2025 IL App (2d) 240399 No. 2-24-0399 Opinion filed December 10, 2025 _____________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
MILTON REYNOLDS, Individually and ) Appeal from the Circuit Court on Behalf of Similarly Situated Individuals, ) of Kane County. ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 23-LA-465 ) STATE FARM LIFE INSURANCE ) COMPANY, and STATE FARM LIFE ) AND ACCIDENT ASSURANCE ) COMPANY, ) Honorable ) John G. Dalton Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices McLaren and Birkett concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 At issue here is whether section 20(b) of the Genetic Information Privacy Act (Act) (410
ILCS 513/1 et seq. (West 2022)), applies to life insurance underwriting. Upon careful
consideration, we determine that it does not and therefore affirm.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 A. Factual Background
¶4 On October 30, 2023, plaintiff Milton Reynolds filed this putative class action in the Kane
County Circuit Court. Reynolds’s complaint raised a single cause of action arising out of the Act’s 2025 IL App (2d) 240399
section 20(b). Id. § 20(b). Reynolds alleged that State Farm Life Insurance Company and State
Farm Life and Accident Assurance Company (collectively “State Farm”) required him (and other
similarly situated individuals) to undergo a physical exam and to provide genetic personal health
information (genetic PHI) to assess their eligibility for life insurance coverage. Reynolds’s
complaint alleged that this practice ran afoul of the Act’s section 20(b), which prohibits insurers
from using or disclosing “protected health information that is genetic information” for
“underwriting purposes.” Id.
¶5 On March 14, 2024, State Farm moved to dismiss Reynolds’s complaint under section 2-
615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2024)). State Farm argued, inter alia,
that section 20(b) did not apply to life insurance underwriting but rather solely to health insurance
underwriting. On March 31, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on State Farm’s motion to dismiss.
Reasoning that section 20(b) “[t]aken as a whole, read in context, [and] giving affect [sic] to all of
its provisions” did not apply to life insurers, the trial court granted State Farm’s motion to dismiss
with prejudice. This timely appeal followed.
¶6 B. Summary of Parties’ Main Arguments
¶7 Reynolds advances numerous arguments in his brief in support of his theory that the Act’s
section 20(b) applies to life insurance underwriting. He points first to section 20(b)’s use of the
broad term “insurers”—rather than a more qualified term, such as “health insurers”—and
concludes that this section regulates life insurers insofar as they meet the statutory definition of
“insurer.” 1 Reynolds next contrasts section 20(b)’s language with that of adjacent subsections (a)
1 There was some question in the trial court whether life insurers meet the Act’s statutory definition
of “insurer.” State Farm chooses not to argue this point. Therefore, we proceed as if life insurers meet the
statutory definition.
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and (c). 410 ILCS 513/20(a), (c) (West 2022). These latter subsections, Reynolds notes, explicitly
limit their application to accident and health insurance, while subsection (b) contains no similar
limitation. Following this, Reynolds anticipates State Farm’s argument that construes subsection
(b)(4) (id. § 20(b)(4)) as a “catch-all clause,” limiting the definition of “underwriting purposes” to
health insurance underwriting. See infra ¶¶ 17-23 (section II(C)). Reynolds stresses that, under the
“last antecedent rule,” the limiting language in one subpart ought to apply only to that subpart.
Thus, per Reynolds, the language of subsection (b)(4)—apparently limiting the definition of
“underwriting purposes”—should apply only to subsection (b)(4).
¶8 Reynolds’s brief dives into section 20(b)’s legislative history as well. Passed in 2014, he
notes that section 20(b) is unique alongside its 1998 counterparts in that it does not expressly limit
its application to health and accident insurers. Reynolds contends that this was an intentional
omission by the General Assembly, designed to widen section 20(b)’s applicability to all insurers.
Moreover, Reynolds argues, the General Assembly based section 20(b)’s text on a similar Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) (42 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (2018))
regulation. When it did so, however, it replaced HIPAA’s “covered entity” terminology (a narrow
term meaning a health plan or health insurance company) with the broader term of “insurer,” which
likewise demonstrates the legislature’s intent to cast a broad regulatory net in passing this section.
