Rhodes v. Iowa

170 U.S. 412, 18 S. Ct. 664, 42 L. Ed. 1088, 1898 U.S. LEXIS 1556

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: May 9, 1898
• Docket: 21
• Status: Published

Opinions

Mr. Justice White

delivered the opinion of the court.

The Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company was, in 1891, a common carrier, incorporated under the laws of Illinois, and operated among others a line of railway from Dallas, Illinois, to Burlington, Iowa, and beyond said point. The Burlington and Western Bailway Company was, at the same date, a common carrier, incorporated under the laws of Iowa, and operated'a line of railway from -Burlington, Iowa, to Oskaloosa in that State, with stations at intervening points, one of which was Brighton in Washington County. Both of •these corporations had a depot at Burlington, which they jointly used. The two carriers had, at the time stated and for years previous thereto, between themselves joint freight tariffs, by which transportation, under a single through way bill, was given to merchandise from any station on either of the lines to any station on the line of the other.

' In August, 1891, the Dallas Transportation Company delivered to thé Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Bailroad at Dallas, Illinois, a wooden box stated to contain groceries consigned to William Horn, Brighton, Iowa. It had been the habit of the agent of the Dallas company before this date to ship intoxicating liquors over-the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy. The box in question was receipted for as through freight and was billed through in accordance with the custom above stated, was taken to Burlington, Iowa, there delivered-to the Burlington and Western company, by whom it was carried to Brighton. On its arrival there, the package was placed by the trainmen on the station platform, and shortly afterwards the plaintiff in error, who was the station agent of the Burlington and-Western, in the discharge of his duties. opened the door of the freight house and moved the box into a freight warehouse, which was about six feet from the platform. In about an hour thereafter the box was seized by a constable under a search warrant, on the ground that it contained intoxicating liquors, which proved to be the truth, and subsequently the- liquor was condemned and ordered to be destroyed, and the order was executed. At the time of the seizure the freight charge due to the railways was unpaid. It was admitted that there was nothing on the package to notify the receiving railway of its contents, unless such knowledge can be imputed from the nature of the previous dealings of the Dallas company with the railway. There was, however, testimony showing that the railroad agent who moved the box from the freight platform to the warehouse had reason to know or suspect that it contained liquor since it.was proven that, before the arrival of the box at Brighton, a mail carrier called at the station and asked for a package consigned to William Horn, stating that one was expeeted from Dallas, and that it would contain intoxicating liquor.

The plaintiff in error was proceeded against by information before a justice of the peace, charging him with the unlawful transportation of intoxicating liquors conveyed from Burlington to Brighton, Iowa. This prosecution was under the provisions of the statutes of the State of Iowa, to which we shall hereafter refer. He was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of $10.0. An appeal from this sentence was taken to the district court, where it was affirmed, in which court, among other defences, it was alleged that the package in question was not subject to the jurisdiction of the State of Iowa, because at the time of its removal from the platform to the freight warehouse it was in course of interstate commerce transportation. The district court having affirmed the conviction, an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa, where the judgment below was also affirmed. State v. Rhodes, 90 Iowa, 496. To this judgment of affirmance this writ of error is prosecuted.

The sole question presented for consideration is whether the statute of the State of Iowa can be held to apply to the box in question whilst it was in transit from- its point of shipment, Dallas, Illinois, to its delivery to the consignee at the point to' ' which it was consigned. That is to say, whether the law of the State.of Iowa can be made to apply to a shipment from the State of Illinois, before the arrival and delivery of the merchandise, without causing .the Iowa law to be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.

In Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway, 1888, 125 U. S. 465, this court was called upon to determine the validity of a statute of the State of Iowa, which it was asserted was repugnant to the third clause of section 8 of article I of the Constitution of the United States, because its provisions amounted to a regulation of interstate commerce. The facts upon which the controversy then presented arose were briefly as follows: Kegs of beer were offered in the State of Illinois to a common carrier operating a line of railway in the States of Illinois and Iowa. The beer was consigned to a point in Iowa, and the carrier refused to receive it, on the ground that the statute of Iowa made it unlawful to bring intoxicating liquors within the limits of that State, except when accompanied with a specified certificate, which the Iowa law provided should be granted under particular and exceptional conditions. The one by whom the beer was tendered to the carrier in the State of Illinois thereupon sued the railroad company for the damages claimed to have arisen from its refusal to receive and carry the merchandise. The railway company defended on the ground that it was justified in its refusal because of the provision of the Iowa statute. This, on the other hand, was asserted not to be an adequate defence, because it was claimed that the Iowa statute was whólly void, as it'constituted a regulation of interstate commerce. The sole issue árising therefrom was whether the Iowa law protected the refusing carrier, and thus involved determining whether the statute of the State was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. After great consideration, it was held that the law of the State of Iowa, in so far as it affected interstate commerce, was repugnant to the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution, and was void. It was decided that the transportation of merchandise from one State into and across another ivas interstate commerce, and was protected- from the operation of state laws from the moment of shipment whilst in transit and up to the ending of the journey by the delivery of the goods to the consignee at the place to which they were consigned. The court in. the course of its opinion adverted to the question whether goods so shipped continued to be protected by the interstate commerce clause after their delivery to the consignee and up to and including their sale in the original package by the one to whom they had been delivered, but did not decide the question, as it was not essential to do so. Referring to the subject, however, the court said (pp. 499-500):

