Ray'Quan Harding v. TransUnion LLC

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: January 15, 2026
• Docket: 24-14006
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-14006 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 01/15/2026 Page: 1 of 16

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-14006 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

RAY’QUAN HARDING, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus

TRANSUNION LLC, EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, UPSTART NETWORK, INC., Defendants-Appellees. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cv-23775-RNS ____________________ USCA11 Case: 24-14006 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 01/15/2026 Page: 2 of 16

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Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: This action involves claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act asserted by Ray’Quan Harding against Upstart Network, Inc., TransUnion, LLC, and Experian Information Solutions. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. Before us is the district court’s dismissal of the claims against Upstart with prejudice and entry of judgment on the pleadings in favor of TransUnion and Experian. Following review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm. I Upstart is a loan servicer. In January of 2021, Upstart ser- viced a personal unsecured loan with a principal of $5,000 for Mr. Harding. TransUnion and Experian are consumer reporting agen- cies. Mr. Harding generally alleges that TransUnion and Experian have been inaccurately reporting information in his credit reports due to underlying errors with his Upstart account. Before bringing this action, Mr. Harding filed a complaint with the American Arbitration Association against Upstart, assert- ing violations of the FCRA and other federal laws. Although TransUnion and Experian were not parties to the arbitration, Mr. Harding’s complaint in the arbitration proceeding named the two reporting agencies and detailed the alleged errors in his credit re- ports. The arbitrator reviewed the parties’ submissions, held an ev- identiary hearing in July of 2023, and ultimately concluded that Mr. Harding’s claims lacked merit. The arbitral award issued in August USCA11 Case: 24-14006 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 01/15/2026 Page: 3 of 16

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of 2023 and awarded Mr. Harding “nothing” despite his demand for over $800,000. See D.E. 67-5 at 2; D.E. 67-6. In a separate pro- ceeding in the Southern District of Florida, a district court entered an order confirming the arbitration award and denied Mr. Har- ding’s motion to vacate the award. See Upstart Network Inc. v. Har- ding, No. 1:23-cv-24579-PCH, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13512 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 12, 2024). In October of 2023, Mr. Harding, proceeding pro se, brought this action alleging that there were several errors in his credit re- ports. He asserted the following claims under the FCRA: (1) inac- curate reporting in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) against TransUnion and Experian; (2) failure to conduct a reasonable rein- vestigation in violation of § 1681i(a)(1)(A) against TransUnion and Experian; (3) failure to review information in violation of § 1681i(a)(4) against TransUnion and Experian; (4) failure to mod- ify or delete inaccurate reports under § 1681i(a)(5)(A) against TransUnion and Experian; (5) failure to report a disputed account in violation of § 1681i(c) against TransUnion and Experian; (6) fail- ure to reinvestigate in violation of § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A) against Up- start; (7) failure to report deletion results in violation of § 1681s- 2(b)(1)(D) against Upstart; and (8) failure to delete inaccurate and incomplete information in violation of § 1681s-2(b)(1)(E) against Upstart. Mr. Harding also asserted a breach of contract claim against Upstart. He sought actual and punitive damages under § 1681n and § 1681o as well as an order directing the defendants to delete any inaccurate, incomplete, or obsolete information from his credit file. USCA11 Case: 24-14006 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 01/15/2026 Page: 4 of 16

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Upstart moved to dismiss Mr. Harding’s fourth amended complaint. TransUnion and Experian jointly moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court ruled that claim preclusion barred Mr. Harding’s claims against Upstart and granted its motion to dismiss with prejudice. The court then concluded that issue pre- clusion barred Mr. Harding’s claims against TransUnion and Ex- perian “to the extent those claims rely on inaccuracies in the un- derlying Upstart account itself.” D.E. 92 at 10. To the extent those claims were independent of the Upstart account, the court held that the claims were not actionable under the FCRA. Accordingly, the court granted TransUnion’s and Experian’s joint motion for judgment on the pleadings. II We begin with the district court’s grant of Upstart’s motion to dismiss. Mr. Harding argues on appeal that the district court erred in its application of the doctrine of claim preclusion. He con- tends that each new inaccuracy creates a new claim that was not resolved in the 2023 arbitration. Mr. Harding also argues that the court failed to accept the allegations in his fourth amended com- plaint as true. A “We review de novo the district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, accepting the complaint’s allegations as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Newbauer v. Carnival Corp., 26 F.4th 931, 934 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 USCA11 Case: 24-14006 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 01/15/2026 Page: 5 of 16

