In the Iowa Supreme Court
No. 24–1645
Submitted January 20, 2026—Filed May 22, 2026
Rhonda Baldwin, as executor of the Estate of Garrett O. Baldwin,
Appellee,
vs.
Central Iowa Hospital Corp., d/b/a Iowa Methodist Medical Center,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Coleman McAllister,
judge.
Interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment on
a wife’s claims for vicarious liability based on the alleged negligence of a nurse,
direct negligence in retaining that nurse, emotional distress damages, and
punitive damages following her husband’s death. Reversed and Case
Remanded.
McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices
joined.
Jeffrey R. Kappelman (argued), Erik P. Bergeland, Peter R. Lapointe, and
Joseph F. Moser of Finley Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Gary Dickey (argued) and Matthew Sahag of Dickey, Campbell, & Sahag
Law Firm, PLC., Des Moines, for appellee. 2
McDonald, Justice.
Plaintiff Rhonda Baldwin, individually and as executor of the Estate of
Garrett Baldwin, brought this suit against nurse Andrea Cline and Central Iowa
Hospital Corp. d/b/a Iowa Methodist Medical Center arising out of the death of
her husband. This appeal arises from the district court’s denial of the hospital’s
motion for summary judgment. At issue in this appeal are the following
questions: (1) whether the plaintiff’s claim for negligent retention and supervision
is barred because it is not disputed that the hospital is vicariously liable for the
alleged negligence of its employees; (2) whether the summary judgment record
shows there is a triable issue of fact with respect to Rhonda’s request for
bystander emotional distress damages; and (3) whether the summary judgment
record shows there is a triable issue of fact on the plaintiff’s request for punitive
damages. Our review is for the correction of errors at law. Kostoglanis v. Yates,
956 N.W.2d 157, 158 (Iowa 2021).
I.
The summary judgment record, when viewed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, shows the following. Garrett Baldwin presented to the emergency
room on March 26, 2021, with abdominal pain. Physicians diagnosed him with
acute pancreatitis without infection or necrosis, and he was admitted to the Iowa
Methodist Medical Center (IMMC) for continued care. Baldwin’s condition did not
improve, and he was transferred to the critical care unit at IMMC. As a result of
Baldwin’s declining renal function, he was started on Continuous Renal
Replacement Therapy (CRRT), a form of continuous dialysis. The CRRT was
administered through a catheter inserted into Baldwin’s jugular vein. Baldwin
remained in the critical care unit for the next several days. 3
Nurse Andrea Cline was on Baldwin’s critical care team. On April 11, she
was responsible for checking the CRRT tubing and monitoring Baldwin. The
CRRT tubing was supposed to be, but was not, secured with a Luer lock. A Luer
lock is a standardized, threaded, and secure connection system used to join
small fluid fittings to ensure they do not become disconnected. On the morning
of April 11, Cline did not document in Baldwin’s chart that the tubing
connections were secure; the inference being that Cline did not check to ensure
that the tubing connections were secure. At some point during that morning,
Cline, in an effort to move some of the CRRT tubing out of the way, fastened the
CRRT tubing to Baldwin’s bed railing using a tourniquet tied too tightly or a clip
that was too small to allow slack in the tubing. Later that afternoon, Baldwin
asked to be repositioned in his bed. When Cline went to reposition him, the
tubing did not have enough slack to accommodate the new position, and the
catheter was pulled from Baldwin’s neck. This allowed air to enter the tube,
which caused Baldwin to suffer cardiac arrest.
Rhonda was sitting next to Baldwin and holding his hand at the time this
occurred. Rhonda testified during her deposition that she was watching a
football game on the television when “the next thing [she] kn[e]w,” she heard a
“kabam!” Rhonda was not sure what had happened, but she thought that maybe
Cline accidentally dropped the bed while she was trying to lower it. Cline called
for help, and hospital staff flooded into the room. Someone started chest
compressions. Rhonda was escorted out of the room and taken to a conference
room. She heard a “code blue bed 12 ICU” over the loudspeaker, and she “knew
enough to know what that meant.”
Baldwin died twelve days after this incident, but the parties dispute the
cause of death. Rhonda claims that Baldwin was resuscitated but that he never 4
fully recovered from the disconnection event and died as a result of the cardiac
arrest. IMMC contends that Baldwin was immediately resuscitated after the
disconnection event and that he died twelve days later from unrelated causes,
including necrosis of the pancreas, spleen, liver, and prostate; hypertensive
atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease of the heart and kidneys; pleural
effusions; acute tubular necrosis; hepatic steatosis; jaundice; and obesity.
Just under one year after Baldwin’s death, Rhonda filed this suit against
Cline and IMMC. With respect to Cline, Rhonda alleged that Cline was negligent
by failing to secure the CRRT tubing connection and by improperly fixing the
CRRT tubing to the bedrail, among other things. Rhonda alleged that IMMC was
vicariously liable for Cline’s negligence. With respect to IMMC, Rhonda alleged
that IMMC was independently negligent in hiring, retaining, and supervising
Cline. As to this theory of liability, Rhonda claimed that Cline was involved in an
incident approximately two years prior to Baldwin’s death involving the improper
placement of a feeding tube in a patient, along with related monitoring failures,
that resulted in the patient’s death. The patient’s estate brought suit, and it was
settled confidentially. Cline was formally disciplined by the Iowa Board of
Nursing in February 2024 for her failure in that case “to assess, accurately
document, evaluate or report the status of a patient” and for “committing an act
or omission which may adversely affect the physical or psychosocial welfare of
the patient.” Cline did not lose her nursing license. Given Cline’s involvement in
a different case involving the death of a patient, Rhonda contended that IMMC
was negligent in retaining Cline.