“ It might be very convenient and useful in the execution of the policy of prohibition within the State to extend the powers of the State beyond its territorial limits. But- such extraterritorial powers cannot be assumed upon such an implication. On the contrary, the nature of the case contradicts their existence. For if they belong to one State, they-belong to all, and cannot be exercised severally and independently. The attempt would necessarily produce that conflict and confusion which it was the very purpose of the Constitution* by its delegations of national power to prevent.

“It is easier to think that the right of importation from abroad, and of transportation from one' State to another, includes, by necessary implication, the right of the importer to sell unbroken packages at the place where the transit terminates; for the very purpose and motive of that branch of commerce which consists in transportation is that other and consequent act of commerce which consists in the sale and exchange of the commodities transported. Such, indeed, was the point decided in the case of Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, as to foreign commerce, with the express statement, in the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, that the conclusion would be the same in a case of commerce among the States. But it is not necessary now to express any opinion upon the point, because that question does not arise in the present^ case. The precise line which ■ divides the transaction, so far as it belongs to foreign or interstate commerce, from the internal and domestic commerce of the State, we are not now called upon to delineate. It is enough to say that the power to regulate or forbid tlje sale of a commodity, after it has been brought into the State, does not carry with it the right and power to prevent its introduction by transportation from another State.”

Subsequently, in Leisy v. Hardin, (1890) 135 U. S. 100, the question which was thus reserved in the Bowman case arose for adjudication, and it was held that the right to sell the imported merchandise in the original'package free from interference of state laws was protected by the Constitution of .the United States, as up to such, sale the goods brought into the-State were not- commingled with the -mass of property in' the State. Summing up its conclusions the court' said (p. 124): “ The plaintiffs iii error are citizens of Illinois, are. not pharmacists and have no ^permit, but import into Iowa beer which they sell in original packages', as described. • Under our decision in Bowman v. Chicago &c. Railway Co., supra, they had the right to import this beer into that State, and, in the view which .we have expressed, they had the right to sell it, by which act alone it would become mingled in the common mass of -property within the State. Up;to that point, of time we hold that, in the absence-of- Congressional permission to do so, the State had no power to. interfere by seizure, or any other action, in prohibition of- -importation and sale by .the -foreign or non-resident importer.” ■

'The statute of the State of Iowa, under which the prosecution- now before us was instituted, is as follows:

'“If any express company, railway company or any agent or person in the employ of any express company, or of any common carrier, or any person- in the employ of. any common carrier, or if. any other person shall transport or convey between . points,' or from one .place to another within - /this -Staté, for any other person or persons or corporation,, any intoxicating liquors, without having first been furnished with a certificate from and under the seal of .the. county auditor of the county, to which said liquor is to be transported or’- is consigned for transportation, or within which it is to be conveyed from place to place, certifying that the consignée or person to whom said liquor- is to. be transported, conveyed or delivered ..is authorized to sell such intoxicating liquors in'such county, such company, corporation or person so offending, and each of them, and any agent of said company, corporation or per^ son. so offending, shall, upon- conviction thereof, be-fined in, the sum of one hundred dollars forgeach. offence, and pay. costs of prosecution, and the costs shall include a reasonable . attorney fee to be assessed by the court, which shali be paid into the county fund, and stand committed to the-county jail until such fine and costs of prosecution are paid. The offence herein defined shall be held to be complete, and shall be held to have been committed in any county of the State, through or to which said intoxicating liquors are transported, or in which the same is unloaded for transportation, or in which said, liquors are conveyed from place to place or delivered. It shall be the duty of the several county auditors of the State to issue the certificate herein contemplated to any person having such permit, and the certificate so issued shall be truly dated when issued, and shall specify the date at which the permit expires, as shown by the county records. Provided, however, that tlie defendant may show as a defence hereunder by preponderance of evidence that the character and circumstances of the shipment and its contents were unknown to him.” (Iowa Code, section 1553, paragraph 2410, McClain’s Annotated Code of Iowa.)

