Ricardo Chuzon Herna v. Christopher Chesnut, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 RICARDO CHUZON HERNA, Case No. 1:25-cv-01919-JLT-SAB (HC)

12 Petitioner, ORDER CONVERTING THE MATTER TO A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION1; GRANTING 13 v. THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN PART; AND REFERRING THE MATTER TO 14 CHRISTOPHER CHESNUT, et al., THE ASSIGNED MAGISTRATE

15 Respondents. (Doc. 2.) 16 18 Before the Court for decision is Ricardo Chuzon Herna’s request for a temporary 19 restraining order (“TRO”) (Doc. 2), filed in conjunction with his petition for a writ of habeas 20 corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his ongoing detention. (Doc. 1.) Having 21 evaluated the TRO request and Respondents’ opposition, (Docs. 7, 10), the Court converts the 22 matter into a motion for preliminary injunction, GRANTS that motion IN PART, and REFERS 23 the matter to the assigned magistrate judge for a determination on the merits. 25 Petitioner is a citizen of Peru who was apprehended by U.S. Customs and Border Patrol 26 (“CPB”) on or about August 31, 2024, after entering the United States without inspection near 27 1 Upon the agreement of the parties, the Court converts the motion for temporary restraining order into one for 28 preliminary injunction. (Doc. 2 at 2; Doc. 7 at 11.) The parties have also affirmatively declined an evidentiary 1 Eagle Pass, Texas. (Doc. 2-1 at 2.) Petitioner was served an I-860 Notice and Order of Expedited 2 Removal and, after being briefly detained, claimed a fear of return to Peru due to past 3 persecution he experienced on account of his sexual orientation. (Doc. 7-1 at 5.) On September 4 5, 2024, an Asylum Pre-Screening Officer issued a negative fear claim. (Id.) On October 1, 5 2024, an Immigration Judge overturned the negative finding. (Id.) 6 CBP issued Petitioner a Notice to Appear (Form I-862) on October 2, 2024, charging him 7 pursuant to § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) and § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration Nationality Act, as an 8 alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled by an immigration officer. 9 (Doc. 2-1 at 7; Doc. 2-3 at 2.) Petitioner then was released from custody on his own 10 recognizance and was enrolled in the Alternatives to Detention (“ATD”) program, which 11 imposed various reporting requirements. (Doc. 7 at 2.) In releasing Petitioner on his own 12 recognizance, immigration officials necessarily determined that Petitioner did not present a risk 13 of flight or danger to the community. See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8) (“Any officer authorized to 14 issue a warrant of arrest may, in the officer’s discretion, release an alien not described in section 15 236(c)(1) of the Act, under the conditions at section 236(a)(2) and (3) of the Act; provided that 16 the alien must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a 17 danger to property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.”). 18 On or about November 19, 2025, Petitioner reported to a routine check-in at the 19 Immigration and Customs Enforcement office, where he was arrested for failing to comply with 20 ISAP reporting requirements. (Doc 2-1 at 7; Doc. 7 at 2.) ICE officials informed Petitioner that 21 he was under arrest for failing to report as ordered on August 25, 2025. (Doc. 7 at 2; Doc. 10-1 22 at 1.) Petitioner is currently detained at the California City Detention Facility in California City, 23 California. 24 The government opposes the issuance of preliminary injunctive relief and maintains that 25 Petitioner’s detention is “mandatory” under expedited removal procedures set forth at 8 U.S.C. 26 § 1225(b)(2). (See generally Doc. 8.) 28 The standard governing the issuing of a TRO is “substantially identical” to the standard 1 for issuing a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 2 F.3d 832, 839 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2001). A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish: (1) 3 they are “likely to succeed on the merits” of their claims, (2) they are “likely to suffer irreparable 4 harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction,” (3) “the balance of equities tips in [their] 5 favor” and (4) “an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 6 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see also Ctr. For Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2011) 7 (“After Winter, ‘plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in 8 order to obtain a preliminary injunction.’”). 9 The party seeking a preliminary injunction has the burden to “make a showing on all four 10 prongs” of the Winter test to obtain a preliminary injunction. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. 11 Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011); Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) 12 (holding that the moving party has “the burden of persuasion”); see also Hecox v. Little, 104 13 F.4th 1061, 1073 (9th Cir. 2023). The Court may weigh the request for a preliminary injunction 14 with a sliding-scale approach. Alliance, at 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, a stronger showing 15 on the balance of hardships may support the issuance of a preliminary injunction where there are 16 “serious questions on the merits … so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of 17 irreparable injury, and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Id. Finally, “a preliminary 18 injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24. 20 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 21 This first factor “is the most important” under Winter, and “is especially important when 22 a plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation and injury.” Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1041 (9th 23 Cir. 2023). Petitioner argues he is likely to succeed on his claim that Respondents violated his 24 Fifth Amendment Due Process rights when he was detained without notice or provided a custody 25 hearing before a neutral arbiter. (Doc. 3 at 8-23.) 26 The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits government deprivation of an 27 individual’s life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Hernandez v. Session, 872 F.3d 28 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). The Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the borders of 1 the United States, regardless of immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) 2 (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the United States, including 3 noncitizens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”). These 4 due process rights extend to immigration proceedings. Id. at 693–94. “Even when the 5 government has discretion to detain an individual, its subsequent decision to release the 6 individual creates ‘an implicit promise’ that she will be re-detained only if she violates the 7 conditions of her release.” Garro Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-CV-05632-PCP, --- F. Supp. 3d. ----, 8 2025 WL 3691938, at *30 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2025) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 9 482 (1972)). Other courts, including this Court, have held similarly. J.E.H.G. v. Chestnut, No. 10 1:25-CV-01673-JLT-SKO, 2025 WL 3523108, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025) (citing Doe v. 11 Becerra, No. 2:25-CV-00647-DJC-DMC, 2025 WL 691664, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025)). 12 In analyzing procedural due process claims such as this one, courts must first determine 13 whether a protected liberty interest exists under the Due Process Clause. See Kentucky Dep’t of 14 Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989.) If a protected liberty interest is found to 15 exist, the court then must examine whether the procedures necessary to ensure that any 16 deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. (Id.) To the extent 17 that Respondents substantively address Petitioner’s due process argument, they deploy a blanket 18 assertion that Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” subject to mandatory detention under 8 19 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) of the INA and therefore categorically ineligible for a bond hearing. 20 (Doc. 7 at 8-11.) 21 Although Petitioner’s claim is ultimately constitutional in nature, it turns on whether 22 section 1225(b) or section 1226(a) justify Petitioner’s re-detention. Courts nationwide, including 23 this one, have overwhelmingly rejected Respondents’ new legal position and found the DHS 24 policy unlawful. See, e.g., Ortiz Donis v. Chestnut, 1:25-CV-01228-JLT, 2025 WL 2879514 at 25 *3–6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2025); see also, M.R.R. v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-CV-01517-JLT, 2025 WL 26 3265446 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025); Hortua v. Chestnut, et al., No. 1:25-cv-01670-TLN-JDP, 27 2025 WL 3525916 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025); Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-CV-6582 28 (LAK), ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) 1 (estimating over 350 cases ruled the DHS policy improper across 160 different judges sitting in 2 about 50 different courts nationwide); Mirley Adriana Bautista Pico, et al. v. Kristi Noem, et al., 3 No. 25-CV-08002-JST, 2025 WL 3295382, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2025) (collecting cases); 4 Armando Modesto Estrada-Samayoa v. Orestes Cruz, et al., No. 1:25-CV-01565-EFB (HC), 5 2025 WL 3268280, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025) (collecting cases). 6 Even assuming Respondents are correct that § 1225(b) is the applicable detention 7 authority for all “applicants for admission,” Respondents fail to meaningfully contend with the 8 liberty interest created by the fact that the Petitioner in this case was released on recognizance in 9 August 2024, before the current manifestation of this interpretation. Respondents argue that the 10 Court should not apply the test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-335 (1976), citing the 11 Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022). 12 Rodriguez Diaz noted that the Supreme Court, “when confronted with constitutional challenges 13 to immigration detention has not resolve the issue through express application of Mathews.” Yet, 14 after noting that (1) other circuits have applied the Mathews test to immigration detention issues 15 and (2) the Ninth Circuit has applied Mathews in order immigration contexts, Rodriguez Diaz 16 went on to “assume without deciding” that Mathews applied in the context of immigration 17 detention. Id. at 1207. 18 Thus, the Court must evaluate the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 19 U.S. 319, 334-335 (1976), to determine whether the procedures (or lack thereof) that have been 20 applied to Petitioner are sufficient to protect the liberty interest at issue. Pinchi, 2025 WL 21 2084921at *3. In Mathews, the Court determined the following: 22 [O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three 23 distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the 24 official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, 25 of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the 26 fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 27 28 During his more than a year and a half on parole, Petitioner build a life outside detention, albeit 1 under the terms of that parole. Petitioner has a substantial private interest in being out of custody 2 and his detention denies her that liberty interest. