Beasley, Judge.
Chiquata Redding, Aquarious Redding and Bobby Williams filed these personal injury suits against Pauline Walker. Walker owned the car which co-defendant Dennis Watson, while driving at speeds in excess of 100 mph, crashed into plaintiffs’ vehicle. A few months after the suits were filed, Walker was released from all dischargeable debts by order of the bankruptcy court. On August 22, 1995, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaints against Walker and Watson. [654]*654Subsequently, the trial court amended its orders to dismiss only Walker, on the basis of the bankruptcy discharge. Watson is allegedly judgment-proof.
Plaintiffs in their appeals contend the dismissal of Pauline Walker has the erroneous effect of dismissing her insurer. Walker filed motions to dismiss the appeals because the trial court’s dismissals were not final judgments (OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1)) and contained no language rendering them directly appealable (see OCGA § 9-11-54 (b)), and because the interlocutory appeal procedures were not followed pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-34.
1. The ruling below, as to each plaintiff’s case, was in effect an order of summary judgment. The motion was denominated a motion to dismiss, responded to under the same denomination, and so referred to in the court’s order. But Walker’s motion in each case was not in substance or form a motion pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-12 (b). It did not present one of the defenses listed in subsection (b) but rather presented the defense of bankruptcy discharge. That does not constitute “[flailure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6), or any of the other listed defenses which may be disposed of by a motion under that Code section. In substance her motions were for summary judgment, based on a complete bar.
In form as well, the motion in each case was in effect a motion for summary judgment. Walker attached evidence in the form of a document, and the court accepted another document at the time of the hearing on the motions. Documentary evidence, as well as the affidavits expressly mentioned in the summary judgment provision of the Civil Practice Act (at OCGA § 9-11-56 (e)), may be used in considering such motions. Paulin v. Okehi, 264 Ga. 604 (449 SE2d 291) (1994); Kiker v. Pinson, 120 Ga. App. 784 (1) (172 SE2d 333) (1969).
Discharge in bankruptcy is an affirmative defense. OCGA § 9-11-8 (c). It was not originally pled by Walker, but she pled a stay of proceedings because of the petition for bankruptcy protection in the federal court. An affirmative defense “asserts a bar to recovery and not merely the abatement of an action. [Cit.]” City of Atlanta v. Chambers, 205 Ga. App. 834, 835 (1) (424 SE2d 19) (1992). That case distinguishes between the two concepts. Matters in abatement are such as those found in OCGA § 9-11-12 (b), with the exception of OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6). Intl. Indem. Co. v. Blakey, 161 Ga. App. 99, 100-101 (1) (289 SE2d 303) (1982). “ ‘[A] motion for summary judgment applies to the merits of the claim or to matters in bar but not to matters in abatement. [Cit.]’ [Cits.]” Id. at 101 (1).
The documents presented to the court were the basis upon which the court resolved an issue of fact (whether defendant’s plea in bar was valid) and dismissed the complaints against Walker with prejudice. This terminated, rather than merely abated, each claim [655]*655against her and left only the claims against the driver, Watson. When the court considers evidence in ruling on such a motion, a ruling in favor of the movant constitutes summary judgment for that defendant. Jones v. Ward, 201 Ga. App. 757, 758-759 (1) (412 SE2d 576) (1991). See also Peeples v. City of Atlanta, 189 Ga. App. 888, 889 (1) (377 SE2d 889) (1989). The judgments are final as to Walker, based not on the pleadings alone but together with the evidence which proved the basis for the judgments in her favor, i.e., the discharge in bankruptcy.
“An order granting summary judgment. . . as to any party shall be subject to review by appeal.” OCGA § 9-11-56 (h). Plaintiffs contend that Walker should not be eliminated from the cases as a defendant. If they are correct, the trial or trials should not proceed to judgment which, if it favors plaintiffs, must still be appealed to decide the question now properly before the Court on direct appeals. If Walker was erroneously excused, additional trials would be required were the appeals dismissed.
2. Each plaintiff makes the identical arguments on appeal, that the discharge in bankruptcy does not allow defendant Walker’s liability insurer to escape liabihty, and that the case should therefore continue -with Walker as defendant to the limit of her insurance coverage, relying on Wilkinson v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 236 Ga. 456, 457 (2) (224 SE2d 167) (1976), federal cases involving bankruptcy law, and OCGA § 33-7-11 (a) (4).
