IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MICHAEL REDFORD, Civil No. 3:19-cv-0555
Petitioner (Judge Mariani)
v. .
Governor TOM WOLF, Respondent MEMORANDUM
Petitioner, Michael Redford, an inmate confined in the Calhoun State Prison,
Morgan, Georgia, initiated the above captioned in the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania. By Notice of Removal dated March 29, 2019, the action was removed to the
Middle District of Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1). The sole Respondent is Governor Tom Wolf.
Presently before the Court is Respondent's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs complaint. (Doc. 3).
The motion is fully briefed and is ripe for disposition. For the reasons set forth below, the
Court will grant Respondent's motion to dismiss.
|. Background On a form complaint used in the Superior Court of the State of Georgia, Petitioner,
crossed out “Georgia,” inserted “Pennsylvania’ and entitled his action a “Civil Action
Mandamus,” in which he seeks an order of court releasing him from prison “within 24
hours”. (Doc. 6-1 at 7). Specifically, Petitioner alleges that Governor Tom Wolf allowed the
governor of Georgia, the Philadelphia Sheriff and Northeast 52™ Precinct Police Department
to “kidnap” him “without extradition procedures, probable cause or Governor Wolfs official
grant of extradition,” in Violation of Petitioner's “extradition process granted by the United
States Constitution.” Id. He asserts claims under (i) the Extradition Clause in the United
States Constitution; (ii) Pennsylvania’s Uniform Extradition Act; and (iii) various
constitutional amendments. /d. For relief, Petitioner “seeks immediate release from prison
in Georgia. Id. Specifically, he requests “Governor Wolf to call Governor Nathan Deal of
Georgia and order within 24 hours of this court order release of [Petitioner] from Georgia's
Calhoun State Prison, to end this interstate kidnapping.” Id
ll. Standard Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide the defendant
notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Phillips v. Cty. of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). The plaintiff must present facts that, accepted
as true, demonstrate a plausible right to relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “only a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” a complaint may nevertheless be dismissed
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for its “failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts as true all
factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
them, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
679 (2009); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). To
prevent dismissal, all civil complaints must set out “sufficient factual matter” to show that
their claims are facially plausible. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,
578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). The plausibility standard requires more than a mere
possibility that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct: “[W]here the well-pleaded
facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged — but it has not ‘show(n]' — ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Accordingly, the Third Circuit has identified the following steps that a district court
must take when reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion: (1) identify the elements that a plaintiff must
plead to state a claim; (2) identify any conclusory allegations contained in the complaint that
are “not entitled” to the assumption of truth; and (3) determine whether any “well-pleaded
factual allegations” contained in the complaint ‘plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”
See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 421, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). The Third Circuit has specified that in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “a court must consider only the complaint,
exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly
authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents.” See
Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.
White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).
in the context of pro se prisoner litigation, the court must be mindful that a document
filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.” See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can be dismissed for failure to state a claim
only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim that would entitle him to relief. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
Ill. Discussion Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1364, ‘“[t]he district courts ... have original jurisdiction of any
action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or
any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Authority to
issue a writ of mandamus is bestowed by the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). See
Mitchell v. United States, 419 F.Supp.2d 709, 712 (W.D. Pa.2009).
Mandamus is a “drastic remedy that ‘is seldom issued and [] is discouraged.’ ” In re
Patenaude, 210 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir.2000). The Supreme Court has said that “[t]he
extraordinary remedy of mandamus ... will issue only to compel the performance of a ‘clear
nondiscretionary duty.’” Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MICHAEL REDFORD, Civil No. 3:19-cv-0555
Petitioner (Judge Mariani)
v. .
Governor TOM WOLF, Respondent MEMORANDUM
Petitioner, Michael Redford, an inmate confined in the Calhoun State Prison,
Morgan, Georgia, initiated the above captioned in the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania. By Notice of Removal dated March 29, 2019, the action was removed to the
Middle District of Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1). The sole Respondent is Governor Tom Wolf.
Presently before the Court is Respondent's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs complaint. (Doc. 3).
The motion is fully briefed and is ripe for disposition. For the reasons set forth below, the
Court will grant Respondent's motion to dismiss.
