Riley v. Kurtz

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: March 17, 2004
• Docket: 02-1488
• Status: Published

Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Riley v. Kurtz No. 02-1488 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0081P (6th Cir.) File Name: 04a0081p.06 Daniel E. Manville, LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL E. MANVILLE, Ferndale, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: John L. Thurber, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant. Daniel E. Manville, LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL E. MANVILLE, Ferndale, Michigan, FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT for Appellee. _________________ _________________ JIMMIE LEE RILEY, X Plaintiff-Appellee - OPINION - _________________ - No. 02-1488 v. - LEON JORDAN, District Judge. Daniel Manville, > appointed counsel for the prisoner plaintiff,1 obtained a jury , verdict in favor of his client in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, for DAVID T. KURTZ, - Defendant-Appellant. - which he was awarded attorney’s fees as a prevailing party. The defendant appealed only the jury verdict. We overturned N the jury verdict on one of the plaintiff’s four claims and Appeal from the United States District Court remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of punitive for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. damages unless the plaintiff accepted a remittitur. The No. 94-71263—Denise Page Hood, District Judge. plaintiff chose the remittitur, and an amended judgment was entered by the district court. Mr. Manville then filed an Argued: July 30, 2003 application for appellate fees which was granted. The defendant appeals the district court’s award of trial and Decided and Filed: March 17, 2004 appellate fees, arguing that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (42 U.S.C. § 1997e) limits an award of attorney’s fees. Before: GILMAN and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges; Mr. Manville argues that the defendant failed to appeal the JORDAN, District Judge.* award of attorney’s fees for his trial work, and this court does not have jurisdiction to consider the district court’s award of _________________ these fees. Concerning his request for appellate fees, Mr. Manville argues that the Prison Litigation Reform Act COUNSEL does not apply because an appeal by the defendant is not an “action brought by a prisoner” and application of the Prison ARGUED: Linda M. Olivieri, OFFICE OF THE Litigation Reform Act under these circumstances would ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant.

1 * Since any recovery of attorney’s fees will go directly to The Honorable Leon Jordan, Senior United States District Judge for Mr. Manville, we will refer to the fee application arguments as the Eastern District of Tennessee, sitting by designation. Mr. Man ville’s.

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violate the Equal Protection Clause. For the reasons set forth judge who determined that Mr. Manville was entitled to his below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court as to trial fees because the defendant did not appeal that issue in the award of trial fees, and REVERSE the district court’s 1998. The district court agreed with the magistrate judge’s award of appellate fees. determination on this point. As to the appellate fees, the district court found that the PLRA does not limit I. BACKGROUND Mr. Manville’s appellate fees because Mr. Manville was appointed prior to the enactment of the PLRA; Mr. Manville The plaintiff, a prisoner, filed a pro se complaint in the was not allowed to withdraw from the case; and the PLRA federal district court in 1994. On April 8, 1996, the district does not apply to time spent by a prevailing prisoner plaintiff court appointed attorney Daniel Manville to represent the defending challenges of judgments by prison officials. plaintiff on a pro bono basis. Mr. Manville states that he accepted the appointment with the understanding that if the II. ANALYSIS plaintiff prevailed, he could recover attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. On April 26, 1996, the Prison Litigation A. Standard of Review Reform Act (PLRA) became effective. In December 1996, Mr. Manville filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the This court’s review of an application for attorney’s fees is plaintiff because of the PLRA’s potential limit on attorney’s for an abuse of discretion. Glover v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 229, fees. The district court denied his motion. 251 (6th Cir. 1998). Statutory interpretation, however, is subject to de novo review. Id. at 249. The plaintiff won a jury verdict on all four of his claims for a total damage award of $25,003.00, and judgment was B. Attorney’s Fees Under § 1988 and the Prison entered in December 1997. On January 5, 1998, Litigation Reform Act – 42 U.S.C. § 1997e Mr. Manville submitted an application for attorney’s fees and expenses for his trial work in the amount of $32,097.80. The Traditionally, parties to litigation bear their own costs defendant filed a notice of appeal of the jury verdict on unless a specific statute or contractual provision provides January 12, 1998, but did not appeal Mr. Manville’s request otherwise. In 1976, the courts were given discretion to award for attorney’s fees at that time, or later when the district court a reasonable attorney’s fee to prevailing civil rights litigants. granted the request (May 30, 1998). See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); Glover, 138 F.3d at 248; see also Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 39 (1st Cir. 2000) (discussing On appeal, this court overturned the verdict on one of the 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)). Section 1988(b) provides that a “court, plaintiff’s claims and remanded the remaining claims for a in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the new trial on the issue of punitive damages or a remittitur. United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” The plaintiff chose the remittitur, and an amended judgment “[A] plaintiff ‘prevails’ when actual relief on the merits of his for $1,003.00 was entered on July 13, 2000. Thereafter, claim materially alters the legal relationship between the Mr. Manville was allowed to withdraw, and he filed a request parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that for appellate fees and expenses on July 11, 2000, in the directly benefits the plaintiff.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. amount of $25,754.54. The defendant then objected to both 103, 111-12 (1992). The Supreme Court held in Farrar that the trial and appellate fee requests as being outside the a plaintiff who is awarded nominal damages may be PLRA’s limitations. The matter was referred to a magistrate considered a prevailing party. Id. at 112. The size of the No. 02-1488 Riley v. Kurtz 5 6 Riley v. Kurtz No. 02-1488

