Reynolds v. O'Malley

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Virginia
DecidedOctober 21, 2024
Docket1:24-cv-00016
StatusUnknown

This text of Reynolds v. O'Malley (Reynolds v. O'Malley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reynolds v. O'Malley, (W.D. Va. 2024).

Opinion

CLERKS OFFICE US DISTRICT COU AT ABINGDON, VA FILED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT — October 214 □□□ FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA LAURA A. AUSTIN, CLERK ABINGDON DIVISION By: /s/ Robin Bordwine DEPUTY CLERK SARAH BETH REYNOLDS, ) Plaintiff ) Civil Action No. 1:24cv00016 ) V. ) REPORT AND ) RECOMMENDATION MARTIN J. O7MALLEY, ) Commissioner of Social Security, ) By: PAMELA MEADE SARGENT Defendant. ) United States Magistrate Judge ) I. Background and Standard of Review Plaintiff, Sarah Beth Reynolds, (“Reynolds”), filed this action challenging the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, (“Commissioner”), denying her claim for supplemental security income, (“SSI’’), under the Social Security Act, as amended, (“Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seg. Jurisdiction of this court is pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). This case is before the undersigned magistrate judge by referral pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). As directed by the order of referral, the undersigned now submits the following report and recommended disposition. Neither party has requested oral argument; therefore, this case is ripe for decision.

The court’s review in this case is limited to determining if the factual findings of the Commissioner are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal standards. See Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence has been defined as “evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion. It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may -|-

be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966). “‘If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is “substantial evidence.”’” Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Laws, 368 F.2d at 642).

The record shows Reynolds protectively filed an application for SSI1 on October 25, 2021, alleging disability as of October 25, 2021,2 due to chronic

1 Reynolds previously filed an application for SSI on January 9, 2017, alleging disability beginning July 31, 2015. (R. at 73.) By decision dated January 22, 2019, the ALJ denied her claim. (R. at 73-88.) The 2019 ALJ decision also references a fully favorable 2002 decision and a 2015 unfavorable ALJ decision. (R. at 83.) Pursuant to the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Albright v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 F.3d 473 (4th Cir. 1999), and in accordance with Social Security Acquiescence Ruling, (“A.R.”) 00-1(4), “[w]hen adjudicating a subsequent disability claim arising under the same … title of the Act as the prior claim, an adjudicator determining whether a claimant is disabled during a previously unadjudicated period must consider such a prior finding as evidence” and consider its persuasiveness in light of all relevant facts and circumstances. A.R. 00-1(4), 65 Fed. Reg. 1936- 01, at *1938, 2000 WL 142361 (Aug. 1, 1991). Pursuant to A.R. 00-1(4), the ALJ must consider prior ALJ findings using factors articulated in Albright such as (1) whether the fact on which the prior finding was based is subject to change with the passage of time, such as a fact relating to the severity of a claimant’s medical condition; (2) the likelihood of such a change, considering the length of time that has elapsed between the period previously adjudicated and the period under consideration in the subsequent claim; and (3) the extent that evidence not considered in the final decision on the prior claim provides a basis for making a different finding with respect to the period being adjudicated in the subsequent claim. See A.R. 00-1(4), 65 Fed. Reg. 1936-01, at *1938, 2000 WL 142361 (Aug. 1, 1991). The ALJ in this case correctly articulated the Albright standard when analyzing the prior ALJ decision. The ALJ afforded substantial weight to the findings of the record in relation to work activity, severity, listing evaluation and the ability to perform other work in the national economy because the ALJ found those findings to be well-supported by the evidence of record. (R. at 32.) The ALJ found that the evidence received at the hearing warranted finding additional severe impairments and additional residual functional capacity restrictions based on diagnostic evidence of record. (R. at 32.) However, the ALJ found that some residual functional capacity findings were not supported by evidence of record, and he did not include them. (R. at 32.) The ALJ gave substantial weight to the findings made in the prior decision, explaining that the record reflects minimal to no changes in the claimant’s condition. (R. at 32.)

-2- diarrhea, severe asthma, thyroid issues and learning disabilities. (Record, (“R.”), at 20, 213, 215-20, 319.) The claim was denied initially and on reconsideration. (R. at 118-19, 130, 136.) Reynolds requested a hearing before an administrative law judge, (“ALJ”). (R. at 138.) A hearing was held on June 2, 2023, at which Reynolds was represented by counsel. (R. at 40-69.)

By decision dated August 8, 2023, the ALJ denied Reynolds’s claim. (R. at 20-34.) The ALJ found Reynolds had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 25, 2021, the application date. (R. at 23.) The ALJ determined Reynolds had severe impairments, namely, irritable bowel syndrome, (“IBS”), with diarrhea; asthma; environmental allergies; obstructive sleep apnea; obesity; and borderline intellectual functioning, but he found Reynolds did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. at 23-26.)

The ALJ found Reynolds had the residual functional capacity to perform light3 work, except she could frequently climb ramps and stairs and balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl; she could occasionally climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; she must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme heat, humidity, fumes, odors, dusts, gases, poor ventilation and other pulmonary irritants, and hazards; she was limited to work involving only simple, routine tasks with no more than occasional

2 Reynolds initially alleged a disability onset date of January 17, 2019, but amended it at her hearing to October 25, 2021, her protective filing date. (R. at 20, 215.)

3 Light work involves lifting items weighing up to 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. If someone can perform light work, she can also perform sedentary work. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b) (2023).

-3- changes in the work setting, with no strict production or pace requirements; and she could have no more than occasional interaction with supervisors, co-workers and the public. (R. at 26.) The ALJ found Reynolds had no past relevant work. (R.

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Bluebook (online)
Reynolds v. O'Malley, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reynolds-v-omalley-vawd-2024.