Mr. Justice SWAYNE
delivered the opinion of the court.‡
There is no contest between the parties about the facts upon which they respectively rely.
The complainants' are citizens of other States, and own a valuable and productive wharf and dock property above the site of the contemplated bridge. The river is navigable there for vessels drawing from eighteen to twenty feet of water. Commerce has been carried on in all kinds of vessels for many years to and from the complainants’ property. The bridge will not be more than thirty feet above the ordinary high-water surface of the river, and hence will prevent the passage of vessels having masts. This will largely reduce the income from the property, and render it less valuable.
The defendants .are proceeding to build the bridge under the authority of an act of the legislature of Pennsylvania. The Schuylkill River is entirely within her limits, and is “ an ancient river and common highway of the State.” Eor [722] many years it has been navigable for masted vessels for the distance of about seven and a half miles only, from its mouth. At Market Street, about five hundred feet above Chestnut, there is a permanent bridge without a draw over the same river, and no higher above the water than it is intended to elevate the bridge about to be built. A bridge at Market Street was erected prior, perhaps, to the year eighteen hundred and nine. It rendered the passage of masted vessels above that point impossible, and since that time comparatively few have appeared above the foot of Chestnut Street. The river there has since been used chiefly as a highway for canal-boats.
The injury to the property of the complainants will be entirely consequential. A large city is rising up on the opposite side of the river. The new bridge is called for by public convenience.
The case resolves itself into questions of law.
At the threshold of the investigation we are met by the objection from the defendants, that the complainants, “ not being specially interested in navigation, cannot intervene for its protection.” It is said, “ that they are not the owners of licensed coasting vessels, and are not pilots nor navigators.”
As regards this objection, the case is not essentially different in principle from the Wheeling bridge case.
The further objection was also taken in that case, that if a nuisance existed, it was of a public nature, and was an offence against the sovereignty whose laws were violated, and that the sovereign only could intervene for the correction of the evil.
It was answered by the court, that wherever a public nuisance is productive of a specific injury to an individual, he may make it the foundation of an action at law, and if the injury would be irreparable, that a court of equity will interpose by injunction. The decision was not put in anywise upon the ground of the trustee character of the complainant. The State alleged that she had lines of improvements for the transportation of freight and passengers [723] extending from the east to Pittsburg, and that by reason of the bridge about to be erected across the river at Wheeling, and the obstruction which it would cause to the navigation of that stream, business would be diverted from her works to other channels, and that the income from her works would thereby be greatly lessened, and their value diminished or destroyed. The court said:
“ The State of Pennsylvania is not a party in virtue of her sovereignty. It does not come here to protect the rights of its citizens, . . nor can the State prosecute the suit upon the ground of any remote or contingent interest in herself. It assumes and claims, not an abstract right, but a direct interest, and that the power of this court can redress its wrongs, and save it from irreparable injury. ... In the present ease, the rights assumed and relief prayed are in no respect different from those of an individual. From the dignity of the State, the Constitution gives to it a right to bring an original suit in this court, and this is the only privilege, if the right be established, which the State of Pennsylvania can claim in the present case.”
In regard to tbe facts it was said:
“ And this injury is of a character for which an action at law could afford no adequate redress. It is of daily occurrence, and would require numerous, if not daily, prosecutions for the wrong done; and from the nature of that wrong, the compensation could not be measured or ascertained with any degree of precision. The effect would be, if not to reduce the tolls on these lines of transportation, to prevent their increase with the increasing business of the country. . . . In no case could a remedy be more hopeless than an action at common law. The structure complained of is permanent, and so are the public works sought to be protected. The injury, if there be one, is as permanent as the works from which it proceeds, and as are the works affected by it. And whatever injury there may now be, will become greater in proportion to the increase of population and the commercial development of the country. And in a country like this, where there would seem to be no limit to its progress, the injury complained of would be far greater in its effects than under less prosperous circumstances.”
[724] The law upon the subject is learnedly and ably examined. The objections were overruled. Considerations of fact, of the same character with those- adverted to, exist in the ease before us, and the- reasoning, and! conclusions there are alike applicable in both eases. Whatever might be our views upon the legal proposition, in the absence of this adjudication, we are, as we think, concluded by it. It is almost as important that the law should be settled permanently, as that it should be- settled correctly. Its rules should be fixed deliberately and adhered to-firmly, unless clearly erroneous. Vacillation is a serious- evil. “ Misc.a est servitus ubi lex est vaga aut incertaJ* This brings us to- the examination of the merits of the- ease-.