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F.3d 1333, 1335 (11th Cir. 2012)). To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff’s complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, ac- cepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “Pro se plead- ings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omit- ted). “In general, if it considers materials outside of the complaint, a district court must convert the motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion.” SFM Holdings, Ltd. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 600 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). But when the movant attaches an extrinsic document to the motion to dismiss, the court may consider that document “if it is (1) central to the plaintiff’s claim, and (2) its authenticity is not challenged.” Id. (cita- tions omitted). Moreover, at the motion to dismiss stage, a district court may take judicial notice of documents filed in other proceed- ings. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 201; Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 713 F.3d 1066, 1076 n.9 (11th Cir. 2013). We likewise “review de novo a district court’s decision to dis- miss an action due to res judicata.” Milner v. Baptist Health Montgom- ery, 132 F.4th 1354, 1357 (11th Cir. 2025). “The party asserting res judicata bears the burden of ‘show[ing] that the later-filed suit is barred.’” Id. (quoting Rodemaker v. City of Valdosta Bd. of Educ., 110 F.4th 1318, 1327 (11th Cir. 2024)). USCA11 Case: 24-14006 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 01/15/2026 Page: 6 of 16

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B “Res judicata prevents plaintiffs from bringing claims related to prior decisions when ‘the prior decision (1) was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) was final; (3) involved the same parties or their privies; and (4) involved the same causes of action.’” Rodemaker, 110 F.4th at 1324 (quoting TVPX ARS, Inc. v. Genworth Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 959 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2020)). “Res judicata comes in two forms: claim preclusion (traditional ‘res ju- dicata’) and issue preclusion (also known as ‘collateral estoppel’).” Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241, 1263 (11th Cir. 2011). As for Upstart, traditional res judicata is at issue. See id. The FCRA “prevent[s] consumers from being unjustly dam- aged because of inaccurate or arbitrary information in a credit re- port.” Equifax, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 678 F.2d 1047, 1048 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-517, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969)). Upstart is a furnisher of information, not a consumer re- porting agency. See § 1681s-2(a). Accordingly, “the only private right of action” Mr. Harding has against Upstart “is for a violation of § 1681s-2(b), which requires furnishers to conduct an investiga- tion following notice of a dispute.” Felts v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 893 F.3d 1305, 1312 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing § 1681s-2(c)(1)). To state a § 1681s-2(b) claim, Mr. Harding must have plausi- bly pled, at least, two things. See Milgram v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 72 F.4th 1212, 1218 (11th Cir. 2023). “First, a plaintiff cannot re- cover on a § 1681s-2(b) claim without identifying inaccurate or in- complete information that the furnisher provided to the reporting USCA11 Case: 24-14006 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 01/15/2026 Page: 7 of 16

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agency.” Id. (citing Felts, 893 F.3d at 1313) (emphasis omitted). “And second, to prove an investigation was unreasonable, a plain- tiff must point out ‘some facts the furnisher could have uncovered that establish that the reported information was, in fact, inaccurate or incomplete.’” Id. (quoting Felts, 893 F.3d at 1313) (emphases omitted). On appeal, Mr. Harding does not meaningfully argue that the first three elements of res judicata do not apply to his claims against Upstart—i.e., that there was a prior decision rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, that was final, and that it involved the same parties. See Milner, 132 F.4th at 1357. Nevertheless, we are confident that, by attaching the final arbitral award to its motion to dismiss showing the finality of the decision and the identicality of the parties, Upstart carried its burden to meet the first three ele- ments. Indeed, it is well-settled that final arbitration decisions may have res judicata effect. See, e.g., Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lam- bert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he determination of issues in an arbitration proceeding should generally be treated as conclusive in subsequent proceedings.”) (citing Restatement (Sec- ond) of Judgments § 84(3) (ALI 1982)). As to the fourth element, we look to whether the “case arises out of the same nucleus of operative fact, or is based upon the same factual predicate” as the prior action. See Milner, 132 F.4th at 1361 (quoting Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 904 F.2d 1498, 1503 (11th Cir. 1990)). “Indeed, the elements of the claims need not be the same; what matters is whether they arise from a common USCA11 Case: 24-14006 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 01/15/2026 Page: 8 of 16

