Restrepo-Contreras v. United States
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Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 96-1411
REYNALDO RESTREPO-CONTRERAS,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent, Appellee.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jaime Pieras, Jr., Senior U.S. District Judge] __________________________
____________________
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Cyr and Stahl, Circuit Judges. ______________
____________________
Reynaldo Restrepo Contreras on brief pro se. ___________________________
Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Warren Vazquez, Assistant _____________ ______________
United States Attorney, and Jose A. Quiles Espinosa, Senior Litigation _______________________
Counsel, on brief for appellee.
____________________
November 4, 1996
____________________
Per Curiam. Petitioner Reynaldo Restrepo Contreras, ___________
having persuaded the district court to reduce his sentence in
light of a retroactive amendment to the sentencing
guidelines, complains on appeal that the court should have
further reduced his sentence pursuant to a nonretroactive
amendment. We disagree and therefore affirm.
In 1990, petitioner was convicted of two offenses
involving cocaine base and sentenced to 360 months in prison.
This court affirmed the judgment on direct appeal. See ___
United States v. Restrepo-Contreras, 942 F.2d 96 (1st Cir. _____________ __________________
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1066 (1992). In February 1994, ____________
petitioner filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 or in the
alternative under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), seeking a reduction
of sentence because of two amendments to U.S.S.G. 2D1.1
that had taken effect the previous November. One of these
(amendment 484) defined the term "mixture or substance" to
exclude materials that must be separated from a controlled
substance before that substance could be used; the other
(amendment 487) defined the term cocaine base to mean "crack"
cocaine. Amendment 484 was included in U.S.S.G. 1B1.10's
listing of amendments that may be considered for retroactive
application; amendment 487 was not.
In a February 1996 ruling, the district court granted
the motion in part. Relying on amendment 484, as well as on
a later amendment that retroactively reduced the maximum base
-2-
offense level (amendment 505), the court recalculated the
drug quantity, reconfigured the applicable offense level, and
reduced petitioner's sentence to 235 months--the low end of
the revised sentencing range. The court declined, however,
to invoke amendment 487 due to its prospective nature.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, this latter determination
entailed no error.
"Resentencing" in the 3582(c)(2) context is different
from that which occurs when an appellate court vacates a
sentence and remands for resentencing. In the latter
situation, the lower court normally is to apply the version
of the guidelines in effect at the time of resentencing
(absent ex post facto concerns). See, e.g., United States v. _____________ ___ ____ _____________
Graham, 83 F.3d 1466, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. ______ _____________
Canon, 66 F.3d 1073, 1076 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995). For _____
3582(c)(2) determinations, the guidelines dictate a different
approach. Section 1B1.10(b) instructs the court to "consider
the sentence that it would have imposed had the amendment(s)
to the guidelines listed in subsection (c) [i.e., those that
have been designated as retroactive] been in effect at the
time the defendant was sentenced." And an accompanying
application note states:
In determining the amended guideline range under
subsection (b), the court shall substitute only the ____
amendments listed in subsection (c) for the
corresponding guideline provisions that were
applied when the defendant was sentenced. All ___
otherguidelineapplicationdecisionsremainunaffected. __________________________________________________
-3-
U.S.S.G. 1B1.10 n.2 (emphasis added). In accordance with
these directions, the district court properly refrained from
applying amendment 487.
In the alternative, petitioner argues that amendment 487
is a "clarifying" rather than "substantive" amendment which
may properly be invoked on a retroactive basis, whether in
connection with a 3582(c)(2) resentencing or by way of a
2255 proceeding. See, e.g., Isabel v. United States, 980 ___ ____ ______ ______________
F.2d 60, 62 (1st Cir. 1992). Yet courts have uniformly
characterized amendment 487 as a substantive
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