After Rhonda filed this suit, IMMC requested that Rhonda dismiss Cline
from the case. Rhonda agreed on the conditions that IMMC stipulate to vicarious
liability for the negligence, if any, of its employed nurses who provided care to 5
Baldwin, including Cline, and that the dismissal would not waive Rhonda’s
vicarious liability claim against IMMC. IMMC agreed to those conditions. Rhonda
filed the stipulations and dismissal on September 15, 2022.
After the parties conducted discovery, IMMC moved for summary
judgment on three grounds. First, IMMC argued that the negligent retention
claim was barred, or preempted, because IMMC agreed it was vicariously liable
for Cline’s negligence, if any. Among other things, IMMC argued that allowing
the negligent retention claim to proceed here would allow Rhonda to make a
double recovery and that allowing the claim was merely a way for Rhonda to
introduce prejudicial and otherwise irrelevant information regarding Cline’s
involvement in the death of a different patient. Second, with respect to emotional
distress damages, IMMC argued that Rhonda and her children could not recover
emotional distress damages because they suffered no physical injury and the
bystander liability theory was inapplicable here. Finally, IMMC argued that
punitive damages were unavailable as a matter of law because the record did not
contain evidence of willful or wanton conduct.
The district court denied summary judgment on the negligent retention
claim, concluding that direct liability claims against an employer are not barred
or preempted when there is no dispute that the employer is vicariously liable for
the underlying acts of employee negligence. The district court acknowledged that
this was an issue of first impression in Iowa, but it decided that the non-
preemption rule—the rule allowing a negligent retention claim even where the
employer is undisputedly vicariously liable for the employee’s conduct—“is the
better rule and the one most likely to be adopted by the Iowa Supreme Court.”
On the emotional distress issue, the court granted summary judgment as
to the Baldwins’ children, who were not present during the disconnection event, 6
but denied summary judgment as to Rhonda. The court reasoned that IMMC’s
argument “pars[ed] the disconnection event too thinly” and held that Rhonda’s
testimony created a triable question under Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104,
108 (Iowa 1981) (en banc), as to whether she contemporaneously observed the
negligent event and reasonably believed death or serious injury would occur.
The court also denied summary judgment with respect to IMMC’s motion
on punitive damages. In support of her punitive damages request, Rhonda
retained an expert, nurse Michael Mayfield, who opined that Cline’s conduct in
the prior case involving a patient death was reckless and should have resulted
in her immediate termination. She also pointed to the testimony of IMMC’s nurse
manager, Janell Smith, who agreed that she would not want to keep any nurse
who had caused a patient’s death. Based on these opinions, Rhonda argued that
IMMC’s continued employment of Cline was reckless. Rhonda also argued that
IMMC ratified Cline’s conduct when IMMC’s chief medical officer, Dr. Tracy
Eckhardt, sent a letter dated June 23, 2021, to Rhonda regarding the results of
the internal investigation into the events of April 11 stating that “[t]he findings
of the investigation confirmed that the dialysis connections were properly placed,
per our protocol, and that staff actions, including monitoring, was appropriate.”
The district court concluded that it could not determine as a matter of law that
punitive damages are unavailable in this case. IMMC sought interlocutory review
of each denial, and we granted the appeal.
II.
The district court was correct that this is the first time this court has
squarely addressed the question of whether a plaintiff’s claim for negligent
hiring, retention, or supervision (hereafter, a negligent retention claim) is
unavailable if the employer does not contest that the employee’s conduct was 7
within the scope of employment and that the employer is vicariously liable for
the employee’s negligence, if any. In answering this question of first impression,
we discuss the development of the negligent retention claim in Iowa, we survey
the persuasive authorities on the preemption question, and we then resolve the
question.
A.
The leading case in Iowa regarding claims for negligent hiring, retention,
and supervision is Godar v. Edwards, 588 N.W.2d 701 (Iowa 1999). In that case,
a former student of a school brought suit against the school district and the
former curriculum director of the school district. Id. at 703. The former student
sought damages for sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated upon him by the
curriculum director both on and off school grounds. Id. Because it was disputed
whether the curriculum director was acting within the scope of his employment,
the plaintiff asserted claims against the district for respondeat superior and
negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. See id. at 703–04. The district court
granted the defendants’ motions for directed verdict as to the plaintiff’s claims
concerning vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior and
negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. Id. at 705.
On appeal, this court first addressed the plaintiff’s vicarious liability claim.
Id. “The well established rule is that under the doctrine of respondeat superior,
an employer is liable for the negligence of an employee committed while the
employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment.” Id. “Thus, ‘[a]
claim of vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior rests on two
elements: proof of an employer/employee relationship, and proof that the injury
occurred within the scope of that employment.’ ” Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Biddle v. Sartori Mem’l Hosp., 518 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Iowa 1994)). This 8
court affirmed the district court’s decision to grant the district’s motion for
directed verdict, concluding “that any alleged sexual abuse by [the employee] was
not an act committed within the scope of his employment for which the school
district may be held liable.” Id. at 706.
