Mr. Chief Justice Waite,
delivered the' opinion of the court:
For the purposes of this case, we must treat the act Of Louisiana of Feb. 23, 1869, as requiring those engaged in inter-state commerce to give all persons travelling in that State, upon the public conveyances employed in such' business, equal rights and privileges in all .parts of the conveyance,- without distinction or discrimination on account of race or color.. Such .was the construction given to that act in the courts below, and it is conclusive upon us as. the construction of a State law by the State courts.. It is with this provision of the statute alone that we have to deal. We have nothing whatever to do with it as a regulation of internal, commerce, or as affecting any thing pisé than commerce among the States.
There can be no doubt but that exclusive-power has been conferred upon'Congress in respect to the regulation of commerce among the several States. The difficulty has never been as to the existence of this, power, but as to what is to be deemed an encroachment upon it; for, as has been often said, ‘‘ legislation may in a great variety of ways affect commerce, and persons engaged in it without constituting a regulation of it within the meaning of the Constitution.” Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 103; State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284. Thus, in Mann v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, it was decided, thgt a State might regulate the charges of public warehouses, [488]*488and in Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Iowa, id. 155, of railroads situate entirely within,the State, even though those "engaged in commerce among the States might sometimes use the warehouses or- the railroads in the prosecution of their business; So, too, it has been held that States. may authorize the construction, of dams and bridges across navigable streams^ situate entirely within their respective-jurisdictions. Willson v. Blackbird, Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245; Pound v. Turck, supra, p. 459; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713. The same is true of turnpikes and ferries. By such statutes'the States regulate, as a matter of domestic concern, the instruments of. commerce situated wholly within their own jurisdictions, and over which they have exclusive governmental control; except .when employed in foreign or inter-state commerce. As they can only be used- in the State, their regulation for all purposes may properly be assumed by the State, until Congress ácts in reference to their foreign or inter-state relations. When Congress does act, the State laws are superseded only to the extent that they affect* commerce outside, the State as it. comes within the State. It has also been held that health and inspection laws may be passed by the States, Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; and that Congress may permit the States to regulate pilots' and pilotage until it shall itself legislate upon the subject, Cooley v. Board of Wardens, &c., 12 How. 299. The line which separates the powers of the States from this exclusive power of Congress is not always distinctly marked, and oftentimes it is not easy to determine on which side a particular- case belongs. Judges not unfrequently differ in their reasons for a decision in which they concur. Under such circumstances it would-be a useless task to undertake- to fix an. arbitrary rule by which the line must in' all cases be located. It is far better to -leave a matter of such delicacy to be settled in each case upon a view of the particular rights involved.
But we. think it may ’ safely be said that State -legislation which seeks to impose'a direct burden upon inter-state commerce, or to interfere directly with its freedom, does encroach upon the-exclusive power of Congress. ' The statute now under consideration, in our -opinion, occupiés that position. -It does not act upon the business through’ the local instruments to be employed [489]*489after coming within the State, but directly upon the business as it comes into the State from without or goes out from within. While it purports only to control the carrier when engaged syithin the 'State, it must necessarily influence his conduct to some extent in the management of his business throughout his entire voyage. His disposition of passengers taken up and put down within, the State, or taken up within to be carried without, cannot but affect in a greater or less degree those taken up' without and brought within, and sometimes those taken up and put down without. A passenger in the cabin set apart for the use of whites without the State must, when the boat comes within,' share the accommodations of that cabin with such colored persons as may come on board afterwards, if the law is enforced.
