Ricardo Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. and Capital One N.A.

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ------------------------------------------------------------------x RICARDO SCOTT,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER -against- 25-CV-02433 (OEM) (CHK)

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A. and CAPITAL ONE N.A.,

Defendants. -----------------------------------------------------------------x ORELIA E. MERCHANT, United States District Judge: On October 27, 2025, pro se plaintiff Ricardo Scott (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action against defendants JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., (“Chase”) and Capital One, N.A., (“Capital One”)1 (“Defendants”) for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1682 et seq. See generally Complaint, Dkt. 1 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”). Before the Court is Chase’s fully briefed motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint.2 For the following reasons, Chase’s Motion is granted.

1 On March 3, 2026, Capital One and Plaintiff filed a stipulation of dismissal, seeking dismissal of Capital One as a party with prejudice, see Stipulation and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice as to Capital One only, Dkt. 30, and the Court dismissed Capital One on March 4, 2026, see Order, dated Mar. 4, 2026.

2 See Notice of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, Dkt. 32 (“Chase’s Motion” or “Chase’s Mot.”); Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, Dkt. 32-7 (“Chase’s Memorandum” or “Chase’s Mem.”); Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.’s Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 33 (“Plaintiff’s Opposition” or “Pl.’s Opp’n.”); Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, Dkt. 34 (“Reply”). BACKGROUND3 A. Factual Background On or about April 12, 2021, Plaintiff opened a credit card with Chase that had a credit limit of $10,000. Compl. ¶ 9. Plaintiff alleges that, from May 2021 through the purported “charge-off date in May 2024, Chase failed to report to [the consumer reporting agencies,] TransUnion and

Experian, the monthly balances, scheduled payment amounts, and actual amounts paid on the account.” Id. ¶ 24. He asserts that from the “charge-off date” in May 2024 “through July 2025, Chase continued to omit reporting the account balances and scheduled payment amounts to both credit reporting agencies.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that Chase “reported inaccurate and misleading information in the Account Status section of Plaintiff’s Experian credit report” by reporting that his account was “‘written off’ in the amount of $12,031, while simultaneously reporting a current balance of $12,031.” Id. ¶ 25. Specifically, Plaintiff’s Experian credit report lists his Chase account status as “Account charged off. $12,031 written off. $12,031 past due as of Aug 2025.” Id. at 15.4 Further, Plaintiff alleges that Chase “failed to report the most recent payment, the monthly payment amount, and the account

terms.” Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiff’s TransUnion and Experian credit reports include a “Payment History” section, which reflect the months in which his payments were “current,” “past due,” or “charged off.” See id. at 15-16, 27-28.

3 The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint and are accepted as true for the purposes of Chase’s Motion. The Court recites only those facts relevant to resolving the pending Motion. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

4 The Court’s citations to pages of the Complaint refer to the automatically generated ECF header.

Additionally, Plaintiff attaches the following documents to his Complaint: Capital One auto loan account details, see Compl. at 12; a TransUnion credit report, see id. at 22-28; Capital One monthly auto statements for June 1 through August 1, 2024, see id. at 18-21, and an Experian report for his auto loan and Chase card, see id. at 13-17. The Court may properly consider these documents. See Chambers v. TimeWarner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating that a court on a motion to dismiss may consider “any written instrument attached to [the complaint] as an exhibit”). On or about September 2, 2025, Plaintiff submitted a dispute to Chase, through TransUnion and Experian, asserting that his account “was reporting inaccurate information and requesting that a reasonable investigation be conducted pursuant to the [FCRA].” Id. ¶ 28. He alleges that Chase did not conduct a reasonable investigation, correct the inaccurate and incomplete information, and

instead “continued to report the disputed account data without marking the account as disputed or rectifying the identified errors.” Id. ¶ 29. On September 22, 2025, “Plaintiff received the results of his dispute from TransUnion, indicating that [Chase] had verified the previously disputed information as accurate.” Id. ¶ 30. On September 24, 2025, “Plaintiff received the results of his dispute from Experian, indicating that [Chase] had verified the previously disputed information as accurate.” Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff contends that, following these verifications “the information . . . remained inaccurate and incomplete, including, but not limited to, erroneous balances [and] inaccurate or missing payment history.” Id. ¶¶ 30-31. As a result of Chase’s purported failure to correct or delete the data following Plaintiff’s disputes, Plaintiff asserts that his “creditworthiness, financial opportunities, and emotional well-