award of damages, however, “does bear on the propriety of first from the damages (up to 25 percent), and then, if fees awarded under § 1988.” Id. at 114. inadequate, the defendant is liable for attorney’s fees under § 1988 up to 150 percent of the money judgment. See In 1996, Congress enacted the PLRA which placed limits Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 2003) (en on the amount of fees that may be awarded under § 1988 to banc), petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3373 (U.S. Nov. attorneys who litigate prisoner lawsuits. Section 1997e(d) of 17, 2003); see also Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 667 (6th Title 42, United States Code, provides in relevant part: Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1095 (2002). Subsection (3) limits the hourly rate for all attorney’s fees awarded under (1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined subsection (1). to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, in which attorney’s fees are authorized under section 1988 of this C. Mr. Manville’s Trial Fees title, such fees shall not be awarded, except to the extent that – The defendant argues that the PLRA limits the district court’s award of attorney’s fees for Mr. Manville’s trial work. (A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in The total award of money damages, after appeal, was only proving an actual violation of the plaintiff’s rights $1,003.00, so the defendant contends that the district court protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may abused its discretion in awarding Mr. Manville much more be awarded under section 1988 of this title; and than 150 percent of the damages. Mr. Manville argues that (B)(i) the amount of fee is proportionately related to the defendant waived any right to contest the amount of the the court ordered relief for the violation; or trial attorney’s fees because a timely notice of appeal of the (ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in fees issue was not filed. We agree that the defendant’s failure enforcing the relief ordered for the violation. to file a timely appeal of the award of attorney’s fees is dispositive of this issue. (2) Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action described in paragraph (1), a portion of the Following a trial, judgment was entered in favor of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to plaintiff on December 18, 1997. Mr. Manville filed a request satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded against the for attorney’s fees as counsel for the prevailing party on defendant. If the award of attorney’s fees is not greater January 5, 1998. The defendant filed his appeal on than 150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be January 12, 1998, not raising the issue of Mr. Manville’s fee paid by the defendant. request. On May 30, 1998, the district court awarded Mr. Manville attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of (3) No award of attorney’s fees in an action described in $32,097.80. The defendant did not appeal this award. After paragraph (1) shall be based on an hourly rate greater remand, an amended judgment was entered, but the defendant than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under still did not raise the issue of Mr. Manville’s attorney’s fees. section 3006A of Title 18, for payment of court- appointed counsel. Nevertheless, the defendant argues that on remand the district court should have revisited, sua sponte, the issue of Subsection (2) of this portion of the PLRA has been attorney’s fees. At the time the district court awarded interpreted to mean that an attorney’s compensation comes Mr. Manville his trial fees, the law in the Sixth Circuit was No. 02-1488 Riley v. Kurtz 7 8 Riley v. Kurtz No. 02-1488

