ResCap Liquidating Trust v. Primary Residential Mortgage

59 F.4th 905
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 2, 2023
Docket21-2139
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 59 F.4th 905 (ResCap Liquidating Trust v. Primary Residential Mortgage) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
ResCap Liquidating Trust v. Primary Residential Mortgage, 59 F.4th 905 (8th Cir. 2023).

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________

No. 21-2139 ___________________________

ResCap Liquidating Trust

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Primary Residential Mortgage, Inc.

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant ____________

Appeal from United States District Court for the District of Minnesota ____________

Submitted: February 15, 2022 Filed: February 2, 2023 ____________

Before LOKEN, COLLOTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. ____________

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

The majority of U.S. residential mortgages are financed by a “securitization” process in which mortgage lenders (originators) obtain funds to make future mortgage loans by pooling large numbers of existing loans and selling them to a trust. The trust acquires a right to receive the stream of future mortgage payments, which it then parcels into certificates that are sold to investors, called certificate holders, with the mortgage loans serving as collateral for the certificates. See BlackRock Fin. Mgmt. Inc. v. Segregated Account of Ambac Assur. Corp., 673 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 2012), and cases cited. The market for residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”) boomed after 2003, but the 2008 financial crisis had a profound negative effect on U.S. real estate and credit markets. This appeal is one small part of the RMBS financial havoc that followed.

I. The Preamble

In the decade leading up to the 2008 crisis, Residential Funding Company, LLC (“RFC”), an affiliate of Ally Financial, Inc., was a middleman or “sponsor” in the RMBS market, purchasing mortgage loans from hundreds of originators and selling them in pools to hundreds of trusts for securitization. Each securitization process began with RFC entering into an Assignment and Assumption Agreement with a depositor entity in which RFC made representations and warranties concerning the individual loans in the pool. The depositor then sold the loans to RMBS Trusts in Pooling and Servicing Agreements that assigned RFC’s representations to the trusts and often contained additional loan-level representations. RFC also contracted with four “monoline” insurers (the “Monolines”) to insure principal and interest payments on some of the RMBS certificates in contracts in which RFC warranted that representations made to the RMBS Trusts were true.

Prior to 2008, Primary Residential Mortgage, Inc. (“PRMI”), a Nevada corporation, was an originator that sold mortgage loans to RFC in transactions governed by two “Client Contracts,” one entered into in March 2000 and another in June 2001. The contracts incorporated the terms of RFC’s more detailed “Seller Guides.”1 The Guides required PRMI to make specific representations and warranties

1 The March 2000 contract incorporated a version of the Guides called the AlterNet Guide, which governed loans sold from March 2000 to June 2001. The June 2001 Client Contract incorporated a newer version, the Client Guide, which governed all subsequently sold loans.

-2- about the characteristics and underwriting of the loans being sold, and gave RFC broad remedies for an Event of Default,2 including repurchase and indemnification. Between 1999 and 2007. PRMI sold over 2,300 loans to RFC.

After the housing market collapse in 2008, loans underlying RFC securitizations began defaulting at a high rate, leading to significant losses to trust investors and the Monolines. They began suing RFC and its affiliates, alleging breach of RFC’s representations and warranties and misrepresentation. Groups of RMBS Trust investors also threatened RFC with litigation. In May 2012, RFC filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the Southern District of New York. In the Chapter 11 proceedings, RMBS trustees filed hundreds of claims for over 1,000 securitization trusts against the Chapter 11 estate, and the Monolines filed their own proofs of claim. The day before filing, RFC entered into a settlement agreement with RMBS Trust investor groups resolving claims by 392 RMBS Trusts created between 2004 and 2007. RFC sought bankruptcy court approval of the pre-bankruptcy settlement. Parties not included in the agreement, including RMBS trusts, objected.

After months of litigation and mediation, the parties to the Chapter 11 proceeding agreed to a Plan Support Agreement and submitted a proposed Final Chapter 11 Plan (the “Plan”), which included an unallocated allowed claim of $7.091 billion for all RMBS Trusts, a $209.8 million allowed claim against RFC’s affiliate GMAC Mortgage, and allowed claims for each of the Monolines. The bankruptcy court approved the Plan and the underlying settlements in a December 2013 order. The Plan included creation of ResCap Liquidating Trust (“ResCap”), a Delaware

2 Section A210 of the October 1, 2001 Client Guideline (Def. Trial Ex. 18) broadly defined “Events of Default” to include PRMI breaches of any representation or warranty, failure to perform its obligations under the Client Guide, false representations to GMAC-RFC, failure to provide complete and accurate information, as well as false representations and failure to provide complete and accurate information by the loan borrower or anyone involved in the loan or its underwriting.

-3- statutory trust, to pursue indemnification claims against originators such as PRMI and to distribute any recoveries as assets of the Chapter 11 estate to RMBS Trusts, Monolines, and other creditors.3 To facilitate distribution, the RMBS Trusts and Monolines exchanged their allowed claims for units in the liquidating trust entitling them to payments if ResCap recovered damages.

In 2013, ResCap began suing originators for indemnification. In 2015, the “First Wave” of suits were consolidated in the District of Minnesota before Judge Susan Richard Nelson. In August 2018, Judge Nelson issued her lengthy Common SJ Order, resolving many common issues in ResCap’s favor. Following this Order, only one First Wave case proceeded to trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of ResCap, and the district court entered judgment for $42.7 million in damages and prejudgment interest and $18 million in attorney’s fees. See In re RFC & ResCap Liquid. Tr. Action, 399 F. Supp. 3d 827, 862 (D. Minn. 2019).

II. This Lawsuit

With First Wave proceedings ongoing, ResCap began filing “Second Wave” suits in the District of Minnesota, including this action against PRMI in December 2016. ResCap again asserted breach of contract and indemnification claims, seeking to recover a portion of the allowed bankruptcy claims for those holding units in the liquidating trust. Assigned most Second Wave cases, Judge Nelson stayed the cases

3 The district court described the complex bankruptcy settlement process in detail in its initial published opinion dealing with ResCap’s breach of contract and indemnification claims against originator defendants. See In re RFC and ResCap Liquidating Tr. Action, 332 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1122-26 (D. Minn. 2018) (“Common SJ Order”). As will become apparent, of great importance in resolving this appeal is the court’s ruling, as a matter of law, “that ResCap has met its burden of proving that the Bankruptcy Settlements at issue were reasonable and entered into in good faith.” Though PRMI raises numerous issues on appeal, it does not challenge this ruling.

-4- pending resolution of the pending First Wave summary judgment motions and the single First Wave trial. After she lifted the stay, most Second Wave cases quickly settled. By August 2019, PRMI was the only remaining defendant.

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59 F.4th 905, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rescap-liquidating-trust-v-primary-residential-mortgage-ca8-2023.