CALLAHAN, J.
In accordance with Practice Book §§ 4147 and 4148, the trial court granted the parties’ joint interlocutory motion for reservation of a question of law to the Appellate Court. We subsequently transferred the reservation to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c). The issue agreed upon by the parties and reserved by the trial court for advice is as follows: “In light of the provisions of Public Act No. 93-297, §§ 1 and [29], is an employee barred from recovering uninsured motorist coverage benefits against his employer’s insurer in regard to a motor vehicle accident that occurred prior to the effective date of the [Public] Act?” We conclude that an employee is not so barred and answer “no” to the reserved question.
The following facts are not disputed. On January 13, 1989, Beverly Martin was involved in a two car accident with an uninsured vehicle in Danbury during the course of her employment as a driver for Jace Transportation (Jace). Martin suffered injuries in the accident, which was caused by the tortious conduct of the driver of the uninsured vehicle. As a result of her injuries, Martin [287]*287applied for, and received, workers’ compensation benefits from Jace’s workers’ compensation carrier.
At the time of Martin’s accident, Jace was covered by an insurance policy issued by the defendant, American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania, that included uninsured motorist coverage. At the same time, Martin also had a personal automobile insurance policy with the plaintiff, Reliance Insurance Company, that included uninsured motorist coverage. Martin sought and received compensation1 for her injuries pursuant to the uninsured motorist coverage provided by her personal insurance policy issued by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff subsequently brought this action against the defendant seeking to recover the sum that the plaintiff had paid to Martin. At this early stage in the proceedings, the trial court has deemed the resolution of the reserved question sufficiently important to invoke the procedural mechanism of Practice Book § 4147, which allows this court or the Appellate Court to answer specific reserved questions if that answer is “reasonably certain to enter into the decision of the case” and if it appears that answering the question “would be in the interest of simplicity, directness and economy of judicial action.”
In CNA Ins. Co. v. Colman, 222 Conn. 769, 610 A.2d 1257 (1992), we concluded that an employee injured in an automobile accident during the course of his or her employment who had received workers’ compensation benefits was barred by General Statutes § 31-284 (a)2 [288]*288from recovering “against a commercial insurance provider on an uninsured motorist insurance policy procured by [his or her] employer.”3 Id., 772. We reasoned that “[b]ecause of the central role that the exclusive remedy provision [of § 31-284 (a)] plays in our workers’ [289]*289compensation law, an employee who can receive workers’ compensation benefits is . . . barred from collecting under his employer’s uninsured motorist coverage, whether that coverage is provided through self-insurance or through a commercial insurance policy.” Id., 774.4
In 1993, in response to our decision in Colman, the legislature enacted No. 93-297 of the 1993 Public Acts (P.A. 93-297), § (1) (f) of which provides that “[n]otwithstanding subsection (a) of section 31-284, an employee of a named insured injured while occupying a covered motor vehicle in the course of employment shall be covered by such insured’s otherwise applicable uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.” The effective date of this provision was January 1, 1994, several years after Martin’s automobile accident. The plaintiff, however, asserts that § (1) (f) of P.A. 93-297 was intended by the legislature to seive as clarifying legislation and therefore must be viewed by this court as a declaration of the legislature’s original intent regarding the interplay of the exclusivity provision of the workers’ compensation laws and the uninsured motorist laws. See Darak v. Darak, 210 Conn. 462, 471, 556 A.2d 145 (1989).
“In principle, a statutory amendment that construes and clarifies a prior statute operates as the legislature’s declaration of the meaning of the original act. State v. [290]*290Blasko, 202 Conn. 541, 558, 522 A.2d 753 (1987); Neyland v. Board of Education, 195 Conn. 174, 180, 487 A.2d 181 (1985). [I]f the amendment was enacted soon after controversies arose as to the interpretation of the original act, it is logical to regard the amendment as a legislative interpretation of the original act .... State v. Blasko, supra, 558, quoting 1A J. Sutherland, [Statutory Construction (4th Ed. Sands 1986)], § 22.31, p. 276; see also Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. v. Della Ghelfa, 200 Conn. 630, 640, 513 A.2d 52 (1986). To determine whether an act should be characterized as clarifying legislation, we look to the legislative history to determine the legislative intent. State v. Blasko, supra, 558.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Darak v. Darak, supra, 210 Conn. 471.