that the PLRA did not apply to cases that were pending at the trial work without a timely appeal having been filed, the time the PLRA became effective. See Hadix v. Johnson, 143 defendant’s challenge to the award of trial fees comes too late F.3d 246, 252 (6th Cir. 1998). In 1999, however, while the for the district court to consider. See, e.g., Morgan, 757 F.2d defendant’s first appeal was pending in this court, the United at 794-95; Day v. Wayne County Bd. of Auditors, 749 F.2d States Supreme Court reversed this opinion and held that the 1199, 1205 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding that issue of attorney’s PLRA fee limitations apply to attorney work done after the fees not before the court where no timely appeal had been Act became effective even if the case was filed before the filed). effective date. Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 360-62 (1999). The defendant argues that the decision in Martin required the D. Mr. Manville’s Appellate Fees district court to review its previous fee award in light of the PLRA. We disagree. In our opinion, the district court had no 1. Application of the PLRA duty to revisit its earlier order, especially in the absence of any objection by the defendant. By the time the case was Mr. Manville was awarded $25,754.54 in fees and costs by remanded, the defendant had already waived his right to the district court for the appellate work he did for the plaintiff. object to the award of attorney’s fees. See Fed. R. App. P. The district court agreed with the magistrate judge’s 4(a)(1)(A) (providing that a notice of appeal must be filed reasoning that Mr. Manville was entitled to this amount of within thirty days after the order appealed from is entered); fees because he was not allowed to withdraw from the case Morgan v. Union Metal Mfg., 757 F.2d 792, 794-95 (6th Cir. until the matter was remanded from the Sixth Circuit. The 1985) (holding that requests for attorney’s fees are collateral district court also found that when a verdict has been rendered to the main cause of action and a separate appeal may be in favor of a prisoner-plaintiff, the plaintiff has proven an taken from the award of attorney’s fees). actual violation of his rights. “An appeal by a losing defendant and a plaintiff’s defense of the appeal cannot be The defendant also argues that the award of attorney’s fees considered an action where a plaintiff must again ‘prove’ that was based on the judgment entered after the jury trial, not the a violation of his rights has occurred since on appeal the amended judgment, so when the amount of damages was standard of review based on a finding by the trier of fact is a reduced, the district court should have reduced the amount of higher standard.” Riley v. Kurtz, No. 94-CV-71263-DT, slip attorney’s fees also. This argument fails to recognize that the op. at 5, (E.D. Mich. Mar. 29, 2002). The court then pointed district court’s award of attorney’s fees was pursuant to out that if Congress intended its legislation to change the § 1988 and was not based on the amount of the damages, but § 1988 standards for awarding attorney’s fees, it could have on the fact that the plaintiff was the prevailing party and on made that intent specific in the statute. the amount of time Mr. Manville spent litigating the case. Thus, amending the judgment did not require an amendment The defendant contends that the district court erred in not of the attorney’s fee award. applying the fee limitation provisions of the PLRA to Mr. Manville’s request for appellate attorney’s fees. Relying The district court did not err in concluding that the on the language of the statute that prohibits an award of fees defendant’s failure to appeal the award of trial attorney’s fees except under specific conditions and concluding that there is waived any objection he might have had to the award of fees. no exception for fees earned defending an award of damages, With a delay of over two years after the order was entered the defendant contends that no fees for appellate work may be awarding attorney’s fees and costs to Mr. Manville for his awarded. In any event, the defendant argues that the PLRA’s No. 02-1488 Riley v. Kurtz 9 10 Riley v. Kurtz No. 02-1488