being” suffered “continued harm.” Id. ¶ 32. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he experienced “repeated denials of credit, which have obstructed Plaintiff’s access to loans and other financial opportunities; substantial out-of-pocket expenses and lost time spent disputing the false information; a measurable decline in [his] credit score and overall creditworthiness; and severe emotional distress, including embarrassment, anxiety, frustration, and mental anguish” as a result of his financial instability. Id. ¶ 41. B. Procedural History On October 27, 2025, Plaintiff commenced this action against Defendants. See Compl. Regarding Chase, in particular, Plaintiff brings one cause of action alleging that Chase willfully and negligently violated the FCRA § 1681s-2(b) by failing to: (1) correct or delete the allegedly incorrect or incomplete information, (2) report Plaintiff’s complete payment history, and (3) mark Plaintiff’s account as disputed. See Compl. ¶¶ 43-51. He seeks actual, statutory, and punitive damages. See id. at ¶ 52(a)-(c). On December 26, 2025, Chase filed a letter motion seeking a pre-motion conference in

anticipation of filing a motion to dismiss. See Chase’s Letter to the Court, Dkt. 15. On January 5, 2026, Plaintiff filed a letter responding to Chase’s letter motion, asserting that the proposed motion to dismiss lacked merit. Plaintiff’s Responsive Pre-Motion Conference Letter (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)), Dkt. 18. On January 6, 2026, the Court denied Chase’s motion for a pre-motion conference and set a briefing schedule for Chase’s motion to dismiss. See Order, dated Jan. 6, 2026. On March 23, 2026, Chase filed its fully briefed motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”). See Chase’s Mot.; Chase’s Mem.; Pl.’s Opp’n; Reply. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 94 (2d Cir. 2013). In doing so, the Court “must limit itself to facts stated in the complaint or in documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated in the complaint by reference.” Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 773 (2d Cir. 1991). In reviewing a pro se complaint, the Court is mindful that a plaintiff’s pleadings “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Even after Twombly,” the Court “remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally.”). DISCUSSION Chase argues that Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b). Specifically, Chase contends that Plaintiff fails to allege that Chase’s credit report was inaccurate. See Chase’s Mem. at 8-13. Plaintiff responds that he has plausibly alleged that Chase failed to comply with its statutory duties under the FCRA. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 1-6. “The [FCRA] ‘regulates credit reporting procedures to ensure the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of consumers’ information.’” Longman v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.,

702 F.3d 148, 150 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b)). It “imposes several duties on those who furnish information to consumer reporting agencies,” which include “duties to refrain from knowingly reporting inaccurate information . . . and to correct any information they later discover to be inaccurate.” Id. (first citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(1); and then citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(2)). “Section 1681s-2(b) requires furnishers to determine if furnished information is ‘incomplete or inaccurate.’” Rubin v. HSBC Bank, USA, NA, 717 F. Supp. 3d 266, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)). Specifically, if a furnisher receives notice of “‘a dispute as to the completeness or accuracy of any information provided’ to a [credit reporting agency], it must ‘conduct an investigation,’ ‘report the results of the investigation to the consumer reporting agency,’ and if the disputed information ‘is found to be inaccurate or incomplete . . . modify that item of information.’” Krausz v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 21-CV-7427 (KMK), 2023 WL 1993886, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2023) (second alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)).