This statute is identical with the one which was held to be unconstitutional in the Bowman case, except that the latter contained the words “knowingly bring within this State,” these words having been stricken out by an amendment adopted after the decision in the Bowman case. In other words, the statute which was under review in the Bowman case provided, “ if any express company, railway company or any agent or person in the employ of any express company, or of any common carrier, or if any other person shall knowingly bring within this State, or transport or convey between points or from one place to another within the State,” whilst the statute now before us provides exactly the same thing, except that the words “ knowingly bring within this State ” are omitted. It is hence manifest that the present statute, as interpreted by t'he Supreme Court of Iowa, has exactly the significance it would have did it contain the words found in the act reviewed in the Bowman case. It follows that the law before us now, as interpreted below, is the exact equivalent of the statute which has once before been declared by this court to be repugnant to the Constitution. This result in reason is inevitable, since the court below held that the words, as found in the present law, were not confined to transportation of commodifies'originating within the State, but related to •shipments made from another State. This ruling hence subjects shipments made from another State to the control of the statute at once on the arrival of the merchandise within the territorial limits of the State, and before the completion of the interstate shipment, as completely as if the words “ bring within this State ” were yet in the statute. As it was held in the Bowman case that the power to ship from one State into another' embraced of necessity the right to have the goods carried to the place of destination, and be delivered at that point to the consignee, it follows that an interpretation of the present law w;hich gives the State the right to stop the goods shipped into the State at the state line, and before their arrival at destination, is directly within the rule announced in' the Bowman case.

The fundamental right which the decision in the Bowman case held to be protected from the operation of state laws by the Constitution of the United States was the continuity of shipment of goods coming from one, State into another from-the point'of transmission to the point of consignment, and the accomplishment there of the delivery covered by the contract. This protection of the Constitution of the United States is plainly • denied by the statute now under review, as its pro- • visions are interpreted by the court below. The power which it was held in the Bowman case the State did not possess was that of stopping ■ interstate shipments at the state line by breaking their continuity and intercepting their course from the point of origin to the point of consummation. The right of a State to exert these very powers is plainly upheld by the decision rendered below. It follows that if the ruling in the Bowman case is applicable to the question here presented, it is decisive of this controversy, and must lead to a reversal of the judgment below rendered. The claim is, however, and it was upon this ground that the court below rested its judgment, that under and by virtue of the provisions of the act of Congress of August 8, 1890, c. 728, 26 Stat. 318, the ruling in the Bowman case is no longer apposite, as the effect of the act of Congress in question was to confer upon the State of Iowa the power to subject to its statutory regulations merchandise shipped from another State the moment it reached the line of the State of Iowa, and. before the consummation of the contract of shipment by arrival at its destination and delivery there to the consignee. And it is to this question that the discussion at bar has mainly related, and upon which a decision of the cause really depends. '

It is not gainsaid that the effect of the act of Congress was to deprive the receiver of goods shipped from another State of all power to sell the same in the State of Iowa in violation of its laws; but whilst it is thus conceded that the act of Congress has allowed the Iowa law to attach to the property when brought into the State before sale, when it otherwise would not have done so until after sale, bn the other hand, it is contended that the act of Congress in no way provides that the laws of Iowa should apply before the consummation by delivery of the interstate commerce transaction. To otherwise construe the act of Congress, it is claimed, would cause it to give to the statutes of Iowa extraterritorial operation, and would render the act of Congress repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. It has been settled that the effect of - the • act of: Congress is to allow the statutes of the several States to operate upon packages of imported liquor before sale. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545.

' Did the act of Congress referred to' operate to attach the legislation of the State of Iowa to. the goods in question the moment they reached the state line, and. before the completion of the act of transportation, by arriving at the point of consignment and the delivery there to the consignee is then the pivotal question ? The'act of Congress is as follows:

“.That all fermented, distilled or other intoxicating liquors or liquids transported into any State or Territory or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale or storage therein, shall, upon arrival in such State or Territory, be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State or Territory, enacted in the exercise of its police powers, to the-same "extent and in the same manner as though such liquids or liquors had been produced in such' State or .Territory, and shall' not-be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original packages or otherwise.”