fee cap applies to all work performed in a case, whether at judicial proceeding, which, if conducted to a determination, trial, post-trial, or on appeal, so even if Mr. Manville was will result in a judgment or decree.” Black’s Law Dictionary entitled to appellate fees, they should have been considered as 29 (7th ed. 1999). There appears to be no reason why an part of Mr. Manville’s overall fee award that is limited to 150 appeal brought by the losing party should be considered percent of the monetary judgment, or $1,504.50. anything other than a continuation of the original action. There is no final judgment or decree until the appeals process In response, Mr. Manville argues that the PLRA does not has ended. Therefore, we reject Mr. Manville’s first argument limit his appellate fee request because the PLRA does not and find that an appeal filed by the defendant is part of the apply to appeals filed by the defendant. He submits that an original action. appeal filed by a defendant is not an “action brought by a prisoner,” that the limitations on attorney’s fees do not apply Moving on to the next part of the statute, we examine the in this circumstance, and that he is entitled to the full amount issue of whether attorney’s fees are authorized under § 1988. of his requested appellate fees. As stated above, parties qualify for attorney’s fees under § 1988 of title 42, United States Code, if they are prevailing Since both parties insist that the statutory language supports parties. “[P]laintiffs may be considered ‘prevailing parties’ their respective positions, the obvious place to begin our for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant analysis is the language of the statute itself. Walker v. Bain, issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the 257 F.3d 660, 666 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. parties sought in bringing suit.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 1095 (2002). The particular statutory language at issue as 103, 109 (1992) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, well as the statute’s design as a whole must be considered. 433 (1983)). Although the plaintiff’s award of damages was Id. at 666-67. Statutes are to be read with “an eye to their limited by this court, he succeeded on three of his four claims. straightforward and commonsense meanings.” Id. at 666 The fact that his success was nominal on these claims does (quoting Henry Ford Health Sys. v. Shalala, 233 F.3d 907, not change his prevailing party status. Id. at 114. 910 (6th Cir. 2000)). “Every word in the statute is presumed to have meaning, and we must give effect to all the words to The defendant contends, however, that it was the intent of avoid an interpretation which would render words superfluous Congress to limit the definition of prevailing party for or redundant.” Id. at 667. We may not rely on the literal attorney’s fees purposes. In a February 6, 1995, report issued language of the statute if “absurd results or an interpretation by the House Committee on the Judiciary, the following which is inconsistent with the intent of Congress” would be statements were made concerning the attorney’s fees section the outcome. Id. of the Act: We start with Mr. Manville’s argument because he focuses This subsection permits prisoners challenging prison on the opening phrase of the statute: “In any action brought conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to receive attorney by a prisoner . . . .” There is no dispute that this litigation fees but reasonably limits the circumstances under which began with a case filed by Jimmy Lee Riley, a prisoner. The fees may be granted as well as the amount of the fees. issue, then, is whether the appeal filed by the defendant is part of the original action, or if, as argued by Mr. Manville, it is a This subsection limits awards of attorney fees in two completely separate action. The term “action” is not defined ways. First, it narrows the judicially-created view of a in the statute, but Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as “any “prevailing party” so that a prisoner’s attorney will be No. 02-1488 Riley v. Kurtz 11 12 Riley v. Kurtz No. 02-1488

reimbursed only for those fees reasonably and directly Thus, it appears that the defendant is correct in his assertion incurred in proving an actual violation of a federal right. that with this legislation Congress intended to limit the Narrowing the definition of “prevailing party” will definition of prevailing party. A prisoner may only qualify eliminate both attorney fees that penalize voluntary for attorney’s fees under the PLRA if the fees were “directly improvements in prison conditions and attorney fees and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the incurred in litigating unsuccessful claims, regardless of plaintiff’s rights” and if the fee is proportional to the amount whether they are related to meritorious claims. While of damages awarded for the violation. 42 U.S.C. this provision eliminates the financial incentive for § 1997e(d)(1)(A) and (B). prisoners to include numerous non-meritorious claims in sweeping institutional litigation, it retains the financial The defendant’s position is that defending a judgment on incentive to bring lawsuits properly focused on prison appeal is not directly proving a violation, so the plaintiff is conditions that actually violate federal law. not entitled to any fees for appellate work. Whether the defense of a favorable judgment is part of directly proving an Second, this provision has the effect of reducing actual violation of the prisoner’s rights is an issue of first attorney fee awards by eliminating fees for litigation impression in this circuit.2 Nonetheless, a survey of the case other than that necessary to prove a violation of a federal law surrounding the award of attorney’s fees under § 1988 for right. This eliminates the financial incentive for appellate work is instructive. attorneys to litigate ancillary matters, such as attorney fee petitions, and to seek extensive hearings on remedial Shortly after the enactment of § 1988, the courts interpreted schemes. its provisions as including awards for fees earned for the successful defense of a judgment on appeal. See, e.g., Hutto Finally, this provision establishes a proportionality v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-98 (1979) (affirming award of requirement for attorney fee awards. Under current law, appellate fees to prevailing party as part of the costs); the courts retain the discretion to award attorney fees that Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir. 1979) greatly exceed the extent of the relief obtained by the (stating that fees for defending a judgment supported by plaintiff prisoners. This proportionality requirement will Congressional purpose of the Act); see also Adcock-Ladd v. discourage burdensome litigation of insubstantial claims Sec’y of the Treasury, 227 F.3d 343, 351 (6th Cir. 2000) where the prisoner can establish a technical violation of (awarding reasonable appellate fees to prevailing party under a federal right but he suffered no real harm from the Title VII). There is no language in the PLRA that contradicts violation. The proportionality requirement appropriately reminds courts that the size of the attorney fee award must not unreasonably exceed the damages awarded for the proven violation. 2 The court notes tha t the Ninth Circuit has considered this issue when interpreting the enforcem ent part of the PL RA’s fee limitations. Webb v. H.R. Rep. No. 104-21, at 28 (1995), reprinted in 1 Bernard D. Ada County, 285 F.3d 829, 834-35 (9th Cir. 2002). In Webb, the issue Reams, Jr. & William H. Manz, A Legislative History of the was whether the attorneys’ post-judgment work related to enforcing a Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134 consent decree was work proving an actual vio lation. Id. The Ninth Stat. 1321 (1997). Circuit held that § 1997e(d)(1)(b)(ii) only requires that fees be directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation, and allowed compe nsation for po st-judgm ent work. Id. No. 02-1488 Riley v. Kurtz 13 14 Riley v. Kurtz No. 02-1488