Subsequently, “a consumer may bring a civil cause of action against any person who ‘willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed under’ [the FCRA].” Longman, 702 F.3d at 151 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)). “To prevail on a claim under Section 1681s-2(b), a plaintiff must show that ‘(1) the furnisher received notice of a credit dispute from a credit reporting agency, and (2) the furnisher thereafter acted in ‘willful or negligent noncompliance with the statute.’” Pierre v. Wells Fargo Fin. Nat’l Bank, 21-CV-3141 (ALC), 2022 WL 4625350, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2022) (quoting Markovskaya v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 2d 340, 343-44 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)). “Accuracy is . . . an essential element of a claim for negligent or willful violation of § 1681s-2(b) of the FCRA. Thus, a threshold showing of inaccuracy or incompleteness is

necessary to succeed on a claim under § 1681s-2(b).” Id. (quoting Artemov v. TransUnion, 20-cv- 1892 (BMC), 2020 WL 5211068, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 1, 2020)). As defined in the applicable regulations, “[a]ccuracy means that information that a furnisher provides to a consumer reporting agency about an account or other relationship with the consumer correctly: (1) Reflects the terms of and liability for the account or other relationship; (2) Reflects the consumer’s performance and other conduct with respect to the account or other relationship; and (3) Identifies the appropriate consumer.” 12 C.F.R. § 1022.41(a); see also 12 C.F.R. § 1022, app. E (providing guidelines to furnishers for furnishing information to consumer reporting agencies). “A credit entry is inaccurate if it ‘is patently incorrect, or [if] it is misleading in such a way and to such an extent that it can be expected to adversely affect credit decisions.’” Artemov, 2020 WL 5211068, at *3 (alteration in original) (quoting Kilpakis v. JPMorgan Chase Fin. Co., LLC, 229 F. Supp. 3d 133, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)). A. “Written Off” and “Charged Off” Designations Plaintiff alleges that Chase furnished inaccurate information to Experian because Chase

Bank simultaneously reported that his account was “written off” in the amount of $12,031 and reported a current balance of $12,031 on his Experian credit report. Compl. ¶ 25. Chase argues that its report of a “charged off” and “written off” balance was not contradictory or misleading because charged-off debt is still collectible, is synonymous with written-off debt, and nothing in Plaintiff’s credit report suggests that he does not owe a past-due balance. Chase’s Mem. at 8-11. In response, Plaintiff maintains that “[t]he use of ‘written off’ while continuing to report an active receivable plausibly creates ambiguity regarding the account’s present status.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 3. “A charge off, as defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, is ‘[t]o treat (an account receivable) as a loss or expense because payment is unlikely; to treat as a bad debt.’” Artemov, 2020 WL 5211068, at *3 (alteration in original) (quoting Charge Off, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.

2019)); accord In re Anderson, 884 F.3d 382, 385 (2d Cir. 2018) (charging off delinquent debt “means the bank changed the outstanding debt from a receivable to a loss in its own accounting books”). In other words, “charging off a debt ‘is a business practice where a creditor writes off a debt and no longer considers the account balance an asset for accounting purposes.’” Artemov, 2020 WL 5211068, at *3 (quoting Christian v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 18-cv-13682, 2020 WL 2087869, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 30, 2020)). Banks are required to charge off debt that is past due by over 180 days. Id. (citing Anderson, 84 F.3d at 386 n.2). Thus, “it follows that charging off an account does not equate to debt forgiveness”; indeed, such a conclusion “would simply encourage a consumer to take out massive amounts of debt and wait around six months for it to be wiped away.” Id. at *4. Charging off “does not diminish the legal right of the original creditor to collect the full amount of the debt.” Id. (quoting Hinkle v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 827 F.3d 1295, 1297 (11th Cir. 2016)). Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Chase’s Experian credit report was inaccurate.

Describing Plaintiff’s credit card account as “written off” and “charged off” is not contradictory because written off and charged off are synonymous. See id. at *3; Ostreicher v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 19-CV-8175 (CS), 2020 WL 6809059, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2020) (construing charging off and writing off debt as one and the same); Lieberman v. Am. Express Co., 19-cv-6989 (BMC), 2020 WL 5517271, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 14, 2020) (same). Additionally, it is not misleading because the categorization of “written off” and “charged off” does not suggest that Plaintiff does not owe a balance of $12,031 or that a creditor cannot collect on that balance at any time. See Artemov, 2020 WL 5211068, at *5 (“[L]isting a past due balance for a charge off account [is] factually accurate and not misleading” as the creditor can decide at any moment “to collect the charged off debt and seek the delinquent amount.”).

