Richards v. Mueller

Opinion

L.R.,1 Case No. 23-cv-03421-PHK

Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE PURSUANT v. TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

ROBERT MUELLER, et al., Re: Dkt. 1 Defendants.

Pro se Plaintiff L.R. brings this lawsuit against seventy-seven named and unnamed defendants, asserting claims predicated on the following verbatim text: “18USC 1341 [sic]; 18USC 242 inter alia [sic], fraud and fraud in the inducement, this is not a social security case, THIS ARROSE [sic] OUT OF FRAUD IN THE SSA!” [Dkt. 1 at 1]. The Court previously granted Plaintiff’s financial application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). [Dkt. 7]. The Court now analyzes whether Plaintiff’s Complaint satisfies the mandatory screening requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Any complaint filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of § 1915(a) is subject to mandatory review by the Court and sua sponte dismissal if the Court determines the complaint is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief

1 As discussed herein, the pro se complaint at issue is somewhat ambiguous. It appears that Plaintiff may be seeking review of an adverse decision regarding Social Security benefits. Accordingly, as is the Court’s practice in social security cases and out of an abundance of caution, the Court will against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); see Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.”) (emphasis added); see also Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that § 1915(e)(2)(B) “mandates dismissal—even if dismissal comes before the defendants are served”). Congress enacted this safeguard because “a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). If the Court dismisses a complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B), the plaintiff may still file the same complaint by paying the filing fee because such dismissal is not on the merits; rather, the dismissal is an exercise of the Court’s discretion under the IFP statute. Biesenbach v. Does 1-3, No. 21-cv-08091-DMR, 2022 WL 204358, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2022) (citing Denton, 504 U.S. at 32). Because Plaintiff proceeds in this matter pro se, the Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations liberally and affords him the “benefit of any doubt” in undertaking the mandatory screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). I. Whether the Complaint is Frivolous or Malicious The Court first considers whether Plaintiff’s Complaint is “frivolous or malicious.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 31 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325). A complaint is legally frivolous if it fails to establish standing and subject matter jurisdiction. Pratt v. Sumner, 807 F.2d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 1987). A complaint is malicious “if it was filed with the ‘intention or desire to harm another.’” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). the intention or desire to harm another.” Id. Accordingly, the Complaint as drafted does not appear to be malicious and thus dismissal is not warranted on that basis. As to frivolousness, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint is frivolous because it fails to establish subject matter jurisdiction or standing. As courts of limited jurisdiction, “federal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction[.]” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011). There are two bases for federal subject matter jurisdiction: (1) federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331; and (2) diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. A district court has federal question jurisdiction in “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A cause of action “arises under federal law only when the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint raises issues of federal law.” Marin Gen. Hosp. v. Modesto & Empire Traction Co., 581 F.3d 941, 944 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hansen v. Blue Cross of Calif., 891 F.2d 1384, 1386 (9th Cir. 1989)). A district court has diversity jurisdiction “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . . and is between citizens of different states, or citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Here, Plaintiff purports to invoke federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 242 and 1341. See Dkt. 1 at 1 (“Jurisdiction18USC 1341 [sic]; 18USC 242 [sic] inter alia, fraud and fraud in the inducement, this is not a social security case, this ARROSE [sic] OUT OF FRAUD IN THE SSA!”). Title 18 of the United States Code is titled “Crimes and Criminal Procedure.” It is no surprise, then, that 18 U.S.C. §§ 242 and 1341 “are criminal statutes, and it is well-settled that ‘a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non- prosecution of another.’” Carey v. Torres, No. 24-cv-09534-TSH, 2025 WL 277399, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2025) (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (“These criminal provisions, however, provide no basis for civil liability.”); Redmond v. United States, No. 22-cv-01107-TSH, 2022 WL 1304472, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2022) (“[P]rivate individuals lack standing to assert claims for relief based on criminal statutes.”) (collecting cases). “Individuals cannot file criminal charges in the United government, usually through the United States Attorney's Office.” Carey, 2025 WL 277399, at *5 (quoting :Candy-Anh-Thu:Tran v. Daniel, No. 17-cv-04243-BLF, 2017 WL 6513414, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2017)) (alteration omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff lacks standing to bring claims under either 18 U.S.C. § 242 or 18 U.S.C. § 1341, as alleged in the Complaint. See Williams v. Praetorian Ins. Co., No. 20-cv- 04766-TSH, 2020 WL 13815138, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2020) (“Because Williams lacks standing to bring criminal charges, any such claim must be dismissed without leave to amend.”). If Plaintiff believes the individuals and entities names as defendants in his Complaint have engaged in criminal conduct, Plaintiff may try to contact federal law enforcement or the United States Attorney's Office, but the ultimate decision on whether to investigate or prosecute any federal crimes rests with these government officials and not with Plaintiff. To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to invoke this Court’s diversity jurisdiction, the Complaint does not allege the Parties’ citizenship or allege that the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory minimum. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Accordingly, the Complaint fails to adequately plead diversity jurisdiction, and for that reason, fails to demonstrate subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to dismissal as frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), for failure to adequately plead subject matter jurisdiction. II. Whether the Complaint Fails to State a Claim for Relief The Court next considers whether the Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112 (citing Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127). “The Rule 12(b)(6) standard requires a complaint to contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Detailed factual allegations are not required but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A pleading must “contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Here, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a claim for relief. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that various individuals and governmental entities engaged in “fraud.” [Dkt. 1 at 1-2]. Plaintiff’s vague allegations appear directed at an application or claim for social security disability benefits. Plaintiff states that he “incorporates all previously filed information and exhibits and especially the writings and recommendations of Defendants #1 Robert Mueller and #2 Jocelyn Burton,” as well as “the written orders from Judge Charles A. Legge Former Judge of the Northern District of California[.]” Id. at 1. Plaintiff also references communications with a “worker assigned to the Benefits Analysis Division of the Social Security Administration” regarding “the wrong ResJudicata [sic] standing of this case.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff alleges that “the SSA has committed severe frauds against [him] previously, including but not limited to DENYING THE EXISTENCE OF the tumor in his spine existant [sic] since he was 12 years old; and USING THAT DENIAL OF TUMOR EXISTANCE to deny his childhood based, [sic] on his father’s and mother’s SSA Accounts, and falsely claiming [he] had money to close his SSI claims.” Id. Stating that he is “VERY SICK AND MEDICALLY FRAGILE,” Plaintiff asks the Court to “IMMEDIATELY SET ASIDE THIS CURRENT CASE-AT-BAR FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR” so that he can preserve his ability to file “A NEW LAWSUIT” for social security benefits. Id. at 2-3. To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to bring a fraud-based claim, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that he allege fraud “with particularity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); accord Irving Firemen’s Relief & Ret. Fund v. Uber Techs., Inc., 998 F.3d 397, 404 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Because allegations of fraud inescapably carry a degree of moral turpitude, Rule 9(b) imparts a heightened note of seriousness, requiring a greater degree of pre-discovery investigation by the plaintiff, followed by the plaintiff's required particular allegations, thereby protecting a defendant's defendant to respond to the particularized allegations.”). To plead fraud with particularity, “the pleader must state the time, place, and specific content of the false representations as well as the identity of the parties to the misrepresentation.” Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 553 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). That is, “[a]verments of fraud must be accompanied by the who, what, when, where, and how” of the alleged misconduct. Terpin v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 118 F.4th 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009)). Here, the Complaint does not adequately set forth the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the alleged fraud, but rather (as quoted above) refers generally to some actions taken in connection with an apparent denial of social security benefits without sufficient explanation as to the alleged fraud. “The elements of fraud are: (1) a misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (or scienter); intend to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage.” Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268, 274 (Cal. 2004). As quoted above, the Complaint does not adequately plead the required elements of fraud. Rather, the Complaint asserts “fraud,” “fraud in the inductment [sic],” and “fraud in the SSA” in conclusory terms. Even construing the Complaint liberally, the allegations which appear to support Plaintiff’s fraud claims are that: (1) a Social Security Administration employee “very recently this year” told Plaintiff “WITH ABSOLUTE ROCK SOLID CERTAINTIY [sic] THAT UNLESS A NEW LAWSUIT [for social security benefits] WAS FILED BEFORE THE PLAINTIFF TURNS 65 YEARS OLD THEN THAT LAWSUIT WILL BE BARRED;” (2) former Northern District of California Judge Charles A. Legge “promised Plaintiff that defendants Jocelyn Burton and Robert Mueller would resolve the backpay issues in this case;” (3) “the SSA has committed severe frauds against [Plaintiff] previously, including but not limited to DENYING THE EXISTENCE OF the tumor in his spine existant [sic] since he was 12 years old; and USING THAT DENIAL OF TUMOR EXISTANCE to deny his childhood based, [sic] on his father’s and mother’s SSA Accounts, and falsely claiming [he] had money to close his SSI claims;” and (4) Defendants Robert Mueller and Jocelyn Burton “swore under oath . . . but then actually never so did.” [Dkt. 1 at 1-2]. To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to allege fraud based on the alleged statements by the SSA employee or the “promise” made by Judge Legge, Plaintiff does not allege who that employee is, when the statements were made, or how and why any statement or “promise” was a misrepresentation. To the extent that Plaintiff alleges “severe frauds” committed by the SSA “previously,” Plaintiff does not allege who specifically made the alleged promise, what specific statements were made, when and where the statements were made, or how they were made. See Lazar v. Superior Ct., 909 P.2d 981, 989 (Cal. 1996) (stating that the particularity requirement for fraud claims “necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered”). To the extent that Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Mueller and Burton failed to investigate Plaintiff’s backpay issue, the Complaint fails to allege what specific statements these Defendants made, when and where the statements were made, how they were made, and more specifically, how these alleged promises were breached. To the extent that Plaintiff has filed this lawsuit to seek this Court’s review of the circumstances surrounding the apparent denial of Plaintiff’s previous social security applications, the Court lacks jurisdiction to do so. Judicial review of appeals of final decisions of the Social Security Administration are governed by a specific set of rules and procedures. See Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. Soc. Sec. R. 1 (“These rules govern an action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for review on the record of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security that presents only an individual claim.”). Plaintiff has failed to identify or otherwise allege that there exists an official “final decision” made by the Social Security Administration regarding Plaintiff’s application(s) for benefits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. Soc. Sec. R. 2(b)(1) (setting forth the minimum pleading requirements for social security claims); see also Richards v. Apfel, No. C-98-4132-CAL, 1999 WL 252477, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 1999) (“The Social Security Act bars judicial intervention in benefit claims processings. The sole jurisdictional basis for court review of administrative actions concerning claims for benefits under Titles II and XVI is set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).”). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a claim for relief. U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). III. Whether any Defendant is Immune from Monetary Relief While the Court finds that the Complaint must be dismissed under the first two prongs of § 1915(e)(2)(B) as discussed above, for completeness the Court turns to the third prong of the statute. Under the mandatory screening statute, the final inquiry is whether the Complaint seeks monetary relief against defendants who are immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). Here, Plaintiff does not specify the form of relief that he seeks. To the extent that Plaintiff is seeking monetary relief, it appears likely that at least some of the defendants may be immune from such relief. However, given the ambiguity of the pleading, the Court will not dismiss the Complaint on these grounds. As discussed below, the Court provides Plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint which should more squarely identify both the named defendants and the exact relief sought. For the reasons set forth herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT: 1. Plaintiff’s Complaint [Dkt. 1] is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), as frivolous and for failure to state a claim for relief. 2. Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE to file an Amended Complaint that addresses the issues discussed herein by no later than August 1, 2025. 3. If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint by the ordered deadline or if he cannot cure the identified deficiencies, that may result in negative consequences for this case, including but not limited to a recommendation by this Court that this action be dismissed with prejudice either in whole or in part. 4. Plaintiff is ADVISED that there are several resources for pro se litigants. The Court makes available a guide for pro se litigants called Representing Yourself in Federal Court: A Handbook for Pro Se Litigants, which provides instructions on how to proceed at every stage of a case, including discovery, motions, and trial. This guide is available electronically online at https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/wp- copy form free of charge from the Clerk of Court’s Office. The Court additionally has a webpage with resources for pro se litigants: https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se- litigants/. In addition, Plaintiff has the option to seek assistance from the Legal Help Center by making an appointment by telephone at (415) 782-8982 or by email at fedpro@sfbar.org. The Legal Help Center is a free service provided by the Justice & Diversity Center of the Bar Association of San Francisco (“JDC”), and is not part of the United States District Court. The Legal Help Center is staffed by attorneys employed by the JDC to provide information and limited-scope legal assistance to pro se litigants in civil cases. See https://cand.uscourts.gov/about/court-programs/legal-helpdesks/. 5. The Court further ADVISES that the amended complaint shall include the caption and civil case number used in this Order (24-cv-01513-PHK) and the words FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT shall be written on the caption page. The Court recommends that Plaintiff use this Court’s form complaint (available on the Court website) for drafting the amended complaint. 6. Because an amended complaint completely replaces the previous complaint, Plaintiff SHALL include in his amended complaint all claims he wishes to present, all defendants he wishes to sue, and all relief sought. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). The amended complaint SHALL NOT incorporate material from the prior complaint by reference. Similarly, the amended complaint SHALL NOT incorporate by reference unidentified filings in either previous Social Security Administration proceedings or in previous lawsuits. In that regard, the Court notes that the Richards case cited above appears to be a previous lawsuit filed by Plaintiff here against numerous defendants involved with the Social Security Administration, and that previous case was dismissed by Judge Legge. See Richards v. Apfel, No. C-98-4132-CAL, 1999 WL 252477 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 1999). In that dismissal Order, Judge Legge wrote:

