1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 7 8 L.R.,1 Case No. 23-cv-03421-PHK
9 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE PURSUANT 10 v. TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
11 ROBERT MUELLER, et al., Re: Dkt. 1 12 Defendants.
13 14 Pro se Plaintiff L.R. brings this lawsuit against seventy-seven named and unnamed 15 defendants, asserting claims predicated on the following verbatim text: “18USC 1341 [sic]; 16 18USC 242 inter alia [sic], fraud and fraud in the inducement, this is not a social security case, 17 THIS ARROSE [sic] OUT OF FRAUD IN THE SSA!” [Dkt. 1 at 1]. The Court previously 18 granted Plaintiff’s financial application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), in accordance with 19 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). [Dkt. 7]. The Court now analyzes whether Plaintiff’s Complaint satisfies 20 the mandatory screening requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 21 LEGAL STANDARD 22 Any complaint filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of § 1915(a) is subject to mandatory 23 review by the Court and sua sponte dismissal if the Court determines the complaint is “frivolous 24 or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief 25
26 1 As discussed herein, the pro se complaint at issue is somewhat ambiguous. It appears that Plaintiff may be seeking review of an adverse decision regarding Social Security benefits. Accordingly, as 27 is the Court’s practice in social security cases and out of an abundance of caution, the Court will 1 against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); see 2 Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. 3 § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 4 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an 5 [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.”) (emphasis added); see also Chavez v. Robinson, 817 6 F.3d 1162, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that § 1915(e)(2)(B) “mandates dismissal—even if 7 dismissal comes before the defendants are served”). Congress enacted this safeguard because “a 8 litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks 9 an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton 10 v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). 11 If the Court dismisses a complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B), the plaintiff may still file 12 the same complaint by paying the filing fee because such dismissal is not on the merits; rather, the 13 dismissal is an exercise of the Court’s discretion under the IFP statute. Biesenbach v. Does 1-3, 14 No. 21-cv-08091-DMR, 2022 WL 204358, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2022) (citing Denton, 504 15 U.S. at 32). 16 Because Plaintiff proceeds in this matter pro se, the Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations 17 liberally and affords him the “benefit of any doubt” in undertaking the mandatory screening of 18 Plaintiff’s Complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 19 2012) (citation omitted). 20 ANALYSIS 21 I. Whether the Complaint is Frivolous or Malicious 22 The Court first considers whether Plaintiff’s Complaint is “frivolous or malicious.” 28 23 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or 24 in fact.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 31 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325). A complaint is legally 25 frivolous if it fails to establish standing and subject matter jurisdiction. Pratt v. Sumner, 807 F.2d 26 817, 819 (9th Cir. 1987). A complaint is malicious “if it was filed with the ‘intention or desire to 27 harm another.’” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 1 the intention or desire to harm another.” Id. Accordingly, the Complaint as drafted does not 2 appear to be malicious and thus dismissal is not warranted on that basis. 3 As to frivolousness, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint is frivolous because it fails 4 to establish subject matter jurisdiction or standing. As courts of limited jurisdiction, “federal 5 courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their 6 jurisdiction[.]” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011). There are 7 two bases for federal subject matter jurisdiction: (1) federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 8 § 1331; and (2) diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. A district court has federal question 9 jurisdiction in “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 10 States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A cause of action “arises under federal law only when the plaintiff's 11 well-pleaded complaint raises issues of federal law.” Marin Gen. Hosp. v. Modesto & Empire 12 Traction Co., 581 F.3d 941, 944 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hansen v. Blue Cross of Calif., 891 F.2d 13 1384, 1386 (9th Cir. 1989)). A district court has diversity jurisdiction “where the matter in 14 controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . . and is between citizens of different states, or 15 citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 16 Here, Plaintiff purports to invoke federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 17 §§ 242 and 1341. See Dkt. 1 at 1 (“Jurisdiction18USC 1341 [sic]; 18USC 242 [sic] inter alia, 18 fraud and fraud in the inducement, this is not a social security case, this ARROSE [sic] OUT OF 19 FRAUD IN THE SSA!”). Title 18 of the United States Code is titled “Crimes and Criminal 20 Procedure.” It is no surprise, then, that 18 U.S.C. §§ 242 and 1341
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 7 8 L.R.,1 Case No. 23-cv-03421-PHK
9 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE PURSUANT 10 v. TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
