OPINION OF THE COURT
FLAHERTY, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal by allowance from an order of the Commonwealth Court which affirmed an order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review denying benefits for the appellant, David Rebel. At issue is whether appellant’s refusal to submit to the employee drug testing policy of Duquesne Light Company constituted willful misconduct such that, upon appellant’s dismissal for failure to undergo testing, unemployment benefits can properly be denied.
Pursuant to Duquesne Light’s policy of maintaining a drug-free workplace, all employees of the company are subject to a random drug testing program. Appellant, an electrical engineer who had been employed by Duquesne Light for more than twenty years, was aware of the program. All employees had been informed that disciplinary action would be taken against any that refused to comply. On May 10, 1995, appellant was directed to report immediately for a urinalysis drug test. He was given an employee handout explaining that, if there were any questions or problems, he should feel free to consult his supervisor. Appellant, however, did not report for the test and did not inform his supervisor of any problem that would prevent him from being tested. The following day, when his supervisor asked about the test, appellant replied that he had no intention of being tested and that he did not [117]*117believe in the prograna. The supervisor informed him of the seriousness of this infraction and notified authorities in the corporate security and personnel departments. Appellant was instructed to leave the site and was placed on non-pay status pending further review. Soon thereafter he was notified that, due to his refusal to comply with the drug testing policy,1 he was discharged effective May 11, 1995.
Appellant filed an application for unemployment compensation, but benefits were denied. An appeal was taken, whereupon a referee determined that appellant had no valid cause for refusing to take the drug test. Appellant’s refusal was deemed willful misconduct which, under Section 402(e) of the Unemployment Compensation Law, 43 P.S. § 802(e), provided Duquesne Light with a basis for discharging him from employment without incurring liability for benefits.2 The Unemployment Compensation Board of Review affirmed. The Commonwealth Court likewise affirmed.
The term “willful misconduct” is not statutorily defined, but this court has defined it to include a “deliberate violation of the employer’s rules” and a “disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of an employee.” Rossi v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 544 Pa. 261, 267, 676 A.2d 194, 197 (1996). In determining whether an employee’s actions constitute willful misconduct, it is necessary to consider all of the circumstances, including the reasons for the employee’s noncompliance with the employer’s directives. Id. at 266, 676 A.2d at 197. If the “conduct was justifiable or reasonable under the circumstances, it was not willful misconduct because it was not in disregard of standards that the employer had a right to expect.” Id. at 267, 676 A.2d at 197-98. Hence, “if there was good cause for the conduct, it was not willful misconduct.” Id.
[118]*118Appellant contends that Duquesne Light’s drug testing program invades his privacy rights. He complains that the program was not adopted with the employees’ consent,3 and he characterizes the program as being draconian in its intrusiveness. In particular, he objects that it is not limited to those in safety-sensitive positions or those with a history of substance abuse, that it can cause employees to reveal personal medical information about their health and prescriptions, that it subjects employees to indignities when urine samples are collected, and that it is not justified on the basis of existing levels of employee drug use or drug-related workplace accidents. He argues, therefore, that he had good cause for refusing to comply with the program. We do not agree.
Appellant asserts that, in determining whether there was cause to disobey an employer’s directive, a balancing test must be utilized to weigh the burden on the employee against the employer’s interest in making the demand. Cited as the source of this balancing test is Simpson v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 69 Pa.Cmwlth. 120, 450 A.2d 305 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822, 104 S.Ct. 88, 78 L.Ed.2d 97 (1983). In Simpson, an employee was discharged for refusing to comply with a policy requiring that lunch buckets be opened for inspection when employees leave the workplace. The policy was designed to deter the pilferage of tools. The court held that the employer’s policy was a reasonable one, and that failure to comply constituted willful misconduct that precluded an award of unemployment benefits. It reasoned that the employee’s interest in privacy was outweighed by the employer’s interest in deterring theft. The court noted that search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution were not applicable since the search was conducted by a private employer and there was no governmental action. Id. at 128, 450 A.2d at 309. Accord Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322-323, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 1305, 137 [119]*119L.Ed.2d 513, 529 (1997) (Fourth Amendment constraints not applicable to private sector drug testing).
Notwithstanding the fact that the court in Simpson was not persuaded by the employee’s claim of privacy, appellant relies on the analytical framework of Simpson to support his contention that Duquesne Light’s interest in a drug-free workplace is outweighed by common law privacy rights. With regard to the balancing of employer and employee rights, and the duty to comply with employer directives, Simpson instructs:
An employee owes his employer, among other duties, a reasonable level of cooperation regarding matters that are important to the employer’s interest....
