Redevelopment Authority of the City of Pottsville v. 23 North Centre Street, Pottsville, Pennsylvania, Tax Parcel ID No. 68-27-0362.000, et al.

• Court: District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
• Decided: February 4, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-00902
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF POTTSVILLE,

Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-00902

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

23 NORTH CENTRE STREET, POTTSVILLE, PENNSYLVANIA, TAX PARCEL ID NO. 68-27- 0362.000, et al.,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM This matter comes before the court on a motion to remand this diversity case to the state court from which it was removed. In addition, the movant has requested that it be awarded costs and attorney fees incurred as a result of the removal of this case to federal court. For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted. I. BACKGROUND On September 16, 2024, the petitioner, Redevelopment Authority of the City of Pottsville (the “Redevelopment Authority”), commenced this conservatorship action by filing a petition in the Court of Common Pleas for Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania, styled as , No. S-1767-

2024 (Schuylkill Cnty. (Pa.) Ct. Com. Pl. filed Sept. 16 2024), seeking a court-appointed conservator pursuant to the Abandoned and Blighted Property Conservatorship Act, 68 P.S. § 1101 1

The petition included two named respondents. The first was the allegedly blighted property itself, a building and parcel of land located at 23 North Centre Street, Pottsville, Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania,

commonly known as the “Thompson Building,” which has been assigned tax parcel number 68-27-362 by the county. The other named respondent was the record owner of the property, Advanced Consulting, Inc., a

Minnesota corporation with its principal place of business in New York, which had apparently acquired the property via a tax sale on April 28, 2021.2

1 A copy of the original state-court petition has been filed as an exhibit to the removing defendant’s notice of removal. Doc. 1-2, at 28–58. Regardless, a district court may properly take judicial notice of state and federal court records. Fed. R. Evid. 201; , 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007); , 108 F.3d 486, 498–99 (3d Cir. 1997); , 373 F.2d 771, 778 (3d Cir. 1967). 2 Schuylkill Cnty. (Pa.) Recorder of Deeds, https:// pa.uslandrecords.com (select “Schuylkill” from counties menu, select “Volume Search” from search type menu, and search for “Volume 2729, Appearing initially through counsel, Advanced Consulting filed an

answer and appeared for a hearing on the petition on October 30, 2024. Finding that additional time was needed for the hearing, the state court continued it until December 9, 2024.

On December 5, 2024, the chief executive officer of Advanced Consulting, an individual named Gemini Lake, filed a pro se civil rights action in this court, seeking to enjoin the state court proceedings,

claiming that the state-court conservatorship proceedings violated his federal constitutional rights. On December 6, 2024, we entered an opinion and order dismissing Lake’s civil rights action for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. , No. 3:24-cv-02104, 2024 WL 5008863 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2024). On December 8, 2024, Advanced Consulting filed a pro se Chapter

Page 2103”) (deed recorded Apr. 30, 2021) (last visited Jan. 29, 2026); Schuylkill Cnty. (Pa.) Assessment Information Website, https:// gis.vgsi.com/SchuylkillCountyPA/Search.aspx (search for address “23 N Centre Street” for property ownership history) (last visited Jan. 29, 2026). A district court may take judicial notice of publicly recorded property records such as this. Fed. R. Evid. 201; , 188 Fed. App’x 86, 88 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (taking judicial notice of publicly recorded deeds reflecting property ownership); , 941 F. Supp. 2d 547, 556 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (taking judicial notice of publicly recorded real estate transfer records). 11 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the

Southern District of New York. , No. 24- 12456-pb (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. dismissed Feb. 19, 2025).3 On December 9, 2024, the date of the scheduled hearing in this

matter, the state court entered an order staying the conservatorship proceedings after being advised of Advanced Consulting’s eleventh-hour bankruptcy petition.

On February 19, 2025, Advanced Consulting’s bankruptcy petition was dismissed with prejudice on the motion of the United States Trustee. In dismissing the case, the bankruptcy court expressly found, in its

written order and in its bench ruling, that the debtor had filed the bankruptcy case in bad faith and for tactical or dilatory reasons. , No. 24-12456-pb (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. dismissed Feb.

19, 2025). That same day, presumably upon receiving notice that the bankruptcy case had been dismissed, the state court scheduled a two-day trial on the petition, to take place on March 5 and 10, 2025.

