of multiplicity of suits, or some cause presenting a case of equity jurisdiction.”
In Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Cheyenne, 113 U. S. 516, 525, 526, 5 Sup. Ct. 601, 605 (28 L. Ed. 1098), the rule is clearly laid down by the court:
“It cannot be denied that bills in equity to restrain the collection of taxes illegally imposed have frequently been sustained. But it is well settled that there ought .to be some equitable ground for relief besides the mere illegality of the tax'; for it must be presumed that the law furnishes a remedy for illegal taxation. It often happens, however, that the ease is such that the person illegally taxed would suffer irremediable damage, or be subject to vexatious litigation, if he were compelled to resort to his legal remedy alone. Bor example, if the legal remedy consisted only of an action to recover back the money after it had been collected by distress and sale of the tax-payer’s lands, the loss of his freehold by means of a tax sale would be a mischief hard to be remedied. Even the cloud cast upon his title by a tax under which such a sale could be made, would be a grievance which would entitle him to go into a court of equity for relief. Judge Cooley fairly sums up the law on this subject as follows: ‘To entitle a party to relief in equity against an illegal tax, he must by his bill bring his case under some acknowledged head of equity jurisdiction. The illegality of the tax alone, or the threat to sell property for its satisfaction, cannot, of themselves, furnish any grounds for equitable interposition. In ordinary cases a party must find his remedy in the courts of law, and it is not to be supposed he will fail to find one adequate to his proper relief. Cases of fraud, accident or mistake, cases of cloud upon the title to one’s property, and cases where one is threatened with irremediable mischief, may demand other remedies than those the common law can give, and these, in proper cases, may be afforded in courts of equity.’ This statement is in general accordance with the decisions of this court as well as of many state courts.”
See, also, Dows v. City of Chicago, 78 U. S. (11 Wall.) 108, 20 L. Ed. 65; State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, 23 L. Ed. 663; Ogden City v. Armstrong, 168 U. S. 224, 18 Sup. Ct. 98, 42 L. Ed. 444; Pittsburgh, etc., Railway v. Board of Public Works of W. Va., 172 U. S. 32, 19 Sup. Ct. 90, 43 L. Ed. 354; Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Benedict, 229 U. S. 481, 33 Sup. Ct. 942, 57 L. Ed. 1288; Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U. S. 576, 34 Sup. Ct. 372, 58 L. Ed. 737.
In Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. Salm et al., 258 U. S. 122, 42 Sup. Ct. 207, 66 L. Ed. 496, the alleged invalidity consisted in discriminatory overvaluation. There was no claim of absolute illegality in the assessment. Appellant had a remedy with the board of review to correct the assessment, and the court said that resort to the suit to prevent either a sale for an illegal tax creating a cloud upon title or other irreparable injury had no basis.
In Union Pacific R. Co. v. Board of Com’rs of Weld County, 217 Fed. 540, 133 C. C. A. 392, this court said with reference to the casting of a cloud upon real property creating an “equitable circumstance” that the remedy which the statute prescribes will dissipate any such cloud, and says:
“Those cases which hold that a cloud upon the title to real property affords a ground for equitable relief are not applicable, when the taxpayer is given the remedy of paying his taxes and recovering back any sum which the courts shall hold to have been illegally exacted.”
[720]*720There is no such provision in the South Dakota statute.
In Boise Artesian Hot & Cold Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U. S. 276, 29 Sup. Ct. 426, 53 L. Ed. 796, it was held that equity should not enjoin the collection of a tax on the ground of cloud on title when the tax can only be collected in suit at law in which the defense of its illegality is open, and further it not appearing that the tax is a lien on any of complainant’s property.
In Indiana Manufacturing Co. v. Koehne, 188 U. S. 681, 23 Sup. Ct. 452, 47 L. Ed. 651, certain assessments upon shares of stock in a corporation were involved. The court found that as there was no lien created on real estate there was no cloud on title.
It is well settled that an assessment that will put a cloud on title gives rise to equitable jurisdiction unless there is an adequate remedy at law. Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Cheyenne, 113 U. S. 516, 5 Sup. Ct. 601, 28 L. Ed. 1098; Greene, Auditor, et al., etc., v. Louisville & Interurban Railroad Co., 244 U. S. 499, 37 Sup. Ct. 673, 61 L. Ed. 1280, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 88.