It was to meet just' such a case that the commercial clause in the Constitution was adopted. The river Mississippi passes through- or along the. borders of ten different States, and its tributaries reach many more. The commerce upon these waters is immense, and its regulation clearly a matter of national concern. • If- each State was at liberty to regulate the conduct, of carriers while within its jurisdiction, the confusion likely to follow could not but be productive of great inconvenience and unnecessary hardship. Each State could provide for its own/ passengers and regulate the transportation of its own freight, regardless of the interests of others. Nay more, it could prescribe rules by whjch the carrier must be governed within the State in respect to passengers and property brought from without. On one side of the river or its tributaries he might be required to observe. one set of rules, and' on' tbe other another. Commerce cannot flourish in the midst of such ¿mbarfassments. No carrier of passengers can conduct his business with, satisfaction to himself, or comfort to those employing him, if on one side of a State line his' passengers, both white and colored, must be permitted to occupy the same cabin, and on the other be kept separate. Uniformity in, the regulations by which he is to be governed from one end to the other of his route is a necessity in his business, and to secure, it Congress, which is untrammelled by State lines, has been- invested with the exclusive legislative power of determining what such regu[490]*490latieras shall be. If this statute can be enforced against those engaged in inter-state commerce, it may be as well against those engaged in. foreign; and the master of a ship clearing from New Orleans for Liverpool, having passengers on board, would be compelled to carry all, white and colored, in the same ■ cabin during his passage down the river, or be subject to an action for damages,exemplary as well as. actual,” by any one who felt himself aggrieved because he had been excluded on account of his color.
This power of regulation, may be exercised without legislation as well as with it. By refraining from action, Congress, in effect, adopts as its own regulations those which the common law or the .civil law, where that prevails, has provided for the government of such business, and those which the States, in the regulation of their domestic concerns, have established affecting commerce, but not regulating it within the meaning of the Constitution. In fact, congressional legislation is only necessary to cure defects in -existing laws, as they are discovered, and to adapt such laws to new developments of trade. As was-said by Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the court in Welton v. The State of Missouri, 91 U. S.
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Mr. Chief Justice Waite,
delivered the' opinion of the court:
For the purposes of this case, we must treat the act Of Louisiana of Feb. 23, 1869, as requiring those engaged in inter-state commerce to give all persons travelling in that State, upon the public conveyances employed in such' business, equal rights and privileges in all .parts of the conveyance,- without distinction or discrimination on account of race or color.. Such .was the construction given to that act in the courts below, and it is conclusive upon us as. the construction of a State law by the State courts.. It is with this provision of the statute alone that we have to deal. We have nothing whatever to do with it as a regulation of internal, commerce, or as affecting any thing pisé than commerce among the States.
There can be no doubt but that exclusive-power has been conferred upon'Congress in respect to the regulation of commerce among the several States. The difficulty has never been as to the existence of this, power, but as to what is to be deemed an encroachment upon it; for, as has been often said, ‘‘ legislation may in a great variety of ways affect commerce, and persons engaged in it without constituting a regulation of it within the meaning of the Constitution.” Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 103; State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284. Thus, in Mann v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, it was decided, thgt a State might regulate the charges of public warehouses, [488]*488and in Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Iowa, id. 155, of railroads situate entirely within,the State, even though those "engaged in commerce among the States might sometimes use the warehouses or- the railroads in the prosecution of their business; So, too, it has been held that States. may authorize the construction, of dams and bridges across navigable streams^ situate entirely within their respective-jurisdictions. Willson v. Blackbird, Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245; Pound v. Turck, supra, p. 459; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713. The same is true of turnpikes and ferries. By such statutes'the States regulate, as a matter of domestic concern, the instruments of. commerce situated wholly within their own jurisdictions, and over which they have exclusive governmental control; except .when employed in foreign or inter-state commerce. As they can only be used- in the State, their regulation for all purposes may properly be assumed by the State, until Congress ácts in reference to their foreign or inter-state relations. When Congress does act, the State laws are superseded only to the extent that they affect* commerce outside, the State as it. comes within the State. It has also been held that health and inspection laws may be passed by the States, Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; and that Congress may permit the States to regulate pilots' and pilotage until it shall itself legislate upon the subject, Cooley v. Board of Wardens, &c., 12 How. 299. The line which separates the powers of the States from this exclusive power of Congress is not always distinctly marked, and oftentimes it is not easy to determine on which side a particular- case belongs. Judges not unfrequently differ in their reasons for a decision in which they concur. Under such circumstances it would-be a useless task to undertake- to fix an. arbitrary rule by which the line must in' all cases be located. It is far better to -leave a matter of such delicacy to be settled in each case upon a view of the particular rights involved.