11 ROBERT MUELLER, et al., Re: Dkt. 1 12 Defendants.
13 14 Pro se Plaintiff L.R. brings this lawsuit against seventy-seven named and unnamed 15 defendants, asserting claims predicated on the following verbatim text: “18USC 1341 [sic]; 16 18USC 242 inter alia [sic], fraud and fraud in the inducement, this is not a social security case, 17 THIS ARROSE [sic] OUT OF FRAUD IN THE SSA!” [Dkt. 1 at 1]. The Court previously 18 granted Plaintiff’s financial application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), in accordance with 19 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). [Dkt. 7]. The Court now analyzes whether Plaintiff’s Complaint satisfies 20 the mandatory screening requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 21 LEGAL STANDARD 22 Any complaint filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of § 1915(a) is subject to mandatory 23 review by the Court and sua sponte dismissal if the Court determines the complaint is “frivolous 24 or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief 25
26 1 As discussed herein, the pro se complaint at issue is somewhat ambiguous. It appears that Plaintiff may be seeking review of an adverse decision regarding Social Security benefits. Accordingly, as 27 is the Court’s practice in social security cases and out of an abundance of caution, the Court will 1 against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); see 2 Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. 3 § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 4 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an 5 [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.”) (emphasis added); see also Chavez v. Robinson, 817 6 F.3d 1162, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that § 1915(e)(2)(B) “mandates dismissal—even if 7 dismissal comes before the defendants are served”). Congress enacted this safeguard because “a 8 litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks 9 an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton 10 v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). 11 If the Court dismisses a complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B), the plaintiff may still file 12 the same complaint by paying the filing fee because such dismissal is not on the merits; rather, the 13 dismissal is an exercise of the Court’s discretion under the IFP statute. Biesenbach v. Does 1-3, 14 No. 21-cv-08091-DMR, 2022 WL 204358, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2022) (citing Denton, 504 15 U.S. at 32). 16 Because Plaintiff proceeds in this matter pro se, the Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations 17 liberally and affords him the “benefit of any doubt” in undertaking the mandatory screening of 18 Plaintiff’s Complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 19 2012) (citation omitted). 20 ANALYSIS 21 I. Whether the Complaint is Frivolous or Malicious 22 The Court first considers whether Plaintiff’s Complaint is “frivolous or malicious.” 28 23 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or 24 in fact.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 31 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325). A complaint is legally 25 frivolous if it fails to establish standing and subject matter jurisdiction. Pratt v. Sumner, 807 F.2d 26 817, 819 (9th Cir. 1987). A complaint is malicious “if it was filed with the ‘intention or desire to 27 harm another.’” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 1 the intention or desire to harm another.” Id. Accordingly, the Complaint as drafted does not 2 appear to be malicious and thus dismissal is not warranted on that basis. 3 As to frivolousness, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint is frivolous because it fails 4 to establish subject matter jurisdiction or standing. As courts of limited jurisdiction, “federal 5 courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their 6 jurisdiction[.]” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011). There are 7 two bases for federal subject matter jurisdiction: (1) federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 8 § 1331; and (2) diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. A district court has federal question 9 jurisdiction in “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 10 States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A cause of action “arises under federal law only when the plaintiff's 11 well-pleaded complaint raises issues of federal law.” Marin Gen. Hosp. v. Modesto & Empire 12 Traction Co., 581 F.3d 941, 944 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hansen v. Blue Cross of Calif., 891 F.2d 13 1384, 1386 (9th Cir. 1989)). A district court has diversity jurisdiction “where the matter in 14 controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . . and is between citizens of different states, or 15 citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 16 Here, Plaintiff purports to invoke federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 17 §§ 242 and 1341. See Dkt. 1 at 1 (“Jurisdiction18USC 1341 [sic]; 18USC 242 [sic] inter alia, 18 fraud and fraud in the inducement, this is not a social security case, this ARROSE [sic] OUT OF 19 FRAUD IN THE SSA!”). Title 18 of the United States Code is titled “Crimes and Criminal 20 Procedure.” It is no surprise, then, that 18 U.S.C. §§ 242 and 1341 “are criminal statutes, and it is 21 well-settled that ‘a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non- 22 prosecution of another.’” Carey v. Torres, No. 24-cv-09534-TSH, 2025 WL 277399, at *5 (N.D. 23 Cal. Jan. 23, 2025) (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)); Aldabe v. 24 Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (“These criminal provisions, however, provide no 25 basis for civil liability.”); Redmond v. United States, No. 22-cv-01107-TSH, 2022 WL 1304472, at 26 *3 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2022) (“[P]rivate individuals lack standing to assert claims for relief based 27 on criminal statutes.”) (collecting cases). “Individuals cannot file criminal charges in the United 1 government, usually through the United States Attorney's Office.” Carey, 2025 WL 277399, at *5 2 (quoting :Candy-Anh-Thu:Tran v. Daniel, No. 17-cv-04243-BLF, 2017 WL 6513414, at *2 (N.D. 3 Cal. Dec. 20, 2017)) (alteration omitted). 