Reeves v. CMP Consultants, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedFebruary 22, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-01308
StatusUnknown

This text of Reeves v. CMP Consultants, Inc. (Reeves v. CMP Consultants, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reeves v. CMP Consultants, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MICHAEL REEVES, Plaintiff, 23-CV-1308 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND CMP CONSULTANTS, INC., et al., Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action invoking the Court’s federal question jurisdiction and asserting a claim of “discrimination in fair housing.” (ECF 1, at 2.)1 He submits an unsigned order to show cause for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order with a supporting memorandum of law. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the defendants from “further withholding of [a] NYC lottery apartment that [he] won through [a] lottery,” and to stay eviction proceedings in the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (“Housing Court”). (ECF 3, at 1.) By order dated February 16, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunctive relief and a temporary restraining order, but grants him leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

1 The Court quotes from the complaint and other documents verbatim. Unless otherwise indicated, all grammar, spelling, punctuation, and emphasis are as in the original. relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially

plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff submitted a complaint naming CMP Consultants, Inc. as the sole defendant, asserting a claim of discrimination in fair housing, and referring the Court to the order to show cause and the supporting memorandum of law for the facts of his case. In both the order to show cause and supporting memorandum of law, Plaintiff names as Defendants CMP Consultants, Inc., 101 West End REIT, LLC, Marita Ponce, Orlando Ponce, and Dermot Realty Management Company. (ECF 3, at 1; ECF 4, at 1.) The Court assumes that Plaintiff brings this action against

all five named defendants. The following assertions are taken from Plaintiff’s memorandum of law. On or about August 13, 2022, Plaintiff won the “NYC Housing Lottery Lot #641,” which grants him the opportunity to rent an affordable apartment in a building located at 101 West End Avenue in Manhattan. (ECF 4, at 2.) Plaintiff, who had previously lived in the neighborhood, is familiar with the building, which is “occupied ‘predominantly by white’ people.” (Id.) Since Plaintiff’s lottery win, Defendants, who either own or manage the building, “have taken active steps to prevent [him] from moving into the building due to his race.” (Id.) After winning the lottery, Plaintiff contacted the defendants and was told that there was no housing lottery for that building, but after he threatened to file a complaint with United States Department of Housing

and Urban Development (“HUD”), they “admitted the truth.” (Id.) However, nothing happened after that and all of Plaintiff’s phone calls and emails to defendants went unanswered. After two months, Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants with the New York State Division of Human Rights (“NYSDHR”). Plaintiff asserts that Defendants responded by retaliating against him, “by repeatedly asking for the same documents . . . to harass, taunt and to frustrate him.” (Id.) For example, Defendants have demanded all the pages of Plaintiff’s checking account statements from June 2022, through February 5, 2023, although “[t]here is no logical explanation for doing this.” (Id.) Defendants claimed that they have to continuously update their records, which is a “baseless justification” and even if true, “highly unfair to make an applicant, better yet a lottery winner, to have to suffer through such nightmare of an experience.” (Id.) Defendants have also demanded that Plaintiff provide “cash app information,” and threatened to take away the lottery unit until he did so. They only relented when Plaintiff submitted a cash app statement showing no transactions and no balance. (Id. at 3.)

On January 13, 2023, Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s NYSDHR complaint, indicating that the delay in releasing the apartment to Plaintiff was caused by the New York City Housing Authority’s (“NYCHA”) delays in approving Plaintiff’s Section 8 voucher. On February 2, 2023, Plaintiff received an eviction order from the Housing Court to vacate his current apartment in Brooklyn, New York, because he owed two months of back rent. He attributes the eviction order to the delay caused by Defendant’s actions. On February 7, 2023, after learning that Plaintiff was facing eviction from his current apartment, NYCHA approved Plaintiff’s Section 8 voucher and “issued a conditional move in.” (Id. at 3.) A NYCHA official informed Plaintiff that “the landlord,” whom Plaintiff does not identify, had tried to discourage issuance of the voucher. (Id.) Further, although NYCHA has completed an inspection of the apartment and

issued a move in letter, Defendants continue to obstruct Plaintiff’s access to the apartment.

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Bluebook (online)
Reeves v. CMP Consultants, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reeves-v-cmp-consultants-inc-nysd-2023.