|. Background On a form complaint used in the Superior Court of the State of Georgia, Petitioner,
crossed out “Georgia,” inserted “Pennsylvania’ and entitled his action a “Civil Action
Mandamus,” in which he seeks an order of court releasing him from prison “within 24
hours”. (Doc. 6-1 at 7). Specifically, Petitioner alleges that Governor Tom Wolf allowed the
governor of Georgia, the Philadelphia Sheriff and Northeast 52™ Precinct Police Department
to “kidnap” him “without extradition procedures, probable cause or Governor Wolfs official
grant of extradition,” in Violation of Petitioner's “extradition process granted by the United
States Constitution.” Id. He asserts claims under (i) the Extradition Clause in the United
States Constitution; (ii) Pennsylvania’s Uniform Extradition Act; and (iii) various
constitutional amendments. /d. For relief, Petitioner “seeks immediate release from prison
in Georgia. Id. Specifically, he requests “Governor Wolf to call Governor Nathan Deal of
Georgia and order within 24 hours of this court order release of [Petitioner] from Georgia's
Calhoun State Prison, to end this interstate kidnapping.” Id
ll. Standard Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide the defendant
notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Phillips v. Cty. of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). The plaintiff must present facts that, accepted
as true, demonstrate a plausible right to relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “only a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” a complaint may nevertheless be dismissed
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for its “failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts as true all
factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
them, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
679 (2009); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). To
prevent dismissal, all civil complaints must set out “sufficient factual matter” to show that
their claims are facially plausible. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,
578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). The plausibility standard requires more than a mere
possibility that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct: “[W]here the well-pleaded
facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged — but it has not ‘show(n]' — ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Accordingly, the Third Circuit has identified the following steps that a district court
must take when reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion: (1) identify the elements that a plaintiff must
plead to state a claim; (2) identify any conclusory allegations contained in the complaint that
are “not entitled” to the assumption of truth; and (3) determine whether any “well-pleaded
factual allegations” contained in the complaint ‘plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”
See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 421, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). The Third Circuit has specified that in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “a court must consider only the complaint,
exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly
authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents.” See
Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.
White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).
in the context of pro se prisoner litigation, the court must be mindful that a document
filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.” See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can be dismissed for failure to state a claim
only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim that would entitle him to relief. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
Ill. Discussion Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1364, ‘“[t]he district courts ... have original jurisdiction of any
action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or
any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Authority to
issue a writ of mandamus is bestowed by the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). See
Mitchell v. United States, 419 F.Supp.2d 709, 712 (W.D. Pa.2009).
Mandamus is a “drastic remedy that ‘is seldom issued and [] is discouraged.’ ” In re
Patenaude, 210 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir.2000). The Supreme Court has said that “[t]he
extraordinary remedy of mandamus ... will issue only to compel the performance of a ‘clear
nondiscretionary duty.’” Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 121 (1988). To
obtain such relief, ‘[t]he Petitioner must show that he has no other adequate means to attain
the relief he desires and that he has a clear and indisputable right to the writ.” Mitchell v.
United States, 419 F.Supp.2d at 712 (citing Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476,
482 (3d Cir.1995)). See also Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern District
of lowa, 490 U.S. 296, 309 (1989) (Petitioners seeking a writ of mandamus “carry the
burden of showing that their right to issuance of the writ is ‘clear and indisputable.’ ”)
(citation omitted). Furthermore, even if such a showing is made, it is still within the district
court’s discretion to determine whether to issue the writ. See Mitchell, supra at 712 (citing
Glenmede, 56 F.3d at 482). Finally, federal courts have no authority to issue a writ of
mandamus to state officers or private citizens. See, €.g., In re Razzoli, No. 05-3797, 161
Fed. Appx. 203 (3d Cir. Jan.3, 2006) (holding that inmate's request for court order directing
his release from prison was not available via a writ of mandamus and that such relief as
available by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus); U.S. ex rel. Chapman v. Supreme
Court of Pa., 151 F.Supp. 681, 682 (W.D.Pa.1957) (federal court is without authority to
issue writ of mandamus against state officers in exercise of their discretionary duties).
Redford’s prayer for a writ of mandamus in this case is misplaced on all fronts. First,
he has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that his right to the writ is “clear and
indisputable .” Mallard, supra, 490 U.S. at 309. Nor is Plaintiff seeking to compel the
performance of a “clear, nondiscretionary duty.” Pittston Coal Group, 488 U.S. at 121. On
the contrary, Petitioner's entitlement to relief here on the merits of his claims is dubious at
best. Moreover, Petitioner has other adequate means besides mandamus to address the
alleged illegality of his underlying extraditions, convictions and sentences—namely potential habeas relief under 28 U .S.C. § 2254.' Finally, this Court has no authority to issue writs of
mandamus against county or state officers. Thus, because Petitioner has failed to make
the requisite showing of entitlement to mandamus relief, Respondent's motion to dismiss
will be granted. IV. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, Respondent’s motion to dismiss Petitioner's action will
be granted. This Court is without jurisdiction to entertain Petitioner's petition for writ of
mandamus, or any habeas corpus petition, challenging his Georgia conviction.
A separate Order shall issue. LLn\ BAL Rebert Dwarianj/ United States District Judge
1 To that end, Respondent indicates that Redford has already commenced a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, seeking the exact same relief he seeks here. See Redford v. Obama, 16-CV-2083 (N.D. Georgia March 30, 2017). In the Georgia Action Redford filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (among myriad other filings) that challenged the legality of his pre-trial and postconviction confinement. See id. The Court denied Petitioner’s challenge to his pre-trial confinement as moot because Petitioner had already been convicted. Id. The Court also dismissed without prejudice Petitioner’s challenge to his post-conviction confinement for lack of exhaustion because Petitioner had not completed the appeal process in state court before commencing the Georgia Action in federal court. Jd.