The Godar court also affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the direct
negligence claims against the school district. Id. at 710. The Godar court
explained that “whether the school district is liable based on a theory of
negligence is separate and distinct from liability under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.” Id. at 707 n.3. At that time, this court had “never addressed the
validity of a claim against an employer based on negligent hiring.” Id. at 708.
After reviewing the relevant authorities, this court “join[ed] those jurisdictions
that have recognized a claim by an injured third party for negligent hiring and
conclude[d] that an employer has a duty to exercise reasonable care in hiring
individuals, who, because of their employment, may pose a threat of injury to
members of the public.” Id. at 709. This included actions “for negligent retention
and negligent supervision.” Id.1 Having recognized the tort, Godar concluded that
the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to generate a jury question that
the district knew or should have known about the abuse. Id. at 710.
Since recognizing negligent retention in Godar, this court has clarified the
elements of the tort. A negligent retention claim against the employer “must
include as an element an underlying tort or wrongful act committed by the
employee.” Schoff v. Combined Ins. of Am., 604 N.W.2d 43, 53 (Iowa 1999)
1Although not material to the outcome of this case, this court had in fact recognized
negligent retention claims prior to Godar. See, e.g., Cubbage v. Est. of Conrad Youngerman, Inc., 134 N.W. 1074, 1076 (Iowa 1912) (affirming plaintiff’s verdict against an elevator operator and stating that under Iowa law “[h]abitual negligence and carelessness in the performance of the duties involved in the employment may constitute incompetency chargeable to the employer as negligence in retaining the employé in his service”). 9
(quoting Haverly v. Kaytec, Inc., 738 A.2d 86, 91 (Vt. 1999)). As we later
explained, “[a] claim of negligent hiring, retention, or supervision requires proof
of two kinds of tortious misconduct.” Randolph v. Aidan, LLC, 6 N.W.3d 304, 309
(Iowa 2024). “There must be proof of both (1) the employer’s negligence in hiring,
retaining, or supervising the unfit employee and (2) negligence or other tortious
misconduct by the employee.” Id.; see also McCoy v. Thomas L. Cardella &
Assocs., 992 N.W.2d 223, 228 (Iowa 2023) (“Negligent supervision is only
actionable when ‘the conduct that proper supervision . . . would have avoided
is . . . actionable against the employee.’ ” (omissions in original) (quoting Schoff,
604 N.W.2d at 53)). Stated differently, the employer can only be found negligent
on a direct negligence claim if the employee is found negligent first. Thus, while
the employer’s liability is not derivative in a strict sense, it is nonetheless
contingent upon the employee’s liability.
B.
With that background regarding the negligent retention claim in Iowa, we
turn to the preemption rule. While this is the first time this court has considered
the issue, numerous other courts have addressed it. Some states have adopted
the preemption rule (or assumption rule in some jurisdictions): the rule that a
plaintiff may not pursue a negligent retention claim where it is undisputed that
the employer is vicariously liable for the employee’s negligence, if any. Other
states have adopted the non-preemption (or non-assumption rule): the rule that
the plaintiff is the master of her complaint and may pursue both claims at the
same time.
We begin with those states that have adopted the preemption rule. See
Diaz v. Carcamo, 253 P.3d 535, 543–44 (Cal. 2011); Ferrer v. Okbamicael, 390
P.3d 836, 841–42 (Colo. 2017) (en banc), superseded by statute, 2021 Colo. Sess. 10
Laws ch. 147, § 1 (codified at Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111.5(1.5)(c) (2022)), as
recognized in, Brown v. Long Romero, 495 P.3d 955 (Colo. 2021) (en banc);
Clooney v. Geeting, 352 So. 2d 1216, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Wise v.
Fiberglass Sys., Inc., 718 P.2d 1178, 1181 (Idaho 1986); Sedam v. 2JR Pizza
Enters., LLC, 84 N.E.3d 1174, 1178 (Ind. 2017); Houlihan v. McCall, 78 A.2d 661,
665 (Md. App. Ct. 1951); McHaffie v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Mo. 1995) (en
banc); Weinberg v. Guttman Breast & Diagnostic Inst., 679 N.Y.S.2d 127, 128
(App. Div. 1998); LaPlant v. Snohomish County, 271 P.3d 254, 257 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2011); Bogdanski v. Budzik, 408 P.3d 1156, 1162–63 (Wyo. 2018); see also
Cole v. Alton, 567 F. Supp. 1084, 1085–86 (N.D. Miss. 1983) (predicting
Mississippi courts would apply the rule); Roaf v. Stephen S. Rebuck Consulting,
LLC, 550 P.3d 173, 179 (Ariz. 2024); Werner Enters., Inc. v. Blake, 719 S.W.3d
525, 542 & n.* (Tex. 2025) (Young, J., concurring) (noting at least six of Texas’s
courts of appeals have adopted the rule and expressing approval).
The primary reason “given for holding that it is improper for a plaintiff to
proceed against an [employer] on the independent theory of imputed negligence
where respondeat superior is admitted has to do with the nature of the claim.”