The defendants- assert that the act of the legislature, under which they are proceeding, justifies the building of the bridge.
The complainants insist that such an obstruction to the navigation of the river is repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States, touching the subject of commerce.
These provisions of the Constitution bear upon the subject:
“ Congress- shall have power . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes; . , to make all laws-which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into/ execution the foregoing powers.”
“ This Constitution, andi the laws- which shall be made in pursuance thereof, . . shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”
“ The power® not delegated! to- the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
The act of the 18th- of February, 1793, authorizes vessels enrolled and licensed according to its provisions to engage in the coasting trade.
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Mr. Justice SWAYNE
delivered the opinion of the court.‡
There is no contest between the parties about the facts upon which they respectively rely.
The complainants' are citizens of other States, and own a valuable and productive wharf and dock property above the site of the contemplated bridge. The river is navigable there for vessels drawing from eighteen to twenty feet of water. Commerce has been carried on in all kinds of vessels for many years to and from the complainants’ property. The bridge will not be more than thirty feet above the ordinary high-water surface of the river, and hence will prevent the passage of vessels having masts. This will largely reduce the income from the property, and render it less valuable.
The defendants .are proceeding to build the bridge under the authority of an act of the legislature of Pennsylvania. The Schuylkill River is entirely within her limits, and is “ an ancient river and common highway of the State.” Eor [722] many years it has been navigable for masted vessels for the distance of about seven and a half miles only, from its mouth. At Market Street, about five hundred feet above Chestnut, there is a permanent bridge without a draw over the same river, and no higher above the water than it is intended to elevate the bridge about to be built. A bridge at Market Street was erected prior, perhaps, to the year eighteen hundred and nine. It rendered the passage of masted vessels above that point impossible, and since that time comparatively few have appeared above the foot of Chestnut Street. The river there has since been used chiefly as a highway for canal-boats.
The injury to the property of the complainants will be entirely consequential. A large city is rising up on the opposite side of the river. The new bridge is called for by public convenience.
The case resolves itself into questions of law.
At the threshold of the investigation we are met by the objection from the defendants, that the complainants, “ not being specially interested in navigation, cannot intervene for its protection.” It is said, “ that they are not the owners of licensed coasting vessels, and are not pilots nor navigators.”
As regards this objection, the case is not essentially different in principle from the Wheeling bridge case.
The further objection was also taken in that case, that if a nuisance existed, it was of a public nature, and was an offence against the sovereignty whose laws were violated, and that the sovereign only could intervene for the correction of the evil.
It was answered by the court, that wherever a public nuisance is productive of a specific injury to an individual, he may make it the foundation of an action at law, and if the injury would be irreparable, that a court of equity will interpose by injunction. The decision was not put in anywise upon the ground of the trustee character of the complainant. The State alleged that she had lines of improvements for the transportation of freight and passengers [723] extending from the east to Pittsburg, and that by reason of the bridge about to be erected across the river at Wheeling, and the obstruction which it would cause to the navigation of that stream, business would be diverted from her works to other channels, and that the income from her works would thereby be greatly lessened, and their value diminished or destroyed. The court said:
“ The State of Pennsylvania is not a party in virtue of her sovereignty. It does not come here to protect the rights of its citizens, . . nor can the State prosecute the suit upon the ground of any remote or contingent interest in herself. It assumes and claims, not an abstract right, but a direct interest, and that the power of this court can redress its wrongs, and save it from irreparable injury. ... In the present ease, the rights assumed and relief prayed are in no respect different from those of an individual. From the dignity of the State, the Constitution gives to it a right to bring an original suit in this court, and this is the only privilege, if the right be established, which the State of Pennsylvania can claim in the present case.”
In regard to tbe facts it was said:
“ And this injury is of a character for which an action at law could afford no adequate redress. It is of daily occurrence, and would require numerous, if not daily, prosecutions for the wrong done; and from the nature of that wrong, the compensation could not be measured or ascertained with any degree of precision. The effect would be, if not to reduce the tolls on these lines of transportation, to prevent their increase with the increasing business of the country. . . . In no case could a remedy be more hopeless than an action at common law. The structure complained of is permanent, and so are the public works sought to be protected. The injury, if there be one, is as permanent as the works from which it proceeds, and as are the works affected by it. And whatever injury there may now be, will become greater in proportion to the increase of population and the commercial development of the country. And in a country like this, where there would seem to be no limit to its progress, the injury complained of would be far greater in its effects than under less prosperous circumstances.”
