R.C.C. v. Kristi Noem, et al.

Opinion

Petitioner, No. 1:26-cv-00373-TLN-EFB

v. ORDER KRISTI NOEM, et al., Respondents.

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner R.C.C.’s1 (“Petitioner”) Ex-Parte Emergency Application for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”). (ECF No. 2.) For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner’s motion for TRO is GRANTED and Respondents are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why the Court should not grant the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1). Petitioner is a native and citizen of Cuba and an asylum applicant in the United States. (ECF No. 2 at 9.) In August 2022, Petitioner entered the United States without inspection seeking 1 Petitioner also filed a motion to proceed via pseudonym (ECF No. 3), which the Court will address after Respondents have an opportunity to respond. asylum. (Id.) He turned himself in to U.S. Customs and Border Protection and expressed a fear of returning to Cuba. (Id.) Shortly thereafter, immigration authorities released Petitioner on his own recognizance to pursue his asylum claim. (Id.) Petitioner’s asylum application is still pending. (Id.) In the three years since his release, Petitioner has: reunited with his wife who is a lawful permanent resident of the United States; obtained a work permit valid for five years; and established his own business and a stable residence. (Id. at 9–10.) Petitioner has also complied with all the conditions of his release. (Id. at 9.) He does not have a criminal record. (Id.) Nevertheless, on September 18, 2025, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detained Petitioner at a scheduled check-in appointment. (ECF No. 1 at 8.) Petitioner has not been provided any notice or opportunity to be heard as to his detention. (ECF No. 2 at 10.) Petitioner has now been detained without a hearing for four months. (See id.) Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his civil detention and seeks immediate release. (See ECF Nos. 1, 2.) For a TRO, courts consider whether a petitioner has established “[1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Petitioner must “make a showing on all four prongs” of the Winter test. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). In evaluating a petitioner’s motion, a district court may weigh petitioner’s showings on the Winter elements using a sliding-scale approach. Id. A stronger showing on the balance of the hardships may support issuing a TRO even where the petitioner shows that there are “serious questions on the merits . . . so long as the [petitioner] also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Id. Simply put, a petitioner must demonstrate, “that [if] serious questions going to the merits were raised [then] the balance of hardships [must] tip[ ] sharply” in petitioner’s favor in order to succeed in a request for a TRO. Id. at 1134–35. III. ANALYSIS2 The Court considers each of the Winter elements with respect to Petitioner’s motion. A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits Petitioner has established a likelihood of success on his claim that his detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.3 The Court discusses each claim in turn. i. Violation of the INA Under the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“§ 1226(a)”) “provides the general process for arresting and detaining [noncitizens] who are present in the United States and eligible for removal.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022). Section 1226(a) provides the Government broad discretion whether to release or detain the individual and it provides several layers of review for an initial custody determination. Id. It also confers “an initial bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, the opportunity to be represented by counsel and to present evidence, the right to appeal, and the right to seek a new hearing when circumstances materially change.” Id. at 1202. Conversely, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (“§ 1225(b)”) mandates detention during removal proceedings for applicants for admission and does not provide for a bond hearing. Until the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) changed its policy in July 2025 (“DHS’s July Policy”), the Government consistently applied § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), to noncitizens residing in the United States who were detained by immigration authorities and subject to removal.

2 The Court finds Petitioner has met the requirements for issuing a temporary restraining order without notice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Petitioner notified Respondents via email that he would be filing the motion and served copies of the documents. (See ECF No. 2-3.) See R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01141-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2617255, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2025) (similarly finding requirements for TRO were met without notice); Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-05632-RML, 2025 WL 1853763, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 4, 2025) (same).

