Redstone v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.

583 F. Supp. 74, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20725
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedJanuary 5, 1984
DocketCiv. A. 83-414-S
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 583 F. Supp. 74 (Redstone v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Redstone v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 583 F. Supp. 74, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20725 (D. Mass. 1984).

Opinion

*75 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SKINNER, District Judge.

This is an action for securities fraud and conversion. The defendant has moved to dismiss and to strike counts of the complaint. The motion is allowed in part and denied in part as set out below.

The plaintiffs, the Redstones, are investors who wished to invest some five million dollars in municipal securities in the summer of 1982. The Redstones sought the assistance of Herbert Cobey, a securities broker-dealer with the investment banking firm Goldman, Sachs & Co. (“Goldman”). According to the plaintiffs, Cobey held himself and his firm out as experts in the field of investment counseling, and led the plaintiffs to rely on their expertise. The plaintiffs allege that Cobey went to some lengths to establish a fiduciary relationship with them. From July, 1982 through October, 1982, Cobey acted as broker-dealer for the plaintiffs and purchased securities on their behalf.

The plaintiffs complain of two wrongs. First, they allege that Cobey fraudulently breached his duty to them by not disclosing his intention to steer their funds into securities for which Goldman was acting as underwriter or dealer. During the period in which Cobey was advising the plaintiffs, interest rates were falling, and the plaintiffs allege, in effect, that Cobey failed to invest their money promptly in higher yield securities because he was waiting to put it into securities that Goldman was marketing. As a result of Cobey’s delay in investing their funds, the plaintiffs allege that they ended up with a less valuable, lower yield portfolio. The plaintiffs allege in addition that Cobey made an unauthorized purchase of bonds of the City of Malden and wrongfully charged their account for the loss on disposition of the securities.

The plaintiffs bring their action under several different theories. Wrongful steering of the plaintiff’s investment is alleged to create liability under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act and the regulations promulgated pursuant to it, and in addition, to create liability under the Massachusetts law of negligence, contract, fiduciary duty and unfair business practices (M.G.L. e. 93A). Relief is sought under the same Massachusetts law theories for the unauthorized purchase of the Malden bonds. In addition, the plaintiffs seek relief for both wrongs as violations of Rule G-19 of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (“MSRB”).

The defendants have moved (1) that all the counts of the complaint arising out of the alleged wrongful selection of investment be dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted: (2) that the MSRB and Chapter 93A claims be dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted; (3) that all claims against the individual defendants be dismissed (the plaintiff has named all of the partners and some of the limited partners of Goldman as well as the partnership itself); (4) that the plaintiff’s request for exemplary damages in 1139(c) of the complaint be stricken “for legal insufficiency”; (5) that the defendants be awarded their costs, expenses and attorney’s fees.

Both parties have assumed for the purposes of this motion that the Exchange Act will support a private action for the kind of nondisclosure alleged here.

The principal attack brought by the defendants on the plaintiffs’ claim of wrongful steering goes to the issue of damages. The defendants argue that since the plaintiffs’ portfolio has appreciated in the months since the purchases were made the plaintiffs suffered no compensable loss as a result of the defendants’ conduct.

The defendants rely initially on the language of 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a), which restricts damages awarded under the Exchange Act to “actual damages”. The defendants argue that this language implies a rigid limit of damage awards to out-of-pocket losses. The Second Circuit has, in a thorough opinion, examined the meaning of the “actual damage” concept. Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107 (1981). The court ruled that the word “actual” was meant to prohibit punitive damages, and to prevent dou *76 ble recovery by those who assert both state and federal claims arising out of the same conduct. Osofsky, supra at 111. Citing Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64, 23 L.Ed. 802 (1876), the Court reasoned that the term “actual damages” had an accepted meaning at the time of the enactment of the Exchange Act (1934). Actual damages meant compensatory damages measured by economic loss. Osofsky, supra at 111. “[Tjhere cannot be any one rule of damages which will apply in all cases, even where it is conceded that the finding must be limited to actual damages”. Id., quoting Birdsall, supra at 70. “It is for the district judge, after becoming aware of the nature of the cáse, to determine the appropriate measure of damages in the first instance.” Arrington v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 651 F.2d 615, 620-621 (9th Cir.1981).

The defendants argue that our Court of Appeals has specified the measure of damages in cases where a purchaser of securities has been defrauded. Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 879, 86 S.Ct. 163, 15 L.Ed.2d 120 (1965) involved a group of stockholders who proved that the defendant had fraudulently induced them to sell their interest in a company to him. Judge Aldrich stated that in the case of a defrauded buyer, damages are to be reckoned “solely by the difference between the real value of the property at the date of its sale to the plaintiffs and the price paid for it, with interest from that date, and, in addition, such outlays as were legitimately attributable to the defendant’s conduct, but not damages covering ‘the expected fruits of an unrealized speculation.’ ” Id. at 786 (citing Sigafus v. Porter, 179 U.S. 116, 21 S.Ct. 34, 45 L.Ed. 113 (1900))

I do not read Judge Aldrich’s comment as requiring the denial of recovery on the facts of this case. The plaintiffs allege that they instructed Cobey to purchase a very specific class of securities, AA-grade municipal bonds. These bonds had a known yield. The defendants failed to make these purchases, and ultimately purchased lower yield securities in furtherance of their marketing purposes. The plaintiffs are therefore seeking realization of their reasonably certain expectations rather than “the expected fruits of an unrealized speculation”.

The case law in other circuits is consistent with this reading of Janigan. Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357,1360 (8th Cir.) cert. den. 435 U.S. 951, 98 S.Ct. 1578, 55 L.Ed.2d 801 (1978) (out-of-pocket rule not a talisman); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S.

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Bluebook (online)
583 F. Supp. 74, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20725, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/redstone-v-goldman-sachs-co-mad-1984.