On March 3, 2025, the state court entered an order formally lifting

3 Advanced Consulting’s pro se Chapter 11 petition was signed by Lake as its CEO and authorized representative. The debtor was never represented by counsel in the bankruptcy proceedings. its stay of the conservatorship action, and it rescheduled the two-day trial

for April 9 and 11, 2025. On March 21, 2025, Advanced Consulting’s attorney, Anthony M. Crane, Esq., moved for leave to withdraw as counsel of record for the

corporation due to personal health reasons. On March 26, 2025, Lake filed a pro se federal civil rights action related to the Thompson Building conservatorship proceedings,

seeking monetary damages and declaratory and injunctive relief, including an order enjoining the state conservatorship action from proceeding. That action has been referred to a United States magistrate

judge for all pretrial proceedings, and it remains pending. , No. 3:25-cv-00548 (M.D. Pa. filed Mar. 26, 2025). Following a phone conference on April 3, 2025, the state court

granted Attorney Crane’s motion to withdraw as counsel of record for Advanced Consulting. On April 7, 2025, Lake filed a pro se federal civil rights action

related to the Thompson Building conservatorship proceedings, again seeking monetary damages and declaratory and injunctive relief, including an order enjoining the state conservatorship action from proceeding. That action has been referred to a United States magistrate

judge for all pretrial proceedings, and it remains pending. , No. 3:25-cv-00668 (M.D. Pa. filed Apr. 7, 2025).

On the April 9, 2025, trial date, Lake appeared and informed the state court that he had been unable to obtain substitute counsel to represent Advanced Consulting in the conservatorship action. But he

further informed the state court that, on April 1, 2025, Advanced Consulting had conveyed a 50-percent ownership stake in the Thompson Building to him personally, and that the deed conveying that interest to

Lake had been recorded on April 7, 2025.4 That same day, the state court entered an order rescheduling the two-day trial for May 22 and 23, 2025, and adding Lake to the action as a party-respondent in recognition of his

newly acquired status as a record owner of the property.

4 Schuylkill Cnty. (Pa.) Recorder of Deeds, https:// pa.uslandrecords.com (select “Schuylkill” from counties menu, select “Volume Search” from search type menu, and search for “Volume 2899, Page 2479”) (deed recorded Apr. 7, 2025) (last visited Jan. 29, 2026); Schuylkill Cnty. (Pa.) Assessment Information Website, https:// gis.vgsi.com/SchuylkillCountyPA/Search.aspx (search for address “23 N Centre Street” for property ownership history) (last visited Jan. 29, 2026). On the eve of trial in the state court, May 21, 2025, Lake filed a

notice of removal in this federal court, which was received over the counter by the clerk. Service copies of the notice, however, were not delivered to the state court or to the Redevelopment Authority until May

22, 2025. Not yet having received service of the notice of removal, the state court commenced trial on the morning of May 22, 2025. Although Lake

informed the court of his filing of the notice of removal, in light of his history of dilatory conduct in connection with this litigation, petitioner’s counsel and the state court were apparently skeptical of his claims. After

informing the state court of the filing of his notice of removal and arguing that the proceeding should not go forward, Lake left the courtroom against the court’s advice. The trial then proceeded without Lake present,

with the court receiving testimony from several witnesses and admitting several documentary exhibits. At the conclusion of the trial, the state court took the matter under advisement and informed the petitioner that

it would issue an order in the near future.5 No ruling was ever entered,

5 Lake has submitted a copy of the trial transcript as an exhibit to his brief in opposition to remand. Doc. 11-1. however, apparently because the court and the petitioner subsequently

learned that they had received service copies of the notice of removal that same day. II. LEGAL STANDARD 28 U.S.C. § 1441 governs the removal of a case to federal court.

Generally, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant . . . to the district court of the United States for the district

and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

“Removal statutes are to be strictly construed, with all doubts to be resolved in favor of remand.” , 575 F.3d 322, 326 (3d Cir. 2009). Thus, “[t]he defendants bear the burden of establishing removal

jurisdiction and demonstrating compliance with all pertinent procedural requirements.” , 254 F. Supp. 2d 509, 514 (M.D. Pa. 2003); , 57 F.3d 350, 359 (3d

Cir. 1995) (“[T]he burden of establishing removal jurisdiction rests with the defendant.”); , 149 F. Supp. 3d 551, 555 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (“Defendants must also establish that all pertinent procedural requirements for removal have been met.”).