Plaintiff’s argument to the contrary is unavailing. He argues that whether Chase’s simultaneous reporting of “written off” and “charged off” is misleading “is a factual determination inappropriate for dismissal.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 3. However, courts have addressed whether reported information is misleading at the motion to dismiss stage “where ‘the parties provide the reported information in dispute and the court determines only one reasonable interpretation of the report exists.’” Lamando v. Rocket Mortg., 3:23-CV-147 (MAD/ML), 2024 WL 264034, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2024) (quoting Boyer v. TransUnion, LLC, 3:21-cv-00918 (KAD), 2023 WL 143005, at *4 (D. Conn. Feb. 1, 2023)). As explained above, based on the and Experian credit report provided, there is only one reasonable interpretation of Chase’s simultaneous reporting of charged-off and written-off; it is not misleading. B. Omission of Plaintiff’s Complete Payment History Plaintiff alleges that Chase furnished inaccurate and incomplete information to TransUnion

and Experian by failing to report Plaintiff’s payment history, including “the most recent payment, the monthly payment amount, and the account terms.” Compl. ¶ 26. Chase argues that it has “no such obligation to report such ‘positive’ credit information.” Chase’s Mem. at 11. Plaintiff responds that a report of complete payment history is “vital” to allow verification of the current balance, provide context for the delinquency status, verify the first delinquency date, and confirm the lawful reporting period. Pl.’s Opp’n at 3-4. The premise of Plaintiff’s claim is that, by not reporting Plaintiff’s payment history, Chase furnished incomplete or inaccurate information; but Plaintiff fails to allege how Chase’s omission of ostensibly additional payment history made the reports inaccurate or incomplete. The FCRA is voluntary. It “does not impose upon information furnishers any affirmative duty to report

consumer information to [consumer reporting agencies].” In re Ditech Holding Corp., 19-10412 (JLG), 2024 WL 313300, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Bankr. Jan 26, 2024); see Hill v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 1:13-CV-153, 2013 WL 6241043, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 3, 2013) (“[Section 1681s-2(b)] does not apply to situations where a consumer’s credit report lacks positive information that the consumer would like to be reported.” (citing Chi Chi Wu & Elizabeth De Armond, Fair Credit Reporting §§ 1.4.6, 6.1.1 (7th ed. 2010))); 12 C.F.R. § 1022, app. E (not requiring the provision of all positive account history). Indeed, “as a matter of law, the Court’s task is to consider whether the information is inaccurate or misleading, not to look for ways that the information might be more accurate.” Lamando, 2024 WL 264034, at *8 (emphasis in original) (quoting Holland v. TransUnion LLC, 574 F. Supp. 3d 292, 300 (E.D. Pa. 2021)). Plaintiff does not cite to any legal authority that supports his contention that furnishers are required to provide a consumer’s complete payment history. See generally Pl.’s Opp’n. Contra

Lamando, 2024 WL 264034, at *8 (“Perhaps a report reflecting continued payment, without creditors requiring the payment, might be more inclusive and all-encompassing of the reality of Plaintiff’s situation, but it is not required by law.”). Moreover, Plaintiff has made no factual allegations as to what payment history was allegedly excluded such that his credit report was misleading to the extent that it adversely affected credit decisions. See Artemov, 2020 WL 5211068, at *3. Instead, his allegations are entirely conclusory, alleging that “Chase . . . omit[ted] reporting the account balances and scheduled payment amounts to both credit reporting agencies” which “resulted in an incomplete, misleading, and materially inaccurate tradeline.” Compl. ¶ 24. Even in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, this is insufficient to draw a reasonable inference that Chase’s report could be expected to or did adversely affect credit decisions. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678 (2009). Contra Tescher v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 21-CV-02266 (PMH), 2022 WL 564048, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2022) (collecting cases and denying motion to dismiss where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant in reporting one late payment on two different account numbers making it appear that plaintiff made a late payment on two separate accounts, would adversely affect credit decisions); Kilpakis, 229 F. Supp. 3d at 141 (denying motion to dismiss where the plaintiff alleged that the furnisher provided information that was “technically true” but only selective to the credit reporting agencies, which the plaintiff alleged could and did adversely impact his credit rating and access to a home mortgage). Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. He asserts that, because Chase voluntarily chose to furnish information regarding Plaintiff’s account, it was required to ensure the completeness and accuracy of “any information” that it provided. Pl.’s Opp’n at 2. He defines “any information” as including balances, scheduled payment amounts, amounts actually paid, past-