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) 3 (“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical 4 restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”). 5 In Rocha Chavarria v. Chestnut, the Court recently found that the Petitioner had 6 demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his procedural due process claim because 7 (1) he had demonstrated a liberty interest in his continued release, and (2) that his continued 8 detention without written notice and a hearing was unlawful. Rocha Chavarria v. Chestnut, No. 9 1:25-cv-1755-DAD-AC, 2025 WL 3533606, *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025). The court ordered the 10 immediate release of Petitioner who allegedly “incurred compliance violations” that were not 11 identified and where respondents did not suggest the alleged violations were the reason for 12 petitioner’s re-detention. (Id.) See also, Gholami v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-CV-01644-DAD-DMC 13 (HC), 2025 WL 3640675 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2025) (construing Respondent’s non- 14 responsiveness and unsubstantiated allegations of release violations as concessions that the 15 present matter and Rocha Chavarria were not substantively distinguishable). 16 Unlike the Respondents in Rocha Chavarria and Bernal2, Respondent’s supplemental 17 exhibits to their opposition (Doc. 10), constitute sufficient, independent verifiable supporting 18 documentation regarding the quantity, nature and substance of Petitioner’s alleged ISAP/ATD 19 violations and reasons for re-arresting him. C.f. C.A.R.V. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01395-JLT- 20 SKO, 2025 WL 3059549, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025) (finding “key factual assertions” made 21 by Respondents were not adequately supported when the deportation officer did not state the 22 “basis for personal knowledge for the facts claimed in his declaration.”). 23 Nevertheless, the Court finds there is at least some risk of erroneous deprivation under 24 the present circumstances, with the record suggesting several reasons why Petitioner’s detention 25 may not be justified. First, in 2024, in releasing him on parole, DHS necessarily concluded that 26

27 2In Bernal, the court found that Petitioner was likely in compliance with the conditions of her release -- preserving the full force of her liberty interest -- given that Respondents provided “no detail about the restrictions – if any – 28 required by [the ATD] program,” and nothing regarding the timing or substance of Petitioner’s alleged release 1 Petitioner was not a flight risk or danger to the community. Noori v. LaRose, et al., 2025 WL 2 2800149, at 13* (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025) (In general, ‘[r]elease reflects a determination by the 3 government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.’” Saravia v. 4 Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. 5 Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018).” 6 The Supreme Court has held that “the Constitution requires some kind of a hearing 7 before the State deprives a person of liberty or property.” See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 8 127 (1990) (emphasis in original). However, the Court also recognized that there may be 9 situations that urgently require arrest, in which a prompt post-deprivation hearing is appropriate. 10 Id. at 128 (noting there may be “special case[s]” where a pre-deprivation hearing is 11 impracticable); Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-05436-RFL, 2025 WL 1983677, at *9 12 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2025) (“absent evidence of urgent concerns, a pre-deprivation hearing is 13 required to satisfy due process, particularly where an individual has been released on bond by an 14 IJ”). The rapidly developing caselaw on this subject gives limited guidance as to where this line 15 should be drawn. Some courts that have addressed detention-related habeas petitions brought by 16 persons released with enhanced supervision conditions have required pre-deprivation process, 17 but in somewhat different circumstances. In E.A.T.-B. v. Wamsley, No. C25-1192-KKE, 2025 18 WL 2402130, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2025), the district court ordered the release of a 19 petitioner arrested by ICE immediately after appearing in immigration court. That court agreed 20 with the petitioner that ICE’s post hoc explanation that violations warranted his detention was 21 pretextual, given that ICE first became aware of petitioner’s alleged violations a few hours 22 before his immigration hearing, DHS did not raise those violations at the hearing or argue the 23 petitioner should be detained for any reason, and the petitioner was then provided multiple, 24 inconsistent justifications for his arrest. Id. In Arzate v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00942-KES-SKO 25 (HC), 2025 WL 2230521, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2025), converted to preliminary injunction 26 sub nom, 2025 WL 2411010, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2025), the court ordered immediate 27 release of in immigration detainee who had been in compliance with his conditions of release, 28 1 even though he had incurred a misdemeanor arrest while on parole, in part because no charges 2 were ever filed. 