Section 8463 of the South Dakota Statutes provides for the board of county commissioners fixing the proportion of benefits of proposed drainage among the lands affected.
Section 8464 provides for the board making an assessment against each tract and property affected, and this is collectible by the treasurer’s office. Clearly the assessment would create a cloud upon the title. Fixing the proportion of benefits being preliminary to the assessment and a part of the machinery of assessment, likewise, we think, creates a cloud upon thq title and gives equity jurisdiction. Shelton v. Platt, 139 U. S. 591, 11 Sup. Ct. 646, 35 L. Ed. 273; Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U. S. 576, 34 Sup. Ct. 372, 58 L. Ed. 737; Hopkins et al. v. Walker et al., 244 U. S. 486, 37 Sup. Ct. 711, 61 L. Ed. 1270.
Was the case prematurely brought? It is claimed that inasmuch as the board of county commissioners had' not assessed the taxes complained of consequently the suit is premature.
In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Howe et al., 180 Fed. 44, 103 C. C. A. 398, it was held by this court that the suit was prematurely brought because the telegraph company did not pursue the remedy afforded by law to have its assessment corrected by the state board of equalization. That was not a case, however, where it .was claimed that the entire proceedings were without authority and illegal, as is the case here. The jurisdiction to act was not questioned.
In Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. Salm et al., 258 U. S. 122, 42 Sup. Ct. 207, 66 L. Ed. 496, the question involved was the amount of the tax. It was not claimed that the proceedings were illegal.
In the late case of Milheim et al. v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement District et al., 262 U. S. 710, 43 Sup. Ct. 694, 67 L. Ed. 1194, there was no question of jurisdiction of the taxing body as there is here. Plaintiff’s property was by legislative act placed within the taxing district.
The proceeding here involved, being without authority, the situation is quite different from where the only question involved is the inequality of taxes levied by a board having jurisdiction to act.. The actions, we are satisfied, were not premature.
[721]*721Appellants urgently insist that it does not appear from, the record that the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest or costs, exceeds the sum or value of $3,000, and that the statements in the various complaints of appellees so alleging are false, and stated with the fraudulent purpose of imposing upon the jurisdiction of the federal court; that no tax has in fact been assessed; that the apportionment of benefits is tentative and subject to correction; and that there is no way of determining what the amount of the assessment against the respective appellees would have been had the proceedings not been interrupted by the injunctions; and that there is in fact no sum whatsoever in controversy between the parties hereto.
It has been held that future, undetermined, unaccrued, or unspecified taxes cannot be taken into consideration to give jurisdiction; that the court cannot engage in speculation as to such taxes. Holt v. Indiana Manufacturing Co., 176 U. S. 68, 20 Sup. Ct. 272, 44 L. Ed. 374; New England Mortgage Security Co. v. Gay, 145 U. S. 123, 12 Sup. Ct. 815, 36 L. Ed. 646; Citizens’ Bank v. Cannon, 164 U. S. 319, 17 Sup. Ct. 89, 41 L. Ed. 451; Washington & Georgetown R. R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 146 U. S. 227, 13 Sup. Ct. 64, 36 L. Ed. 951. Also, that where there is a suit to enjoin collection of a. tax the amount of the tax is the test of jurisdiction. Linehan Ry. Transfer Co. v. Pendergrass, 70 Fed. 1, 16 C. C. A. 585; Eachus v. Hartwell et al. (C. C.) 112 Fed. 564; Washington & Georgetown R. R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 146 U. S. 227, 13 Sup. Ct. 64, 36 L. Ed. 951; Board of Trustees of Whitman College v. Berryman et al. (C. C.) 156 Fed. 112; Citizens’ Bank v. Cannon, 164 U. S. 319, 17 Sup. Ct. 89, 41 L. Ed. 451; City of Ottumwa, Iowa, v. City Water Supply Co., 119 Fed. 315, 56 C. C. A. 219, 59 L. R. A. 604.
It has also been held that where the complaint alleges the amount in controversy to equal the jurisdictional requirement and the contrary does not appear to a certainty from the evidence, that the jurisdiction will be sustained. Maffet v. Quine (C. C.) 95 Fed. 199; Von Schroeder v. Brittan (C. C.) 93 Fed. 9.