the traditional view that reasonable appellate fees may be incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff’s rights awarded to prevailing parties. . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(A). We are to presume that when Congress passes legislation, The only similar case that has come to our attention is a it is fully aware of the existing law. See Int’l Union, United district court decision from the Eastern District of Michigan. Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., Local Sallier v. Scott, 151 F. Supp. 2d 836 (E.D. Mich. 2001). In 737 v. Auto Glass Employees Fed. Credit Union, 72 F.3d Sallier, the issue was whether the post-judgment work done 1243, 1248 (6th Cir. 1996) (“It is a settled principle of by the prisoner’s attorney included “proving” a violation. Id. statutory construction that when Congress drafts a statute, at 838. Based on the definition of “prove” in Black’s Law courts presume that it does so with full knowledge of the Dictionary (to establish or make certain), the district court existing law.”). Thus, the presumption is that Congress was found that “hours spent defending the jury award, against the aware when passing the PLRA that, under § 1988, fees are defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law, may also awarded to prevailing parties for work done by attorneys at be considered hours spent to ‘make certain’ the verdict.” Id. trial, post-trial, and on appeal. at 839. These attorney’s fee awards, however, are limited by the We reject the defendant’s argument that attorney’s fees for results obtained by the plaintiff. The Supreme Court has held defending a judgment on appeal are not available under the that plaintiffs should receive attorney’s fees for work PLRA. We hold that a prisoner who prevails on appeal is “expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved” and not entitled to attorney’s fees under the PLRA because the hours for work on claims unrelated to successful claims. See were part of proving or making certain an actual violation of Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983) (citation the prisoner’s rights. After all, if the prisoner’s favorable omitted). In this circuit, work on claims unrelated to the verdict is being challenged on appeal, he is having to prove or claims upon which the plaintiff prevailed should not be establish his violation again, this time to a higher court. compensated. See Kelley v. Metro. County Bd. of Educ., 773 F.2d 677, 684-85 (6th Cir. 1985) (denying a request for 2. Violation of the Equal Protection Clause attorney’s fees for work on an unrelated matter); see also Jenkins v. Missouri, 127 F.3d 709, 717 (8th Cir. 1997) (en Next, Mr. Manville contends that if the PLRA is applied to banc) (stating the question as whether the issues in the post- his request for appellate fees, then the Equal Protection judgment litigation are inextricably intertwined with those Clause of the Fifth Amendment is violated. He concedes that upon which the plaintiff prevailed in the underlying suit). he must show that an application of the PLRA’s fee limitations to appellate fees is not “rationally related to any However, an appeal by a defendant challenging a prisoner’s conceivable legitimate legislative purpose.” See Hadix v. success at trial is litigation related to the underlying suit, and Johnson, 230 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 2000). attorney’s fees would be allowed under § 1988 and Hensley. To this court’s mind, the “related claim” limitation set out in Under this standard the statute will be afforded a strong Hensley has been incorporated into the fee limitation section presumption of validity and must be upheld as long as of the PLRA. Although stated differently, this limitation on “there is a rational relationship between the disparity of attorney’s fees is like the limitation in the PLRA – attorney’s treatment and some legitimate government purpose.” fees are only available if “the fee was directly and reasonably The government has no obligation to produce evidence No. 02-1488 Riley v. Kurtz 15 16 Riley v. Kurtz No. 02-1488

