Redmond v. United States

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedMarch 17, 2022
Docket3:22-cv-01107
StatusUnknown

This text of Redmond v. United States (Redmond v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Redmond v. United States, (N.D. Cal. 2022).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JOHN DOE, Case No. 22-cv-01107-TSH

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 9 v. PROCEED ANONYMOUSLY;

10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL; GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 11 Defendant. APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; SCREENING 12 COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(E); DENYING MOTION IN 13 DEFENSE OF RICO RACKETEERING 14 FILING

15 I. INTRO DUCTION 16 Plaintiff John Doe brings this case against Defendant United States of America. ECF No. 17 1. On February 22, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed Anonymously (ECF No. 2), 18 Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 3), Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 5), 19 and Motion in Defense of RICO Racketeering Filing (ECF No. 6). For the reasons stated below, 20 the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed Anonymously, Motion to Appoint Counsel, and 21 Motion in Defense of RICO Racketeering Filing. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Application to 22 Proceed in Forma Pauperis but finds the complaint deficient under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). No later 23 than April 25, 2022, Plaintiff must file a first amended complaint curing the deficiencies 24 identified in this screening order or a response arguing why the current complaint is sufficient. If 25 Plaintiff fails to file a response or the response fails to cure the deficiencies addressed herein, the 26 case will be reassigned to a Unites States district judge with a recommendation for dismissal. 27 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff brings this suit against the United States of America, alleging breach of contract, 3 conversion, unjust enrichment, fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, intentional 4 infliction of emotional distress, violation of the Federal Torts Claims Act, and patent infringement. 5 ECF No. 1, Complaint, at ¶¶ 191-297. Plaintiff’s claims arise from an alleged conspiracy among 6 government officials to deprive Plaintiff of a government grant to build electric cars. Id. at 35. 7 Plaintiff also alleges companies bribe U.S. politicians and deprive the stock market in violation of 8 plaintiff’s civil rights, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), and 9 antitrust laws. Id. at 19-20. Plaintiff claims he reported the conspiracy to the government and was 10 since been targeted and attacked by hackers. Id. at 57, ¶¶ 215-16. Plaintiff seeks damages and 11 injunctive relief. Id. at 76-77. 12 III. MOTION TO PROCEED ANONYMOUSLY 13 Plaintiff moves to proceed under the pseudonym “John Doe” out of fear that ex-spy agency 14 contractors have been hired to stalk, harass, and attack plaintiff. ECF No. 2 at 1. 15 “The normal presumption in litigation is that parties must use their real names.” Doe v. 16 Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 596 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010); see 17 also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a)(requiring that the title of every complaint “include the names of all the 18 parties”). This presumption is related to the public’s common law right of access to judicial 19 proceedings, Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2000), 20 and “the right of private individuals to confront their accusers.” Kamehameha Schools, 596 F.3d 21 at 1042. Nevertheless, a party may proceed anonymously when “special circumstances justify 22 secrecy.” Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d at 1067. To determine whether a plaintiff has 23 overcome such presumption, a court considers the follows factors: (1) “the severity of the 24 threatened injury;” (2) “the reasonableness of the anonymous party’s fears;” (3) “the anonymous 25 party's vulnerability to retaliation;” (4) “prejudice at each stage of the proceedings to defendants;” 26 and (5) “the public's interest.” Id. at 1068. 27 Here, Plaintiff makes broad and conclusory statements regarding his alleged harassment 1 evidence of harassment or stalking. Compare ECF No. 2 at 2 (“I have been previously attacked 2 and have active death threats against me. Private ex-spy agency contractors like Fusion GPS, 3 Media Matters, Black Cube, In-Q-Tel and others have been hired to stalk and harass me online.”) 4 with Kamehameha Schools, 596 F.3d at 1043 (“The Doe children point to threats . . . “jus gonna 5 get lickins everyday” and that these “4 kids ... will need 10 bodyguards lol.” . . . the phone call to 6 their attorney threatening that now “both you and your haole clients can get the lickins' you 7 deserve.”); see also Doe v. Coder, 10-cv-4756-MMC, 2010 WL 4938282, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8 30, 2010) (denying motion to proceed anonymously where “Plaintiff's showing is entirely 9 speculative. Plaintiff has not shown any threat of harm, let alone a threat of “severe harm.”) 10 Plaintiff also does not identify evidence showing his vulnerability, address prejudice at this stage 11 of litigation, or explain how Plaintiff’s use of a pseudonym overrides the public’s interest in 12 viewing public records and documents. Notably, Plaintiff included his name in his Civil Cover 13 Sheet and Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. See Doe v. United States Dept. of Health 14 and Human Serv., 517 Fed.Appx. 548, 549 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The district court did not abuse its 15 discretion in denying Doe leave to proceed anonymously where there were insufficiently 16 “unusual” circumstances justifying anonymity, and where Doe failed to redact her true name in 17 documents filed in the district court.”) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed Anonymously 18 is DENIED. 19 IV. MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL 20 Plaintiff requests the Court appoint counsel because Plaintiff has a disability. ECF No. 5 at 21 2. Plaintiff also asserts appointment of counsel will ensure fairness given that his claims involves 22 a constitutional challenge. Id. at 2-3. 23 There is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case unless a “litigant may lose his 24 physical liberty if he loses the litigation.” Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Svcs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 25 (1981); see also Gardner v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792, 793 (9th Cir. 1965) (“[T]he appointment of 26 counsel in a civil case is . . . a privilege and not a right.”). The Court may under “exceptional 27 circumstances” appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1 determining whether “exceptional circumstances” exist, the Court considers “the likelihood of 2 success on the merits as well as the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light 3 of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 4 1983). “Neither of these factors is dispositive and both must be viewed together before reaching a 5 decision on request of counsel.” Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). 6 The Court finds Plaintiff’s circumstances are not “exceptional” under the meaning 7 described above. Given the early stage of litigation, the likelihood of success of Plaintiff’s claims 8 is unclear.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. Mitchell
596 F.3d 18 (First Circuit, 2010)
United States v. Mitchell
445 U.S. 535 (Supreme Court, 1980)
United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.
503 U.S. 30 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc.
622 F.3d 1035 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Gilbert Schmidt v. Karl Herrmann
614 F.2d 1221 (Ninth Circuit, 1980)
Michael Henry Ferdik v. Joe Bonzelet, Sheriff
963 F.2d 1258 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
Mchenry v. Renne
84 F.3d 1172 (Ninth Circuit, 1996)
United States v. Bormes
133 S. Ct. 12 (Supreme Court, 2012)
Navajo Nation v. Department of the Interior
876 F.3d 1144 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Redmond v. United States, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/redmond-v-united-states-cand-2022.