McHaffie, 891 S.W.2d at 826. In adopting the preemption rule, the Colorado
Supreme Court explained that vicarious liability and direct negligence claims are
both rooted in the employee’s tortious acts. Ferrer, 390 P.3d at 845. “That is,
tortious conduct by an employee is a predicate in direct negligence claims against
the employer.” Id. at 844. Because a plaintiff must prove that the employee
engaged in tortious conduct to prevail on a direct negligence claim against the
employer, an employer’s admission of vicarious liability renders the direct
negligence claim superfluous. See id.; see also McHaffie, 891 S.W.2d at 826. The
additional claim adds no compensable damage because the employer has already 11
acknowledged its liability “for one hundred percent of the damages attributable
to the employee’s negligence.” Ferrer, 390 P.3d at 845; see also Bogdanski, 408
P.3d at 1162–63.
Courts also express concern that, without the preemption rule, irrelevant
and potentially inflammatory evidence would be introduced into the record.
Where the plaintiff claims no additional damage from the employer’s conduct,
not only does the employer’s direct liability add nothing to the damages sought,
but any evidence related to the employer’s direct liability becomes “irrelevant to
any contested issue in the case.” McHaffie, 891 S.W.2d at 826. The only practical
effect of allowing the plaintiff to pursue a negligent retention claim is to allow the
plaintiff to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence that is unfairly prejudicial
to the individual employee and the defendant. See id. (stating “the evidence
laboriously submitted to establish other theories serves no real purpose” except
for potentially inflaming the jury). “For instance, evidence of an employee’s prior
convictions for traffic offenses, relevant to the issue of the employer’s negligent
hiring, may lead a jury to ‘draw the inadmissible inference that because the
[driver] had been negligent on other occasions he was negligent at the time of the
accident.’ ” Ferrer, 390 P.3d at 845 (alteration in original) (quoting Houlihan, 78
A.2d at 665).
Double recovery, jury confusion, and judicial economy concerns are also
cited by preemption rule courts. See id.; Sedam, 84 N.E.3d at 1178–79. They
reason that the preemption rule eliminates any “danger that a jury will assess
the employer’s liability twice and award duplicative damages to the plaintiff if it
hears evidence of both” a negligent retention claim and a vicarious liability claim.
Ferrer, 390 P.3d at 845. By contrast, allowing both claims to continue will only
“prejudice the employer, confuse the jury, and waste judicial resources when 12
ultimately the result—that the employer is liable—is the same and the employer
has stipulated as much.” Sedam, 84 N.E.3d at 1178.
Other courts have reached a different conclusion and rejected the
preemption rule. See Quynn v. Hulsey, 850 S.E.2d 725, 729–30 (Ga. 2020);
McQueen v. Green, 202 N.E.3d 268, 280 (Ill. 2022); Marquis v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 961 P.2d 1213, 1225 (Kan. 1998); MV Transp., Inc. v. Allgeier, 433
S.W.3d 324, 336 (Ky. 2014); James v. Kelly Trucking Co., 661 S.E.2d 329, 331
(S.C. 2008); Binns v. Trader Joe’s E., Inc., 690 S.W.3d 241, 253 (Tenn. 2024);
Ramon v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 493 P.3d 613, 619 (Utah 2021); see also Wright v.
Watkins & Shepard Trucking, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1221 (D. Nev. 2013)
(“These considerations imply that the Nevada Supreme Court would not adopt
the ‘majority’ approach . . . .”); Poplin v. Bestway Express, 286 F. Supp. 2d 1316,
1320 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (“[T]he precedent of the Alabama Supreme Court indicates
that Alabama would adhere to the minority view in this situation.”); Smith v.
Williams, No. 05C–10–307, 2007 WL 2677131, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Sep. 11,
2007) (“Delaware courts have shown a willingness to entertain both causes of
action . . . .”); Lim v. Interstate Sys. Steel Div., Inc., 435 N.W.2d 830, 832–33
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
These courts reason that a defendant’s stipulation that the employee was
acting within the scope of employment cannot foreclose the plaintiff’s pursuit of
another, separate claim arising out of the employer’s separate negligence. James,
661 S.E.2d at 332. They explain that an “employer’s liability under [a direct
liability] theory does not rest on the negligence of another, but on the employer’s
own negligence.” Id. at 331. Even though “direct negligence claims . . . may be
classified as derivative in the sense that both typically require the plaintiff to
prove that an employee’s underlying conduct was negligent, the liability 13
stemming from negligent training and supervision is not vicarious.” Binns, 690
S.W.3d at 250 (footnote omitted). Therefore, “claims based on [direct negligence]
are independent of claims based on respondeat superior, and the existence of
one claim does not render the other claim superfluous or unnecessary.” Id. at
251 (quoting Gordon v. Tractor Supply Co., No. M2015–01049–COA–R3–CV, 2016
WL 3349024, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 8, 2016)); see also Marquis, 961 P.2d
at 1225 (“Because the torts of negligent hiring, retention, or supervision are
recognized in Kansas as separate torts that are not derivative of the employee’s
negligence, an admission that the employee was acting within the scope of his
or her employment does not preclude an action for both [claims.]”)