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nucleus of operative fact.” Id. at 1361 (citing NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1561 (11th Cir. 1990)). The question is whether the claim “could have been raised in the prior action” even if it was not. See id. (quoting In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001)). Claims that “could have been brought” are generally only those claims “in existence at the time the original complaint” in the earlier action was filed. Manning v. City of Auburn, 953 F.2d 1355, 1360 (11th Cir. 1992). In the arbitration proceeding, Mr. Harding asserted a cause of action under § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A) and (B). In this case, Mr. Harding brought claims under § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A), (B), (D), and (E). Mr. Har- ding also brought a breach of contract claim in this action but not in the arbitration proceeding. Below and on appeal, Mr. Harding argues that the claims against Upstart are based on facts that arose after the arbitration. Specifically, he contends that each new credit report dispute “triggers a fresh obligation” for the furnisher to in- vestigate and report the results of the investigation to the con- sumer reporting agency. See Br. for Appellant at 22. This argument fails because Mr. Harding’s fourth amended complaint is devoid of the prefatory factual allegation that there is new “inaccurate or incomplete information that the furnisher pro- vided to the reporting agency” that arose after August of 2023. See Milgram, 72 F.4th at 1218. The only alleged reporting inaccuracy Mr. Harding raises in this suit that he did not allege in his arbitra- tion proceeding is his allegation that TransUnion reported an inac- curate “date updated” on his credit reports. See D.E. 51 ¶ 47. He USCA11 Case: 24-14006 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 01/15/2026 Page: 9 of 16

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does not attribute this “date updated” to information that Upstart provided beyond the general allegation that TransUnion forwards disputes to furnishers. See id. ¶¶ 19, 50. Mr. Harding’s fourth amended complaint also lacks any “facts [which Upstart] could have uncovered that establish that [its] reported information was, in fact, inaccurate or incomplete” after August of 2023 to correct this alleged TransUnion error. See Mil- gram, 72 F.4th at 1218. In simplest terms, all of Upstart’s alleged FCRA violations at issue in his fourth amended complaint occurred during the same period addressed by the arbitration proceeding. Although Upstart has an ongoing “duty not to furnish information about a consumer to a reporting agency if the furnisher ‘knows or has reasonable cause to believe’ that the information is inaccurate,” this ongoing obligation does not obfuscate Mr. Harding’s need to identify new factual inaccuracies to overcome res judicata. See id. at 1217. Mr. Harding’s additional § 1681s-2(b)(1)(D) and (E) claims— for Upstart’s alleged failure to report deletion results or delete in- accurate and incomplete information—fare no better. These sub- sections of the statute proscribe what the furnisher “shall” do “if the investigation finds that the information is incomplete or inac- curate” or if the disputed information “cannot be verified after any reinvestigation[.]” §§ 1681s-2(b)(1)(D)–(E). Accordingly, there is no reason why these two claims, assuming but not deciding that they are separate claims from those under §§ 1681s-2(b)(1)(A)–(C), could not have been brought in the arbitration proceeding. Indeed, based USCA11 Case: 24-14006 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 01/15/2026 Page: 10 of 16