A defendant seeking to remove an action must file a notice of removal with the district court within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the complaint or

initial pleading. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1); , 254 F. Supp. 2d at 514. When a case involves multiple defendants, “each defendant individually has thirty days to file a notice of removal beginning when

that particular defendant is served.” , 660 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2011). “[A]ll defendants must unanimously join or consent to the removal through a timely-filed, express written indication

of consent.” , 168 F. Supp. 3d 747, 756 (E.D. Pa. 2016). “This action can take the form of: (1) clearly and unambiguously joining in the removing defendant’s notice of removal; or (2) filing a separate

written consent to removal with the court.” , ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2025 WL 3172848, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Once an action is removed, a plaintiff may challenge removal by moving to remand the case back to state court.” at *2; , 415 F. Supp. 3d 588, 591 (E.D. Pa. 2019); , 149 F. Supp. 3d at 555. “Cases may be remanded under § 1447(c) for (1) lack of

district court subject matter jurisdiction or (2) a defect in the removal procedure.” , 7 F.3d 349, 352 (3d Cir. 1993). However, “[a] motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other

than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a).” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “A motion to remand based on an objection to a procedural

defect in the removal process is clearly waived if it is not raised within thirty days after the filing of the notice of removal.” , 631 F. Supp. 22d 601, 608 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (citing

, 208 F.3d 445, 450 (3d Cir. 2000), and , 351 F. 3d 611, 613 (3d Cir. 2003)); , ___ F. Supp. 3d at ____, 2025 WL 3172848, at *2;

, 774 F. Supp. 2d 596, 613 (D. Del. 2011). Courts are without authority to expand this period. , 891 F.2d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 1989) (“By remanding the case for

procedural defects after the thirty day limit imposed by . . . Section 1447(c) had expired, the district court exceeded its statutorily defined power.”) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); , ___ F. Supp. 3d at ____, 2025 WL 3172848, at *2.

III. DISCUSSION Here, the petitioner has raised two non-jurisdictional objections to removal, which require this case to be remanded to state court. First, Lake’s eleventh-hour filing of the notice of removal was untimely, coming

well more than thirty days after the state court ordered him added as a respondent to the petition, which it did in conjunction with a hearing at which Lake was present and in which he participated. Second, the

corporate respondent, Advanced Consulting, similarly failed to timely join or consent in removal of the case.

As CEO of Advanced Consulting, Lake was aware of and had participated in the conservatorship action since it had commenced in September 2024. He personally participated in multiple hearings in this

matter before the state court, including—at a minimum—hearings conducted on December 4, 2024, April 9, 2025, and May 22, 2025. At the April 9, 2025, state court hearing, Lake appeared pro se and

informed the state court that he had personally acquired a 50-percent ownership interest in the property at issue by a deed recorded on April 7, 2025. That same day, the state court entered an order joining Lake as a party-respondent, based on his newly acquired ownership interest in the

property. At the time, Lake had already received a copy of the conservatorship petition, and thus the action became newly removable upon his joinder as a party-respondent. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2);

, 660 F.3d at 185. On May 21, 2025—one day before the state court trial was scheduled to commence, and after he was joined as a

party-respondent in this conservatorship action—Lake filed his notice of removal in this action. Doc. 1. On May 30, 2025— after Lake was joined as a party-

respondent in this action—Advanced Consulting filed its initial, defective written consent to removal of this action. Doc. 6. Advanced Consulting’s initial written notice of consent was not signed by counsel of record for

the corporation; rather, it was signed by non-attorney Lake in his capacity as CEO of Advanced Consulting. On July 10, 2025, we entered an order advising Advanced Consulting that its written consent

to removal was defective and subject to being stricken under Rule 11(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the defect was not timely cured. Doc. 16. On August 25, 2025— after Lake was joined as a party- respondent in this action—counsel of record entered her appearance on

behalf of Advanced Consulting and filed a written consent to removal on behalf of the corporation. Doc. 22. On June 5, 2025—less than thirty days after Lake’s notice of

removal was filed—the petitioner timely filed a motion to remand this conservatorship action to state court. Doc. 8; Doc. 9. Among other reasons given, the petitioner argued that Lake had failed to timely file

his notice of removal in this action, and that Advanced Consulting had failed to timely join or consent in writing to Lake’s removal of the action. The petitioner’s objections to removal are well taken. Under the

circumstances set forth above, Lake’s notice of removal and Advanced Consulting’s written consent to removal were both untimely filed, well more than thirty days after Lake was properly joined and had received a

copy of the initial pleading in this action, and thus we are compelled to remand the matter to state court for any further proceedings. , 15 F. Supp. 2d 552, 560 (D.N.J. 1998)