to support the rationality of its statutory classifications state treasuries. Walker, 257 F.3d at 669; Hadix, 230 F.3d at and may rely entirely on rational speculation unsupported 845. by any evidence or empirical data. The legislature is not even required to articulate any purpose or rationale in As we noted in Walker, “the twin goals of decreasing support of its legislation. Consequently, plaintiffs bear marginal lawsuits and protecting the public fisc are legitimate the heavy burden of “negativ[ing] every conceivable government interests, and . . . decreasing an attorney fee basis which might support [the legislation], . . . whether award in the context of prisoner civil rights litigation serves or not the basis has a foundation in the record.” both of these interests.” Walker, 257 F.3d at 669 (citing Hadix, 230 F.3d at 845). These goals apply equally to trial Id. (citations omitted). and appellate work. Thus, Mr. Manville has failed to negate every conceivable basis which might support the legislation, One of Congress’ purposes in passing the PLRA was to and his constitutional argument fails. reduce the large number of frivolous prisoner lawsuits being filed in federal courts. See id. at 844 (citing to 141 Cong. Finally, Mr. Manville argues that it would be unfair to deny Rec. S7498-01 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. him his full attorney’s fees for his appellate work on behalf of Dole)). The fee cap provisions are directly related to this the prisoner. He asserts that if the fee limitation provision purpose. Mr. Manville argues, however, that once a prisoner applies to defending a judgment, a losing defendant prison has prevailed at the trial level, the claims can no longer be official would have little incentive to accept an unfavorable considered frivolous. Applying the fee caps to his appellate judgment and considerable incentive to cause the attorney to work under these circumstances, he contends, would be an generate billable hours for which he or she might not be equal protection violation. In response, the defendant argues compensated. Having to defend a successful judgment below that our decisions in Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. without additional compensation, however, is no different a 2001), and Hadix v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 2000), situation than is faced by every plaintiff’s lawyer working on are dispositive of this issue. We agree with the defendant. a fixed contingency fee. The possibility of having to defend a favorable judgment on appeal is just another factor a We found in Walker and Hadix that it is rational to prisoner’s lawyer has to take into account in deciding whether speculate that narrowing the definition of a prevailing party to take the prisoner’s case in the first place. While the court and building in a proportionality requirement (150% of the appreciates the dilemma Mr. Manville found himself in when monetary judgment) could reduce the incentive of prisoners he was denied permission to withdraw, we conclude that the and their attorneys to file frivolous claims. As we discussed PLRA applies to all the attorney’s fees generated by a in Hadix, the fee cap could “counter-balance” a prisoner’s prevailing prisoner – trial, post-trial, and on appeal. numerous incentives to litigate and place prisoners and non- prisoners in a similar decision-making position. Hadix, 230 Upon accepting his remittitur, the plaintiff’s monetary F.3d at 845. Just as a non-prisoner civil rights litigant should judgment was $1,003. Applying the 150 percent cap to this consider all the costs of bringing the action, including amount, the defendant is liable for attorney’s fees in the appellate costs, so should a prisoner litigant. Furthermore, as amount of $1,504.50. However, under the unique facts of this we discussed in both Walker and Hadix, the fee cap case, Mr. Manville will receive $32,097.80 in attorney’s fees provisions are rationally related to protecting the federal and for his trial work on this case, an amount well in excess of the 150 percent allowed by the PLRA. We conclude that the No. 02-1488 Riley v. Kurtz 17

$1,504.50 allowed under the PLRA is included in the award of trial fees, leaving no room for any further award for Mr. Manville’s appellate work. III. CONCLUSION For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court awarding Mr. Manville his trial fees and REVERSE the judgment of the district court as to Mr. Manville’s appellate fees.