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on the arbitrator’s factual findings, there was no proof that the in- vestigation found incomplete or inaccurate information or that there was information that could not be verified—the prerequisites for the § 1681s-2(b)(1)(D) and (E) duties to be triggered. Finally, Mr. Harding does not address the breach of contract claim in his brief. “[A] legal claim or argument that has not been briefed before the court is deemed abandoned and its merits will not be addressed.” Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004). Such issues will be resurrected only in ex- traordinary circumstances, which are not present here. See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (dis- cussing the “five situations in which we may exercise our discretion to consider a forfeited issue”). Mr. Harding has abandoned any ar- gument that the district court’s conclusion that the breach of con- tract claim arose out of the common nucleus of operative fact was erroneous. See id. His pro se status does not exempt him from our forfeiture rules. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Har- ding’s claims against Upstart. III We next consider the district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of TransUnion and Experian, the consumer reporting agencies. Mr. Harding contends that the district court erred by applying the doctrine of issue preclusion because, in his view, each new inaccurate credit report created by Experian and TransUnion constitutes a separate FCRA violation. He argues that USCA11 Case: 24-14006 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 01/15/2026 Page: 11 of 16

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the arbitration did not address the specific factual inaccuracies or the ongoing attendant harm. A “We review de novo an order granting judgment on the pleadings.” Samara v. Taylor, 38 F.4th 141, 149 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2014)). “Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judg- ment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Cannon v. City of W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001)). As in the Rule 12(b)(6) context, we “accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” here Mr. Harding, when reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). See id. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). We may consider documents attached to a Rule 12(c) motion if they are central to one of the claims and if their authenticity is undis- puted. See Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1135 (11th Cir. 2002). We also may judicially notice documents filed in other proceedings. See Fed. R. Evid. 201. B “Issue preclusion ‘bars successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment, even if the issue recurs in the con- text of a different claim.’” Miller’s Ale House, Inc. v. Boynton Carolina Ale House, LLC, 702 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Taylor USCA11 Case: 24-14006 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 01/15/2026 Page: 12 of 16

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v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008)). The doctrine of issue preclu- sion applies when: (1) the issue at stake is identical to the one involved in the prior litigation; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior suit; (3) the determination of the issue in the prior litigation was a critical and necessary part of the judgment in that action; and (4) the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier pro- ceeding. Id. “A defendant who was not a party to the original action may invoke collateral estoppel against the plaintiff.” Hart v. Yamaha- Parts Distribs., Inc., 787 F.2d 1468, 1473 (11th Cir. 1986). Because TransUnion and Experian were not parties to the arbitration, issue preclusion may apply to Mr. Harding’s claims against them. In this action, Mr. Harding brings claims under § 1681e and § 1681i against the two consumer reporting agencies. “To state a claim under § 1681e, the plaintiff must show that the agency’s report contained factually inaccurate information, that the procedures it took in preparing and distributing the report weren’t ‘reasonable,’ and that damages followed as a result.” Losch v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 995 F.3d 937, 944 (11th Cir. 2021) (first cit- ing Cahlin v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 1991), and then citing Nagle v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 297 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 2002)). “The elements of a claim under § 1681i—which focuses on the consumer’s credit ‘file’ rather than his credit ‘report’—are the same, except that the plaintiff USCA11 Case: 24-14006 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 01/15/2026 Page: 13 of 16

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needn’t show that the agency prepared and distributed a report.” Id. (citing Collins v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 775 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 2015)). A credit report or file contains “factually inaccu- rate information” when it is “factually incorrect, objectively likely to mislead its intended user, or both.” Erickson v. First Advantage Background Servs. Corp., 981 F.3d 1246, 1252 (11th Cir. 2020). Mr. Harding does not meaningfully address each element of issue preclusion separately but generally argues that it does not ap- ply because “the factual issues in this case—specifically, the reason- ableness of the investigations and the accuracy of the credit report- ing—have not been fully adjudicated” by the arbitration. See Br. for Appellant at 21. This argument fails because the threshold showing for § 1681e and § 1681i claims—whether “the agency’s report con- tained factually inaccurate information”—was central to the arbi- tration proceeding. See Losch, 995 F.3d at 944. In his factual submissions to the arbitrator, Mr. Harding al- leged that TransUnion made seven reporting errors and Experian made eight. Mr. Harding asserted that TransUnion failed to report his account’s date of first delinquency and compliance condition code. He alleged that TransUnion inaccurately reported his ac- count type, portfolio type, date of last payment, charge off account, and payment history. As for Experian, he asserted that it failed to report his account’s portfolio type, date of last payment, date of first delinquency, and date closed. Mr. Harding alleged that Ex- perian inaccurately reported his account’s status, high balance, pay- ment history, and balance history. USCA11 Case: 24-14006 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 01/15/2026 Page: 14 of 16