[724] The law upon the subject is learnedly and ably examined. The objections were overruled. Considerations of fact, of the same character with those- adverted to, exist in the ease before us, and the- reasoning, and! conclusions there are alike applicable in both eases. Whatever might be our views upon the legal proposition, in the absence of this adjudication, we are, as we think, concluded by it. It is almost as important that the law should be settled permanently, as that it should be- settled correctly. Its rules should be fixed deliberately and adhered to-firmly, unless clearly erroneous. Vacillation is a serious- evil. “ Misc.a est servitus ubi lex est vaga aut incertaJ* This brings us to- the examination of the merits of the- ease-.
The defendants- assert that the act of the legislature, under which they are proceeding, justifies the building of the bridge.
The complainants insist that such an obstruction to the navigation of the river is repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States, touching the subject of commerce.
These provisions of the Constitution bear upon the subject:
“ Congress- shall have power . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes; . , to make all laws-which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into/ execution the foregoing powers.”
“ This Constitution, andi the laws- which shall be made in pursuance thereof, . . shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”
“ The power® not delegated! to- the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
The act of the 18th- of February, 1793, authorizes vessels enrolled and licensed according to its provisions to engage in the coasting trade.
Commerce includes navigation. The power to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all the navigable waters of the [725] United States which are accessible from a State other than those in which they lie. For this purpose they are the public property of the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation hy Congress.* This necessarily includes the power to keep them open and free from any obstruction to their navigation, interposed hy the States or otherwise; to remove such obstructions when they exist; and to provide., hy such sanctions as they may deem proper, against the occurrence of the evil and for the punishment of offenders. For these purposes, Congress possesses all the powers which existed in the States before the adoption of the national Constitution, and which have always existed in the Parliament in England.
It is for Congress to determine when its full power shall he brought into activity, and as to the regulations and sanctions which shall be provided.†
A license under the act of 1793, to engage in the coasting trade, carries with it right and authority. “ Commerce among the States” does not stop at a State line. Coming from abroad it penetrates wherever it can find navigable waters reaching from without into the interior, and may follow them up as far as navigation is practicable. Wherever “ commerce among the States” goes, the power of the nation, as represented in this court, goes with it to protect and .enforce its rights.‡ There can he no doubt that the coasting trade may be carried on beyond where the bridge in question is to he built.
We will now turn our attention to the rights and powers of the States which are to he considered.
The national government possesses no powers but such as have been delegated to it. The States have all but such as they have surrendered. The power to authorize the building of bridges is not to be found in the Federal Constitution. [726] It has not been taken from the States. It must reside somewhere. They had it before the Constitution was adopted, and they have it still. “ "When the Revolution took place the people of each State became themselves sovereign, and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soil under them for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution to the General Government.”*
In Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan,† this court said:
“ The right of eminent domain over the shores and the soil under the navigable waters, for all municipal purposes, belongs exclusively to the States within their respective territorial jurisdictions, and they, and they only, have the constitutional power to exercise it.......But in the hands of the States this power can never be used so as to affect the exercise of any national right of eminent domain or jurisdiction with which the United States have been invested by the Constitution. For although the territorial limits of Alabama have extended all her sovereign power into the sea, it is there, as on the shore, but municipal power, subject to the Constitution of the United States and the laws which shall have been made in pursuance thereof.”
In Gibbons v. Ogden it is said:
“Inspection laws form a portion of that immense mass of legislation which embraces everything within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the General Government; all which can be most advantageously exercised by the States themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State, and those which respect turnpike roads, ferries, &c., are component parts of this mass.”
Bridges are of the same nature with ferries, and are undoubtedly within the category thus laid down.‡
The power to regulate commerce covers a wide field, and embraces a great variety of subjects. Some of these subjects' call for uniform rules and national legislation; others can [727] be best regulated by rules and provisions suggested by the varying circumstances of different localities, and limited in their operation to such localities respectively. To this extent the power to regulate commerce may be exercised by the States.
