Reynolds v. Singh

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: August 5, 2022
• Docket: 2:22-cv-00601
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 SHARITA REYNOLDS; ESTATE OF No. 2:22-cv-00601-JAM-KJN CHELVIN LEE WEBB, BY AND 11 THROUGH THE ESTATE’S ADMINISTRATOR SHARITA 12 REYNOLDS ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND 13 Plaintiffs, 14 v. 15 MALAK SINGH, AN INDIVIDUAL; KP LOGISTICS, INC., A 16 CALIFORNIA CORPORATION; JOHN MILLER, JR.; AND DOES 1 17 THROUGH 20, INCLUSIVE, 18 Defendants. 19 20 This matter is before the Court on Sharita Reynolds’ 21 (“Plaintiff”) motion to remand. Mot. to Remand (“Mot.”), ECF No. 22 14. Malak Singh (“Defendant” or “Singh”) filed an opposition, 23 Opp’n, ECF No. 19, to which Plaintiff replied, Reply, ECF No. 24. 24 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s 25 motion to remand and her request for fees and costs incurred.1 26

27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled 28 for June 28, 2022. 1 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 This case arises from a deadly car crash in Oklahoma. See 3 generally Compl., ECF No. 1 Ex. A. On February 14, 2021, 4 Defendant Singh, while in the course and scope of his employment 5 with Defendant KP Logistics, Inc., negligently rear-ended Chelvin 6 Webb (“Decedent” or “Mr. Webb”) during a winter storm. Id. 7 ¶¶ 13-15. Plaintiff alleges Singh failed to keep a proper 8 lookout, drove at an excessive speed, was operating his vehicle 9 in violation of 49 CFR § 392.14, which requires extra precautions 10 such as reduced speed when operating a commercial vehicle in 11 hazardous conditions, and was improperly operating the vehicle 12 during a declared state of emergency. Id. Mr. Webb died from 13 the injuries he sustained in the collision. Id. ¶ 16. 14 Plaintiff, Decedent’s mother, brought this action on behalf 15 of herself and as the administrator of Decedent’s estate, in 16 Sacramento Superior Court asserting (1) a wrongful death claim 17 and (2) a survival cause of action. See Compl. Defendant Singh 18 removed the case, with the consent of KP Logistics2, invoking 19 this Court’s federal question jurisdiction. Not. of Removal at 20 4, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff then filed this motion to remand, 21 contending removal was improper. See Mot. 22 23 II. OPINION 24 A. Judicial Notice 25 Defendant requests the Court take judicial notice of four 26 2 Defendant argues “[a]t a minimum, the court needs to sever, and 27 to retain the actions involving KP” but does not elaborate why. Opp’n at 4. The Court rejects this argument as the analysis 28 below applies to all Defendants. 1 documents: (1) Plaintiff’s complaint; (3) Defendant Malak 2 Singh’s answer; (3) Defendant Malak Singh’s notice of removal; 3 and (4) Defendant KP Logistics’ countercomplaint. Defendant 4 Singh’s Req. for Judicial Notice, ECF No. 20. The Court denies 5 Defendant’s requests for judicial notice because “it is 6 unnecessary to take judicial notice of documents already in the 7 record.” Wilburn v. Bratcher, No. 15-cv-00699-TLN-GGH, 2015 WL 8 9490242, at *15 (E.D. Dec. 30, 2015), report and recommendation 9 adopted, No. 15-cv-0699-TLN-GGH, 2016 WL 1268046 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10 31, 2016). 11 B. Legal Standard 12 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, a defendant may remove a civil 13 action from state to federal court if there is subject matter 14 jurisdiction over the case. See City of Chi. v. Int’l Coll. of 15 Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997). Courts strictly construe 16 the removal statute against removal and federal jurisdiction 17 must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of 18 removal. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 19 1992); see also Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 20 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A]ny doubt about the right of 21 removal requires resolution in favor of remand.”). The party 22 seeking removal bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. 23 Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 24 1988). 25 C. Analysis 26 1. Federal Question Jurisdiction 27 Courts have federal question jurisdiction over all civil 28 actions “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of 1 the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Removal pursuant to 2 § 1331 is governed by the “well-pleaded complaint rule,” which 3 provides that federal question jurisdiction exists only when “a 4 federal question is presented on the face of plaintiff’s 5 properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 6 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). An “independent corollary to the well- 7 pleaded complaint rule” is the “complete pre-emption doctrine.” 8 Id. at 393 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 9 That doctrine provides a basis for federal question jurisdiction 10 when a federal statute has “such extraordinary pre-emptive 11 power” that it “convert[s] an ordinary state common law 12 complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the 13 well-pleaded complaint rule.” Retail Prop. Trust v. United Bhd. 14 of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 15 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When 16 complete preemption applies, a defendant may remove the 17 preempted state law claims to federal court. Beneficial Nat’l 18 Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003). 