Peterson, J.
— This case involves an intersection accident wherein the plaintiff brought an action to recover damages sustained when the plaintiff, while operating his car, was involved in an accident with an automobile operated by defendant. The accident occurred at the intersection of Jennings Street, running north and south, and Twelfth Street, running east and west, in Sioux City, Iowa. Plaintiff alleged certain acts of negligence on the part of defendant, which defendant denied and defendant also denied that plaintiff was free from contributory negligence.
Plaintiff was driving his car in a northerly direction on Jennings Street and defendant was driving his automobile in a ■westerly direction on Twelfth Street. The case proceeded to trial [1042]*1042before a jury and at tbe close of plaintiff’s evidence tbe defendant’s motion for a directed verdict was sustained by tbe trial court and tbe jury was instructed to enter a verdict in favor of defendant on tbe basis that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in failing to yield the right-of-way in traversing- an intersection. Plaintiff appealed.
Plaintiff testified as he was entering the intersection of Jennings Street and Twelfth Street from tbe south be looked to tbe right and saw defendant’s ear driving west on Twelfth Street about 150 feet away. He then looked to the front as it was a route for school children. When he looked again defendant’s car was about to bit his car.
Plaintiff’s estimate of defendant’s speed was 35 to 40 miles per hour. He said his own speed was 15 to 20 miles per hour. Plaintiff was wrong as to speed or distance. Plaintiff had about 35 feet to go to cross tbe intersection. If defendant drove 150 feet while plaintiff drove 35 to 40 feet, he was going about 75 miles per hour. If defendant was only traveling 35 to 40 miles per hour, plaintiff had ample time to' cross the intersection and leave Twelfth Street behind. Something was wrong, but the only testimony we have in the record is plaintiff’s. Appellant states in the record there were other witnesses "to the accident, but their testimony is not shown. This was a mistake. We might have received helpful information from such evidence.
The question is whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, or should the question be submitted to the jury? In considering a directed verdict plaintiff is entitled to have evidence considered in light most favorable to him. In the absence of more evidence as to what happened from other witnesses, or the defendant, the situation is very doubtful as to plaintiff being guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The criterion is whether two‘or more reasonable minds would differ as to whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. On the present state of the record there is a question of serious doubt. Under such conditions the court should have heard all the evidence and submitted the question to the jury.
Normally, the question of contributory negligence is sub[1043]*1043mitted to tbe jury to be decided as a question of fact by the jury. Brown v. Guiter, 256 Iowa 671, 128 N.W.2d 896; Perry v. Eblen, 250 Iowa 1338, 98 N.W.2d 832; Peterschmidt v. Menke, 249 Iowa 859, 89 N.W.2d 152; Miller v. Griffith, 246 Iowa 476, 66 N.W.2d 505; Pestotnik v. Balliet, 233 Iowa 1047, 10 N.W.2d 99; Davidson v. Vast, 233 Iowa 534, 10 N.W.2d 12; Beardsley v. Hobbs, 239 Iowa 1332, 34 N.W.2d 916.
It is difficult to .find two state of facts in collision cases at intersections that are identical. This is true with reference to the case at bar. However, we find some decisions by this court pertaining to cases which are somewhat the same.
We must consider and keep in mind the statutory provision pertaining to the matter of right-of-way which is section 321.319, 1962 Code of Iowa, as follows: “Where two vehicles are approaching on any public street or highway so that their paths will intersect and there is danger of collision, the vehicle approaching the other from the right shall have the right of way.”