Whether the power in any given case is vested exclusively in the General Government depends upon the nature of the subject to be regulated. Pilot laws are regulations of commerce ; but if a State enact them in good faith, and not covertly for another purpose, they are not in conflict with the power “ to regulate commerce” committed to Congress by the Constitution.*
In the Wheeling bridge case this court placed its judgment upon the ground “ that Congress had acted upon the subject, and had regulated the Ohio River, and had thereby secured to the public, by virtue of its authority, the free and unobstructed use of the same, and that the erection of the bridge, so far as it interfered with the enjoyment of this use, was inconsistent with and in violation of the acts of Congress, and destructive of the right derived under them; and that, to the extent of this interference with the free navigation of the Ohio River, the act of the legislature of Virginia afforded no authority or justification. It was in conflict with the acts of Congress, which were the paramount law.”†
The most important authority, in its application to the case before us, is Wilson v. The Blackbird Creek Marsh Co.‡ Blackbird Creek extends from the Delaware River into the interior of the State of Delaware. The legislature of the State passed an act whereby the company were “ authorized and empowered to make and construct a good and sufficient dam across said creek, at such place as the managers or a majority of them shall find to be most suitable for the purpose,” &c. The company proceeded to erect a dam, whereby the navigation of the creek was obstructed. The defendant, being the owner of a sloop of nearly a hundred tons, regu[728] larly enrolled and licensed under the laws of the United States, broke and injured the dam. The company brought an action of trespass against him in the Supreme Court of Delaware. The defendant pleaded that the place where the trespass was committed was “ a public and common navigable creek, in the nature of a highway, in which the tides had always flowed and reflowed; and that all the citizens of the United States had a right, with sloops, and other vessels, to navigate and pass over the same at all times at their pleasure,” &c., and therefore, &c.
The plaintiffs demurred. The Supreme Court sustained the demurrer and gave judgment in their favor. The Court of Appeals of that State affirmed the judgment. The case was brought into this court by a writ of error. In delivering the opinion of the court, Chief Justice Marshall said:
“ But the measure authorized by this act stops a navigable creek, and must be supposed to abridge the rights of those who have been accustomed to use it ; but this abridgment, unless it comes in conflict with the Constitution or a law of the United States, is an affair between the government of Delaware and its citizens, of which this court can take no cognizance. The counsel for the plaintiffs in error insist that it comes in conflict with the power of the United States £to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States.’ ”
He remarked that if " Congress had passed any law which bore upon the subject the court would not feel much difficulty in saying that a State law, coming in conflict with such an act, would be voidand added, in conclusion :
" But Congress has passed no such act. The repugnancy of the law of Delaware to the Constitution is placed entirely on its repugnancy to the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States; a power which has not been so exercised as to affect the question. We do not think that the act empowering the Blackbird Creek Marsh Company to place a dam across the creek can, under all the circumstances of the case, be considered as repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state, or as being in conflict with any law passed on the subject.”
[729] This opinion came from the same “ expounder of the Constitution” who delivered the earlier and more elaborate judgment in Gibbons v. Ogden. We are not aware that the soundness of the principle upon which the court proceeded has been questioned in any later case. We can see no difference in principle between that case and the one before us. Both streams are affluents of the same larger river. Each is entirely within the State which authorized the obstruction. The dissimilarities are in facts which do not affect the legal question. Blackbird Creek is the less important water, but it had been navigable, and the obstruction was complete. If the Schuylkill is larger and its commerce greater, on the other hand, the obstruction will be only partial and the public convenience, to be promoted, is more imperative. In neither case is a law of Congress forbidding the obstruction an element to be considered. The point that the vessel was enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade was relied upon in that case by the counsel for the defendant. The court was silent upon the subject. A distinct denial of its materiality would not have been more significant. It seems to have been deemed of too little consequence to require notice. Without overruling the authority of that adjudication we cannot, by our judgment, annul the law of Pennsylvania.
It must not be forgotten that bridges, which are connecting parts of turnpikes, streets, and railroads, are means of commercial transportation, as well as navigable waters, and that the commerce which passes over a bridge may be much greater than would ever be transported on the water it obstructs.