An exchange on the floor of the House of Representatives between Representative Robert Farr and Representative Richard Tulisano, one of the sponsors of the House amendment that contained the provision at issue, provides uncontroverted support for the plaintiffs argument that § (1) (f) of P.A. 93-297 was enacted in direct response to our decision in Colman, and that the legislature, in enacting that provision, clarified its intent regarding an injured worker’s ability to collect uninsured motorist benefits from his or her employer’s automobile insurance carrier after having received workers’ compensation benefits. Referring to § (1) (f), Representative Farr asked Representative Tulisano if that provision was “intended to be a recital of what [Representative Tulisano] believe[d] the current law [to be] or [was] that intended to be new legislation?” 36 H.R. Proc., Pt. 27, 1993 Sess., p. 9673. Representative Tulisano responded, “[I]n drafting this, it was intended to be a recital. What we believe current law was and has been, there is a recent Supreme Court case that may have interpreted differently and I think it is a restatement of what we consider [the] law to be at this [291]*291point in time.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Representative Farr then asked how the amendment would affect pending cases in which an employee injured in an automobile accident during the course of his or her employment was seeking to recover from his or her employer’s automobile insurance carrier under the uninsured motorist provisions of the employer’s policy. Representative Tulisano replied, “Since this law doesn’t go into effect until, I think, January, 1994,1 think what it would be is just, as I understand, I think the courts might look at this as [a] restatement of legislative intent
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
CALLAHAN, J.
In accordance with Practice Book §§ 4147 and 4148, the trial court granted the parties’ joint interlocutory motion for reservation of a question of law to the Appellate Court. We subsequently transferred the reservation to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c). The issue agreed upon by the parties and reserved by the trial court for advice is as follows: “In light of the provisions of Public Act No. 93-297, §§ 1 and [29], is an employee barred from recovering uninsured motorist coverage benefits against his employer’s insurer in regard to a motor vehicle accident that occurred prior to the effective date of the [Public] Act?” We conclude that an employee is not so barred and answer “no” to the reserved question.
The following facts are not disputed. On January 13, 1989, Beverly Martin was involved in a two car accident with an uninsured vehicle in Danbury during the course of her employment as a driver for Jace Transportation (Jace). Martin suffered injuries in the accident, which was caused by the tortious conduct of the driver of the uninsured vehicle. As a result of her injuries, Martin [287]*287applied for, and received, workers’ compensation benefits from Jace’s workers’ compensation carrier.
At the time of Martin’s accident, Jace was covered by an insurance policy issued by the defendant, American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania, that included uninsured motorist coverage. At the same time, Martin also had a personal automobile insurance policy with the plaintiff, Reliance Insurance Company, that included uninsured motorist coverage. Martin sought and received compensation1 for her injuries pursuant to the uninsured motorist coverage provided by her personal insurance policy issued by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff subsequently brought this action against the defendant seeking to recover the sum that the plaintiff had paid to Martin. At this early stage in the proceedings, the trial court has deemed the resolution of the reserved question sufficiently important to invoke the procedural mechanism of Practice Book § 4147, which allows this court or the Appellate Court to answer specific reserved questions if that answer is “reasonably certain to enter into the decision of the case” and if it appears that answering the question “would be in the interest of simplicity, directness and economy of judicial action.”
In CNA Ins. Co. v. Colman, 222 Conn. 769, 610 A.2d 1257 (1992), we concluded that an employee injured in an automobile accident during the course of his or her employment who had received workers’ compensation benefits was barred by General Statutes § 31-284 (a)2 [288]*288from recovering “against a commercial insurance provider on an uninsured motorist insurance policy procured by [his or her] employer.”3 Id., 772. We reasoned that “[b]ecause of the central role that the exclusive remedy provision [of § 31-284 (a)] plays in our workers’ [289]*289compensation law, an employee who can receive workers’ compensation benefits is . . . barred from collecting under his employer’s uninsured motorist coverage, whether that coverage is provided through self-insurance or through a commercial insurance policy.” Id., 774.4
In 1993, in response to our decision in Colman, the legislature enacted No. 93-297 of the 1993 Public Acts (P.A. 93-297), § (1) (f) of which provides that “[n]otwithstanding subsection (a) of section 31-284, an employee of a named insured injured while occupying a covered motor vehicle in the course of employment shall be covered by such insured’s otherwise applicable uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.” The effective date of this provision was January 1, 1994, several years after Martin’s automobile accident. The plaintiff, however, asserts that § (1) (f) of P.A. 93-297 was intended by the legislature to seive as clarifying legislation and therefore must be viewed by this court as a declaration of the legislature’s original intent regarding the interplay of the exclusivity provision of the workers’ compensation laws and the uninsured motorist laws. See Darak v. Darak, 210 Conn. 462, 471, 556 A.2d 145 (1989).