According to courts that do not follow the preemption rule, “the argument
that an independent cause of action against an employer must be precluded to
protect the jury from considering prejudicial evidence presumes too much.”
James, 661 S.E.2d at 331. Rather than barring negligent retention claims
outright when vicarious liability is uncontested, these courts emphasize the trial
court’s ability to address concerns about prejudice, duplicative proof, and double
recovery through trial management practices. See McQueen, 202 N.E.3d at 280
(“[W]e generally rely on the trial court to determine when otherwise relevant
evidence should be inadmissible because its probative value is outweighed by
the risk of unfair prejudice.”); James, 661 S.E.2d at 331; Binns, 690 S.W.3d at
252 (“While we agree that inflammatory evidence often exists in lawsuits, the
Tennessee Rules of Evidence exist, in part, to guard against the admission of
overly prejudicial evidence.”); Ramon, 493 P.3d at 619–20 (“The McHaffie rule
is . . . a blunt instrument to deal with that potential issue.”). As the South
Carolina Supreme Court explained, the preemption rule “gives impermissibly
short-shrift to the trial court’s ability to judge the admission of evidence and to 14
protect the integrity of trial, and to the jury’s ability to follow the trial court’s
instructions.” James, 661 S.E.2d at 331.
Even if it is somewhat duplicative to allow both claims, these courts
reason, preventing plaintiffs from bringing even duplicative claims conflicts with
liberal pleading rules and the general principle that the plaintiff is the master of
her pleadings. MV Transp., Inc., 433 S.W.3d at 336; Binns, 690 S.W.3d at 253.
“Settled law allows a plaintiff to plead and prove multiple causes of action.”
McQueen, 202 N.E.3d at 279. Additionally, implementing the preemption rule
requires “a significant departure from . . . well-established standards for
summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings” because it instructs judges
to categorically exclude claims early in a litigation, even if the facts generate a
material fact issue. MV Transp., Inc., 433 S.W.3d at 335.
Some non-preemption rule courts also reason that the rule can distort
fault allocation by forcing jurors to assign all employer responsibility solely
through the employee’s negligence, while ignoring the employer’s independent
breach. See Lorio v. Cartwright, 768 F. Supp. 658, 660 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Quynn,
850 S.E.2d at 729–30; Binns, 690 S.W.3d at 251. They reason that adherence to
the rule “would preclude the jury from apportioning fault to the employer,” and
as a result, “[a]ny allocation of relative fault among those persons at
fault . . . could differ if one person’s fault was excluded from consideration.”
Quynn, 850 S.E.2d at 729.
C.
Having reviewed the relevant authorities, we conclude that a plaintiff
cannot pursue a negligent retention claim when it is not disputed that the
employee was acting within the scope of employment and that the employer is
vicariously liable for the employee’s negligence, if any. In addition to the many 15
practical and case management reasons in support of the preemption rule
discussed above, we conclude the preemption rule follows from the very nature
of the negligent retention tort as developed in Iowa.
The negligent retention tort allows a plaintiff an opportunity to impose
liability on an employer for an employee’s conduct when the employee is acting
outside the scope of employment and vicarious liability would otherwise be
unavailable. Properly conceived, the tort is an alternative to respondeat superior
liability where respondeat superior liability is unavailable or otherwise contested
and “all the requirements of an action of tort for negligence exist[].” Schoff, 604
N.W.2d at 53 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 cmt. a, at 458 (A.L.I.
1958)). As the Indiana Supreme Court explained, “an employer’s admission that
an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment
precludes negligent hiring claims.” Sedam, 84 N.E.3d at 1178. “This outcome
recognizes that a respondeat superior claim necessarily involves an act within
the scope of employment, whereas negligent hiring claims require an act outside
the scope of employment. Under each claim, the plaintiff seeks the same result—
employer liability—and recovery is based on the same negligent act—the
employee’s.” Id.
As in Indiana and the other states adopting the preemption rule, a claim
for negligent retention under Iowa law, although distinct and not derivative, is
tethered to the employee’s underlying misconduct. Because of that, the claim for
negligent retention is redundant where it is undisputed that the employee was
acting within the scope of employment and that the employer is vicariously liable
for the employee’s negligence, if any. The negligent retention claim functions only
as an alternative method—pursued under a different legal theory, to be sure, but 16
directed at the same underlying misconduct—to hold an employer liable for the
employee’s negligence.
The preemption rule is also consistent with the Iowa Comparative Fault
Act. The Iowa Comparative Fault Act requires the trier of fact to determine “[t]he
percentage of the total fault allocated to each claimant, defendant, third-party
defendant, [and] person who has been released from liability.” Iowa Code
§ 668.3(2)(b) (2022). Under the preemption rule, the employer’s vicarious liability
already captures the full measure of its employee’s fault; the employer has
already acknowledged its liability “for one hundred percent of the damages
attributable to the employee’s negligence.” Ferrer, 390 P.3d at 845. Under the
Iowa Comparative Fault Act, “[T]he court may determine that two or more
persons are to be treated as a single party.” Iowa Code § 668.3(2)(b). An employer
who is vicariously liable for its employee’s negligence is treated as a single unit
with the employee for purposes of joint and several liability. Biddle, 518 N.W.2d
at 798–99 (explaining that under Iowa’s joint and several liability scheme, the
employer and employee are treated as one unit when the employer is vicariously
liable). Because the employer and the employee are treated as a single unit, the
employer already bears the full percentage of fault allocated to the employee.