¶9 In its brief, State Farm seeks to counter these arguments. It stresses that, while section 20(b)
regulates “insurers,” an entity’s status as an “insurer” is not enough to trigger section 20(b)’s
regulations. Rather, an entity must be both an insurer and engaged in underwriting. Section 20(b)’s
definition of underwriting, meanwhile, consists principally of health insurance vocabulary, such
as “deductibles” and “pre-existing conditions.” Terms specific to life insurance are notably absent.
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¶ 10 In response to Reynolds’s analysis of section 20(b)(4), State Farm emphasizes section
20(b)’s syntax of “A, B, C and other D’s,” and notes that under standard grammatical rules, the
“other D’s” phrase modifies the entire series, not just the last item of the series. The “last
antecedent” rule that Reynolds forwards, State Farm points out, applies to a different type of
syntax.
¶ 11 Finally, State Farm examines the legislative history of section 20(b). It demonstrates that
the General Assembly added this section to modernize the Act in light of new federal regulations,
which applied solely to health insurers. It notes the life insurance industry’s conspicuous silence
when the General Assembly was considering section 20(b) in 2014—a notable contrast to 1998,
when the life insurance industry’s outcry forced changes to the original law. It points also to
recently introduced legislation which, if enacted, would regulate the use of genetic PHI for life
insurance underwriting. Such legislation would be unnecessary, State Farm notes, if section 20(b)
already applied to life insurance underwriting.
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 A. Standard of Review
¶ 14 When considering the sufficiency of a complaint under section 2-615, we must determine
whether the allegations in the complaint, construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, are
sufficient to set forth a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. Jost v. Bailey, 286 Ill.
App. 3d 872, 877 (1997). A claim should be dismissed on the pleadings only if “it clearly appears
that no set of facts can be proved under the pleadings which will entitle the plaintiff to recover.”
Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc. 174 Ill. 2d 77, 86 (1996). Because a section 2-615
motion to dismiss “challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint based on defects apparent on its
face,” our review is de novo. Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 429 (2006). In
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examining a motion to dismiss with respect to the pleadings, the court must accept as true all well-
pleaded facts and any reasonable inferences drawn from those facts. The court must also construe
the well-pleaded facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. However, the court may not accept
as true conclusions of law or fact unsupported by specific allegations of fact. M.U. v. Team Illinois
Hockey Club, Inc. 2022 IL App (2d) 210568, ¶ 16.
¶ 15 B. General Principles
¶ 16 This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation. The cardinal rule of statutory
construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. Wade v. City of North Chicago
Police Pension Board, 226 Ill. 2d 485, 509 (2007). “The best indicator of legislative intent is the
plain language of the statute itself.” O’Connell v. County of Cook, 2022 IL 127527, ¶ 21. The court
should evaluate the statute as a whole, “with each provision construed in connection with every
other section.” Roselle Police Pension Board v. Village of Roselle, 232 Ill. 2d 546, 552 (2009).
“Although a court should first consider the language of the statute, a court must presume that the
legislature, in enacting the statute, did not intend absurdity or injustice.” Wade, 226 Ill. 2d at 510.
“Each word, clause, and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if possible, and
should not be rendered superfluous.” Williams v. Bruscato, 2021 IL App (2d) 190971, ¶ 13.
¶ 17 C. Whether State Farm Created or
Received “Protected Health Information”
¶ 18 Section 20(b) prohibits insurers from using or disclosing “protected health information”
(PHI) that is “genetic information” for underwriting purposes. 410 ILCS 513/20(b) (West 2022).
The Act adopts HIPPA’s definitions of both terms. Id. § 10 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2022)).
“Genetic information” means, in relevant part,
“information about:
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(i) [an] individuals’ genetic tests;
(ii) [t]he genetic tests of family members of the individual;
(iii) [t]he manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members of such
individual; or
(iv) [a]ny request for, or receipt of, genetic services, or participation in clinical
research which includes genetic services, by the individual or any family member of the
individual.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2022).
Reynolds contends that the information collected by State Farm meets the Act’s definition of
“genetic information” because it qualifies as “information about *** the manifestation of a disease
or disorder in” Reynolds’s family members. We agree, but this is not enough. The genetic
information must also meet the statutory definition of PHI. Our review of this definition leads us
to conclude that the information collected here does not qualify as PHI.