Of course, an employee’s implied obligation to cooperate with his employer does not abrogate all of the non-constitutional personal and proprietary rights upon which an employee could rely to justifiably withhold the action requested. Certainly, for example, an employee does not have an implied obligation to open his home to an employer search, or to stand on his head because the employer so requests. The extent to which the implied obligation to cooperate will be deemed to prevail over an allegedly reserved common law right must, in effect, rest on a conclusion about the circumstantial reasonableness of the employer’s request and its burdensomeness to the employee....
But if an employer’s request can be deemed circumstantially reasonable, after considering the burden to the employee, then the employee has an implied obligation to cooperate. Although there might be practical reasons that can justify an employee’s refusal to cooperate, such noncompliance cannot be predicated upon asserted common law personal and property rights.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
FLAHERTY, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal by allowance from an order of the Commonwealth Court which affirmed an order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review denying benefits for the appellant, David Rebel. At issue is whether appellant’s refusal to submit to the employee drug testing policy of Duquesne Light Company constituted willful misconduct such that, upon appellant’s dismissal for failure to undergo testing, unemployment benefits can properly be denied.
Pursuant to Duquesne Light’s policy of maintaining a drug-free workplace, all employees of the company are subject to a random drug testing program. Appellant, an electrical engineer who had been employed by Duquesne Light for more than twenty years, was aware of the program. All employees had been informed that disciplinary action would be taken against any that refused to comply. On May 10, 1995, appellant was directed to report immediately for a urinalysis drug test. He was given an employee handout explaining that, if there were any questions or problems, he should feel free to consult his supervisor. Appellant, however, did not report for the test and did not inform his supervisor of any problem that would prevent him from being tested. The following day, when his supervisor asked about the test, appellant replied that he had no intention of being tested and that he did not [117]*117believe in the prograna. The supervisor informed him of the seriousness of this infraction and notified authorities in the corporate security and personnel departments. Appellant was instructed to leave the site and was placed on non-pay status pending further review. Soon thereafter he was notified that, due to his refusal to comply with the drug testing policy,1 he was discharged effective May 11, 1995.
Appellant filed an application for unemployment compensation, but benefits were denied. An appeal was taken, whereupon a referee determined that appellant had no valid cause for refusing to take the drug test. Appellant’s refusal was deemed willful misconduct which, under Section 402(e) of the Unemployment Compensation Law, 43 P.S. § 802(e), provided Duquesne Light with a basis for discharging him from employment without incurring liability for benefits.2 The Unemployment Compensation Board of Review affirmed. The Commonwealth Court likewise affirmed.
The term “willful misconduct” is not statutorily defined, but this court has defined it to include a “deliberate violation of the employer’s rules” and a “disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of an employee.” Rossi v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 544 Pa. 261, 267, 676 A.2d 194, 197 (1996). In determining whether an employee’s actions constitute willful misconduct, it is necessary to consider all of the circumstances, including the reasons for the employee’s noncompliance with the employer’s directives. Id. at 266, 676 A.2d at 197. If the “conduct was justifiable or reasonable under the circumstances, it was not willful misconduct because it was not in disregard of standards that the employer had a right to expect.” Id. at 267, 676 A.2d at 197-98. Hence, “if there was good cause for the conduct, it was not willful misconduct.” Id.
[118]*118Appellant contends that Duquesne Light’s drug testing program invades his privacy rights. He complains that the program was not adopted with the employees’ consent,3 and he characterizes the program as being draconian in its intrusiveness. In particular, he objects that it is not limited to those in safety-sensitive positions or those with a history of substance abuse, that it can cause employees to reveal personal medical information about their health and prescriptions, that it subjects employees to indignities when urine samples are collected, and that it is not justified on the basis of existing levels of employee drug use or drug-related workplace accidents. He argues, therefore, that he had good cause for refusing to comply with the program. We do not agree.
Appellant asserts that, in determining whether there was cause to disobey an employer’s directive, a balancing test must be utilized to weigh the burden on the employee against the employer’s interest in making the demand. Cited as the source of this balancing test is Simpson v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 69 Pa.Cmwlth. 120, 450 A.2d 305 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822, 104 S.Ct. 88, 78 L.Ed.2d 97 (1983). In Simpson, an employee was discharged for refusing to comply with a policy requiring that lunch buckets be opened for inspection when employees leave the workplace. The policy was designed to deter the pilferage of tools. The court held that the employer’s policy was a reasonable one, and that failure to comply constituted willful misconduct that precluded an award of unemployment benefits. It reasoned that the employee’s interest in privacy was outweighed by the employer’s interest in deterring theft. The court noted that search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution were not applicable since the search was conducted by a private employer and there was no governmental action. Id. at 128, 450 A.2d at 309. Accord Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322-323, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 1305, 137 [119]*119L.Ed.2d 513, 529 (1997) (Fourth Amendment constraints not applicable to private sector drug testing).