We-have held, however, that the right-ofrway statute as to passage of ears at intersections is not an. absolute right, but is a relative right. Jacobson v. Aldrich, 246 Iowa 1160, 1164, 68 N.W.2d 733. Our statement is as follows':-
“Certainly the defendant had the directional right of way. This is not an absolute right, but relative.- It is qualified by section 321.288, Code of Iowa, 1950, which - so far as material says: ‘The person operating a motor vehicle *'? shall have the same under control and shall reduce the speed -to a reasonable and' proper rate: * * * 3. When approaching and traversing a crossing or intersection of public highways * *
“There is additionally the duty of all parties to exercise ■reasonable care to keep a proper lookout at all times, particularly when approaching and traversing an intersection. As in all eases, this duty is in proportion to the danger reasonably to be anticipated.” -
Ordinarily, where the party has been held contributorially negligent as -a matter of law in failing- to yield the right^o-f-way to a car approaching from the right the question of improper ■lookout is involved. In such cases either the plaintiff- did not look to ascertain if there would be danger of a collision or looked [1044]*1044and failed to see what was in plain sight. Such cases were Beezley v. Kleinholtz, 251 Iowa 133, 100 N.W.2d 105; Peterschmidt v. Menke, 249 Iowa 859, 89 N.W.2d 152; Olson v. Truax, 250 Iowa 1040, 97 N.W.2d 900.
This is not the situation however in the case at bar. Plaintiff testified, as above outlined in detail, that as he approached the intersection he took a quick glance to the left and saw there were no vehicles approaching; then he looked to his right and discovered defendant’s approaching automobile. Defendant’s car however was about one-half block, or 150' feet to his right, which gave him more than sufficient time and space to go through the intersection and proceed north on Jennings Street.
Plaintiff testified he assumed that he had time to get through the intersection. This is a state of mind with reference to which plaintiff had a right to testify. Brown v. Guiter, 256 Iowa 671, 128 N.W.2d 896; Shuck v. Keefe, 205 Iowa 365, 218 N.W. 31. In the Shuck case the court held that a jury case was presented as to plaintiff’s contributory negligence where plaintiff testified he saw the defendant approaching from the right, 100 feet away and he assumed he had time to cross. The court said that it could not be said as a matter of law that his assumption was unreasonable.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Peterson, J.
— This case involves an intersection accident wherein the plaintiff brought an action to recover damages sustained when the plaintiff, while operating his car, was involved in an accident with an automobile operated by defendant. The accident occurred at the intersection of Jennings Street, running north and south, and Twelfth Street, running east and west, in Sioux City, Iowa. Plaintiff alleged certain acts of negligence on the part of defendant, which defendant denied and defendant also denied that plaintiff was free from contributory negligence.
Plaintiff was driving his car in a northerly direction on Jennings Street and defendant was driving his automobile in a ■westerly direction on Twelfth Street. The case proceeded to trial [1042]*1042before a jury and at tbe close of plaintiff’s evidence tbe defendant’s motion for a directed verdict was sustained by tbe trial court and tbe jury was instructed to enter a verdict in favor of defendant on tbe basis that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in failing to yield the right-of-way in traversing- an intersection. Plaintiff appealed.
Plaintiff testified as he was entering the intersection of Jennings Street and Twelfth Street from tbe south be looked to tbe right and saw defendant’s ear driving west on Twelfth Street about 150 feet away. He then looked to the front as it was a route for school children. When he looked again defendant’s car was about to bit his car.
Plaintiff’s estimate of defendant’s speed was 35 to 40 miles per hour. He said his own speed was 15 to 20 miles per hour. Plaintiff was wrong as to speed or distance. Plaintiff had about 35 feet to go to cross tbe intersection. If defendant drove 150 feet while plaintiff drove 35 to 40 feet, he was going about 75 miles per hour. If defendant was only traveling 35 to 40 miles per hour, plaintiff had ample time to' cross the intersection and leave Twelfth Street behind. Something was wrong, but the only testimony we have in the record is plaintiff’s. Appellant states in the record there were other witnesses "to the accident, but their testimony is not shown. This was a mistake. We might have received helpful information from such evidence.