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In his fourth amended complaint, Mr. Harding alleged that TransUnion’s and Experian’s reports are factually inaccurate be- cause the date of first delinquency, compliance condition code, and date closed are missing. Further, he asserted that his account’s pay- ment history, balance history, and date updated are inaccurate. Specifically, regarding the “date updated,” Mr. Harding alleged that TransUnion claimed to reinvestigate his account in January of 2024, and, therefore, the account should show a date last updated of January 26, 2024, instead of January 21, 2022. Comparing Mr. Harding’s factual submission in arbitration to his fourth amended complaint reveals that the issues at stake—the factual inaccuracies in his credit report—were identical (except for the new “date up- dated” alleged inaccuracy as to TransUnion, which we will address shortly). The parties litigated the inaccuracy issue in the arbitration, and the arbitrator found that “the agencies verified that the infor- mation provided by [Upstart] was accurate.” D.E. 67-5 at 2. There was no evidence before the arbitrator that TransUnion’s or Ex- perian’s reports were inconsistent with Upstart’s records as to Mr. Harding’s default on the loan. The determination of the factual in- accuracy issue in the prior litigation was a critical and necessary part of the judgment because a § 1681s-2(b) claimant, as Mr. Har- ding was in arbitration, must identify the inaccurate or incomplete information that the furnisher provided to the reporting agency as an essential part of the claim. See Losch, 995 F.3d at 944. Lastly, Mr. Harding had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier proceeding. He does not controvert that the arbitrator held USCA11 Case: 24-14006 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 01/15/2026 Page: 15 of 16

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an evidentiary hearing and allowed him to be heard. See Greenblatt, 763 F.2d at 1360 (stating that an arbitration decision may have “col- lateral estoppel effect” if it “affords basic elements of adjudicatory procedure, such as an opportunity for presentation of evidence”). Judgment on the pleadings was appropriate because Mr. Harding has never disputed that the alleged errors in TransUnion’s or Experian’s credit reporting are not related to his Upstart ac- count. Therefore, when accepting the facts in the complaint as true, collateral estoppel precludes Mr. Harding from arguing that such reporting is inaccurate. He already litigated the accuracy of that reporting in an arbitration proceeding and subsequent confir- mation action, and the arbitrator found the reporting to be accu- rate. The only alleged reporting inaccuracy for which Mr. Har- ding is not estopped from asserting is his claim that TransUnion inaccurately reported the “date updated” on his credit reports. But the district court alternatively ruled that this inaccuracy is not ac- tionable under the FCRA because Mr. “Harding fail[ed] to supply any support, either legal or factual, for his theory that any of this information, or lack thereof, resulted in an inaccurate or materially misleading report that would be expected to have an adverse effect on him.” D.E. 92 at 13 (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 342 (2016)) (noting that “not all inaccuracies cause harm or present any material risk of harm”). Because Mr. Harding does not challenge the district court’s alternative holding that this inaccuracy is not actionable under the USCA11 Case: 24-14006 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 01/15/2026 Page: 16 of 16

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FCRA, that argument is forfeited. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014) (where an initial brief “fails to clearly raise any challenge to the alternative holdings,” and “treats those holdings as though they do not exist,” any argument that the holdings were error is abandoned). Indeed, even construed liberally, Mr. Harding makes only a passing reference to the alleg- edly inaccurate “date updated” in discussing his new post-arbitra- tion claims and damages. See id. at 681 (“[A]n appellant abandons a claim when he either makes only passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and au- thority.”). Accordingly, we affirm. IV We affirm the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of Mr. Harding’s claims against Upstart. We also affirm the court’s entry of judgment on the pleadings in favor of TransUnion and Experian. AFFIRMED.