[T]he government has represented to this court in its brief that upon dismissal of this action, plaintiff's case will be returned to the proper component of the Social Security Administration to address plaintiff's And plaintiff might be able to obtain reinstatement of his Title XVI 1 checks by complying with the SSA's requests for information. 2 Id. at *7. 3 To the extent Plaintiff is relying on the government’s representation from 1999 as the basis 4 for the current lawsuit, Plaintiff's amended complaint SHALL explain with specific facts 5 what happened after that reconsideration and how and why those events constitute the 6 alleged fraud. 7 7. Plaintiff SHALL comply with all of this Court’s Orders (including all Standing Orders, 8 available on the Court’s website) and all deadlines required by the Federal Rules of Civil 9 Procedure and the Local Rules of this Court, in a timely fashion. When needed, Plaintiff 10 may file a motion (prior to a deadline) requesting an extension of time to meet a court- 11 ordered deadline. In order to be granted, any such motion SHALL show good cause why 12 there exists a need for a reasonable amount of additional time to complete the necessary 13 tasks. 14 8. Failure to file an amended complaint by the deadline herein and failure to prosecute this 15 action timely may result in negative consequences for Plaintiff's case, including a 16 recommendation for dismissal of this action with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil 17 Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute. 18 20 21 || Dated: June 9, 2025 eg 4 | 4 wy □ 22 , 23 United States Manistrate Judge 24 25 26 27 28