But we. think it may ’ safely be said that State -legislation which seeks to impose'a direct burden upon inter-state commerce, or to interfere directly with its freedom, does encroach upon the-exclusive power of Congress. ' The statute now under consideration, in our -opinion, occupiés that position. -It does not act upon the business through’ the local instruments to be employed [489]*489after coming within the State, but directly upon the business as it comes into the State from without or goes out from within. While it purports only to control the carrier when engaged syithin the 'State, it must necessarily influence his conduct to some extent in the management of his business throughout his entire voyage. His disposition of passengers taken up and put down within, the State, or taken up within to be carried without, cannot but affect in a greater or less degree those taken up' without and brought within, and sometimes those taken up and put down without. A passenger in the cabin set apart for the use of whites without the State must, when the boat comes within,' share the accommodations of that cabin with such colored persons as may come on board afterwards, if the law is enforced.
It was to meet just' such a case that the commercial clause in the Constitution was adopted. The river Mississippi passes through- or along the. borders of ten different States, and its tributaries reach many more. The commerce upon these waters is immense, and its regulation clearly a matter of national concern. • If- each State was at liberty to regulate the conduct, of carriers while within its jurisdiction, the confusion likely to follow could not but be productive of great inconvenience and unnecessary hardship. Each State could provide for its own/ passengers and regulate the transportation of its own freight, regardless of the interests of others. Nay more, it could prescribe rules by whjch the carrier must be governed within the State in respect to passengers and property brought from without. On one side of the river or its tributaries he might be required to observe. one set of rules, and' on' tbe other another. Commerce cannot flourish in the midst of such ¿mbarfassments. No carrier of passengers can conduct his business with, satisfaction to himself, or comfort to those employing him, if on one side of a State line his' passengers, both white and colored, must be permitted to occupy the same cabin, and on the other be kept separate. Uniformity in, the regulations by which he is to be governed from one end to the other of his route is a necessity in his business, and to secure, it Congress, which is untrammelled by State lines, has been- invested with the exclusive legislative power of determining what such regu[490]*490latieras shall be. If this statute can be enforced against those engaged in inter-state commerce, it may be as well against those engaged in. foreign; and the master of a ship clearing from New Orleans for Liverpool, having passengers on board, would be compelled to carry all, white and colored, in the same ■ cabin during his passage down the river, or be subject to an action for damages,exemplary as well as. actual,” by any one who felt himself aggrieved because he had been excluded on account of his color.
This power of regulation, may be exercised without legislation as well as with it. By refraining from action, Congress, in effect, adopts as its own regulations those which the common law or the .civil law, where that prevails, has provided for the government of such business, and those which the States, in the regulation of their domestic concerns, have established affecting commerce, but not regulating it within the meaning of the Constitution. In fact, congressional legislation is only necessary to cure defects in -existing laws, as they are discovered, and to adapt such laws to new developments of trade. As was-said by Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the court in Welton v. The State of Missouri, 91 U. S. 282, “inaction [by Congress] . . . is equivalent to- a. declaration that inter-state commerce shall remain free and untrammelled.” Applying that principle to the circumstances of this, case, congressional inaction left Benson at liberty to adopt such reasonable rules and regulations for- the disposition of passengers upon his boat, while pursuing her voyage within Louisiana or without, as seemed to him most for the .interest of- all concerned. The statute under which this, suit is brought, as construed by the State court,' seeks to take a way-'from him that, power-, so long as he is within Louisiana;. and while recognizing to the fullest extent the •principle which sustains a statute, unless .its unconstitutionality is clearly established, we think this statute, tó -the extent that it requires those engaged in the transportation of. passengers among the States to carry colored passengers in Louisiana in the same cabin with whites, is unconstitutional and void. If the public, good requires-’ such legislation, it must come from Congress and not from the .States. . .
We confine our decision to the statute in . its effect iipon [491]*491foreign and inter-state commerce, expressing no opinion as to its validity in any other respect.
Judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded, with instructions to reverse the judgment of the District Court, and direct such further proceedings in conformity with this opinion as may appear to be necessary; and it is
So ordered-