Rebecca A. Camplin v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 7, 2018
• Docket: 18A-CR-1260
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be Dec 07 2018, 10:05 am

regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK Indiana Supreme Court court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals and Tax Court the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Benjamin Loheide Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Law Office of Benjamin Loheide Attorney General of Indiana Columbus, Indiana Evan M. Comer Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Rebecca A. Camplin, December 7, 2018 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1260 v. Appeal from the Bartholomew Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable James D. Worton, Appellee-Plaintiff Judge Trial Court Cause No. 03D01-1703-F6-1553

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1260 | December 7, 2018 Page 1 of 5 [1] Rebecca A. Camplin appeals the trial court’s order that revoked her probation

and ordered her to serve all of her suspended sentence. Finding no abuse of

discretion, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] On October 23, 2017, Camplin pled guilty to Level 6 felony possession of a

narcotic. 1 Pursuant to her plea agreement, the court imposed a two-year

sentence and placed Camplin on probation for two years. As conditions of

probation, the court ordered Camplin to, among other things, undergo a

substance abuse evaluation and follow any treatment recommendations. After

the sentencing hearing, the court released Camplin and she went to the

probation office, where she scheduled an orientation appointment for

November 30, 2017.

[3] Camplin did not appear for her scheduled appointment. Probation officer

Shalah Noblitt attempted to reschedule Camplin’s orientation appointment for

December and January by sending letters to the address that Camplin had

provided to the probation office. Camplin did not respond to either of those

letters, and she did not contact the probation office to reschedule. Because she

had not been to her orientation, her substance abuse evaluation was not

scheduled.

1 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6(a).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1260 | December 7, 2018 Page 2 of 5 [4] On January 9, 2018, the State filed a petition to revoke Camplin’s probation

because she had failed to report to orientation on November 30, 2017, on

December 14, 2017, and on January 4, 2018. The court set the petition for a

hearing on February 16, 2018. Camplin failed to appear for that hearing, so the

court issued a warrant for her arrest. Police arrested Camplin on March 8,

2018. On April 9, 2018, the State filed an amended petition to revoke probation

that alleged Camplin had failed to appear, had failed to obtain the substance

abuse evaluation, had failed to pay court costs and probation fees within 180

days as ordered, and had committed a new criminal offense in Jennings

County.

[5] The court held a hearing on the amended petition on May 10, 2018. Camplin

admitted all the violations except the commission of the new criminal offense.

The probation office recommended the court order Camplin to serve the

remainder of her sentence incarcerated. The court revoked all of Camplin’s

suspended time and ordered her to serve the remainder of her sentence in jail.

Discussion and Decision [6] “Probation is a favor granted by the State, not a right to which a criminal

defendant is entitled.” Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 955 (Ind. Ct. App.

2005), trans. denied. Revocation of that favor is a two-step process: first, the

court must determine whether a probationer violated a condition of probation;

second, the court must decide whether that violation justifies revocation of

probation. Id. If a probationer admits violating probation, “the court can

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1260 | December 7, 2018 Page 3 of 5 proceed to the second step of the inquiry and determine whether the violation

warrants revocation.” Id.

[7] When we review the revocation of probation, we look only at the evidence

favorable to the trial court’s judgment, and we may not reweigh the evidence or

assess the credibility of the witnesses. Id. at 954-55. We may reverse the trial

court’s determination only if the probationer demonstrates the court abused its

discretion. Id. at 956. An abuse of discretion occurred if the trial court’s

decision was against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances that

were before the court.

[8] Here, Camplin admitted three violations of probation: failure to appear for her

probation orientation, failure to undergo the substance abuse evaluation, and

failure to pay costs and fees. Thus, we turn to whether the violations justified

revocation of her probation. See id. at 955 (court found violation based on

admissions and parties presented evidence as to proper sanction).

[9] Camplin testified that when she was released following her sentence, she found

out that she was homeless and had no car or phone. She claimed she had no

way to get to the probation orientation because she had no car and no friends to

drive her there. She also testified that the monthly disability check she receives

is not enough money for her to rent a place to live. Although Camplin claimed

she tried to contact the probation department after she missed her November

appointment, the probation department has no record that she called to

reschedule her orientation or to report her location or status. As Camplin

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1260 | December 7, 2018 Page 4 of 5 provided no testimony to suggest the situation would be any different if the

court kept her on probation, we cannot find an abuse of discretion in the trial

court’s decision to revoke Camplin’s probation and order her to serve the

remainder of her sentence incarcerated. 2 See id. at 957 (affirming revocation of

remainder of suspended sentence).

Conclusion [10] Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked the

remainder of Camplin’s two-year suspended sentence, we affirm.

[11] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Robb, J., concur.

2 Camplin argues “the court skipped straight to the most severe sanction, when any number of intermediate sanctions would have been far more reasonable.” (Br. of Appellant at 9.) However, while the statute controlling dispositions of juvenile delinquents requires the court to place an offender in “the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available,” Ind. Code § 31-37-18-6, the statute controlling probation revocations includes no such restriction. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3 (containing no restriction on the court’s authority if probationer violates condition of probation prior to termination of probation).

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