Richardson v. TIAA/CREF

123 B.R. 540, 13 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1491, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1473, 21 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 542, 1991 WL 12508
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. North Carolina
DecidedJanuary 14, 1991
Docket90-462-CIV-5-BR
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 123 B.R. 540 (Richardson v. TIAA/CREF) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richardson v. TIAA/CREF, 123 B.R. 540, 13 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1491, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1473, 21 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 542, 1991 WL 12508 (E.D.N.C. 1991).

Opinion

ORDER

BRITT, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on appeal by the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America and the College Retirement Equities Fund (hereafter “TIAA/CREF”) from the bankruptcy court’s order of 20 June 1990 in which the court held that funds in two supplemental retirement annuities belonging to the debt- or were property of the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). The court ordered TIAA/CREF to pay the accumulated amounts in those two accounts to Ernest C. Richardson, III, trustee in bankruptcy for Martin Schwarz, the debtor.

Jurisdiction is established in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), this proceeding being one that was referred to the bankruptcy court *541 under Title 28 U.S.C. § 157. Appeal was duly taken pursuant to Rule 8001(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.

I.STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On 24 June 1988, the debtor filed a petition under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The plaintiff was appointed the trustee for the case. The chapter 7 proceeding was subsequently converted to a proceeding under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code although on 29 September 1989, it was converted back to a chapter 7 proceeding and the plaintiff was reappointed as trustee. The debtor received a discharge in bankruptcy in October 1988.

On 18 October 1989, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the United States Bankruptcy Court seeking the court to order that funds held by the debtor in six retirement accounts administered by TIAA/CREF were property of the estate pursuant to section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The action was opposed by the debtor and by TIAA/CREF. The Honorable Thomas M. Moore, United States Bankruptcy Judge, entered an order along with a memorandum opinion on 20 June 1990 in which he held that funds in four of the accounts were not property of the estate and that funds in accounts designated as TIAA No. K040006-5 and CREF No. J040006-7 were property of the estate. The two accounts that were determined to be property of the estate are supplemental retirement annuities.

The bankruptcy court’s decision turned on the application of 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) which excludes from property of the estate a trust which has “[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debt- or ... that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law_” 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). To determine whether the restrictions on transfer of the trusts were enforceable under nonbankruptcy law, the court looked to New York law because the contracts between the debtor and TIAA/CREF state that such law shall govern all contract construction issues. With respect to the two supplemental retirement annuities accounts, the bankruptcy court stated:

They do not contain enforceable restrictions against transfers of the trust corpus by the beneficiary. The debtor has the ability to withdraw funds from the trust corpus at his option. The result is that the debtor has the ability to transfer portions of the trust to himself or other parties, whereas he does not have that ability with the other trusts.

TIAA/CREF appeals the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that the supplemental retirement annuities are property of the estate. The issues have been thoroughly briefed, and the appeal is now ripe for disposition.

II.STATEMENT OF FACTS

The court adopts the following facts found by the bankruptcy court:

The debtor is a professor at East Carolina University. From October 1965 through March 1990, he has participated in the TIAA/CREF retirement program through the retirement plans at the University of Michigan, Rice University, University of Tulsa and East Carolina University. The TIAA is a non-profit, legal reserve life insurance company. It provides a fixed retirement annuity to fund the retirement plans of institutions of higher education. TIAA invests the institution’s retirement plan contributions in mortgages, real estate, bonds and other debt securities. CREF is a companion non-profit organization that provides retirement annuities to fund these retirement plans. Its investments are common stocks and other securities having equity characteristics.

In addition, the parties stipulated that only the debtor has made contributions to supplemental retirement account numbers K040006-5 and J040006-7.

III.STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court applies two standards of review when considering an appeal from a bankruptcy court decision: “one for findings of fact; the other for conclusions of law.” Morter v. Farm Credit Services, 110 B.R. 390, 392 (N.D.Ind.1990). Rule *542 8013 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy-Procedure provides that “findings of fact shall not be set aside [by the district court] unless clearly erroneous.” Bankr.R. 8013. “When a bankruptcy judge’s conclusions [of law] are challenged, the district court must make a de novo review and may overturn the findings if they are contrary to law.” Morter, 110 B.R. at 393. The district court “may affirm, modify, or reverse” the bankruptcy court’s conclusions. Bankr.R. 8013. The appellant in this case alleges the bankruptcy court erred in finding as fact that the supplemental retirement annuities “do not contain enforceable restrictions against transfers of the trust corpus by the beneficiary.” The appellant also alleges that the bankruptcy court made an error of law in holding that the debtor’s two supplemental retirement annuities are part of the estate pursuant to § 541(a). The appellant contends the two annuities are excluded from property of the estate pursuant to § 541(c)(2).

IV. DISCUSSION

Section 541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code defines property of the estate as all property in which the debtor has “a legal or equitable interest ... as of the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). However, an exception to this definition is provided in 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) which states:

A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbank-ruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title.

11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). The bankruptcy court held that the debtor’s supplemental retirement annuities do not fall within the exception and are therefore property of the estate.

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123 B.R. 540, 13 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1491, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1473, 21 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 542, 1991 WL 12508, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richardson-v-tiaacref-nced-1991.