It is for the municipal power to weigh the considerations which belong to the subject, and to decide which shall be preferred, and how far either shall be made subservient to the other. The States have always exercised this power, and from the nature and objects of the two systems of government they must always continue to exercise it, subject, however, in all cases, to the paramount authority of Congress, whenever the power of the States shall be exerted within the sphere of the commercial power which belongs to tbe nation.
[730] The States may exercise concurrent or independent power in all cases but three:
1. Where the power is lodged exclusively in the Federal Constitution.
2. Where it is given to the United States and prohibited to the States.
3. Where, from the nature and subjects of the power, it must necessarily be exercised by the National Government exclusively.*
The power here in question does not, in our judgment, fall within either of these exceptions.
“ It is no objection to distinct substantive powers that they may be exercised upon the same subject.” It is not possible to fix definitely their respective boundaries. In some instances their action becomes blended; in some, the action of the State limits or displaces the action of the nation; in others, the action of the State is void, because it seeks to reach objects beyond the limits of State authority.
A State law, requiring an importer to pay for and take out a license before he should be permitted to sell a bale of imported goods, is void,† and a State law, which requires the master of a vessel, engaged in foreign commerce, to pay a certain sum to a State oflicer on account of each passenger brought from a foreign country into the State, is also void.‡ But, a State, in the exercise of its police power, may forbid spirituous liquor imported from abroad, or from another State, to be sold by retail or to be sold at all without a license ; and it may visit the violation of the prohibition with such punishment as it may deem proper.§ Under quarantine laws, a vessel registered, or enrolled and licensed, may be stopped before entering her port of destination, or be afterwards removed and detained elsewhere, for an indefinite period; and a bale of goods, upon which the duties have or have not been paid, laden with infection, may be seized un[731] der “health laws,” and if it cannot be purged of its poison, may be committed to the flames.
The inconsistency between the powers of the States and the nation, as thus exhibited, is quite as great as in the case before us; but it does not necessarily involve collision or any other evil. None has hitherto been found to ensue. The public good is the end and aim of both.
If it he objected that the conclusion we have reached will arm the States with authority potent for evil, and liable to be abused, there are several answers worthy of consideration. The possible abuse of any power is no proof that it does not exist. Many abuses may arise in the legislation of the States which are wholly beyond the reach of the government of the nation. The safeguard and remedy are to be found in the virtue and intelligence of the people. They can make and unmake constitutions and laws; and from that tribunal there is no appeal. If a State exercise unwisely the power here in question, the evil consequences will fall chiefly upon Lor own citizens. They have more at stake than the citizens of any other State. Hence, there is as little danger of the abuse of this power as of any other reserved to the States. Whenever it shall be exercised openly or covertly for a purpose in conflict with the Constitution or laws of the United States, it will be within the power, and it will be the duty, of this court, to interpose with a vigor adequate to the correction of the evil. In the Pilot case, the dissenting judge drew an alarming picture of the evils to rush in at the breach made, as he alleged, in the Constitution. None have appeared. The stream of events has since flowed on without a ripple due to the influence of that adjudication. Lastly, Congress may interpose, whenever it shall be deemed necessary, by general or special laws. It may regulate all bridges over navigable waters, remove offending bridges, and punish those who shall thereafter erect them. Within the sphere of their authority both the legislative and judicial power of the nation are supreme. A different doctrine finds no warrant in the Constitution, and is abnormal and revolutionary.
[732] Since the adoption of the Constitution there has been but one instance of such legislative interposition; that was to save* and not to destroy. The Wheeling bridge was legalized, and a decree of this court was, in effect, annulled by an act of Congress. The validity of the act, under the power “to regulate commerce,” was distinctly recognized by this court in that case. This is, also, the only instance, occurring within the same period, in which the case has been deemed a proper one for the exercise, by this court, of its remedial power.
The defendants are proceeding in no wanton or aggressive spirit. The-authority upon which they rely was given, and afterwards deliberately renewed by the State. The ease stands before us as if the parties were the State of Pennsylvania and the United States. The river, being wholly within her limits, we cannot say the State has exceeded the bounds of her authority. Until the' dormant power of the Constitution is awakened and made effective, by appropriate legislation, the' reserved power of the States is plenary, and its exercise in good faith cannot be made the subject of review by this court. It is not denied that the defendants are justified if the law is valid. We find nothing in the record which would warrant ns in disturbing the decree of the Circuit Court, which is, therefore,
Affirmed with costs.