What is the situation here? Each one of the appellees is threatened with an assessment of more than $3,000. The Northern States Power ’ Company is threatened with one of $50,000. And further, certain appellees who have no property within the original drainage districts No. 1 and No. 2 are brought into the district and made liable to future assessments for maintenance and repair of ditches. It appears from the record that the board of county commissioners had fixed against the different appellees the proportion of benefits on a unit basis. It is without question that the county commissioners have issued approximately $255,000 worth of warrants for this work, and that the amount due thereon is about $300,000. It is a matter then of mere mathematical calculation to arrive at the threatened assessment against each one of appellees.
Exhibit G is the notice to the various parties against whom proportions of benefits have been fixed. It provides as follows, to wit:
“All such owners and all persons interested are hereby notified and summoned to show cause at the time and place aforesaid why the proportion of [722]*722benefits shall not be fixed as stated, and the said determination of said board made final.”
If no action whatever were taken by appellees the amounts would be final, and under these circumstances we believe the amount in dispute in each case exceeds the jurisdictional requirement. The claim of amount is evidently made in good faith, and not for the mere purpose of giving the federal courts jurisdiction. We do not believe that where the board has passed a resolution fixing benefits which exceed the jurisdictional amount and are the basis of a proposed assessment, and which parties claim are fixed by the board without authority, that because said board may equalize the benefits or even find that no benefit exists the parties must wait until the final action of the board. It is suggested that the board may so equalize benefits that the jurisdictional amount will not be involved, but as the matter stood when the case was brought each appellee was threatened with the levying of a tax for more than the jurisdictional amount, and some of the necessary steps had already been taken.
As the proportion of benefits had been fixed subject to, change by the board only if appellees should convince them that their conclusion was erroneous, and in view of the claim in apparent good faith in each of the bills that the amount involved exceeded the jurisdictional i amount, we hold, from a careful survey of the entire record, that the necessary amount existed in each case to give jurisdiction to the federal court.
All bills of complaint raise questions under the federal Constitution that are substantial and not merely colorable. Hence the court fyas jurisdictipn exclusive of diversity of citizenship, which existed as to all appellees except the city of Sioux ’Falls, necessary amount being involved, to determine all questions in the record, and it has not lost jurisdiction by omitting to decide the constitutional ones. Siler et al., etc., v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 29 Sup. Ct. 451, 53 L. Ed. 753; Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U. S. 576, 34 Sup. Ct. 372, 58 L. Ed. 737; Louis. & Nash. R. R. Co. v. Finn, 235 U. S. 601, 35 Sup. Ct. 146, 59 L. Ed. 379; Greene, Auditor, et al., etc., v. Louis & Interurban R. R. Co., 244 U. S. 499, 37 Sup. Ct. 673, 61 L. Ed. 1280, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 88.
, Appellants plead estoppel against all of the appellees, and claim that appellees are not in position to maintain their actions, for the reason that as to some of the railroad companies the engineering departments have been in close touch with the drainage ditch proceedings; that some of them were assessed for benefits received upon the construction of the original drainage ditches in the same territory, received benefit thereby, and have not protested before the bringing of this action. As to some of the appellees it is claimed that their officers showed interest in the construction work and encouraged the board of commissioners to do the work; that some of the appellees, for instance, the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, hauled men and materials used in the construction work, and stopped trains between stations to unload men and materials. As to the city of Sioux Falls, it is claimed by way of estoppel that under due au[723]*723thority the mayor and city auditor signed the petition for the project. There can certainly be no just claim of estoppel as to those appellees whose property was not within the area of the original drainage ditches No. 1 and No. 2. As to the other appellees, the decree related only to the property outside of the original assessment areas of drainage ditches No. 1 and No. 2. So we are to consider the situation as bearing on the question of estoppel only as to the property outside of the original assessment areas up to the time of the notice of the fixing of benefits. The various appellees as to such property had no notice, when the acts constituting the alleged estoppel took place, that the same was to be affected by the drainage construction or would be assessed for the cost thereof. Hence the claimed acts of agents and officers of appellees would not constitute estoppel. The situation is quite different from that presented in Gilseth v. Risty (S. D.) 193 N. W. 132 — at least as to all appellees except the city of Sioux Falls. We do not pass on the question- of estoppel as to any appellees, as to assessments that may be made on their property within the original area of ditch No. 1 and ditch No. 2, for the purpose of maintaining such ditches.
Other questions are presented which we think are not involved in the determination of these cases.
The decree of the trial court in each case is affirmed.