4 Accordingly, Plaintiff lacks standing to bring claims under either 18 U.S.C. § 242 or 18 5 U.S.C. § 1341, as alleged in the Complaint. See Williams v. Praetorian Ins. Co., No. 20-cv- 6 04766-TSH, 2020 WL 13815138, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2020) (“Because Williams lacks 7 standing to bring criminal charges, any such claim must be dismissed without leave to amend.”). 8 If Plaintiff believes the individuals and entities names as defendants in his Complaint have 9 engaged in criminal conduct, Plaintiff may try to contact federal law enforcement or the United 10 States Attorney's Office, but the ultimate decision on whether to investigate or prosecute any 11 federal crimes rests with these government officials and not with Plaintiff. 12 To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to invoke this Court’s diversity jurisdiction, the 13 Complaint does not allege the Parties’ citizenship or allege that the amount in controversy exceeds 14 the statutory minimum. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Accordingly, the Complaint fails to adequately 15 plead diversity jurisdiction, and for that reason, fails to demonstrate subject matter jurisdiction. 16 Accordingly, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to dismissal as 17 frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), for failure to adequately plead subject matter 18 jurisdiction. 19 II. Whether the Complaint Fails to State a Claim for Relief 20 The Court next considers whether the Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a 21 claim for relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff 22 has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same 23 as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison, 668 24 F.3d at 1112 (citing Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127). “The Rule 12(b)(6) standard requires a complaint 25 to contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 26 face.” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 27 678 (2009)). Detailed factual allegations are not required but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 1 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A pleading must 2 “contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to 3 sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562 (citation omitted) 4 (emphasis in original). 5 Here, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a claim for relief. In the Complaint, Plaintiff 6 alleges that various individuals and governmental entities engaged in “fraud.” [Dkt. 1 at 1-2]. 7 Plaintiff’s vague allegations appear directed at an application or claim for social security disability 8 benefits. Plaintiff states that he “incorporates all previously filed information and exhibits and 9 especially the writings and recommendations of Defendants #1 Robert Mueller and #2 Jocelyn 10 Burton,” as well as “the written orders from Judge Charles A. Legge Former Judge of the 11 Northern District of California[.]” Id. at 1. Plaintiff also references communications with a 12 “worker assigned to the Benefits Analysis Division of the Social Security Administration” 13 regarding “the wrong ResJudicata [sic] standing of this case.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff alleges that “the 14 SSA has committed severe frauds against [him] previously, including but not limited to 15 DENYING THE EXISTENCE OF the tumor in his spine existant [sic] since he was 12 years old; 16 and USING THAT DENIAL OF TUMOR EXISTANCE to deny his childhood based, [sic] on his 17 father’s and mother’s SSA Accounts, and falsely claiming [he] had money to close his SSI 18 claims.” Id. Stating that he is “VERY SICK AND MEDICALLY FRAGILE,” Plaintiff asks the 19 Court to “IMMEDIATELY SET ASIDE THIS CURRENT CASE-AT-BAR FOR 20 APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR” so that he can preserve his ability to file “A NEW LAWSUIT” 21 for social security benefits. Id. at 2-3. 22 To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to bring a fraud-based claim, the Federal Rules of 23 Civil Procedure require that he allege fraud “with particularity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); accord 24 Irving Firemen’s Relief & Ret. Fund v. Uber Techs., Inc., 998 F.3d 397, 404 (9th Cir. 2021) 25 (“Because allegations of fraud inescapably carry a degree of moral turpitude, Rule 9(b) imparts a 26 heightened note of seriousness, requiring a greater degree of pre-discovery investigation by the 27 plaintiff, followed by the plaintiff's required particular allegations, thereby protecting a defendant's 1 defendant to respond to the particularized allegations.”). To plead fraud with particularity, “the 2 pleader must state the time, place, and specific content of the false representations as well as the 3 identity of the parties to the misrepresentation.” Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 553 (9th 4 Cir. 2007) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th 5 Cir. 1986)). That is, “[a]verments of fraud must be accompanied by the who, what, when, where, 6 and how” of the alleged misconduct. Terpin v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 118 F.4th 1102, 1112 (9th 7 Cir. 2024) (quoting Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009)). Here, the 8 Complaint does not adequately set forth the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the alleged 9 fraud, but rather (as quoted above) refers generally to some actions taken in connection with an 10 apparent denial of social security benefits without sufficient explanation as to the alleged fraud. 11 “The elements of fraud are: (1) a misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or 12 nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (or scienter); intend to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (4) 13 justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage.” Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 14 268, 274 (Cal. 2004). As quoted above, the Complaint does not adequately plead the required 15 elements of fraud. Rather, the Complaint asserts “fraud,” “fraud in the inductment [sic],” and 16 “fraud in the SSA” in conclusory terms. Even construing the Complaint liberally, the allegations 17 which appear to support Plaintiff’s fraud claims are that: (1) a Social Security Administration 18 employee “very recently this year” told Plaintiff “WITH ABSOLUTE ROCK SOLID 19 CERTAINTIY [sic] THAT UNLESS A NEW LAWSUIT [for social security benefits] WAS 20 FILED BEFORE THE PLAINTIFF TURNS 65 YEARS OLD THEN THAT LAWSUIT WILL 21 BE BARRED;” (2) former Northern District of California Judge Charles A. Legge “promised 22 Plaintiff that defendants Jocelyn Burton and Robert Mueller would resolve the backpay issues in 23 this case;” (3) “the SSA has committed severe frauds against [Plaintiff] previously, including but 24 not limited to DENYING THE EXISTENCE OF the tumor in his spine existant [sic] since he was 25 12 years old; and USING THAT DENIAL OF TUMOR EXISTANCE to deny his childhood 26 based, [sic] on his father’s and mother’s SSA Accounts, and falsely claiming [he] had money to 27 close his SSI claims;” and (4) Defendants Robert Mueller and Jocelyn Burton “swore under oath 1 . . . but then actually never so did.” [Dkt. 1 at 1-2]. 2 To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to allege fraud based on the alleged statements by 3 the SSA employee or the “promise” made by Judge Legge, Plaintiff does not allege who that 4 employee is, when the statements were made, or how and why any statement or “promise” was a 5 misrepresentation. To the extent that Plaintiff alleges “severe frauds” committed by the SSA 6 “previously,” Plaintiff does not allege who specifically made the alleged promise, what specific 7 statements were made, when and where the statements were made, or how they were made. See 8 Lazar v. Superior Ct., 909 P.2d 981, 989 (Cal. 1996) (stating that the particularity requirement for 9 fraud claims “necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what 10 means the representations were tendered”). To the extent that Plaintiff alleges that Defendants 11 Mueller and Burton failed to investigate Plaintiff’s backpay issue, the Complaint fails to allege 12 what specific statements these Defendants made, when and where the statements were made, how 13 they were made, and more specifically, how these alleged promises were breached. 14 To the extent that Plaintiff has filed this lawsuit to seek this Court’s review of the 15 circumstances surrounding the apparent denial of Plaintiff’s previous social security applications, 16 the Court lacks jurisdiction to do so. Judicial review of appeals of final decisions of the Social 17 Security Administration are governed by a specific set of rules and procedures. See Fed. R. Civ. 18 P. Supp. Soc. Sec. R. 1 (“These rules govern an action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for review on the 19 record of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security that presents only an individual 20 claim.”). Plaintiff has failed to identify or otherwise allege that there exists an official “final 21 decision” made by the Social Security Administration regarding Plaintiff’s application(s) for 22 benefits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. Soc. Sec. R. 2(b)(1) (setting forth the minimum pleading 23 requirements for social security claims); see also Richards v. Apfel, No. C-98-4132-CAL, 1999 24 WL 252477, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 1999) (“The Social Security Act bars judicial intervention 25 in benefit claims processings. The sole jurisdictional basis for court review of administrative 26 actions concerning claims for benefits under Titles II and XVI is set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).”). 27 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a claim for relief. 1 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 2 III. Whether any Defendant is Immune from Monetary Relief 3 While the Court finds that the Complaint must be dismissed under the first two prongs of 4 § 1915(e)(2)(B) as discussed above, for completeness the Court turns to the third prong of the 5 statute. Under the mandatory screening statute, the final inquiry is whether the Complaint seeks 6 monetary relief against defendants who are immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 7 § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). Here, Plaintiff does not specify the form of relief that he seeks. To the extent 8 that Plaintiff is seeking monetary relief, it appears likely that at least some of the defendants may 9 be immune from such relief. However, given the ambiguity of the pleading, the Court will not 10 dismiss the Complaint on these grounds. As discussed below, the Court provides Plaintiff the 11 opportunity to file an amended complaint which should more squarely identify both the named 12 defendants and the exact relief sought. 