There is no separate “employer fault” to allocate because the employer’s liability
is coextensive with the employee’s. Adding a negligent retention claim does not
create a new source of fault to be allocated. It merely introduces a second path
to the same liability that the employer has already assumed. “All roads lead to
Rome in a case such as this.” Bogdanski, 408 P.3d at 1162.
One of the plaintiff’s counterarguments against the adoption of the
preemption rule in Iowa is a statutory argument. The general assembly recently
passed legislation establishing a preemption rule for negligent hiring claims in 17
“any civil action involving the operation of a commercial motor vehicle requiring
a commercial driver’s license.” 2023 Iowa Acts ch. 84, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code
§ 668.12A(1) (2024)). Applying the familiar canon of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, the plaintiff argues, leads to the conclusion that the legislature did not
intend preemption in medical negligence cases. We are unpersuaded for several
reasons. At the outset, we question whether this is a situation in which the canon
applies, as it typically applies to inferences to be drawn from a single statute.
Assuming it applies, it applies only weakly here. The canon of expressio unius is
a canon of statutory construction. It aids in the interpretation of legislative
enactments by drawing inferences from what the legislature included and
excluded in a particular statute. But the preemption rule is a common law
doctrine, developed by courts in the exercise of their authority to define the
contours of common law torts. The legislature’s decision to codify a preemption
rule in one statutory context does not constrain this court’s independent
authority to adopt, modify, or reject a common law rule in another. Relatedly,
this court had never addressed the question presented in this case. Whether this
court would adopt the preemption rule was an open question under Iowa law at
the time section 668.12A was adopted. The legislature therefore could not have
been legislating against a backdrop of settled Iowa common law on the
preemption question as there was no common law rule to preserve or displace.
Section 668.12A is thus best read as a legislative determination that certainty
was needed on this question in a specific, highly regulated and highly litigated
industry, not as a legislative determination that preemption is inappropriate
outside the commercial motor vehicle context. Finally, the statute does not sweep
as far as the plaintiff contends. The statute extends only to negligent hiring 18
cases, which is not at issue here. By contrast, the preemption rule we adopt
today applies to negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claims generally.
For these reasons, we hold that when it is not disputed that the employee
was acting within the scope of employment and the employer is liable for the
employee’s negligence, if any, a claim for negligent hiring, retention, and
supervision is precluded. The district court erred in holding otherwise.
III.
We next address the district court’s ruling on the availability of bystander
emotional distress damages. The parties do not dispute that the district court
properly granted summary judgment with respect to the damages sought by the
Baldwins’ children, who were not at the hospital at the time of the disconnection
event. See Fineran v. Pickett, 465 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Iowa 1991) (holding that
bystander emotional distress claims are limited to those at the scene when the
allegedly negligent event occurs). The only issue presented in this case is whether
Rhonda’s request for bystander emotional distress damages fails as a matter of
law. For the reasons expressed below, we conclude that it does.
In Barnhill, we set out the five elements that a plaintiff must satisfy to
recover for a bystander emotional distress claim:
1. The bystander was located near the scene of the accident.
2. The emotional distress resulted from a direct emotional impact from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence.
3. The bystander and the victim were husband and wife or related within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity.
4. A reasonable person in the position of the bystander would believe, and the bystander did believe, that the direct victim of the accident would be seriously injured or killed.
5. The emotional distress to the bystander must be serious. 19
300 N.W.2d at 108.
IMMC contends that Rhonda cannot prove she contemporaneously
perceived the accident, as opposed to learning of it after it occurred, and that
she therefore could not have reasonably believed Baldwin would be seriously
injured or killed as a result of the accident. See id. The arguments are
interrelated. According to IMMC, because Rhonda did not know the
disconnection event occurred until after-the-fact, any belief that Baldwin’s life
was in danger could not have arisen from contemporaneous observation of the
accident.
Rhonda correctly argues that contemporaneous perception does not
require bystanders to view the accident as it occurred. Martin v. Crook, No. 08–
1711, 2009 WL 2392077 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2009), is the most instructive
Iowa case on that point. There, a family stopped on an icy interstate to help
another vehicle that was stranded on the shoulder of the road. Id. at *1. While
the husband stood outside the car rendering aid, a passing vehicle slid off the
road and struck him. Id. at *2. The wife, who remained in the car with the
children, testified that she saw “a red car in the rearview mirror . . . spinning [in]
a circle” near where her husband was standing, turned to look out the back
window, and realized that she did not see her husband anymore. Id. at *7. She
then got out of the vehicle and saw her husband on the ground. Id. Although
“she did not see the actual impact of [the defendant’s] car striking her husband,”
and it was “[o]nly when she turned to look for [him] and did not see him [that]
she realize[d] he had been hit by the car,” the court of appeals held that her
testimony created a jury question on whether she contemporaneously perceived
the accident. Id. The wife’s “failure to immediately ‘process’ what she was seeing
[did] not defeat her claim as a matter of law.” Id. The children in Martin did not 20
have a viable bystander liability claim. Id. at *8. “They were watching a movie in
the minivan at the time of the accident,” and “did not notice that anything had
happened until [their mother] exclaimed [it].” Id. Because “[t]heir perceptions of
the event did not commence until they saw their injured father lying in the snow
after the fact,” they could not meet the contemporaneous perception element. Id.