¶ 19 The Act defines PHI as having “the meaning ascribed to it under HIPAA, as specified in
45 CFR 16[0].103.” 410 ILCS 513/10 (West 2022). HIPAA regulations define PHI as follows:
“Protected health information means individually identifiable health information:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this definition, that is:
(i) Transmitted by electronic media;
(ii) Maintained in electronic media; or
(iii) Transmitted or maintained in any other form or medium.” (Emphasis
added.) 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2022).
¶ 20 The same section defines “individually identifiable health information” as:
“information that is a subset of health information, including demographic information
collected from an individual, and:
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(1) Is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, employer, or
health care clearinghouse; and
(2) Relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of
an individual; the provision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or
future payment for the provision of health care to an individual; and
(i) That identifies the individual; or
(ii) With respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe the
information can be used to identify the individual.” (Emphasis added.) Id.
¶ 21 Put simply, section 20(b) regulates the use and disclosure of PHI. For information to be
PHI, it must also be “individually identifiable health information.” Individually identifiable health
information, in turn, must have been “created or received by a health care provider, health plan,
employer, or health care clearinghouse.” Id. Reynolds does not allege that State Farm is any of
these things.
¶ 22 Reynolds might protest that ExamOne, which conducted the medical examination on
behalf of State Farm, is itself a “health care provider” that “created” health information, thereby
transforming the information it collected into individually identifiable health information and,
ultimately, into PHI. Indeed, Reynolds refers to ExamOne as a “health care provider” on several
occasions in its brief. However, beyond this conclusory characterization, Reynolds gives us no
reason to conclude that ExamOne meets HIPAA’s definition of a “health care provider,” nor is
that conclusion evident from the facts. See id. (defining health care provider). Because “health
care provider” has a specific definition under the statute, finding that ExamOne meets this
definition would amount to a legal conclusion. Even at this stage of proceedings, we are bound to
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not accept legal conclusions “unsupported by specific allegations of fact.” Team Illinois Hockey
Club, Inc., 2022 IL App (2d) 210568, ¶ 16.
¶ 23 Accordingly, because State Farm is not a health care provider, plan, employer, or
clearinghouse, its collection and use of Reynolds’s genetic information falls outside of section
20(b)’s scope. Moreover, with the facts and argument before us, we cannot conclude that ExamOne
meets the definition of “health care provider.” We could affirm the trial court’s ruling on this basis
alone. However, because doing so would leave the central question of this appeal unresolved, we
continue to analyze the language of section 20(b).
¶ 24 D. Section 20(b) Applies Only to Health Insurance Underwriting
¶ 25 In relevant part, section 20(b) states as follows:
“An insurer shall not use or disclose protected health information that is genetic
information for underwriting purposes. For purposes of this Section, ‘underwriting
purposes’ means, with respect to an insurer:
(1) rules for, or determination of, eligibility (including enrollment and continued
eligibility) for, or determination of, benefits under the plan, coverage, or policy (including
changes in deductibles or other cost-sharing mechanisms in return for activities such as
completing a health risk assessment or participating in a wellness program);
(2) the computation of premium or contribution amounts under the plan, coverage,
or policy (including discounts, rebates, payments in kind, or other premium differential
mechanisms in return for activities, such as completing a health risk assessment or
participating in a wellness program);
(3) the application of any pre-existing condition exclusion under the plan, coverage,
or policy; and
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(4) other activities related to the creation, renewal, or replacement of a contract of
health insurance or health benefits.” 410 ILCS 513/20(b) (West 2022).
Flanking section 20(b) are subsections (a) and (c). Neither party disputes that these latter
subsections apply only to accident and health insurance policies. Id. § 20(a), (c).
¶ 26 At the outset, we acknowledge that the language of section 20(b) lends itself to confused
reading. In their pursuit of precision, this section’s drafters have sacrificed clarity. The result is
multiple lawsuits, thousands of dollars in legal bills, and hundreds of hours in labor, all to make
sense of exactly what the above words mean. There is no rule requiring that legislatures enact
opaque legislation. Our review of comparable state laws reveals that it is possible to regulate
insurers and their underwriting practices without resorting to the turgid prose above. Indeed, the
best constructed statutes define not only what the law does regulate, but also what it does not
regulate. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 40-2259(c) (West 2022) (from Kansas, “[s]ubsection (b) does
not apply to an insurer writing life insurance, disability income insurance or long-term care
insurance coverage”). A similar drafting approach here would have prevented the controversy
before us now. Applying this approach in the future will doubtlessly forestall many similar
controversies.