“In principle, a statutory amendment that construes and clarifies a prior statute operates as the legislature’s declaration of the meaning of the original act. State v. [290]*290Blasko, 202 Conn. 541, 558, 522 A.2d 753 (1987); Neyland v. Board of Education, 195 Conn. 174, 180, 487 A.2d 181 (1985). [I]f the amendment was enacted soon after controversies arose as to the interpretation of the original act, it is logical to regard the amendment as a legislative interpretation of the original act .... State v. Blasko, supra, 558, quoting 1A J. Sutherland, [Statutory Construction (4th Ed. Sands 1986)], § 22.31, p. 276; see also Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. v. Della Ghelfa, 200 Conn. 630, 640, 513 A.2d 52 (1986). To determine whether an act should be characterized as clarifying legislation, we look to the legislative history to determine the legislative intent. State v. Blasko, supra, 558.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Darak v. Darak, supra, 210 Conn. 471.
An exchange on the floor of the House of Representatives between Representative Robert Farr and Representative Richard Tulisano, one of the sponsors of the House amendment that contained the provision at issue, provides uncontroverted support for the plaintiffs argument that § (1) (f) of P.A. 93-297 was enacted in direct response to our decision in Colman, and that the legislature, in enacting that provision, clarified its intent regarding an injured worker’s ability to collect uninsured motorist benefits from his or her employer’s automobile insurance carrier after having received workers’ compensation benefits. Referring to § (1) (f), Representative Farr asked Representative Tulisano if that provision was “intended to be a recital of what [Representative Tulisano] believe[d] the current law [to be] or [was] that intended to be new legislation?” 36 H.R. Proc., Pt. 27, 1993 Sess., p. 9673. Representative Tulisano responded, “[I]n drafting this, it was intended to be a recital. What we believe current law was and has been, there is a recent Supreme Court case that may have interpreted differently and I think it is a restatement of what we consider [the] law to be at this [291]*291point in time.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Representative Farr then asked how the amendment would affect pending cases in which an employee injured in an automobile accident during the course of his or her employment was seeking to recover from his or her employer’s automobile insurance carrier under the uninsured motorist provisions of the employer’s policy. Representative Tulisano replied, “Since this law doesn’t go into effect until, I think, January, 1994,1 think what it would be is just, as I understand, I think the courts might look at this as [a] restatement of legislative intent and probably inteipret the law [as] we always have been. I just note that we have always understood that the workers’ compensation] carriers had a lien on any proceeds and therefore, they were always covered and I think a, Supreme Court decision was just out of the ordinary in this area.” (Emphasis added.) Id., p. 9674. Representative Farr then responded, “For the record, I would concur with Representative Tulisano’s interpretation of what this language is intended to do.” Id.
This legislative history persuades us that § (1) (f) of P.A. 93-297 was intended to be clarifying legislation and, as such, must be accepted as a declaration of the legislature’s original intent pertaining to the interplay between the uninsured motorist provisions of General Statutes § 38a-336 and the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision of § 31-284. See Darak v. Darak, supra, 210 Conn. 471. Consequently, we conclude that an employee is not barred from recovering uninsured motorist coverage benefits against his or her employer’s insurer in regard to a motor vehicle accident that occurred prior to the effective date of P.A. 93-297.5
[292]*292The reserved question is answered “no.”
No costs will be taxed in this court to either party.
In this opinion PETERS, C. J., and BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ and PALMER, Js., concurred.