We agree with the defendants, however, that the issue before us is more
nuanced than whether Rhonda hearing a “kabam” satisfies the
contemporaneous perception requirement. The critical question is what exactly
Rhonda perceived when she heard the noise. As explained, the second Barnhill
element requires that the bystander perceived the accident. “The accident” is the
injury-producing event itself, not merely a later manifestation of the resulting
harm. In some contexts, the injury-producing event is immediately recognizable.
In a car accident, for example, the accident is obvious because lay observers
understand that vehicles are not supposed to collide and that collision itself
causes injury. An example of a non-car accident case sufficient to take a
bystander emotional distress claim to the jury is Pollock v. Ottumwa Regional
Mobile Intensive Care Services, Nos. 0–631, 00–0040, 2000 WL 1825444 (Iowa
Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2000). In Pollock, emergency responders placed the plaintiff’s
ill husband on a gurney to transport him from a home to an emergency vehicle,
and while he was being carried, she saw her husband “was either dropped or he
fell or rolled off of it and landed on the ground.” Id. at *1. The court of appeals
reversed summary judgment on the wife’s bystander emotional distress claim,
concluding that the claim should have been presented to the jury. Id. at *3–4.
Although the precise negligence involved was not immediately apparent, the
accident was obvious. See id. at *1, *3. 21
Awareness of the accident is less apparent in other contexts, in particular,
in the context of a medical malpractice case arising out of actions in a critical
care unit, where a tragedy could result from any number of errors or no error at
all, and where the injury-producing event may be invisible to the lay observer.
For example, in Bird v. Saenz, 51 P.3d 324, 328–29 (Cal. 2002), the California
Supreme Court held that plaintiffs could not show that they were
contemporaneously aware of the injury-producing event. The plaintiffs saw their
mother rushed down a hospital hallway. Id. at 326. She was “bright blue,” feet
“way up in the air,” with doctors and nurses surrounding her. Id. But the
plaintiffs did not perceive the medical error itself. Id. at 328–29. Because the
plaintiffs’ emotional distress arose from witnessing the medical crisis and its
aftermath, rather than from contemporaneous awareness of the injury-
producing event, their claims failed as a matter of law. Id. The Bird court
explained that:
This is not to say that a layperson can never perceive medical negligence, or that one who does perceive it cannot assert a valid claim for NIED. To suggest an extreme example, a layperson who watched as a relative’s sound limb was amputated by mistake might well have a valid claim for NIED against the surgeon. Such an accident, and its injury-causing effects, would not lie beyond the plaintiff’s understanding awareness. But the same cannot be assumed of medical malpractice generally.
Id. at 329.
We find the Bird court’s reasoning sound, but we clarify a point. A
bystander need not appreciate at the time of perception that the injury-
causing conduct was tortious, in the legal sense. See id. at 331. However, the
bystander still must perceive the accident and that the accident caused harm to
a close relative. See id. As the Bird court explained, the nature of medical
treatment makes it difficult for bystanders to meet this requirement because 22
unlike other catastrophic events such as “explosion[s], traffic accident[s], or
electrocution[s],” negligent medical treatment is an injury-producing event that
is not often perceived as it is unfolding and is therefore not ordinarily “a
component of [the bystander’s] emotional trauma.” Id. As the court explained, a
witness to a fatal car accident understands that the driver’s conduct caused the
death, even if she does not yet know whether the driver was intoxicated. Id. But
it is a “giant leap” to impose bystander liability “based on nothing more than a
bystander’s ‘observation of the results of the defendant’s infliction of harm,’
however ‘direct and contemporaneous.’ ” Id. (quoting Mobaldi v. Bd. of Regents,
127 Cal. Rptr. 720, 727 (Ct. App. 1976), overruled in part by, Elden v. Sheldon,
758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988) (en banc)).
Here, Rhonda perceived that something occurred, but the record does not
support a finding of contemporaneous perception of an injury-producing event
distinct from her husband’s underlying medical condition. Rhonda testified that
she was watching television beside Baldwin’s bed when she heard a “kabam,”
but she “didn’t realize what had happened then.” She assumed that Cline
dropped the bed when she was lowering it. She “thought immediately, well,
maybe he’s too heavy to lift up with the bed.” It was only when Cline yelled for
help and hospital staff came rushing into the room that she realized something
had gone wrong. She was removed from the room and escorted to a conference
room. Some time later, Rhonda learned that a line had disconnected. Rhonda
perceived a noise and the commotion that resulted, but her awareness of the
injury-producing event—and the connection between that event and Baldwin’s
cardiac arrest—came from what she was told later. Accordingly, we hold that
Rhonda’s claim fails as a matter of law. 23
IV.
Finally, we must decide whether the district court erred in denying the
motion for summary judgment with respect to punitive damages. We note that
several courts adopting the preemption rule have recognized an exception
permitting a negligent retention claim to proceed when the plaintiff has a viable
claim for punitive damages against the employer based on the employer’s own
conduct in retaining the employee. See, e.g., Ferrer, 390 P.3d at 845–46;
McHaffie, 891 S.W.2d at 826. The district court relied on this exception as an
alternative ground for denying summary judgment on the negligent retention
claim, reasoning that Rhonda had presented a viable punitive damages claim.