19 The parties dispute whether federal question jurisdiction 20 exists to support the removal of this case from state court. 21 Mot. at 3-8; Opp’n at 7-10. Defendant acknowledges Plaintiff 22 has only pled state-law claims, but argues the Court 23 nevertheless has federal question jurisdiction over this lawsuit 24 because complete preemption applies. Opp’n at 7-9. 25 Specifically, Defendant contends Plaintiff’s claims are 26 preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization 27 Act (“FAAAA”). Id. 28 The Supreme Court has identified only a few federal 1 statutes whose preemptive force is so extraordinary as to 2 completely preempt state law claims: (1) the Labor Management 3 Relations Act (“LMRA”), Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 4 U.S. 557 (1968); (2) the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 5 of 1976 (“ERISA”), Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 6 (1987); and (3) the National Bank Act, Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. 7 Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003). The Ninth Circuit has explained 8 that there are only a “handful of ‘extraordinary’ situations 9 where [. . .] a well-pleaded state law complaint will be deemed 10 to arise under federal law for jurisdiction purposes.” Holman 11 v. Laulo-Rowe Agency, 994 F.2d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 1993). A 12 federal statute will only be found to completely preempt state 13 causes of action “for purposes of federal jurisdiction under 14 § 1331 [. . .] when Congress: (1) intended to displace a state- 15 law cause of action, and (2) provided a substitute cause of 16 action.” City of Oakland v. BP PLC, 969 F.3d 895, 906 (9th Cir. 17 2020). 18 The FAAAA, relied upon by Defendant, satisfies neither 19 prong. As an initial matter, Defendant has not met his burden 20 of showing 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) even applies here. That 21 provision regulates “motor carriers,” “brokers,” and “freight 22 forwarders” “with respect to the transportation of property.” 23 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). There are no allegations in 24 plaintiff’s complaint that come within this statutory scheme. 25 See Compl. Rather, Defendant relies on outside evidence in an 26 attempt to demonstrate “plaintiff’s implausible facts show road 27 safety, which the FAAAA does not preempt, is not at issue.” 28 Opp’n at 9. But as Defendant even acknowledges earlier in his 1 briefing, the Court cannot consider such evidence. See id. at 7 2 (“In determining the existence of removal jurisdiction based 3 upon a federal question, [courts] must look to the complaint as 4 of the time the removal petition was filed.”) (quoting Libhart 5 v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1979) 6 (emphasis added); see also California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, 7 Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The federal issue must 8 be disclosed upon the face of the complaint, unaided by the 9 answer or by the petition for removal.”). 10 Even if the FAAAA was implicated, by its own terms it does 11 not preempt state-law negligence actions involving motor vehicle 12 safety. The statute expressly provides that it “shall not 13 restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect 14 to motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A). Plaintiff’s 15 Complaint, which alleges Defendant Singh “failed to keep a 16 proper lookout, drove at an excessive speed and [was] improperly 17 operating [the] vehicle during a declared state of emergency due 18 to a winter storm”, clearly asserts a motor safety claim, not a 19 claim concerning Defendants’ “price, route, or service.” Compl. 20 ¶ 15(a). Finally, the federal statute identified by Defendant 21 does not provide a substitute cause of action as required for 22 complete preemption. Defendant points to 49 U.S.C. § 14707. 23 However, that provision provides a cause of action if a person 24 violates the registration requirements of the act, not at issue 25 here. 26 Defendant also argues federal jurisdiction exists as 27 Plaintiff alleges negligence per se resulting from Defendants’ 28 violation of a federal regulation, 49 CFR § 392.14. Opp’n at 9. 1 But the Supreme Court has rejected that argument, finding that 2 when a complaint alleges a violation of a federal statute or 3 regulation as an element of a state cause of action, that itself 4 does not provide for a private cause of action, the claim does 5 not arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 6 United States. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 7 804, 817 (1986). “[A] plaintiff’s invocation of federal law as 8 the source of a duty under state law is simply insufficient to 9 create federal question jurisdiction.” Fuller v. BNSF Ry. Co., 10 472 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (S.D. Ill. 2007). Accordingly, 11 Defendant has not met his burden of demonstrating federal 12 question jurisdiction exists. See Goforth v. Nevada Power Co., 13 101 F. Supp. 3d 975, 978 (D. Nev. 2015) (finding federal 14 question jurisdiction did not exist when violation of federal 15 regulations alleged to establish the duty and breach elements of 16 a negligence claim). 