The words “ shall upon arrival in such State or Territory be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State or Territory,” in one sense might be held to mean arrival at' the state line. But to -so interpret them would necessitate isolating these words from the entire context of the act, and would compel a construction destructive of -other provisions contained therein. But this would violate the fundamental rule requiring that a law be construed as a whole, and not by distorting or magnifying a particular word found in it. It is clearly contemplated that the word “arrival” signified that the goods should actually come into the State, since it is provided that “ all fermented, distilled or other intoxicating liquors or liquids transported into a State "or Territory,” and this is further accentuated by the other provision, “or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale or storage therein.”

'. This language makes it. impossible in reason to hold that the law intended that the word “ arrival ” should mean at the state line, since it presupposes the coming of the goods into the State for “use, .consumption, sale or storage.” The fair inference from the enumeration of these conditions, which are all-embracing, is that the time when they could arise was made the test-by which to determine the period when the operation of the state law-should attach to goods brought into the State. But to uphold the meaning of the word “ arrival,” which is necessary to support the state law, as construed below, forces the conclusion that the act of Congress in question authorized state laws to forbid the bringing into the State at all. This follows from the fact that if arrival means crossing the line, then the act of crossing into the State would be a violation of the state law, and hence necessarily the operation of' the law is to forbid crossing the line and to compel remaining beyond the same. Thus, if the construction of the word “ arrival ” be that which is claimed for it, it must be held that the state statute attached and operated beyond the state line confessedly before the time when it was intended by the act of Congress it. should take effect.

But the subtle signification of words and the niceties of verbal distinction furnish no safe guide for construing the act of Congress. On the contrary, it should- be interpreted and enforced by the light of the fundamental, rule of carrying out its purpose and object, of affording the remedy which it was intended to create, and of defeating the wrong which it was its purpose to frustrate. Undoubtedly the purpose of the act was' to enable the laws of the several States to control the character of merchandise therein enumerated at an earlier date than would have been otherwise the case, but it is equally unquestionable that the act of Congress manifests no purpose to confer upon the States the power to give their statutes an extraterritorial operation so as to subject persons and property beyond their borders- to the restraints of their laws. If the act of Congress be construed as reaching the contract for interstate • shipment made in another State, the necessary effect must be to give to the laws of the several States extraterritorial operation, for, as held in the Bowman case, the inevitable consequence of allowing a state law to forbid interstate shipments of merchandise would- be to destroy the right to contract beyond the limits of the State for such shipments. . If the construction claimed be upheld, it would be in the power of each State to compel every interstate commerce train to stop before crossing its borders, and discharge its freight, lest by crossing the line it might carry within the State merchandise of the character named covered by the inhibitions of a state statute. The forcé of this view is well illustrated by the conclusions of the court below, where it is said:

“Was the defendant, in the removal of the liquor, engaged in transporting or. conveying it within the meaning of our statute? The language of the statute is broad enough to cover the act of defendant in removing the liquor from the platform to the freight room of the depot. He was one of the instruments necessary to complete the act of transportation. If it be nót so, thén clearly he is within-the terms of1 the act, as he conveyed ‘ the liquor from one point to another within this State.’ His guilt is not to be determined by the distance he conveyed the package, but his conveying it any distance was a violation of the law. With the propriety of legislation, making such an act a crime, and with the severity of the punishment attached to doing the act, we have nothing to do.”

If it had been the intention of the act of Congress to provide for the stoppage at the state line of every interstate commerce contract relating to the merchandise named in the act, such purpose would have been easy of expression. The fact that such power was not conveyed, and that, on the contrary, the language of the statute relates to the receipt of the goods “into any State or Territory for use, consumption, sale or storage therein,” negatives the correctness of the interpretation holding that the receipt into any State or Territory for the purposes named could never take place. Light is thrown upon the purpose and spirit of the act by another consideration. The Bowman case was decided in 1888, the opinion in Leisy v. Hardin was announced in April, 1890, the act under consideration was approved August 8, 1890. Considering these dates, it is reasonable to infer' that the provisions of the act were intended by Congress to cause the legislative authority of the respective States to attach to intoxicating liquors coming into the States by an interstate shipment, only after the consummation of the shipment, but before the- sale of the merchandise, that is, that the one receiving merchandise of the character named should, whilst retaining the full right to use the same, no longer enjoy the right to sell free from the restrictions as to sale created by state legislation, a right which the decision in Leisy v. Hardin had just previously declared to exist.

