Raymond Zaborowski v. Commissioner Social Security

115 F.4th 637

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: September 18, 2024
• Docket: 23-2637
• Status: Published

Opinion

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _______________

No. 23-2637 _______________

RAYMOND STEPHEN ZABOROWSKI, Appellant

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY _______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2:22-cv-01130) Magistrate Judge: Honorable Carol S. Wells _______________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on July 8, 2024

Before: BIBAS, FREEMAN, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges

(Filed: September 18, 2024)

F. Michael Friedman 821 Terwood Road P.O. Box 467 Drexel Hill, PA 19028 Counsel for Appellant

David E. Somers III SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL – OFFICE 3 6401 Security Boulevard Baltimore, MD 21235 Counsel for Appellee

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT _______________

BIBAS, Circuit Judge. When weighing medical opinions in Social Security mat- ters, administrative law judges must consider a range of fac- tors, but all they must explain are the reasons for their deci- sions. Raymond Zaborowski served in the U.S. Army for 5½ years, including during both Gulf Wars. As a result, he suffers from anxiety and PTSD. Because those conditions have stopped him from working since 2014, he claimed Social Se- curity disability benefits. The administrative judge denied Zaborowski’s claim, ex- plaining that the available medical evidence showed that he could still do light work. At the District Court, Zaborowski consented to jurisdiction by a magistrate judge, who denied review.

2 Zaborowski now appeals. He claims that (1) the regulation that specifies how administrative judges must explain their decisions violates the Social Security Act, (2) the administra- tive judge did not explain how supportable and consistent each medical opinion was, and (3) the administrative judge’s find- ings of supportability and consistency were not supported by substantial evidence. We review all legal issues, including the regulation’s validity, de novo. Hagans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 694 F.3d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 2012). We review the administra- tive judge’s findings of fact and her ultimate decision to deny benefits deferentially for substantial evidence. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). First, Zaborowski argues that the regulation violates the Act. The statute, he notes, requires administrative judges to state the “reasons upon which [a denial of benefits] is based.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1). And the implementing regulation tells claimants: “We will consider [a list of] factors when we con- sider the medical opinion(s) and prior administrative medical finding(s) in your case.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c). Yet that regulation requires administrative judges to explain only two of these factors: whether medical opinions were (1) based on “objective medical evidence and supporting explanations” and (2) consistent with other medical opinions in the record. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). We call these two factors supporta- bility and consistency for short. Like any other regulation, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c must fol- low the statute that authorizes it, which is 42 U.S.C. § 405(a). It does. Zaborowski conflates the authorizing statute’s require- ment to give reasons with the regulation’s list of factors. A judge may consider many factors yet base a decision on just

3 one or two. And those one or two are the “reasons upon which [the denial of benefits] is based.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1). The statute requires administrative judges to explain only the dis- positive reasons for their decisions, not everything else that they considered. The regulation complies with the statute by requiring admin- istrative judges to explain their dispositive reasons. Administra- tive judges must always discuss the two most important factors: supportability and consistency. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). But if opposing medical opinions are equally well-supported and consistent, then supportability and consistency are not dis- positive. If so, the administrative judge must “articulate how [she] considered the other most persuasive factors.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(3). So under the regulation, administrative judges must always explain the reasons for their decisions. But that does not mean always explaining all the factors. Second, Zaborowski objects that the administrative judge did not articulate how supportable and consistent the various doctors’ opinions were. Not so. To satisfy this requirement, a judge need not reiterate the magic words “support” and “con- sistent” for each doctor. And the administrative judge did weave supportability and consistency throughout her analysis of which doctors were persuasive. AR 31–33. As she explained, the first psychologist based her opinion on her review of the record, and it fit with the other evidence of Zaborowski’s con- dition and treatability. Another psychologist based his opinion on his examination of Zaborowski, and the administrative judge found it “persuasive because it is consistent with the rec- ord.” AR 32. By contrast, the opinion of Zaborowski’s treating psychiatrist was “not consistent with the record that shows that

4 the claimant has social avoidance issues, but he is able to cope within his limits.” Id. at 33. Last, Zaborowski’s other psychologist did not address “any specific functional work-related limita- tions or restrictions.” Id. at 32. There was no need to say more than that. Third, there was substantial evidence to support the admin- istrative judge’s decision about how much weight to give each medical opinion, as shown by her explanations discussed above. And after she weighed the opinions, there was substan- tial evidence for her conclusion that Zaborowski could still work. The first and second psychologists’ opinions, plus the record evidence that he could live alone and help his mother with chores and medical appointments, was enough to clear that low threshold. So we will affirm.