¶ 27 Applying the above principles of statutory interpretation, we can come to no other
conclusion than this: section 20(b) applies only to health insurance underwriting. First, there is
section 20(b)(4). If we do not construe this clause as a “catch-all” provision, encompassing within
the definition of underwriting those activities “related to the creation, renewal or replacement of a
contract for health insurance” besides those already stated in subsections (b)(1)-(3), what purpose
could this clause serve? It cannot be that it introduces these activities to the definition of
underwriting, as subsections (b)(1)-(3) are examples of health insurance-related activities falling
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under subsection (b)(4)’s domain. To illustrate, imagine a statute that seeks to define the
commanders-in-chief of the United States Military:
“The commanders-in-chief of the United States Military have been:
(1) George Washington;
(2) Abraham Lincoln;
(3) Franklin D. Roosevelt; and
(4) other persons who have held the office of President.”
¶ 28 One cannot conclude that subsection (4) of this fictional statute merely introduces that
presidents may be considered the commanders-in-chief of the United States Military. This is
already known because Washington, Lincoln, and Roosevelt were all presidents. Any
interpretation of subsection (4) in this manner would render it redundant. The same logic applies
to the real statute before us. The presence of the word “other” in the Act’s section 20(b)(4) leads
us to this same conclusion. In Williams, 2021 IL App (2d) 190971, ¶¶ 11-12, we rejected
Williams’s interpretation of the phrase “willfully and intentionally failed to comply with [the
Freedom of Information Act [(5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2018))], or otherwise acted in bad faith.”
(Emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams urged an interpretation in which civil
penalties could be imposed against a public body if either that public body willfully and
intentionally failed to comply with the Act or if the public body acted in bad faith. Id. ¶¶ 12-14.
(“In other words, plaintiff construes the terms ‘willfully and intentionally’ and ‘in bad faith’ as
separate bases for imposing a civil penalty.”). Such an interpretation, we reasoned, would render
superfluous the term “or otherwise.” Id. ¶ 14. We instead concluded that the phrase was “meant as
a catchall to include other actions that constitute bad faith.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. (“ ‘when a
statute provides a list of examples followed by a catchall term *** the preceding list provides a
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clue as to what the drafters intended the catchall provision to mean’ ” (quoting Song fi Inc. v.
Google, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 876, 883 (N.D. Cal. 2015))). The same logic applies to the present
statute. Just as the statutory syntax in Williams meant that “bad faith” could be imputed to the term
“willfully” and “intentionally,” the similar syntax here means that we should impute the phrase
“activities related to *** health insurance or health benefits” to all of the examples preceding it.
Under this interpretation, there can be no doubt that section 20(b) does not extend to life insurers.
¶ 29 Second, the principle of noscitur a sociis supports this conclusion as well. Under
noscitur a sociis, “[t]he meaning of questionable words or phrases in a statute may be ascertained
by reference to the meaning of words or phrases associated with it.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Senese v. Village of Buffalo Grove, 383 Ill. App. 3d 276, 279 (2008). “The classic gloss
of noscitur a sociis is that general and specific words which are capable of an analogous
meaning[,] being associated together, take color from each other, so that the general words are
restricted to a sense analogous to the less general.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v.
Taylor, 349 Ill. App. 3d 839, 843 (2004). Put another way, “one knows a word by the company it
keeps.” Id.
¶ 30 For example, in Fischer v. United States, 603 U.S. 480 (2024), the government charged a
January 6th defendant under section 1512 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which provides as
follows:
“(c) Whoever corruptly—
(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or
attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in
an official proceeding; or
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(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts
to do so, shall be fined *** or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(c) (2018).
¶ 31 Because the government accused Fischer of impeding Congressional certification of the
2020 presidential election results, and not of destroying, mutilating, or concealing any object, it
charged Fischer only with “otherwise obstruct[ing] *** any official proceeding” under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(c)(2). Fischer, 603 U.S. at 483-84. The lower court dismissed this charge, and the Supreme
Court concurred. Applying noscitur a sociss, it interpreted the general term “otherwise obstruct”
in light of its neighboring words: “record, document, or other object,” and concluded that section
(c)(2) “ma[de] it a crime to impair the availability or integrity of records, documents, or objects
*** in ways other than those specified in (c)(1).” Id. at 489-91. Accordingly, Fischer’s interruption
of a congressional vote—without more—could not satisfy section 1512’s elements.