Notwithstanding the fact that the court in Simpson was not persuaded by the employee’s claim of privacy, appellant relies on the analytical framework of Simpson to support his contention that Duquesne Light’s interest in a drug-free workplace is outweighed by common law privacy rights. With regard to the balancing of employer and employee rights, and the duty to comply with employer directives, Simpson instructs:
An employee owes his employer, among other duties, a reasonable level of cooperation regarding matters that are important to the employer’s interest....
Of course, an employee’s implied obligation to cooperate with his employer does not abrogate all of the non-constitutional personal and proprietary rights upon which an employee could rely to justifiably withhold the action requested. Certainly, for example, an employee does not have an implied obligation to open his home to an employer search, or to stand on his head because the employer so requests. The extent to which the implied obligation to cooperate will be deemed to prevail over an allegedly reserved common law right must, in effect, rest on a conclusion about the circumstantial reasonableness of the employer’s request and its burdensomeness to the employee....
But if an employer’s request can be deemed circumstantially reasonable, after considering the burden to the employee, then the employee has an implied obligation to cooperate. Although there might be practical reasons that can justify an employee’s refusal to cooperate, such noncompliance cannot be predicated upon asserted common law personal and property rights. As to employer requests that are reasonable in the above sense, the employee has waived those rights as a basis for noncompliance; he waived them when he voluntarily assumed the legal relationship with his employer.
Id. at 131-32, 450 A.2d at 311. Simpson accurately sets forth the relevant interests to be balanced and was properly relied [120]*120upon by the court below in concluding that appellant’s noncompliance constituted willful misconduct.
Upon weighing the employer’s interest in the drug testing program against the burden to employees, we conclude that the program is a reasonable one. Appellant had an implied obligation, therefore, to comply.
The employer has a strong interest in maintaining a workplace that is free from the influence of drugs. This is true of the entire work site, not just areas that are regarded as highly safety-sensitive. Employees who have consumed drugs can incur reductions in their productivity, reliability, and competency, thereby adversely affecting the employer’s interests. In turn, interests of customers can be detrimentally affected as well. There are also overriding concerns of safety and liability. Workplace safety is obviously undermined by employees who are impaired in their physical and mental capacities. Not only are fellow workers endangered, but the public is likewise placed at risk. The avoidance of injury, as well as concern for vicarious liability that can accrue to the employer, are legitimate interests of the employer that must be accorded substantial weight.
Appellant’s objection that Duquesne Light adopted the testing program without having obtained the employees’ consent is groundless. The creation of rules and requirements that govern the workplace is the prerogative of the employer. As stated in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 146 Pa.Cmwlth. 648, 657, 606 A.2d 955, 960 (1992),
An employer has the right to make decisions as to how he or she is going to run his or her business. In Hayes [v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 36 Pa. Cmwlth. 49, 54, 387 A.2d 186, 188 (1978) ], this Court stated: “[T]he right of an employer to run his business according to his own beliefs and judgment may not be restricted unless compelling reasons to the contrary exist.”
See also Novak v. Commonwealth, 514 Pa. 190, 193-94, 523 A.2d 318, 320 (1987) (discussion of management prerogatives [121]*121in public sector employment, applicable as well in the private sector).
Further, appellant’s characterization of the program as being draconian in its intrusiveness is simply not supported by the record. The drug testing is conducted in off-site medical facilities where employees are tested in a confidential and professional manner, and urine samples are obtained in conformity with standardized testing procedures. Contrary to appellant’s assertions, the record does not indicate that indignities are inflicted on employees during this process. See generally Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658, 115 S.Ct. 2886, 2393, 132 L.Ed.2d 564, 577-78 (1995) (Acceptable test conditions make the privacy interests compromised in the process of obtaining urine samples for drug testing negligible.).
Nor is there basis for appellant’s contention that the program results in broad disclosures of personal medical conditions. The drug test makes no generalized inquiry into such conditions. Those being tested are asked to reveal prescription and non-prescription drugs that they have consumed in the preceding thirty days, and this information is used only to confirm reasons for positive test results. The information is not disclosed to others.
Further, the only drugs for which random testing is conducted are marijuana, cocaine, opiates, phencyclidine, and amphetamines, i.e., ones which the employer has a legitimate interest in excluding from the workplace. Appellant’s suggestion that testing for these drugs should be confined to employees with a known history of substance abuse is without merit. There is no basis for belief that the only drug users in the workplace are those whose prior use is already known to the employer.
We conclude that the testing program of Duquesne Light was narrowly tailored to meet the employer’s needs and that it did not unduly intrude on appellant’s privacy interests. Hence, it was reasonable. Appellant’s failure to cooperate with the program was without good cause. Willful misconduct [122]*122was properly found, and the denial of unemployment benefits was, therefore, proper.
Order affirmed.
Justice ZAPPALA, files a concurring opinion.
Justice NIGRO, files a concurring and dissenting opinion.