due amounts, account status, date of last payment[s], date of first delinquency, and dispute notations.” Id. But Plaintiff misconstrues the statute and does not cite any authority to support such arguments. As explained above, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) does not impose an affirmative obligation on a furnisher to provide “any information” in such an exhaustive manner as Plaintiff suggests; rather, it permits a consumer to dispute the completeness or accuracy of “any information provided by a person to a consumer reporting agency.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1). C. Reasonable Investigation Plaintiff alleges that Chase failed to conduct a reasonable investigation and failed to correct or delete inaccurate data following Plaintiff’s dispute. Compl. ¶ 32. Chase maintains that Plaintiff fails to state a claim due to his failure to plausibly allege inaccuracy. Chase’s Mem. at 12-13. Plaintiff responds that he has plausibly alleged “that the investigation was unreasonable and that

the reporting could not be properly verified given the omissions.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. Because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged any inaccuracies, he does not plausibly allege a FCRA violation for failure to conduct a reasonable investigation or correct or delete inaccurate information. See Lieberman, 2020 WL 5517271, at *5 (declining to reach the plaintiff’s claim of failure to conduct a reasonable investigation because the plaintiff did not plausibly allege inaccuracy). D. Alleged Failure to Mark Plaintiff’s Account as Disputed Plaintiff alleges that Chase “failed to mark the account as ‘disputed’ in Plaintiff’s Experian credit file after receiving Plaintiff’s formal written dispute.” Compl. ¶ 27. Chase argues that Plaintiff can neither bring a cause of action under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) for failure to mark a file as disputed, nor is there a private right of action under the proper section for marking a file as disputed, which is 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(3). Reply at 5. Plaintiff responds that a failure to mark an account as disputed “may independently render the reporting materially misleading,” which

supports his 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) claim. Pl.’s Opp’n at 4-5. Plaintiff brings his claim for Chase’s alleged failure to mark his account as disputed under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b). See Compl. ¶ 50. However, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) does not confer a duty on a furnisher to provide notice that information furnished by a person to a consumer reporting agency is disputed by a consumer. That duty is set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(3). There is no private cause of action for a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(3). See Lichtman v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 18-CV-10960 (CS), 2020 WL 1989486, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2020). Thus, even if Plaintiff asserted this claim under the section applying to disputes, he would still fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. E. Leave to Amend The Court next considers leave to amend. “When a motion to dismiss is granted, the usual

practice is to grant leave to amend the complaint.” Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 53 (2d Cir. 1999). In particular, pro se litigants “should be afforded every reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that [they have] a valid claim.” Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Satchell v. Dilworth, 745 F.2d 781, 785 (2d Cir. 1984)). However, the decision to grant or deny leave to amend is within the trial court’s discretion, and parties need not be granted leave to amend if there is evidence of, inter alia, futility. Saravia v. Royal Guard Fence Co., 19-2086 (DRH) (SIL), 2020 WL 5231696, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 2, 2020). “Where the problem with a claim ‘is substantive . . . better pleading will not cure it,’ and ‘[r]epleading would thus be futile.” Eaves v. Designs for Fin., Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d 229, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000)). Plaintiff does not request leave to amend his Complaint. Additionally, it is likely that amendment of Plaintiff’s Complaint would be futile because he fails to state a claim for a violation

of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b). However, given Plaintiff’s pro se status, Plaintiff shall have until September 4, 2026, to move for leave to amend his Complaint. Plaintiff is advised that, should he elect to move for leave to file an amended complaint, such motion shall comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, Local Civil Rule 7.1(e), and the Court’s Individual Practices and Rules. Chase shall respond to Plaintiff’s motion to amend by September 18, 2026. No reply shall be permitted unless otherwise directed by the Court. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Chase’s motion to dismiss is granted and Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff is granted leave to move to amend his Complaint by September 4, 2026.

SO ORDERED. __/s/____________________ ORELIA E. MERCHANT United States District Judge August 21, 2026 Brooklyn, New York