3 In contrast, this Court ordered a bond hearing in Martinez Hernandez v. Andrews, No. 4 1:25-CV-01035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025), where the petitioner’s 5 records indicated numerous violations. Though Martinez Hernandez offered explanations for the 6 violations and there was a dispute of fact as to whether the violations occurred, ICE’s reliance 7 upon those violations was “not obviously pretexual.” Id. at * 12 (“If Respondent’s view of the 8 facts is correct, it is at least arguable that providing Petitioner with notice and a pre-deprivation 9 hearing would have been impracticable and/or would have motivated his flight.”). As this Court 10 noted in Martinez Hernandez: 11 In similar circumstances, courts have refused to release the petitioners but have ordered timely bond hearings. Carballo v. 12 Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00978-KES-EPG (HC), 2025 WL 2381464, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025), citing Perera v. 13 Jennings, et. al, No. 21-CV-04136-BLF, 2021 WL 2400981, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2021); Pham v. Becerra, No. 23-CV-01288- 14 CRB, 2023 WL 2744397, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2023). “[A]llowing a neutral arbiter to review the facts would significantly 15 reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation.” Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-05436-RFL, 2025 WL 1983677, at *8 (N.D. 16 Cal. July 17, 2025). Thus, the Court concludes that prompt, post- deprivation process is required here. 17 18 Id. Finally, as to the third Mathews factor, this Court concludes that the government’s interest in 19 detaining Petitioner without proper process is slight. “Since respondents did not engage with 20 Petitioner’s due process arguments, they have not provided the court with any information 21 regarding the burden on the government.” Rocha Chavarria, 2025 WL 3533606, at *4. In sum, 22 sum, the Court concludes that Petitioner has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits 23 on his due process claim. 24 B. Remaining Preliminary Injunction Factors 25 The remaining preliminary injunction factors—irreparable harm, the balance of equities, 26 and the public interest—decidedly weigh in favor of Petitioner. “[I]t is well established that the 27 deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. 28 Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)); 1 see also Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 767 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Deprivation of physical 2 liberty by detention constitutes irreparable harm.”). By successfully demonstrating that 3 Respondents lack a basis to detain her, Petitioner has succeeded in showing irreparable harm. 4 As to the final two Winter factors, “[w]hen the government is a party, the analysis of the 5 balance of the hardships and the public interest merge.” Nat'l Urban League v. Ross, 484 F. 6 Supp. 3d 802, 807 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 7 1092 (9th Cir. 2014)). The Court finds there is no equitable reason that would tip the balance in 8 the Government's favor. While the government has a compelling interest in enforcing the 9 immigration laws, granting relief to Petitioner will not seriously impinge its ability to do so. The 10 Government “cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being 11 enjoined from constitutional violations.” Zepeda v. U.S. Immigr. & Nat. Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 12 (9th Cir. 1983). Moreover, “the public has a strong interest in upholding procedural protections 13 against unlawful detention, and the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public of 14 immigration detention are staggering.” Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-cv-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at 15 *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (quoting Jorge M.F. v. Wilkinson, No, 21-cv-01434, 2021 WL 16 783561, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021)). In sum, the last two Winter factors also weigh in 17 Petitioner's favor. 19 1. Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 2) is converted to a 20 Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and it is GRANTED in PART. 21 2. Petitioner SHALL be provided a substantive bond hearing no later than 22 February 2, 2026 at which the Immigration Judge will determine whether Petitioner poses a risk 23 of flight or a danger to the community if he is released. 24 3. At any such hearing, the Government SHALL bear the burden of establishing, by 25 clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of 26 flight, and Petitioner SHALL be allowed to have counsel present. 27 4. The bond requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) is waived. See 28 Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2011). Courts regularly waive security in cases 1 | like this one. See, e.g., Zakzouk v. Becerra, No. 25-cv-06254, 2025 WL 2899220, at *8 (N.D. 2 | Cal. Oct. 10, 2025). 3 5. The parties are directed to meet and confer no later than 14 days from the 4 | date of the entry of this order, and, if possible, submit a joint proposed briefing schedule 5 || discussing the abeyance of further proceedings on the merits pending the 9" Circuit Appeal of 6 | Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, 779 F.Supp.3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025). If the parties are unable 7 | to agree to a joint proposed briefing schedule, the Court will rule on the request. 8 6. The government may file a further brief on the merits of the habeas petition 9 | within 45 days. Alternatively, as soon as it can within that 30-day period, the government may 10 | file a notice that it does not intend to file further briefing. If the government files an additional 11 | brief, Petitioner may file a further brief within 30 days thereafter. 12 5. The matter is referred to the assigned magistrate judge for consideration of the 13 | merits of the petition as quickly as possible. 14 16 | Dated: _ January 22, 2026 Charis [Tourn TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28