No insurer is a party to these suits. No evidence in the record shows that Walker had liability insurance. Although the plaintiffs answered Walker’s motion to dismiss with an assertion that “Walker had liability insurance at the time the accident occurred,” that does not satisfy their burden to point to evidence showing a triable issue remains. See Hodge v. SAHA Enterprises, 217 Ga. App. 688, 690 (1) (458 SE2d 876) (1995).
Normally, when an ill-styled motion to dismiss is treated as a motion for summary judgment, as in this case, the nonmovant should have 30 days to respond with opposing evidence, from the time it is chargeable with knowing that the court will treat the motion as one for summary judgment. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c); Cardin v. Outdoor East, 220 Ga. App. 664, 665 (468 SE2d 31) (1996) (Beasley, C. J., concurring specially); Hart v. Sullivan, 197 Ga. App. 759, 760 (399 SE2d 523) (1990) (physical precedent).
In this instance that is not necessary. Plaintiffs do not need time to present evidence controverting the discharge; they in fact agreed in their responses to the motions that it had occurred. Instead, they objected to her discharge because, they asserted, she had liability insurance at the time of the accident.
Even if plaintiffs were given time to file copies of Walker’s insur[656]*656anee policy, if there is one, the result would be the same.
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Beasley, Judge.
Chiquata Redding, Aquarious Redding and Bobby Williams filed these personal injury suits against Pauline Walker. Walker owned the car which co-defendant Dennis Watson, while driving at speeds in excess of 100 mph, crashed into plaintiffs’ vehicle. A few months after the suits were filed, Walker was released from all dischargeable debts by order of the bankruptcy court. On August 22, 1995, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaints against Walker and Watson. [654]*654Subsequently, the trial court amended its orders to dismiss only Walker, on the basis of the bankruptcy discharge. Watson is allegedly judgment-proof.
Plaintiffs in their appeals contend the dismissal of Pauline Walker has the erroneous effect of dismissing her insurer. Walker filed motions to dismiss the appeals because the trial court’s dismissals were not final judgments (OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1)) and contained no language rendering them directly appealable (see OCGA § 9-11-54 (b)), and because the interlocutory appeal procedures were not followed pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-34.
1. The ruling below, as to each plaintiff’s case, was in effect an order of summary judgment. The motion was denominated a motion to dismiss, responded to under the same denomination, and so referred to in the court’s order. But Walker’s motion in each case was not in substance or form a motion pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-12 (b). It did not present one of the defenses listed in subsection (b) but rather presented the defense of bankruptcy discharge. That does not constitute “[flailure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6), or any of the other listed defenses which may be disposed of by a motion under that Code section. In substance her motions were for summary judgment, based on a complete bar.
In form as well, the motion in each case was in effect a motion for summary judgment. Walker attached evidence in the form of a document, and the court accepted another document at the time of the hearing on the motions. Documentary evidence, as well as the affidavits expressly mentioned in the summary judgment provision of the Civil Practice Act (at OCGA § 9-11-56 (e)), may be used in considering such motions. Paulin v. Okehi, 264 Ga. 604 (449 SE2d 291) (1994); Kiker v. Pinson, 120 Ga. App. 784 (1) (172 SE2d 333) (1969).
Discharge in bankruptcy is an affirmative defense. OCGA § 9-11-8 (c). It was not originally pled by Walker, but she pled a stay of proceedings because of the petition for bankruptcy protection in the federal court. An affirmative defense “asserts a bar to recovery and not merely the abatement of an action. [Cit.]” City of Atlanta v. Chambers, 205 Ga. App. 834, 835 (1) (424 SE2d 19) (1992). That case distinguishes between the two concepts. Matters in abatement are such as those found in OCGA § 9-11-12 (b), with the exception of OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6). Intl. Indem. Co. v. Blakey, 161 Ga. App. 99, 100-101 (1) (289 SE2d 303) (1982). “ ‘[A] motion for summary judgment applies to the merits of the claim or to matters in bar but not to matters in abatement. [Cit.]’ [Cits.]” Id. at 101 (1).
The documents presented to the court were the basis upon which the court resolved an issue of fact (whether defendant’s plea in bar was valid) and dismissed the complaints against Walker with prejudice. This terminated, rather than merely abated, each claim [655]*655against her and left only the claims against the driver, Watson. When the court considers evidence in ruling on such a motion, a ruling in favor of the movant constitutes summary judgment for that defendant. Jones v. Ward, 201 Ga. App. 757, 758-759 (1) (412 SE2d 576) (1991). See also Peeples v. City of Atlanta, 189 Ga. App. 888, 889 (1) (377 SE2d 889) (1989). The judgments are final as to Walker, based not on the pleadings alone but together with the evidence which proved the basis for the judgments in her favor, i.e., the discharge in bankruptcy.