The question is whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, or should the question be submitted to the jury? In considering a directed verdict plaintiff is entitled to have evidence considered in light most favorable to him. In the absence of more evidence as to what happened from other witnesses, or the defendant, the situation is very doubtful as to plaintiff being guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The criterion is whether two‘or more reasonable minds would differ as to whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. On the present state of the record there is a question of serious doubt. Under such conditions the court should have heard all the evidence and submitted the question to the jury.
Normally, the question of contributory negligence is sub[1043]*1043mitted to tbe jury to be decided as a question of fact by the jury. Brown v. Guiter, 256 Iowa 671, 128 N.W.2d 896; Perry v. Eblen, 250 Iowa 1338, 98 N.W.2d 832; Peterschmidt v. Menke, 249 Iowa 859, 89 N.W.2d 152; Miller v. Griffith, 246 Iowa 476, 66 N.W.2d 505; Pestotnik v. Balliet, 233 Iowa 1047, 10 N.W.2d 99; Davidson v. Vast, 233 Iowa 534, 10 N.W.2d 12; Beardsley v. Hobbs, 239 Iowa 1332, 34 N.W.2d 916.
It is difficult to .find two state of facts in collision cases at intersections that are identical. This is true with reference to the case at bar. However, we find some decisions by this court pertaining to cases which are somewhat the same.
We must consider and keep in mind the statutory provision pertaining to the matter of right-of-way which is section 321.319, 1962 Code of Iowa, as follows: “Where two vehicles are approaching on any public street or highway so that their paths will intersect and there is danger of collision, the vehicle approaching the other from the right shall have the right of way.”
We-have held, however, that the right-ofrway statute as to passage of ears at intersections is not an. absolute right, but is a relative right. Jacobson v. Aldrich, 246 Iowa 1160, 1164, 68 N.W.2d 733. Our statement is as follows':-
“Certainly the defendant had the directional right of way. This is not an absolute right, but relative.- It is qualified by section 321.288, Code of Iowa, 1950, which - so far as material says: ‘The person operating a motor vehicle *'? shall have the same under control and shall reduce the speed -to a reasonable and' proper rate: * * * 3. When approaching and traversing a crossing or intersection of public highways * *
“There is additionally the duty of all parties to exercise ■reasonable care to keep a proper lookout at all times, particularly when approaching and traversing an intersection. As in all eases, this duty is in proportion to the danger reasonably to be anticipated.” -
Ordinarily, where the party has been held contributorially negligent as -a matter of law in failing- to yield the right^o-f-way to a car approaching from the right the question of improper ■lookout is involved. In such cases either the plaintiff- did not look to ascertain if there would be danger of a collision or looked [1044]*1044and failed to see what was in plain sight. Such cases were Beezley v. Kleinholtz, 251 Iowa 133, 100 N.W.2d 105; Peterschmidt v. Menke, 249 Iowa 859, 89 N.W.2d 152; Olson v. Truax, 250 Iowa 1040, 97 N.W.2d 900.
This is not the situation however in the case at bar. Plaintiff testified, as above outlined in detail, that as he approached the intersection he took a quick glance to the left and saw there were no vehicles approaching; then he looked to his right and discovered defendant’s approaching automobile. Defendant’s car however was about one-half block, or 150' feet to his right, which gave him more than sufficient time and space to go through the intersection and proceed north on Jennings Street.
Plaintiff testified he assumed that he had time to get through the intersection. This is a state of mind with reference to which plaintiff had a right to testify. Brown v. Guiter, 256 Iowa 671, 128 N.W.2d 896; Shuck v. Keefe, 205 Iowa 365, 218 N.W. 31. In the Shuck case the court held that a jury case was presented as to plaintiff’s contributory negligence where plaintiff testified he saw the defendant approaching from the right, 100 feet away and he assumed he had time to cross. The court said that it could not be said as a matter of law that his assumption was unreasonable.