¶ 32 Here, we must define the scope of the general phrase “underwriting purposes.” To do so,
we look for the company that it keeps. Section 20(b)(1) speaks of benefit eligibility based upon
health assessments or wellness programs. Subsection (b)(2) again references health assessments,
but this time in relation to insurance premiums. Subsection (b)(3) addresses preexisting conditions,
and subsection (b)(4) pertains to “other activities” related to health insurance contracts. Every
clause that follows the term “underwriting purposes” mentions health insurance or some activity
related to health insurance. No clause mentions life insurance or something exclusively related to
life insurance. If the general term “underwriting purposes” is to “take color” from the specific
words which succeed it, we can only conclude that “underwriting purposes” means only health
insurance underwriting purposes.
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¶ 33 Third, a related yet distinct principle of statutory interpretation is ejusdem generis. This
doctrine provides that “when a statutory clause specifically describes several classes of persons or
things and then includes ‘other persons or things,’ the ‘other’ is interpreted as meaning ‘other such
like.’ ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jose A., 2018 IL App (2d) 180170, ¶ 32. Put
another way, the “general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only persons or things of
the same type as those listed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Team Illinois Hockey Club, Inc.,
2022 IL App (2d) 210568, ¶ 28. For example, “the phrase ‘other sports’ in a provision referring to
walking, swimming, biking, running, and other [such like] sports would probably be read to
exclude automobile racing.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
¶ 34 We agree with Reynolds that applying this doctrine is inappropriate here. We conclude
this, however, because ejusdem generis exists to clarify ambiguities inherent to an “unarticulated”
class of persons or things. See Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University v. Department of
Human Rights, 159 Ill. 2d 206, 211 (1994). No such ambiguity exists under section 20(b). Rather,
section 20(b)(4) “articulates” the class of “other activities” as those which are “related to the
creation, renewal, or replacement of a contract of health insurance or health benefits.” If section
20(b)(4) instead read merely “other activities,” applying ejusdem generis would result in us
interpreting that phrase as other activities “such like” those already listed, i.e. other activities
related to health insurance or health benefits. The statute’s language is precise enough, however,
that it effectively does this job for us. Accordingly, the very reason for this doctrine’s
inapplicability confirms that the statute defines a limited class of activities: those related
exclusively to health insurance.
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¶ 35 E. Section 20(e) Does Not Support Reynolds’s
Interpretation of Section 20(b)
¶ 36 The Act’s section 20(e) prohibits “compan[ies] providing direct-to-consumer commercial
genetic testing *** from sharing any genetic test information or other personally identifiable
information about a consumer with any health or life insurance company without written consent
from the consumer.” 410 ILCS 513/20(e) (West 2022). This section, Reynolds insists, “close[s] a
loophole by which insurers could possibly obtain genetic testing information” for life insurance
underwriting purposes.
¶ 37 This section, however, contemplates that insurers may obtain genetic testing information,
provided that the genetic testing company first obtains “written consent from the consumer.” Id.
Insofar as a health insurer obtains genetic information from “[a] company providing direct-to-
consumer commercial genetic testing,” its use is subject to section 20(c), which allows insurers to
consider genetic information “if the individual voluntarily submits the results and the results are
favorable to the individual.” Id. § 20(c), (e). In contrast, a life insurer that receives such information
is not subject to the provisions of section 20(c), nor to any comparable section pertaining
specifically to life insurers. Section 20(e) is therefore illuminating, albeit not for the reasons
Reynolds suggests. It demonstrates that the General Assembly contemplated that both health and
life insurers would seek consumer information from genetic testing companies. Despite this
knowledge, the General Assembly limited only health insurers’ use to that which is “favorable to
the individual.” No such limitation exists for life insurers. This suggests the General Assembly
was both aware of, and comfortable with, the broad utilization of genetic information for life
insurance purposes. Accordingly, section 20(e) reinforces the conclusion that the Act’s
underwriting limitations apply solely to health insurers.
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¶ 38 F. Legislative History Does Not Support
Reynolds’s Reading of Section 20(b)
¶ 39 To the extent this court finds the term “underwriting purposes” to be ambiguous, we may
look to section 20(b)’s legislative history. Krohe v. City of Bloomington, 204 Ill. 2d 392, 398
(2003). “When interpreting an ambiguous phrase in a statute, our supreme court looks especially
to the remarks of the bill’s sponsor.” Maschek v. City of Chicago, 2015 IL App (1st) 150520, ¶ 62;
see Krohe, 204 Ill. 2d at 398.
