Richardson v. Doe

E.D. New York

Richardson v. Doe

DecidedNovember 30, 2021

Docket1:21-cv-06042

StatusUnknown

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Richardson v. Doe, (E.D.N.Y. 2021).

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Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -------------------------------------------------------------X RICHARD RICHARDSON,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER 21-CV-6042 (PKC) (LB) -against-

JANE DOE, Train Dispatch, Long Island Station; JOHN DOE, LIRR Floor Attendant; JOHN DOE, Porter; JOHN and JANE DOE, Long Island Railroad Police,

Defendants. -------------------------------------------------------------X PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:

On October 27, 2021, Plaintiff Richard Richardson, appearing pro se, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants alleging violations of his constitutional rights. The Court grants Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed without leave to amend. BACKGROUND Plaintiff, a houseless person, alleges that he was attacked by another houseless person at a Long Island Rail Road (“LIRR”) station located in Brooklyn, New York, on October 9, 2021, between 5:30 and 6:30 a.m. (Dkt. 1, ECF 5.)1 Plaintiff alleges that the incident occurred within the view of two unnamed Metropolitan Transit Authority (“MTA”)2 employees, a porter and a train dispatch booth occupant, who should have called the police. (Id., ECF 9, 12–13.) Plaintiff also alleges that the MTA

1 “ECF” refers to the pagination generated by the CM/ECF docketing system and not the document’s internal pagination.

2 The LIRR is part of the MTA and the police officers are part of the MTA Police.

1 Police should have seen the incident on video camera and come to his aid, but “no one came to stop [the alleged] attack.” (Id.) Plaintiff does not allege any injuries but asserts that Defendants’ failure to come to his aid violates his constitutional rights and seeks $3,000,000 in damages. (Id., ECF 4, 6.) STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court is mindful that “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A complaint, however, must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). The Court must dismiss a case if it determines that the complaint “(i)

is frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). DISCUSSION To state a claim under section 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that state officials, acting under color of state law, deprived him of a right guaranteed to him by the Constitution or federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996). It is well settled that “nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Serv.’s, 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). “As a general matter, . . . a State’s failure to protect an individual against 2 private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 197. There are only two “exceptional circumstances” in which “a governmental entity may have a constitutional obligation to provide protection:” (1) “a special relationship with an individual,” which requires “involuntary custody” or (2) “because the governmental entity itself has created or increased the danger

to the individual.” Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 533 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198); Matican v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 151, 156 (2d Cir. 2008) (collecting cases requiring involuntary custody). Liberally construed, Plaintiff asserts a due process claim against the MTA Police and the LIRR employees for failure to protect him from the alleged attack by a private actor. As discussed herein, the alleged facts do not rise to the level of a violation of Plaintiff’s substantive due process rights. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197. Moreover, nothing in the Complaint suggests that either the special relationship exception or the state-created-danger exception is applicable to this action. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint against Defendants is dismissed for failure to state a claim without leave to amend. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

FILING INJUNCTION WARNING The ability to litigate in forma pauperis is regarded as a privilege and may be denied if abused. In re Anderson, 511 U.S. 364 (1994); In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 179–180 (1991) (“In order to prevent frivolous petitions for extraordinary relief from unsettling the fair administration of justice, the Court has a duty to deny in forma pauperis status to those individuals who have abused the system.”); Polanco v. Hopkins, 510 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2007) (The ability to proceed in forma pauperis “is not a constitutional right, but rather a congressionally created benefit.”). The Second Circuit has held that a district court not only has the authority, but also an obligation, to deny this benefit to a litigant who has demonstrated a history of filing frivolous and vexatious claims. See In re Martin–Trigona, 737 F.2d 3 1254, 1261 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Federal courts have both the inherent power and the constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions.”). However, it is “[t]he unequivocal rule in this Circuit . . . that the district court may not impose a filing injunction on a litigant sua sponte without providing the litigant with notice and an

opportunity to be heard.” Iwachiw v. New York State Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 396 F.3d 525, 529 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Moates v.

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