13 CONCLUSION 14 For the reasons set forth herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT: 15 1. Plaintiff’s Complaint [Dkt. 1] is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, pursuant to 28 16 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), as frivolous and for failure to state a claim for relief. 17 2. Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE to file an Amended Complaint that addresses the issues 18 discussed herein by no later than August 1, 2025. 19 3. If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint by the ordered deadline or if he cannot cure 20 the identified deficiencies, that may result in negative consequences for this case, including 21 but not limited to a recommendation by this Court that this action be dismissed with 22 prejudice either in whole or in part. 23 4. Plaintiff is ADVISED that there are several resources for pro se litigants. The Court 24 makes available a guide for pro se litigants called Representing Yourself in Federal Court: 25 A Handbook for Pro Se Litigants, which provides instructions on how to proceed at every 26 stage of a case, including discovery, motions, and trial. This guide is available 27 electronically online at https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/wp- 1 copy form free of charge from the Clerk of Court’s Office. The Court additionally has a 2 webpage with resources for pro se litigants: https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se- 3 litigants/. In addition, Plaintiff has the option to seek assistance from the Legal Help 4 Center by making an appointment by telephone at (415) 782-8982 or by email at 5 fedpro@sfbar.org. The Legal Help Center is a free service provided by the Justice & 6 Diversity Center of the Bar Association of San Francisco (“JDC”), and is not part of the 7 United States District Court. The Legal Help Center is staffed by attorneys employed by 8 the JDC to provide information and limited-scope legal assistance to pro se litigants in 9 civil cases. See https://cand.uscourts.gov/about/court-programs/legal-helpdesks/. 10 5. The Court further ADVISES that the amended complaint shall include the caption and 11 civil case number used in this Order (24-cv-01513-PHK) and the words FIRST 12 AMENDED COMPLAINT shall be written on the caption page. The Court recommends 13 that Plaintiff use this Court’s form complaint (available on the Court website) for drafting 14 the amended complaint. 15 6. Because an amended complaint completely replaces the previous complaint, Plaintiff 16 SHALL include in his amended complaint all claims he wishes to present, all defendants 17 he wishes to sue, and all relief sought. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th 18 Cir. 1992). The amended complaint SHALL NOT incorporate material from the prior 19 complaint by reference. Similarly, the amended complaint SHALL NOT incorporate by 20 reference unidentified filings in either previous Social Security Administration proceedings 21 or in previous lawsuits. In that regard, the Court notes that the Richards case cited above 22 appears to be a previous lawsuit filed by Plaintiff here against numerous defendants 23 involved with the Social Security Administration, and that previous case was dismissed by 24 Judge Legge. See Richards v. Apfel, No. C-98-4132-CAL, 1999 WL 252477 (N.D. Cal. 25 Apr. 14, 1999). In that dismissal Order, Judge Legge wrote:
26 [T]he government has represented to this court in its brief that upon dismissal of this action, plaintiff's case will be returned to the proper 27 component of the Social Security Administration to address plaintiff's And plaintiff might be able to obtain reinstatement of his Title XVI 1 checks by complying with the SSA's requests for information. 2 Id. at *7. 3 To the extent Plaintiff is relying on the government’s representation from 1999 as the basis 4 for the current lawsuit, Plaintiff's amended complaint SHALL explain with specific facts 5 what happened after that reconsideration and how and why those events constitute the 6 alleged fraud. 7 7. Plaintiff SHALL comply with all of this Court’s Orders (including all Standing Orders, 8 available on the Court’s website) and all deadlines required by the Federal Rules of Civil 9 Procedure and the Local Rules of this Court, in a timely fashion. When needed, Plaintiff 10 may file a motion (prior to a deadline) requesting an extension of time to meet a court- 11 ordered deadline. In order to be granted, any such motion SHALL show good cause why 12 there exists a need for a reasonable amount of additional time to complete the necessary 13 tasks. 14 8. Failure to file an amended complaint by the deadline herein and failure to prosecute this 3 15 action timely may result in negative consequences for Plaintiff's case, including a 16 recommendation for dismissal of this action with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil 2 17 Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute. 18 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 21 || Dated: June 9, 2025 eg 4 | 4 wy □ 22 , 23 United States Manistrate Judge 24 25 26 27 28