Reynolds v. Iron Silver Mining Co.

116 U.S. 687, 6 S. Ct. 601, 29 L. Ed. 774, 1886 U.S. LEXIS 1811
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedMarch 1, 1886
Docket843
StatusPublished
Cited by53 cases

This text of 116 U.S. 687 (Reynolds v. Iron Silver Mining Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reynolds v. Iron Silver Mining Co., 116 U.S. 687, 6 S. Ct. 601, 29 L. Ed. 774, 1886 U.S. LEXIS 1811 (1886).

Opinions

Mr. Justice Miller

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court for the District of Colorado, which brings here for review a judgment of that court in an action to recover possession of a part of a vein or lode of mineral deposit.

The plaintiff below, the Iron Silver Mining Company, alleges that it was the owner of one hundred and ninety-three and -fVV aeres • of land, conveyed by the United States by patent to its grantors, and seeks to recover of defendants a part of the land thus patented. It is described in the petition as mining land and a mining claim. The patent under which plaintiff claims, which was introduced in evidence, purports to be for placer mines, and it takes two pages of printed matter to describe the courses, distances, and corners. As the law does not permit any one claim to cover more than twenty acres in locating placer mining claims, it is obvious that under the ruling of this court in Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636, a number of these claims, amounting at least to ten, have been consolidated into one patent, which was issued to "Wells and Moyer, the patentees.

. The defendants below asserted a right to the vein or deposit in which they were working under lode claims called the Crown Point and Pinnacle claims, which were older than that of plaintiff.

[689]*689Defendants also set out another defence in- the following language:

“ That at the time of .the survey, entry, and patenting of the said Wells and Moyer placer claim, a certain lode, vein, or deposit of quartáror other rock in place, carrying carbonates of lead and silver-bearing ore, and of great value, called the Pinnacle lode,- and a certain lode, vein, or. deposit, carrying like minerals of great value, were known and claimed to exist within the boundaries and underneath^the surface of said placer claim, survey lot No. 281, and that the fact that such vein or veins were claimed to exist and did exist as aforesaid within said premises was" known to the patentees of said claim at all tne times hereinbefore mentioned, and that in the application'for. patent for said placer claim the said vein or veins so known-to exist were not included, and were, in the patent issued upon such application, expressly excluded therefrom. And- further, in the said patent it was expressly and in terms.reserved, that the premises in and by such patent conveyed might, by the proprietor of any such vein or lode of quartz or other rock in place, bearing mineral or ore as aforesaid, be entered for the. purpose of extracting and removing’the ore from such lode, vein, or deposit, should the same or any part thereof be found to penetrate, intersect, pass through, or dip into the premises by such patent granted.”

The case was tried by a jury; and a verdict rendered lor plaintiff, under a charge from the court, which required such a verdict at their hands.

The case here must be decided on the correctness of the action of the court in giving that chargé, and in refusing to give instructions asked by defendants.

The full charge of the court, which was duly excepted to, is as follows:

“ The evidence tends to prove that the lode in controversy was known to Wells and Moyer, grantees of the United States, at the time they made application -for the placer patent, under which plaintiff claims title; also that William Ik Stevens, one of the grantees of Wells and Moyer, and a grantor of the plaintiff, knew of the existence of the lode at the time application [690]*690was made by Wells and Moyer for the placer patent,, procured such; application .to b.e made with a view to acquiring title to himself and his, associates to the territory described, and probably with a view and intention to acquire title to the lode now in dispute in this action. Assuming the placer patent to have been obtained with knowledge and intention on the part of the patentees, as stated, the 'question is, whether any right or interest in theTod'e in controversy was conveyed .by the patent. That is a question of some difficulty when presented by or oq' behalf of one who has shown some right or interest in the lode, or an-Intention to claim the same according to local law and the acts of Congress.. But here the defendants show no right or title in the lode at the place in controversy. They assume the right to follow the lode on its dip without the side line of the Pinnacle location, and, under the Wells and Moyer placer location. ■ To that it is essential that they have the top and apex of the lode within their location in the general direction of the location. A small segment of the top and apex of the lode is shown within the Crown Point location, but it extends not with the length of the location, but across it, so as to convert the. side lines of the claim into the end lines, and to limit the direction in which it may be pursued to the space enclosed by those lines. The place in controversy is not’ within the side lines of either of defendants’ locations,'nor within the extensions of those lines. No other ground is perceived upon which defendants may assert title or right of possession to the place in controversy, and therefore they are to be regarded as naked intruders, and as to such intruders, the plaintiff’s placer title may give a right of possession and recovery. • The .jury is advised to find for plaintiff, with the value of the ore removed from the placer ground by defendants.”

This charge was delivered to the jury after a refusal to give any of the following instructions asked by defendants:

“1. A patent to a placer claim does not pass title to any vein or lode then known or claimed to exist.
“• 2. If the Pinnacle and Crown Point lodes, or their vein upon which it is alleged defendants have followed into the -ground of the Wells and Moyer placer, were known at time of [691]*691issue of Wells.and Moyer patent, then the vein was not granted in, (or was excepted from) the Wells and Moyer patent, and the plaintiff is not entitled to. recover. .
“ 4. The plaintiff must recover on strength of .his own title.' If the vein is not conveyed to plaintiff by the placer patent under which they claim, then it makes no difference whether defendants have any title or not; the plaintiff cannot ■ recover on the weakness of defendants’ title.
5. If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff’s grantors, at. the time of the locations and entry of the Wells and Moyer placer claim, knew or had reason to presume that underneath it was a deposit or vein of ore carrying precious metals in rock in place, then the same was specially excepted, from the grant of their patent, and never was the property, of the plaintiff or any of its grantors, having been excluded from the grant of the government; no trespass can be committed thereon as against the plaintiff, and they cannot recover, and if the vein upon which the trespass is alleged was the vein so known, then plaintiff cannot recover.
“ 6. It was not the intention of the federal government to permit owners of placer mining claims to obtain title to known lodes or veins of mineral ore by embracing the same in appli-. cations for patents to such placer claims unless specially designated as lode-veins in such applications.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
116 U.S. 687, 6 S. Ct. 601, 29 L. Ed. 774, 1886 U.S. LEXIS 1811, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reynolds-v-iron-silver-mining-co-scotus-1886.