Richard Nixon v. United States

978 F.2d 1269, 978 F.3d 1269, 298 U.S. App. D.C. 249, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 30144, 1992 WL 329428
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedNovember 17, 1992
Docket92-5021
StatusPublished
Cited by180 cases

This text of 978 F.2d 1269 (Richard Nixon v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richard Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 978 F.3d 1269, 298 U.S. App. D.C. 249, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 30144, 1992 WL 329428 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

Opinions

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HARRY T. EDWARDS.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge KAREN LeCRAFT HENDERSON.

HARRY T. EDWARDS, Circuit Judge:

In 1974, Congress passed the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (“PRMPA” or “the Act”), which severely restricted former President Nixon’s rights to his presidential papers.1 Alleging that PRMPA constituted a taking, Mr. Nixon sued for just compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.2 The District Court held that Mr. Nixon held his presidential papers as “a trustee for the American People” and, therefore, he had no compensable property interest in these materials. In the alternative, the District Court held that, even if the papers belonged to Mr. Nixon personally, PRMPA was a permissible use regulation rather than a “taking.” Mr. Nixon appeals from these determinations.

Upon reviewing the long and unbroken history relating to the use, control, and disposition of presidential papers, we are convinced that Mr. Nixon had a well grounded expectation of ownership. In the light of this history, we hold that Mr. Nixon, like every President before him, had a compensable property interest in his presidential papers. Moreover, since PRMPA effectively destroyed the most essential attributes of ownership, it constituted a per se taking of that property requiring the constitutionally mandated remedy of just compensation. We therefore reverse and remand for a determination of the compensation due.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

Between January 20,1969, and August 9, 1974, the White House Office3 accumulated a mass of documents, tape recordings, and other materials related to the Presidency of Richard M. Nixon. These materials— which we hereinafter refer to in shorthand as “the presidential papers” — contained information and communications covering official, political, and personal matters. The presidential papers that were collected in these files included correspondence of the President and his staff, reports relating to the political activities of the Office, copies [1271]*1271of documents pertaining to the executive branch departments, the President’s telephone logs, and drafts of speeches prepared by the President or his staff.4 The tape recordings in the files were the product of an internal voice activated system5 that recorded conversations made in the White House and Executive Office Building, the Cabinet Room, the Lincoln Sitting Room, and those made on the telephones at Camp David. Thus, the presidential papers contain an exhaustive personal, political, and official record of the presidency of Richard Nixon.6

Following his resignation, on August 9, 1974, Mr. Nixon arranged to have his presidential papers removed to California. However, before they could be shipped, Philip W. Buchen, Counsel to President Ford, learned that the Watergate Special Prosecutor had a continuing interest in the materials. Thinking that the Ford Administration might have some responsibility with respect to the files, Mr. Buchen delayed their shipment and inquired of Attorney General William Saxbe regarding them. In response, the Attorney General issued a formal opinion in which he concluded that the materials were owned by Mr. Nixon, but that the government, as custodian, was obliged to respond to subpoenas or other court orders covering the files. 43 Op.Att’y Gen. 7, 9 (1974).

After receiving the Attorney General’s opinion, Mr. Buchen sought to reach some compromise arrangement to deal with the competing claims to the presidential papers. Following consultations with Mr. Nixon’s counsel and President Ford, an agreement was entered into in which Mr. Nixon agreed to deposit all of his presidential papers with the Administrator of General Services, Arthur F. Sampson, for a temporary period, after which certain of the materials would be donated permanently to the United States.7 The agreement guaranteed the full integrity and completeness of the materials so that valid legal process might be satisfied. With that exception, Mr. Nixon retained title to his papers and the right to exclude others from viewing or using the materials while they were in government custody pursuant to the agreement.

Concerned that, despite the Nixon-Sampson agreement, Mr. Nixon might destroy documents necessary to the Watergate investigation, Congress passed the Presidential Records and Materials Preservation Act of 1974, note following 44 U.S.C. § 2111 (1988). The Act effectively abrogated the Nixon-Sampson Agreement and authorized the Administrator of General Services8 to retain "complete possession and control of all papers, documents, memorandums, transcripts, and other objects and materials that constitute the presidential historical materials of Richard M. Nixon.” PRMPA § 101(b)(1).9 / The Act also provided for the Administrator to receive and retain possession of the White House tapes. PRMPA § 101(a). The Act further provided that none of the presidential papers could be destroyed, that access to the [1272]*1272materials was to be regulated by the Administrator, that federal agencies and departments (along with Mr. Nixon) were to have regulated access to the materials at all times, and that the Administrator was to promulgate regulations10 providing for public access to the materials. PRMPA §§ 102-04. Finally, the Act mandated that just compensation was to be paid to any person held to have been deprived by its provisions of private property. PRMPA § 105(c).

Regulations issued pursuant to the Act restrict access to the presidential papers that would disclose trade secrets, constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or libel of a living person, or interfere with the administration of justice. 36 C.F.R. § 1275.52(b) (1992). In addition, the regulations provide that materials not of general historical significance11 are to be returned to Mr. Nixon. 36 C.F.R. § 1275.48 (1992). If the Archivist intends to make any portion of the materials public, the regulations provide that any interested party (including Mr. Nixon) may object on a claim of legal right or privilege. 36 C.F.R. § 1275.44 (1992). Resolution of such claims by the Archivist is subject to judicial review for abuse of discretion. See Public Citizen v. Burke, 843 F.2d 1473 (D.C.Cir.1988).

B. Litigation Background

This regulatory and statutory scheme has resulted in a series of cases in which Mr. Nixon has challenged the government’s control and disposition of his presidential papers. In October, 1974, Mr. Nixon brought suit in which he sought to enforce the terms of the Nixon-Sampson agreement. See Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F.Supp. 107 (D.D.C.1975).12 While Sampson was pending, PRMPA was passed by Congress and signed by President Ford.

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978 F.2d 1269, 978 F.3d 1269, 298 U.S. App. D.C. 249, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 30144, 1992 WL 329428, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richard-nixon-v-united-states-cadc-1992.