“An order granting summary judgment. . . as to any party shall be subject to review by appeal.” OCGA § 9-11-56 (h). Plaintiffs contend that Walker should not be eliminated from the cases as a defendant. If they are correct, the trial or trials should not proceed to judgment which, if it favors plaintiffs, must still be appealed to decide the question now properly before the Court on direct appeals. If Walker was erroneously excused, additional trials would be required were the appeals dismissed.
2. Each plaintiff makes the identical arguments on appeal, that the discharge in bankruptcy does not allow defendant Walker’s liability insurer to escape liabihty, and that the case should therefore continue -with Walker as defendant to the limit of her insurance coverage, relying on Wilkinson v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 236 Ga. 456, 457 (2) (224 SE2d 167) (1976), federal cases involving bankruptcy law, and OCGA § 33-7-11 (a) (4).
No insurer is a party to these suits. No evidence in the record shows that Walker had liability insurance. Although the plaintiffs answered Walker’s motion to dismiss with an assertion that “Walker had liability insurance at the time the accident occurred,” that does not satisfy their burden to point to evidence showing a triable issue remains. See Hodge v. SAHA Enterprises, 217 Ga. App. 688, 690 (1) (458 SE2d 876) (1995).
Normally, when an ill-styled motion to dismiss is treated as a motion for summary judgment, as in this case, the nonmovant should have 30 days to respond with opposing evidence, from the time it is chargeable with knowing that the court will treat the motion as one for summary judgment. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c); Cardin v. Outdoor East, 220 Ga. App. 664, 665 (468 SE2d 31) (1996) (Beasley, C. J., concurring specially); Hart v. Sullivan, 197 Ga. App. 759, 760 (399 SE2d 523) (1990) (physical precedent).
In this instance that is not necessary. Plaintiffs do not need time to present evidence controverting the discharge; they in fact agreed in their responses to the motions that it had occurred. Instead, they objected to her discharge because, they asserted, she had liability insurance at the time of the accident.
Even if plaintiffs were given time to file copies of Walker’s insur[656]*656anee policy, if there is one, the result would be the same. Plaintiffs have presented no authority for the proposition that they as claimants are entitled to retain her even nominally in the lawsuit so as to obligate her insurer with a judgment based on her contract of insurance for liability coverage. The insurer, if there is one, is not even a party at this stage of the incompleted lawsuit, but even if plaintiffs had added her alleged insurer as a defendant, they cite no authority to prevent Walker’s dismissal from the lawsuit. Indeed, the bankruptcy court not only released her from all dischargeable debts, it enjoined all creditors whose debts are discharged by the order “from . . . continuing any action ... to collect such debts as personal liabilities” of the debtor. Plaintiffs’ claims were listed in the bankruptcy.
Wilkinson v. Vigilant Ins. Co., supra, is not directly on point but it supports Walker, not the plaintiffs as to the issue before us. It held that the defendant’s discharge in bankruptcy did not entitle the uninsured motorist carrier of the plaintiff to dismissal as a party. Like these instant cases, it was a suit arising out of an auto collision, and the defendant filed a motion to dismiss him because of the bankruptcy discharge. Unlike these cases, plaintiff Wilkinson’s uninsured motorist carrier was served and filed a motion for summary judgment (the proper type of motion) based on defendant’s discharge. At issue was whether the uninsured motorist carrier’s potential liability remained extant. The Supreme Court ruled that it did, based on 11 USCA § -34 (see current 11 USCA § 524 (e)).
Although the defendant’s motion for dismissal of him as a party was not in issue on appeal in Wilkinson, the Supreme Court implied that he would be entitled to dismissal (or more accurately summary judgment) when it stated that “no liability can attach to the known uninsured” and that the suit should proceed as a John Doe action. Id. at 457 (2).
Defendant Walker’s discharge in bankruptcy is not trumped by the existence of her liability insurance, if she has such, so as to preclude her affirmative defense. She was entitled to judgment in her favor.
The judgments are affirmed.
Judgments affirmed.
Andrews, C. J., Johnson and Smith, JJ, concur. McMurray, P. J., and Blackburn, J., concur in the judgment only of Division 1 and dissent as to Division 2 and the judgment of affirmance. Birdsong, P. J, and Pope, P. J., dissent and would dismiss. Ruffin, J., not participating.