3 Petitioner also alleges Respondents violated the Administrative Procedure Act and Fifth Amendment substantive due process. (ECF No. 1.) Because the Court finds relief warranted based on Petitioner’s likelihood of success of his INA and procedural due process claims, the Court declines to address cumulative violations. Courts nationwide, including this one, have overwhelmingly rejected the Government’s new legal position and have found DHS’s July Policy unlawful. See Morales-Flores v. Lyons, No. 1:25-CV-01640-TLN-EFB, 2025 WL 3552841, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025) (explaining this Court’s reasons for taking this position and collecting cases); see also Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025) (issuing vacatur of unlawful DHS July Policy for a nationwide certified class). Petitioner asserts he is unlawfully detained under § 1225(b)(2) when he is instead subject to § 1226(a). (ECF No. 2 at 11–16.) This Court agrees. Section 1225(b)(2) applies only to “applicants for admission” “seeking admission” –– a category that does not include noncitizens like Petitioner who already entered the United States and was residing here at the time of his re- detention. See Morales-Flores, 2025 WL 3552841, at *3. This Court has made its position on this statutory question clear. Id. Absent new argument, case law, or distinguishable facts, this Court will not reconsider its position. Thus, Petitioner is not an “applicant for admission” subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). Petitioner is instead subject to § 1226(a) and is entitled to the process that statute requires, including a bond hearing at a minimum. Yet, Respondents have not provided any such hearing to either Petitioner in over four months of detention. Accordingly, Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that Respondents have violated the INA and improperly subjected him to mandatory detention without a hearing. ii. Violation of Procedural Due Process The Fifth Amendment prohibits government deprivation of an individual’s life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V; Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). The Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the borders of the United States, regardless of immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). These due process rights extend to immigration proceedings and detention. Id. at 693–94. Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due.”). a) Liberty Interest As for the first step, the Court finds Petitioner has established a protectable liberty interest. See Rico-Tapia v. Smith, No. CV 25-00379 SASP-KJM, 2025 WL 2950089, at *8 (D. Haw. Oct. 10, 2025) (noting “[e]ven where the revocation of a person’s freedom is authorized by statute, that person may retain a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause”). “[T]he government’s decision to release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[ ] to live up to the . . . conditions [of release].” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025) (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482) (modifications in original)). “Accordingly, a noncitizen released from custody pending removal proceedings has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC, 2025 WL 2637503, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025). To determine whether an individual’s conditional release rises to the level of a protected liberty interest, courts have “compar[ed] the specific conditional release in the case before them with the liberty interest in parole as characterized by Morrissey.” R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01141-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 2617255, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept 9, 2025). Here, Petitioner gained a liberty interest in his continued freedom after he was released from custody on his own recognizance in 2022. Under Morrisey, this release implied a promise that he would not be re-detained, during the pendency of his immigration proceedings, if he abided by the terms of his release. His liberty interest was also increased by time and reliance. For three years, Petitioner complied with the conditions of his release and built a life. (ECF No. 2 at 9.) He reunited with his wife, started a business, established a stable residence, and built relationships. (Id. at 9–10.) The Government granted Petitioner a five-year work authorization increasing his expectation that he could continue his release until a decision on his asylum application. (See id. at 9.) As this Court has found previously, along with many other courts in this district when confronted with similar circumstances, Petitioner has a clear interest in his continued freedom. See, e.g., Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (noting the Government’s actions in allowing petitioner to remain in the community for over five years strengthened petitioner’s liberty interest). b) Procedures Required As to the second step — what procedures or process is due — the Court considers three factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). As set forth below, the Court finds Petitioner has established his due process rights were likely violated. First, Petitioner has a substantial private interest in remaining free from detention. As discussed above, Petitioner was out of custody for approximately three years and had built a life and community with his family and business. Despite that, Petitioner has now been detained for over four months without being afforded an opportunity to be heard, inflicting hardship on him and his family. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of finding Petitioner’s private interest has been impacted by his detention. See Manzanarez v. Bondi, No. 1:25-CV-01536-DC-CKD (HC), 2025 WL 3247258, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (finding similarly). Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation is considerable given Petitioner has not received any hearing, either pre- or post-deprivation, nor did he receive notice of the reasons for his detention. (ECF No. 2 at 10.) Petitioner asserts that he complied with all conditions of his release and has never been arrested. (Id. at 9.) Indeed, his arrest was the direct result of his compliance, occurring at a routine ICE check-in. (Id.) Also, Petitioner has no criminal history. (Id.) Thus, the Court finds there is a serious risk that without process Petitioner may have been erroneously deprived of his liberty interest. Without any procedural safeguards to determine whether his detention was justifiable, the probative value of additional procedural safeguards is high. R.D.T.M., 2025 WL 2617255, at *4. Finally, the Government’s interest is low, and the effort and cost required to provide Petitioner with procedural safeguards are minimal. See Garcia v. Andrews, No. 2:25-CV-01884- TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 1927596, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025). Prior to an actionable final order of removal, “[t]he government has no legitimate interest in detaining individuals who have been determined not to be a danger to the community and whose appearance at future immigration proceedings can be reasonably ensured by [ ] bond or alternative conditions.