We need not decide whether to adopt such an exception in this case because, as
we explain below, Rhonda has not produced sufficient evidence to generate a
triable issue of fact on punitive damages.
Punitive damages are recoverable when a plaintiff proves “by a
preponderance of clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence” that “the conduct
of the defendant from which the claim arose constituted willful and wanton
disregard for the rights or safety of another.” Iowa Code section 668A.1(1)(a). We
have explained that punitive damages are “only appropriate when a tort is
committed with ‘either actual or legal malice.’ ” Wolf v. Wolf, 690 N.W.2d 887,
893 (Iowa 2005) (quoting Jones v. Lake Park Care Ctr., Inc., 569 N.W.2d 369, 378
(Iowa 1997)). Such culpability may be shown by “personal spite, hatred, or ill-
will” or “by wrongful conduct committed with a willful or reckless disregard for
the rights of another.” Id. (quoting Jones, 569 N.W.2d at 378); see also Fell v.
Kewanee Farm Equip. Co., 457 N.W.2d 911, 919 (Iowa 1990) (en banc) (stating
that someone acts with a “willful and wanton disregard” when she “has
intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known 24
or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would
follow, and which thus is usually accompanied by a conscious indifference to the
consequences” (first quoting Iowa Code § 668A.1; and then quoting W. Page
Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 34, at 213 (5th ed. 1984))).
Rhonda points us to the opinion of her expert, Mayfield, who opined that
Cline’s conduct in the prior case involving a patient death was reckless and
should have resulted in her immediate termination, and to the testimony of
IMMC’s nurse manager, Smith, who agreed that she would not want to retain a
nurse who was responsible for a patient’s death. We cannot say based on these
conclusory opinions that IMMC acted with malice when it retained Cline, a
licensed nurse. Because the punitive damages claim fails on the merits, any
exception to the preemption rule predicated on a viable punitive damages claim
based on IMMC’s conduct is inapplicable here.
Rhonda also urges that IMMC can be held liable for punitive damages
based on Cline’s conduct under the circumstances presented here. In Iowa,
employers may be held “liable for punitive damages for the willful acts of
employees committed within the scope of employment . . . only when the
corporate employer wrongfully authorized, contributed to, or ratified the
outrageous conduct which caused plaintiff’s injury.” Briner v. Hyslop, 337
N.W.2d 858, 861 (Iowa 1983) (en banc). Rhonda argues that IMMC contributed
to the underlying conduct by recklessly retaining Cline despite her alleged
unfitness for the position and that IMMC ratified Cline’s recklessness when it
declined to terminate her employment and determined after an internal
investigation that Cline’s conduct was appropriate. See id. These arguments
presuppose that Cline’s underlying conduct was outrageous and supports an
award of punitive damages. 25
When the summary judgment record is viewed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, we cannot conclude that there is a triable issue of fact on the
plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages. The evidence against Cline sounds in
negligence: that CRRT line disconnection carries a known risk of serious injury
or death, Cline used a tourniquet or improper equipment to secure the lines,
Cline failed to properly inspect and document the lines, Cline ignored CRRT
alarms earlier in the day, and her actions violated hospital policies.2 Rhonda also
points to expert testimony from Mayfield. Mayfield’s report concludes that Cline
“breached the standard of care because she allowed the lines to become
disconnected” and “she used a tourniquet to secure the CRRT lines to the
bedrail,” among other alleged breaches. He states that “[a]ny reasonable nurse
knows that a patient can move and that you never cut off slack in the lines,
especially between the bed rail and a line connected to a catheter in a patient’s
neck.” “Mere negligent conduct is not sufficient to support a claim for punitive
damages.” McClure v. Walgreen Co., 613 N.W.2d 225, 230 (Iowa 2000) (en banc).
Cline’s alleged negligence, even if true, does not rise to the “extreme” and
“outrageous” conduct necessary to justify a punitive damages award. Briner, 337
N.W.2d at 867–68.
While Mayfield also characterized Cline’s conduct as “reckless” and
“indefensible,” the use of the word “reckless” is not enough to create an issue of
fact on punitive damages. We recently made clear that “a conclusory opinion”
accompanied by “no independent factual investigation” and “lack[ing] any factual
detail” or “analysis supporting an inference that [the] conduct was intentional
rather than merely negligent” is insufficient to carry a case past summary
2IMMC disputes the admissibility of much of this evidence. We assume without deciding
that the evidence would be admissible because that assumption does not affect the outcome here. 26
judgment on the question of recklessness. Rose v. Oakland Healthcare Mgmt.,
LLC, 30 N.W.3d 724, 731 (Iowa 2026). Nothing in this record shows that Cline
acted with “personal spite, hatred, or ill-will” or “with a willful or reckless
disregard for the rights of another.” Wolf, 690 N.W.2d at 893 (quoting Jones, 569
N.W.2d at 378). IMMC, which is only vicariously liable for Cline’s conduct,
cannot be held liable for punitive damages based on Cline’s nonpunitive
conduct.
V.
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court erred in denying the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to each claim.
Reversed and Case Remanded.