¶ 40 The General Assembly first enacted the Act in 1998. At that time, due to pressure from the
life insurance industry, the Act’s sponsors made plain that the legislation did not extend to life
insurance. In the House, Representative Moffitt stated “[t]his legislation does not include life
insurance, since our objective was to make sure there is no discrimination on other insurance,
essentially health insurance and employment.” 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, Apr. 15,
1997, at 184 (statements of Representative Moffitt). Similarly, the Act’s Senate sponsor noted:
“one of the other objections was that life insurance could be a problem, that someone could be
tested and find out that there’s a—a long-term problem and run out and purchase life insurance
without disclosing that information. We have removed life insurance from this bill ***.” (Emphasis
added.) 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, March 20, 1997, at 143 (statements of Senator
Hawkinson).
¶ 41 Spurred by Congress’s passage of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008
(42 U.S.C. § 2000ff et seq. (2018)), the General Assembly began amending the Act to
“harmonize[ ]” it with the federal statute. 95th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 30, 2008,
at 30 (statements of Representative Ryg). The General Assembly added section 20(b) in 2014,
soon after the Department of Health and Human Services promulgated a substantively identical
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regulation in accordance with the federal statute’s directives. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(5)(i)
(2014). The amendment’s Senate sponsor explained that the amendment’s purpose was to
“update[ ] laws related to the disclosure of *** genetic information to protect the disclosure of
such personal health information according to *** HIPAA.” 98th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate
Proceedings, May 19, 2014, at 26 (statements of Senator Hunter). It is beyond dispute that the
HIPAA regulation that spurred the 2014 amendment does not apply to life insurers. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg-53 (2018); Thompson v. Washington National Insurance Co., No. 2:14-cv-00660, 2015
WL 8346166, at *2. If section 20(b) exists to harmonize Illinois law with federal law and the
comparable federal regulation unambiguously does not apply to life insurers, then absent clear
language to the contrary, we can only conclude that section 20(b) likewise does not apply to life
insurers. To find otherwise would be to rewrite the law.
¶ 42 Moreover, as the amicus brief notes, the 2014 amendment passed without any fanfare from
the life insurance industry. This was in marked contrast to 1998, when lawmakers needed to
repeatedly reassure life insurers that the Act would not reach their industry’s long-standing
practices. It strains credulity to believe that, in passing section 20(b), the General Assembly at
once radically upended life-insurance underwriting practices but did so with such stealth that the
law’s effect escaped notice not only at the time, but for more than a decade afterward. Indeed, so
esoteric must this change have been, that even lawmakers themselves were unaware of the change.
See 104th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill 2534, 2025 Sess.; 104th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Bill 250,
2025 Sess. (proposing a ban on life insurers from using genetic information in their underwriting).
¶ 43 While the plain language of the statute is sufficient to conclude that section 20(b) does not
apply to life insurance underwriting, to the extent its review is necessary, the relevant legislative
history confirms the statute’s plain language. Against all this evidence, Reynolds urges us to
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conclude that section 20(b) applies to life insurers. Because the legislature does not “hide elephants
in mouseholes,” we cannot accept such an interpretation. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
People ex rel. Ryan v. Agpro, Inc., 214 Ill. 2d 222, 228 (2005).
¶ 44 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 45 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.
¶ 46 Affirmed.
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Reynolds v. State Farm Life Insurance Co., 2025 IL App (2d) 240399
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County, No. 23-LA-465; the Hon. John G. Dalton, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Robert A. Chapman, Robert J. Shapiro, and Shannon T. Knight, for of Chapman Spingola, LLP, and Eugene Y. Turin, Andrew T. Appellant: Heldut, and Jordan R. Frysinger, of McGuire Law, P.C., both of Chicago, for appellant.
Attorneys Sean G. Wieber, Samantha Lerner, Kevin P. Simpson, and for James W. Randall, of Winston & Strawn LLP, of Chicago, for Appellee: appellees.
Amicus Curiae: Eric S. Mattson and Ellen A. Wiencek, of Sidley Austin LLP, of Chicago, for amicus curiae American Council of Life Insurers.
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