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 994; see also R.D.T.M., 2025 WL 2617255, at *4 (“Civil immigration detention, which is nonpunitive in purpose and effect is justified when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community.”) (cleaned up). Here, Petitioner’s asylum application is still pending and there is no final order of removal. (ECF No. 2 at 9.) Additionally, DHS would have determined in 2022 that Petitioner was not a danger to the community nor a flight risk before they released him on his own recognizance. (See id.) In the subsequent three years, Petitioner’s conduct of compliance only bolsters those findings. Therefore, on this record, the Court cannot find any legitimate interest for Respondents to detain Petitioner. Additionally, the cost and time of procedural safeguards are minimal here. Notice and custody determination hearings are routine processes for Respondents. Indeed, these are the very processes owed to Petitioner under § 1226(a). Any delay in detention (if justified) for the time to provide notice and a hearing would be minimal. It would be less of a fiscal and administrative burden for the Government to return Petitioner home to await a determination on his immigration proceedings than to continue to detain him. See Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-CV-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.”). On balance, this Court finds the Mathews factors demonstrate Petitioner was entitled to notice and hearing to determine whether detention was warranted. Respondents did not provide either. Nor did they provide a bond hearing over four months of detention. Accordingly, with respect to his procedural due process claim, Petitioner has shown he is likely to succeed on the merits. B. Irreparable Harm Petitioner has also established he will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a TRO. The Ninth Circuit recognizes “irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to immigration detention,” including “subpar medical and psychiatric care in ICE detention facilities, the economic burdens imposed on detainees and their families as a result of detention, and the collateral harms to [family.]” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 995. Such harm is present here. Without relief, Petitioner faces the prospect of significant additional time in detention and continued harm to him and his family, while he awaits a decision on his asylum application. Moreover, “[i]t is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). Thus, Petitioner has established irreparable harm. C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest As to the final two Winter factors, “[w]hen the government is a party, the analysis of the balance of the hardships and the public interest merge.” Nat’l Urban League v. Ross, 484 F. Supp. 3d 802, 807 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014)). The Court finds these factors also favor Petitioner. First, the balance of equities tips decidedly in Petitioner’s favor as the Government “cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” Zepeda v. U.S. Immigr. & Nat. Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983). Second, “it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” Melendres, 695 F.3d at 1002. Moreover, “the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.” Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-CV-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (internal citation omitted). Any burden imposed by requiring Respondents to comply with constitutionally required process is both de minimis and clearly outweighed by the substantial harm Petitioner will suffer if he continues to be detained. In sum, these last two factors also weigh in Petitioner’s favor. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s request for a TRO and requires Petitioner’s immediate release on the same terms as he was released prior to his current detention. See Yang v. Kaiser, No. 2:25-cv-02205-DAD-AC, 2025 WL 2791778, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2025) (status quo ante is “the last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.”). Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. Petitioner’s Ex-Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2) is 2. Respondents must IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Petitioner R.C.C. from custody under the same terms he was released prior to his current detention. Respondents shall not impose any additional restrictions on him, unless such restrictions are determined to be necessary at a future pre-deprivation/custody hearing. 3. Respondents are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from re-arresting or re-detaining Petitioner absent compliance with constitutional protections, including seven-days’ notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral fact-finder where: (a) Respondents show material changed circumstances demonstrate a significant likelihood of Petitioner’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, or (b) Respondents demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a flight risk. At any such hearing, Petitioner shall be allowed to have counsel present. 4. Respondents are ENJOINED from keeping Petitioner’s documents and possessions, including passport, driver’s license, EAD, mobile phone, and any other items belonging to Petitioner. In order to return him to status quo prior to Respondents’ detention, those items are to be returned to Petitioner. 5. Respondents are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why this Court should not issue a preliminary injunction continuing this Order or grant the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and enter judgment in favor of Petitioner. Respondents shall file responsive papers to this Order to Show Cause and to Petitioner’s Motion to Proceed With Pseudonym and Protective Order (ECF No. 3) by January 28, 2026. Petitioner may file a reply by February 2, 2026. The parties shall indicate in their briefing whether they waive a hearing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(3). The Court will consider any stipulation and proposed order filed by the parties if they agree to a less demanding briefing schedule. 6. Petitioner is ORDERED to immediately serve this Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause on Respondents (and disclose Petitioner’s full name and A# for the limited purpose of ordering his release and responding to the Order to Show Cause) by emailing a copy to usacae.ecf2241-imm @usdoj.gov. 7. Respondents are hereby notified of their right to apply to the Court for modification or dissolution of the TRO on two days’ notice to Petitioner. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(4). 8. The bond requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) is waived. Courts regularly waive security in cases like this one. See Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2011). Date: January 21, 2026 7, TROY L. □ fH CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 10