Richard Hayes v. Lebanon County Prison

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedOctober 20, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-01766
StatusUnknown

This text of Richard Hayes v. Lebanon County Prison (Richard Hayes v. Lebanon County Prison) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richard Hayes v. Lebanon County Prison, (M.D. Pa. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RICHARD HAYES, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-CV-1766 : Plaintiff : (Judge Neary) : v. : : LEBANON COUNTY PRISON, : : Defendant :

MEMORANDUM

This is a prisoner civil rights case filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff, Richard Hayes, alleges that he is being denied medical care for his hearing loss. Hayes’s complaint will be dismissed without prejudice, and he will be granted leave to file an amended complaint. I. Factual Background & Procedural History

Hayes has been detained in Lebanon County Prison at all relevant times. He filed this case on September 13, 2025, and the court received and docketed it on September 23, 2025. (Doc. 1). The complaint’s factual allegations are limited to one paragraph as follows: Ok so I have loss of hearing in my right ear and was basically denied for treatment[.] The dates should be in medical computer system[.] I’ve lost paper work and dates over time, but it’s completed around Dec[ember]/March/Feb[ruary] to the best of my knowledge[.]

(Id. at 2-3). Hayes seeks either injunctive relief requiring the prison to provide “proper medical treatment” or “money for not being properly medically treated.” (Id. at 3). II. Legal Standard The Prison Litigation Reform Act authorizes a district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or

seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2);1 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.2 The court is required to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

1 ( 22)8 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) provides:

Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have bee(nA p)aid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that(—B) (tih)e allegation of poverty is untrue; or (tihi)e action or appeal— (iii )is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

2 ( a2)8 S Uc.rSe.Ce.n §i n1g9.15A provides:

--The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in w(bh)i cGhr oa upnridsso nfoerr dseisemksi srseadlr.ess from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. --On review, the court shall identify cognizable claim(1s) or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint-- (2) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such In screening claims under Sections 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B), the court applies the standard governing motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Coward v. City of Philadelphia, 546

F. Supp. 3d 331, 333 (E.D. Pa. 2021); Smith v. Delaware, 236 F. Supp.3d 882, 886 (D. Del. 2017). This standard requires the court to “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)).

Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide “the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To test the sufficiency of the complaint, the court conducts a three-step inquiry. Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2010). In the first step, “the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.’” Id. at 130 (alteration in original) (quoting

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Next, the factual and legal elements of a claim must be separated; well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, while mere legal conclusions may be disregarded. Id. at 131-32; Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Once the court isolates the well-pleaded factual allegations, it must determine whether they are sufficient to show a “plausible claim for relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts “that allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Courts must liberally construe complaints brought by pro se litigants. Sause v. Bauer, 585 U.S. 957, 960 (2018). Pro se complaints, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). III. Discussion Hayes’s federal constitutional claims are filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action to redress constitutional wrongs committed by state officials. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute is not a source of substantive rights, but serves as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). To state a Section 1983 claim, plaintiffs must show a deprivation of a “right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States . . . by a person acting under color of state law.” Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1204

(quoting Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995)).

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Gonzaga University v. Doe
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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal
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Santiago v. Warminster Township
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Kneipp v. Tedder
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515 F.3d 224 (Third Circuit, 2008)
Fowler v. UPMC SHADYSIDE
578 F.3d 203 (Third Circuit, 2009)
Anthony Beaver v. Union County Pennsylvania
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Mark v. Borough of Hatboro
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Demar Edwards v. County of Northampton
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Bluebook (online)
Richard Hayes v. Lebanon County Prison, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richard-hayes-v-lebanon-county-prison-pamd-2025.