(“While the time limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) are not jurisdictional, they are mandatory and are to be strictly construed when asserted by a party.”); , 694 F. Supp. 111, 112 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (“Failure to file a petition for removal within the thirty days provided by

§ 1446(b) is sufficient ground on which to remand.”); , 544 F. Supp. 528, 529 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (“This 30-day limitation [for removal] is mandatory and cannot be extended by the

court.”); , , 542 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (remanding case in which notice of removal was filed after complaint was received by the defendant in the mail).

We must then turn to the petitioner’s request for an award of costs and reasonable attorney fees. Section 1447(c) expressly provides that “[a]n order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and

any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “An award under Section 1447(c) is appropriate whether remand is based upon a jurisdictional defect or a

defect in the removal procedure.” , 913 F. Supp. 868, 878 (D.N.J. 1996). “Although the Court has ‘broad discretion’ in determining whether to award fees, such an award is only proper if ‘the removing party lacked

an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.’” , 902 F. Supp. 2d 511, 524 (D.N.J. 2012) (quoting , 99 F.3d 1253, 1260 (3d Cir. 1996), and , 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005)) (citations omitted). “A

finding of bad faith by the removing party is not required for an award under Section 1447(c).” , 913 F. Supp. at 878; , 99 F.3d at 1260 (“[T]he district court may require the payment of fees and costs

by a party which removed a case which the court then remanded, even though the party removing the case did not act in bad faith.”); , 874 F. Supp. 648, 656

(M.D. Pa. 1995) (“An award of costs does not require a finding of bad faith on the part of the removing party.”). “A defendant’s untimeliness in filing his notice of removal is

‘precisely the type of removal defect contemplated by § 1447(c).’” , 652 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting , 516 U.S. 124, 128 (1995)). Thus, “[i]f

objectively unreasonable, an untimely removal may give rise to an award of fees and costs under § 1447(c).” (citing , 445 F.3d 1247, 1254 (9th Cir. 2006));

, 324 F. Supp. 2d 15, 19 (D. Me. 2004) (awarding costs and fees where removal was “obviously” untimely and thus improper); , 913 F. Supp. at 878 (awarding costs and reasonable attorney fees where, among other defects, the amended notice of removal

was filed thirty-four days after the removing defendants received a draft stipulation from the plaintiffs dismissing an allegedly nondiverse corporate defendant); , 874 F. Supp. at 656

(awarding costs under § 1447(c) where “‘minimal research’ into a fundamental question would have revealed to the removing party that removal was improper”). Here, because minimal research would have

revealed to Lake that the time period for removal had expired, his filing of a notice of removal forty-two days after the state court had ordered his joinder as a party-respondent, and his company’s filing of

written consent to removal weeks or even months later, were obviously untimely and thus objectively unreasonable. Moreover, although the court need not find that Lake acted

dilatorily or in bad faith to award costs and attorney fees incurred due to removal, we cannot overlook the removing defendant’s clear pattern of delay and abuse of legal process. In particular, we have considered Lake’s

multiple eleventh-hour filings in federal district and bankruptcy court, undertaken by him in a conspicuous bad-faith effort to delay state court proceedings scheduled to occur in this conservatorship action within days after those filings, and in an attempt to force the Redevelopment

Authority to incur additional, unnecessary expenses. , 438 F. Supp. 2d 561, 565 (E.D. Pa. 2006). IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the petitioner’s motion (Doc. 8) will be

granted in its entirety. This action will be remanded to the Court of Common Pleas for Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania, for all further proceedings on the conservatorship petition, and the removing

respondent, Gemini Lake, will be ordered to reimburse the petitioner for the costs and reasonable attorney fees it has incurred as a result of the

improper removal of this action to federal court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). An appropriate order follows.

Dated: February 4, 2026 JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR. United States District Judge