This view gives meaning and effect to the language of the act providing that such merchandise “shall not be exempt therefrom ” (legislative power of the State) by reason of being introduced therein in “ original packages or otherwise.” These words have no place or meaning in the act if its purpose was to attach the power of the State to the goods before the termination of the interstate commerce shipment. The words “original packages” had, at the time of the passage of the act by the decisions of this court, acquired with reference -to the construction of the Constitution a technical meaning, signifying that the merchandise in such packages was entitled ,to be sold within a State by the receiver thereof, although state laws might forbid the sale of merchandise of like character not in'such'packages.

Whilst it is true that the right to sell free from state inter•ference interstate commerce merchandise was held in Leisy v. Hardin to be an essential incident to interstate commerce, it was yet but an incident, as the contract of sale within a State in its nature was usually subject to the control of the legislative authority of the State. On the other hand, the right to contract for the transportation of merchandise from one State into or across another involved interstate commerce in its fundamental aspect, and imported in its very essence a relation which necessarily must be governed by laws apart from the laws of the several States, since it embraced a contract which must come under the laws of more than one State. The purpose of Congress to submit the incidental power to sell to-the .dominion- of state authority should not without the clearest implication be held to imply the purpose of subjecting to state laws a contract which in its very object and nature was not susceptible of such regulation even if the constitutional right to do so existed, as .to which ‘no opinion is expressed. And- this view is cogently illustrated by the opinion in the Bowman case, where it was said (pp. 486-487):

“ Has the law of Iowa any extraterritorial force which does not belong to the law. of the State of Illinois ? If the law of Iowa forbids the delivery, and the law of Illinois requires the transportation, which ..of the two shall- prevail? How can the former make void the latter ?. In view of this necessary operation of the" law of Iowa, if it be valid, the language of this court in the case of Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, 488, is exactly in. point. It was there said: ‘ But we ■ think it may safely be said that state legislation, which seeks to impose a direct burden ‘upon interstate commerce, or to interfere directly with its' freedom, does encroach upon the exclusive power of Congress. The' statute now under consideration, in our-opinion, occupies that position. It does not adt upon the business through the local instruments to be employed after coming within the State, but directly upon the business as it comes into the State from without or goes out from within. While it purports only to control the carrier when engaged within the State, it must necessarily influence his conduct to some extent in the management of his business throughout his entire voyage. His disposition of. passengers taken up and put down within the State, or taken up within to be carried without, cannot but affect in a greater or less degree those taken up without and brought within, and sometimes those taken up within and put down without. A passenger in the cabin set apart for the use of whites without the State must, when the boat comes within, share the accommodations of that cabin with such colored persons as may come on board afterwards, if the law is enforced. It was to meet just such a case that the commercial clause in the Constitution was adopted. The river Mississippi passes through or along the borders of ten different States, and its tributaries reach many more. The commerce upon these waters is immense, and its regulation clearly a matter of national concern. If each State was at liberty to regulate the conduct of carriers while within its jurisdiction, the confusion likely to follow could not but be productive of great inconvenience and unnecessary hardship. Each State could provide for its own passengers and regulate the transportation of its own freight, regardless of the interests of others. Nay, more; it could prescribe rules by which the carrier must be governed within the State, in respect to passengers and property brought from without. On one side of the river or its tributaries he might be required to observe one set'of rules, and on the other another. Commerce cannot flourish in the midst of such embarrassments. No carrier of passengers can conduct his business with satisfaction to himself, or comfort to those employing him, if on one side of a state line his.passengers, both white and colored, must be permitted to occupy thé same cabin, and on the other be kept separate. Uniformity in the regulations by which he is to be governed from one end to the other of his route-is .a necessity in his business^, and to secure it Congress, which is untrammelled by state lines, has been invested with the exclusive legislative power of determining what such regulations shall be.’ ”

And it was doubtless this construction which caused the court to observe in the opinion in In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 552, that the act of Congress “divests them (objects of interstate commerce shipment) of that character at an earlier period of time than would otherwise be the case.” We think that interpreting the statute by the light of all its provisions, it was not intended to and did not cause the power of the State to attach to an interstate commerce shipmént, whilst the merchandise was in transit under such shipment, and until its arrival at the point of destination and delivery there to the consignee, and of course this conclusion renders it entirely unnecessary to consider whether if the act of Congress had submitted the right to make interstate commerce shipments to state control it would be repugnant to the Constitution.

It follows from this conclusion that as the'.act for which the plaintiff in error was convicted, and which consisted in moving the goods from the plátform to the freight warehouse, was a part of the interstate commerce transportation, and was-done before the law of- Iowa could constitutionally attach to the goods, the conviction was erroneous, and the judgment below is, therefore,

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Gray, with whom concurred Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Brown, dissenting.