Richard S. Miller & Sons, Inc. v. United States

537 F.2d 446, 210 Ct. Cl. 431, 38 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5247, 1976 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 260
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJune 16, 1976
DocketNo. 653-71
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 537 F.2d 446 (Richard S. Miller & Sons, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richard S. Miller & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 537 F.2d 446, 210 Ct. Cl. 431, 38 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5247, 1976 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 260 (cc 1976).

Opinion

Per Curiam :

This case comes before the court on defendant’s exceptions to the recommended decision of Trial Judge Kenneth R. Harkins, filed October 22,1975, pursuant tp Rule 134(h),'having been submitted on the briefs and oral argument of counsel. Upon consideration thereof, since the court agrees with the trial judge’s recommended decision, as hereinafter set forth, it hereby affirms and adopts the same as the basis for its judgment in this case, It is, therefore, concluded that plaintiffs are entitled to an allowance for depreciation of the intangible asset represented by the insurance expira-tions purchased from, the Arch Insurance Agency in 1966, and that this intangible asset has a useful life of not more [435]*435than 10 years and a value of $47,644.35. Plaintiffs.have overpaid their Federal income taxes for the years 1966, 1967, 1968, and 1969 and are entitled to refunds of this overpayment, plus interest, as allowed by law. This case is remanded to the Trial Division for further proceedings pursuant to Rule 131 (c).

OPINION OP TRIAL JUDGE

Harkins, Trial Judge:

In this tax case, plaintiff taxpayers, shareholders of Richard S. Miller & Sons, Inc. (Miller & Sons),1 seek refunds amounting to $8,782.75 from Federal income taxes paid in the 4-year period 1966-69. Returns for the years 1966 through 1969 were timely filed. Claims for refunds sought a depreciation allowance under the Internal Revenue Code,2 measured by a claimed 5-year useful life, for the value of an intangible asset that consisted of insurance expirations and related papers acquired by purchase. Plaintiffs’ refund claims were denied. This action has been properly and timely commenced, and the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties. Trial was held at South Bend, Indiana, on May 28-29,1974.

Effective May 1, 1966,- Miller & Sons purchased the insurance business and agency, together with the goodwill and all current insurance records and papers, from the Arch Insurance Agency.3 The records involved were concerned only with fire and casualty insurance. Both agencies were small enterprises that also engaged in related activities such as real estate sales, income tax preparation, and licensing and collection services. Both were located in Bremen, Indiana, a rural community with a population in 1966 of approximately 2,700 persons and a trading population in a 15-mile radius of approximately 6,000.

The sales contract transferred to Miller & Sons the Arch business and agency, its goodwill, its insurance records and [436]*436papers, which consisted primarily of 1,383 expirations or dailies, and the right to use the Arch name. Over the 60-month life of the. contract, Miller & Sons paid $15,000 for a covenant not to compete, $4,694.51 for interest, and $61,174.92 for the balance of the assets. An expiration (or daily) is a copy of the face of an insurance policy made when the policy is issued. It shows the name of the insured, address, type of insurance, premium, carrier, property covered, and expiration date. Its principal value in the insurance business is its indication of the most advantageous time to solicit a renewal.

At issue is whether plaintiffs’ evidence is sufficient to show that the indivisible asset represented by the 1,383 insurance expirations, as a factual matter, is separate from other elements of goodwill that concurrently were acquired by Miller & Sons as part of a going concern. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs have earned their burden and are entitled to depreciation deductions for this intangible asset. The 1,383 insurance expirations constitute a wasting mass asset that has a limited useful life, the duration of which can be ascertained with reasonable accuracy, and has a determinable value separate and distinct from goodwill.

I.

Section 167(a) of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion and wear and tear of property used in a trade or business. An intangible asset, such as insurance expira-tions, may be subject to a depreciation allowance, under the Treasury regulations, if it is “known from experience or other' factors to be of use in the business or in the production of income for only a limited period, the length of which can be estimated with reasonable accuracy.” 4

Whether a particular intangible capita1 asset may be. depreciated, when it is acquired by purchase of an ongoing operation, depends upon its identification with goodwill. Where the useful life of an intangible.readily can be shown to be limited, such as with a patent or a copyright, deprecia[437]*437tion is available without question5 even though for some purposes it is an element of goodwill.

Goodwill is a concept that embraces many intangible elements and is presumed to have a useful life of indefinite duration. Collectively, these intangibles are associated with continuing favorable customer patronage and goodwill is seen as a self-regenerating asset whose economic value fluctuates but does not necessarily diminish. Since by definition goodwill has no ascertainable useful life, the presumption that this intangible is a nondepreciable capital asset is conclusive.6 The Treasury regulation specifically provides “[n]o deduction for depreciation is allowable with respect to goodwill.”

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537 F.2d 446, 210 Ct. Cl. 431, 38 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5247, 1976 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 260, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richard-s-miller-sons-inc-v-united-states-cc-1976.