In the Jacobson case, supra, on page 1165 of 246 Iowa, the court said: “He who looks to his right and sees no vehicle approaching within a distance which could be covered at a lawful and prudent speed so as to cause a collision at the intersection is not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law if he assumes there is no danger of such an accident. This rule applies also if he sees a car approaching on his right, but at such a distance a lawful speed would not bring it to the intersection in time to cause a collision.”
The question of whether the matter of contributory negligence was a question for the jury is discussed at considerable length by Judge Bliss in Lawson v. Fordyce, 234 Iowa 632, 644, 12 N.W.2d 301. The case was a little different from the ordinary automobile case because it involved one of the parties leading a cow and whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence when he was leading such cow on the right-hand side of the [1045]*1045highway. Judge Bliss said in the opinion: “Negligence to be contributory must have a proximate causal relation to the injury. Whether it has or has not is ordinarily a question for the jury. Carlson v. Meusberger, 200 Iowa 65, 71, 73, 204 N.W. 432; Lane v. Varlamos, 213 Iowa 795, 799, 239 N.W. 689 [together with four other citations].”
The case of Falt v. Krug, 239 Iowa 766, 774, 32 N.W.2d 781, was an intersection collision case. The trial court directed a verdict for defendant. Judge Mantz in writing the opinion for this court quoted from the case of Fitter v. Iowa Telephone Co., 143 Iowa 689, 693, 121 N.W. 48, as follows: “Proximate cause and contributory negligence are questions for the jury, save in very exceptional cases where the facts are so clear and undisputed, and the relation of cause and effect so apparent to evéry' candid mind, that but one conclusion may be fairly drawn therefrom.”
The case of Short v. Powell, 228 Iowa 333, 335, 291 N.W. 406, was an intersection collision ease with some similarities to the ease at bar. We said in the ease: “Whether the court was in error in deciding the case as a matter of law, or whether it should have submitted the case to the jury for determination, is before us on this appeal. We have so frequently held as to require no citation in its support, that where reasonable minds may reach different conclusions from the facts presented, the case is one for the jury.”
The case of Beardsley v. Hobbs, 239 Iowa 1332, 1337, 34 N.W.2d 916, 918, was an intersection collision case occurring near Salix, Iowa. We again said: “If fair-minded and reasonable men would differ on the factual question whether one was guilty of contributory negligence that question is for the trier of the facts.”
Hutchins v. LaBarre, 242 Iowa 515, 531, 47 N.W.2d 269, was an intersection collision case in the residential section of Algona. It had many facts somewhat similar to the facts in the case at bar. After outlining the facts we stated: “We think, under the circumstances of this case, that it was a question of fact for the jury to say whether Mitchell’s failure to look to the north proximately contributed to the accident, and not a matter [1046]*1046to be summarily disposed of as a question of law. Tbe judgment of tbe court below is reversed.”
Tbe ease of Miller v. Griffith, 246 Iowa 476, 479, 66 N.W.2d 505, was an intersection collision case in Cass County. The case was submitted to tbe jury, but appellant insisted tbe question of contributory negligence should be decided against defendant as a matter of law. We stated: “Contributory negligence and proximate cause are strictly issues of fact and ordinarily are for tbe jury except where, under tbe entire record, plaintiff’s contributory negligence is so palpable that reasonable minds may fairly reach no other conclusion, and the question becomes one of law for the court. Kinney v. Larsen, 239 Iowa 494, 498, 31 N.W.2d 635; Howie v. Ryder & McGloughlin, 244 Iowa 861, 865, 58 N.W.2d 389. While we have not set forth the record at. length, an examination thereof shows a situation upon which reasonable minds might well differ. It was properly submitted to the jury. The assignment is without merit.”
Under the facts of the instant case it could not be said that reasonable minds would agree on the matter of plaintiff having been guilty of contributory negligence. The trial court was in error in directing a verdict in favor of defendant on such basis. The case is reversed. — Reversed.
All JustiCes concur except Stuart and ThompsoN, JJ., who dissent.