Ridgway v. Combined Insurance Companies of America

565 P.2d 1367, 98 Idaho 410, 1977 Ida. LEXIS 393

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Decided: June 27, 1977
• Docket: 12160
• Status: Published

Opinions

BAKES, Justice.

The claimant appellant Roger Ridgway was injured while he was in Salt Lake City attending a two week training session operated by the defendant respondent Combined Insurance Companies of America. He applied for workmen’s compensation benefits, but the Industrial Commission denied his claim on the ground that his injury had not arisen out of or during the course of employment with Combined. Because the conclusion of law upon which this order was based was in error and because the decision of the commission did not contain independent grounds for denying the claim, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

In October of 1974 Ridgway answered a newspaper advertisement in which Combined sought trainees to become insurance salesmen. Ridgway signed a trainee agreement with Robert Ward, Combined’s sales manager for an eight-county region in southwestern Idaho. Under that agreement Ridgway was to attend a two week training seminar which Combined operated in Salt Lake City. Ward and Combined provided for Ridgway’s transportation to Salt Lake City, motel accommodations, travel between the motel and the training sessions, and a $6.00 per diem for meals.

The training program began on Monday, November 4,1974. Classroom sessions were scheduled for every day during the following two weeks except Sunday, November 10. On that Sunday, Ridgway and three other trainees were at the motel studying in preparation for the second week of the training session. Shortly before noon, Ridgway and Ronald Sparks, another trainee, left the motel to purchase hamburgers for the group. They traveled in Sparks’ car. While en route to a restaurant Sparks’ car was struck by a train and Ridgway was injured. It is his claim that these injuries were compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Law.

Combined contested the workmen’s compensation claim, arguing among other things, that Ridgway was an independent contractor and not Combined’s employee. The Industrial Commission did not reach this issue. It concluded that even if Ridgway were Combined’s employee, nevertheless,

“the Commission finds that the claimant was performing no service for the defendant at the time of the accident but was on a purely personal errand. There was no special or peculiar risk to the claimant at that time caused by his alleged employment. The only possible connection between the accident and the alleged employment was the fact that but for his relationship with the defendant, the claimant would not have been in Salt Lake City. The Commission concludes that this extremely tenuous connection does not establish sufficient causal relationship between employment and the accident on which to base a conclusion that the accident arose out of and in the course of employment with the defendant.” Sec. Tr., p. 53. (Emphasis added).

Because, as we shall explain below, the Commission has erroneously applied the special or peculiar risk doctrine to this claim, the matter is remanded to the Industrial Commission for further proceedings.

This Court recently considered the peculiar risk doctrine in the case of Clark v. Daniel Morine Const. Co., 98 Idaho 114, 559 P.2d 293 (1977). As we noted in that case, normally an employee traveling to and from work is not within the course of his employment and is not covered by workmen’s compensation. However, there is a recognized exception to this rule where travel to and from work involves a “special exposure to a hazard or risk peculiarly associated with the employment” which is the cause of the injury. In such cases, the injury is within the scope of coverage of the workmen’s compensation law. 98 Idaho at 115, 559 P.2d 293. As can be seen from Clark and the cases cited in that opinion, the peculiar or special risk doctrine only deals with an employee going to and from his work situs, usually the employer’s place of business.

The appropriate rule to be applied to determine the scope of workmen’s compensation coverage for employees whose work entails travel away from the employer’s premises at which the employee normally works is set forth in 1 Larsen, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 25.00, p. 443:

“Employees whose work entails travel away from the employer’s premises are held in the majority of jurisdictions to be within the course of their employment continuously during the trip, except when a distinct departure on a personal errand is shown. Thus, injuries arising out of the necessity of sleeping in hotels or eating in restaurants away from home are usually held compensable.”

When an employee’s work requires him to travel away from the employer’s place of business or his normal place of work, the employee is covered by workmen’s compensation while he attends to matters such as eating or securing lodging. It is necessary for traveling employees to attend to these personal needs in order to carry out the employer’s work, often at a location unfamiliar to the employee. Thus, keeping in mind the liberal construction that is to be given to the workmen’s compensation laws, Colson v. Steele, 73 Idaho 348, 354, 252 P.2d 1049 (1953), the risk incident in going to a restaurant or seeking lodging should normally be covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Law.

This is not to say that the traveling employee is entitled to portal to portal coverage while away from home. The Commission could find, for example, that an employee who is injured while engaged in a non-business related activity such as skiing or who drowns while scuba diving during a break in a business trip had distinctly departed on a personal errand unrelated to employment. Compare Wiseman v. Industrial Accident Commission, 46 Cal.2d 570, 297 P.2d 649 (1956), with Silver Engineering Works, Inc. v. Simmons, 180 Colo. 309, 505 P.2d 966 (1973). However, because it is necessary for any traveling employee to maintain himself while traveling, an employee should ordinarily be covered while traveling to and from restaurants, unless the particular trip represents an unreasonable departure in order to pursue some purely personal activity not connected with his employment or necessary to maintain himself while traveling. Cf. Wineland v. Taylor, 59 Idaho 401, 83 P.2d 988 (1938). Accordingly, the matter is remanded to the Industrial Commission to determine (1) whether Ridgway was an employee of Ward or Combined or was an independent contractor, and (2) if Ridgway was an employee of Combined, whether his injury arose out of or in the course of his employment under the rules we have set forth herein.

Finally, we must consider one evidentiary matter raised by the appellant. Ridgway argues that the Industrial Commission erred by considering defendant’s exhibit 13, a standard contract prepared by Combined. This contract, which Ridgway had signed before his accident, but which Combined had not then signed and has never since signed, was a standard contract between Combined and its salesmen who had completed the training session. While this standard printed contract was certainly not determinative of Ridgway’s status as an employee or independent contractor at the time of his injury, it was not wholly irrelevant to the determination of whether Ridgway was an independent contractor or an employee at the time of his injury and its admission into evidence, whether or not the Industrial Commission found it probative on that question, was not error.

Reversed and remanded. Costs to appellant.

DONALDSON and SHEPARD, JJ., concur. McFADDEN, C. J., concurs in result.