Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc. v. White

202 S.W.3d 24, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 160, 2006 WL 1650610
CourtKentucky Supreme Court
DecidedJune 15, 2006
Docket2005-SC-0695-WC, 2005-SC-0696-WC
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 202 S.W.3d 24 (Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc. v. White) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Kentucky Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc. v. White, 202 S.W.3d 24, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 160, 2006 WL 1650610 (Ky. 2006).

Opinions

[25]*25OPINION OF THE COURT

KRS 342.0011(1) requires a mental harm to directly result from a physically traumatic event. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v. West, 52 S.W.3d 564, 566-67 (Ky.2001). An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the claimant failed to prove a physical injury or trauma and dismissed his application for benefits due to post-traumatic stress disorder. The Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) affirmed, but a divided Court of Appeals reversed. A majority found that contact with another’s blood and body fluids during a lifesaving attempt constituted physical trauma and remanded the claim for further consideration. We affirm, but we do so because the physical exertion of performing CPR and first aid on an individual with multiple gunshot wounds is a physically traumatic event.

Officer White was employed by the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government as a full-time officer in the Police Department. He testified that he was on call 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. With Department approval, he was employed concurrently by the Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc. to work as a security guard at Fayette Mall. There was evidence that off-duty police officers are required to have their sidearms accessible and respond to high priority situations 24 hours per day.

On January 5, 2001, Officer White reported for work at Fayette Mall. He was informed that there was concern about a band of shoplifters and instructed to work in plainclothes in an effort to apprehend them. About one hour into the shift, he received a police dispatch regarding a male subject at the mall who was dressed in a security guard uniform, armed with a night stick, and threatening suicide. Alerted to the subject’s location, Officer White approached an individual matching the description, who then displayed a revolver. Officer White continued to approach, drew his own gun, and displayed his badge. After some initial inquiries, the individual drew his gun, ignored several commands to drop it, raised it, and pointed it at Officer White. Officer White fired four shots. Although hit by three of them, the individual continued moving toward the officer, who fired four more rounds before the subject fell to the ground. Officer White testified that he performed CPR and first aid after the subject fell to the ground. He also stated that his skin came in contact with the subject’s blood and body fluids while attempting to save his life; that he was not permitted to wash for an extended period of time; and that he feared he might have contracted a communicable disease. The subject died at the scene, and suicide notes were found in his vehicle.

After the incident, Officer White was transported to the Department where he was interrogated and placed on administrative leave during an internal investigation. Officer White received blood tests to determine if he had contracted a disease from the blood and body fluids. He also sought treatment from a psychologist for nightmares, flashbacks, and paranoia due to a perception that he might be indicted for the incident and to a fear of having contracted a disease such as AIDS or tuberculosis. His symptoms worsened after he returned to work, and he eventually applied for and received disability retirement. On March 14, 2001, the commonwealth’s attorney determined that the use of deadly force in self-defense was justified under the circumstances. The blood tests were negative.

Five board-certified psychiatrists testified. All diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder and stated that Officer White should not return to police work. All but [26]*26one agreed that the condition caused permanent impairment. The ALJ noted, however, that although Officer White characterized the event in question as an assault and indicated that an Assaulted Officer Report was completed, the official Department record did not contain such a report. Nor did it reflect any physical trauma or harm. Noting the absence of physical trauma or harm, the ALJ determined that the mental condition resulted from the stress and mental impact of the life-threatening situation and dismissed the claim. The Board affirmed.

The employers maintain that the Court of Appeals misapplied West, supra, and that KRS 342.0011(1) requires a mental injury to directly result from a physical injury, not simply from a physically traumatic event. Equating a physical injury with physical harm, they attribute any misunderstanding to what they assert is the West court’s substitution of the phrase “physically traumatic event” for “physical injury.” Id. at 566-67. They argue that, unlike Officer West, Officer White sustained no physical harm such as scratches, abrasions, and soreness and that no evidence indicated that his contact with the deceased’s blood and body fluids caused physical harm. Therefore, he did not sustain a physical injury. Another argument is that Officer White failed to prove a physically traumatic event, that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding, and that the evidence did not compel a favorable finding.

The claimant maintains that Wesi, supra, explained the reason for interpreting KRS 342.0011(1) as requiring a mental condition to directly result from a physically traumatic event and indicated that a physical harm was unnecessary. Id. He asserts that the work-related events of January 5, 2001, clearly involved significant physical contact and directly caused his mental condition.

West, supra, concerned a police officer who gradually sustained a mental condition (post-traumatic stress disorder) due to a series of traumatic events. The first occurred in 1989, when she was assaulted by a knife-wielding suspect. The incident was later described as being a “full-fledged fight” in which the officer and suspect were scuffling and rolling on the ground. She sustained minor scratches, abrasions, and muscle soreness. Nothing indicated that the subsequent events involved physical trauma. Among the matters at issue was whether West’s mental condition was an “injury” under the 1996 version of KRS 342.0011(1).

Since April 4, 1994, KRS 342.0011(1) has required a psychological, psychiatric, or stress-related change in the human organism to directly result from a physical injury. Until December 12, 1996, KRS 342.0011(1) defined an injury as being “any work-related harmful change in the human organism .... ” In contrast, under the 1996 version of the statute, an injury is a “traumatic event” that causes a harmful change in the human organism. It states as follows:

“Injury” means any work-related traumatic event or series of traumatic events, including cumulative trauma, arising out of and in the course of employment which is the proximate cause producing a harmful change in the human organism evidenced by objective medical findings.... “Injury” ...

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Related

Kentucky Employers Safety Ass'n v. Lexington Diagnostic Center
291 S.W.3d 683 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 2009)
KY. EMPLOYERS SAFETY v. Lexington
291 S.W.3d 683 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 2009)
Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc. v. White
202 S.W.3d 24 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 2006)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
202 S.W.3d 24, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 160, 2006 WL 1650610, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richard-e-jacobs-group-inc-v-white-ky-2006.