17 2. Diversity Jurisdiction 18 Defendant also opposes remand on the basis of diversity 19 jurisdiction. Opp’n at 9-12. Diversity jurisdiction requires 20 that all parties be completely diverse and the amount in 21 controversy exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); see also 22 Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 23 (9th Cir. 2003). However, the “forum-defendant” rule provides 24 that a case cannot be removed on the basis of diversity “if any 25 of the parties in interest properly joined and served as 26 defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is 27 brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). 28 While Defendant concedes he and his co-defendants are 1 citizens of California, precluding removal based on diversity 2 under the forum-defendant rule, he nevertheless argues against 3 remand because diversity jurisdiction exists. Opp’n at 9-12. 4 Relying on Williams v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 471 F.3d 975 (9th 5 Cir. 2006), Defendant contends that “since Defendant Singh 6 removed this matter on the basis of federal question 7 jurisdiction, this court retains jurisdiction on that basis, as 8 well as any other basis for jurisdiction apparent in the 9 complaint, including diversity jurisdiction.” Opp’n at 10. 10 This argument is meritless. 11 In Williams the Ninth Circuit held that “[o]nce a case has 12 been properly removed, the district court has jurisdiction over 13 it on all grounds apparent from the complaint, not just those 14 cited in the removal notice.” 471 F.3d at 977 (emphasis added). 15 But whether Defendant properly removed the action to this Court 16 is precisely what is at issue here. As explained above, 17 Defendant did not properly remove the action on the basis of 18 federal question jurisdiction, and as they concede, could not 19 remove based on diversity jurisdiction under the forum-defendant 20 rule. Opp’n 9-10. To allow Defendant to avoid remand based on 21 diversity after he improperly removed on federal question 22 grounds, as he suggests, would render the forum-defendant rule 23 obsolete. Williams does not stand for such a proposition. 24 Accordingly, Defendants cannot avoid remand through their 25 reliance on diversity jurisdiction. 26 3. Attorney’s Fees 27 Plaintiff moves for an award of the fees and costs incurred 28 seeking remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), which provides that 1 upon issuing an order remanding the case, a court may award 2 “just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, 3 incurred as a result of the removal.” The standard for awarding 4 fees turns on the reasonableness of removal. Martin v. Franklin 5 Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). As the Supreme Court 6 has noted “[t]he process of removing a case to federal court and 7 then having it remanded back to state court delays resolution of 8 the case, imposes additional costs on both parties, and wastes 9 judicial resources.” Id. at 140. Accordingly, courts may award 10 attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) when the removing party lacked 11 an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. Id. at 12 141. 13 As discussed above, the relevant case law demonstrates that 14 there was no legitimate basis for removal of this action and 15 Defendant lacked an objectively reasonable basis for removing 16 this case. See Houden v. Todd, 348 Fed. Appx. 221, 223 (9th 17 Cir. 2009) (finding removal was objectively unreasonable when 18 clearly foreclosed by relevant case law). The Court therefore 19 finds an award of Plaintiff’s just costs and actual expenses, 20 including attorneys’ fees, appropriate. Plaintiff requests a 21 rate of $650 per hour for Robert Ounjian, a partner at Carpenter 22 & Zuckerman with more than 20 years of experience, for a total 23 of $ 10,000.3 However, that is not a reasonable hourly rate in 24 this district. See Firstsource Sols. USA, LLC v. Tulare Reg’l 25 Med. Ctr., No. 15-cv-01136-DAD-EPG, 2019 WL 2725336, at *4 (E.D. 26 Cal. July 1, 2019)(reasonable hourly rates are calculated 27 3 Defendant did not dispute the reasonableness of these fees. 28 Opp’n at 12. ee REI IRE IE OS III RII IRI NIN IIE II EE IEE IEE IDI eee ee

1 according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant legal 2 community). Accordingly, the Court reduces Mr. Ounjian’s hourly 3 rate to $450. Price Simms Holding, LLC v. Candle3, LLC, No. 18- 4 cv-1851-WBS-KJN, 2021 WL 1884995 at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 11, 2021), 5 report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-cv-1851-WBS-KJN, 2021 6 WL 2016915 (E.D. Cal. May 20, 2021) (an hourly rate of $450 is 7 reasonable in the Eastern District for partners with at least 20 8 years of experience). Plaintiffs are thus entitled to $8,100 9 for the 18 hours Mr. Ounjian spent on the motion to remand. 10 Ounjian Decl. @@ 6, ECF No. 14-2. 11 12 Til. ORDER 13 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS 14 Plaintiff’s motion to remand and the case is REMANDED to 15 Sacramento County Superior Court. The Court awards Plaintiff 16 $8,100 for the costs and fees incurred as a result of the 17 removal. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 Dated: August 4, 2022 20 open JOHN A. MENDEZ 22 SENIOR UNITED*STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 23 24 25 26 27 28 10